


IDEATION AND ACTION IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Reflections on the Planning, Monitoring, Implementation
and Evaluation of the National Development Strategy 1
in Zimbabwe (2018-25)



Edited by Innocent Chirisa & Percy Toriro

ISBN 978-1-77933-836-5
EAN 9781779338365

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Published by the Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University (ZEGU) Press
Stand No. 1901 Barrassie Rd,
Off Shamva Road
P.O. Box 350
Bindura, Zimbabwe

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SUBSCRIPTION AND RATES

Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University Press Office
Stand No. 1901 Barrassie Rd,
Off Shamva Road
P.O. Box 350
Bindura, Zimbabwe
Telephone: ++263 8 677 006 136 | +263 779 279 912
E-mail: zegupress@admin.uz.ac.zw
<http://www.zegu.ac.zw/press>

Preface

The objective overall of this book is to examine the extent to which the Zimbabwean community has embraced the National Development Strategy 1 (NDS1) as Zimbabwe's socio-economic and transformative and inclusive development blueprint. The chapters are based mainly on a desktop study involving critical interrogation of literature from other countries that have implemented such strategies and documents mined from Google Scholar, Ebsco and websites with news and policies, statutes and related literature. The chapters herein are holistic in orientation and critically engage with NDS1 from a multiplicity of entry points ranging from Information and Communication Technology, Climate Change and adaptation and building resilience strategies, the broad social sciences and developmental perspectives. Some interviews/focus group discussions are also used to gather information from the players mentioned in the objective. Each chapter then critically looks into some individual sectors of the Strategy, identifies and engages the major players and institutions that have the mandate to implement the NDS1 sectors. This engagement allows the interrogation of what strategies are on the ground in response to NDS1, critique of the plans and timelines for implementation and major gaps obtaining (monitoring and evaluation). Recommendations and policy options are then made on how best the gaps may be bridged. These are derived from studying similar strategies implemented in other countries, mainly developed countries. These might have to be tweaked to work accordingly in a developing nation, such as Zimbabwe, with the intention of advancing economic growth, social development and environmental sustainability for the welfare and well-being of the communities.

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CHAPTER 1: AN OVERVIEW ON THE MEANINGS OF NATIONAL PROSPERITY, EMPOWERMENT AND UPPER MIDDLE-INCOME ECONOMY

ZEBEDIAH MUNETA, PERCY TORIRO AND INNOCENT CHIRISA

ABSTRACT

The present chapter explains and critically elaborates the content and meaning of national prosperity, empowerment and upper middle-income economy. The main trope of this chapter is to proffer an overview thereof and clearly identify possible characteristics of these aspects which the developing countries should achieve to improve their economic performance to reduce the level of poverty. The study deploys a desktop study that engaged a review of available literature from Google Scholar, published journal articles, interrogation of the provisions of the National Development Strategy document 1 (NDS1). This chapter concludes that national prosperity, empowerment and upper middle-income are measured by macroeconomic matrices, such as national income performance over a period of time and other factors, such as average life expectancy and social capital infrastructure and literacy rate. From this, one may get a more complete picture and better understanding of the elements of national power.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the World Bank has classified every country's income as low, middle or high. A new classification system distinguishes countries according to their income levels, that is, low-, middle-, upper- and high-income economies. To classify countries, the bank utilises Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in current U.S. dollars, transformed using the Atlas technique of a three-year moving average of exchange rates (Roos, 2017). As a comprehensive measure of economic prosperity, capability and advancement, GNI is regarded as the best indicator. While low- and middle-income countries were once referred to as developing countries, the World Bank dropped the word from its lexicon in 2016 due to the lack of precision in the term's definition. Hardina (2003) argues that it is no

longer necessary for the World Bank to categorise nations based on their geographic location, income and lending status. Although many nations transitioned from low to medium income, only a small number of countries completed the last leap from middle to high income. This is because there are shocks that the country would not be able to sustain as it is investing more in different sectors of the economy. According to this stylised statistic, the transition from an input-based growth model to one that emphasizes productivity is challenging (Takaya *et al.*, 2020). For the country to overcome these growth-related shocks, it has to be able to innovate its way from middle-income status into high income. This provides some hope for emerging developing countries to reach the potential to continue to expand fast, and eventually reach a high-income level in the near future. There are many articles that discuss the MIT, but most of them talk on the probable features of the countries that may be included. Examples include nations that are unable to compete in manufactured exports and in high-skilled innovations with low-income, low-wage economies (ADB, 2011:54).

Economic development, entrepreneurship, governance, education, health, safety and security, personal freedom, and social capital are all measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) levels of a country (Atkinson, 2004). The government is recommended to adopt successful economic policies and reforms based on creativity, innovation, research and development, science, and technology, to have a prosperous country that encourages economic development, provides circumstances for good employment and equitable opportunities for everyone, and promotes economic growth. It is important to note that infrastructure, such as roads, ports and power plants, enhance the productivity of the entire economy, rather than simply a few companies or industries in particular (Ekeh, 2010; Estrada *et al.*, 2018). The region's future investment needs are enormous, notwithstanding prior investments in infrastructure as it is very important for the prosperity of the country.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section contains further review and understanding of national prosperity, empowerment and upper middle-income economy, drawing experiences from other countries.

OVERVIEW AND UNDERSTANDING OF NATIONAL PROSPERITY

As a first step, a wealthy country has an economy capable of contributing to national income growth and generating employment, so that its inhabitants may make a reasonable income, enjoy a certain level of life, and satisfy their fundamental needs (Sofer, 2013). Secondly, a flourishing country should have the essential infrastructure and physical assets to maintain urban living and production, such as enough water, sanitation and other decent amenities, electricity supply, roads, telecommunications, including digital technologies, innovation and research, and development initiatives.

The extent to which poverty is eliminated is a third component of a wealthy country. The country's cities cannot claim to be successful if substantial parts of its inhabitants are impoverished (Takaya *et al.*, 2020). Shakespeare *et al.* (2019) argue that there are various methods to explain national prosperity, including providing inexpensive low-income housing, making land and financing more accessible and establishing realistic and enforceable planning laws. A prosperous country's cities offer essential social services, such as education, health and recreation, to enable their inhabitants to reach their full potential by increasing their intellectual capacity and ability to live full, productive, healthy and satisfying lives (Hutchinson and Das, 2016). The aspect of social inclusion cannot be left out. This is accomplished through improving gender equality, defending the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups and guaranteeing civic engagement in the social, political and cultural spheres by everyone. Nations' inability to properly incorporate all groups, particularly the excluded, into decision-making processes, produces and maintains poverty, while decreasing general well-being.

Besides that, other matrices are preferable than placing faith in simple economic figures, such as per capita income and GDP (Easterly, 2001). It has been claimed that GDP is not the best indicator of quality of life and level of living despite being widely acknowledged to be an essential economic matrix because it calculates a country's annual output of commodities and services. Gross Domestic Income (GDI) is a statistic that is similar to GDP, where wages, profits and earnings in a jurisdiction are totalled over a 12-month period (Price *et al.*, 2018). Income per capita

divides a country's total income by the number of people of its population. Iddrisu (2014) criticises this as more sophisticated than previous measurements of national prosperity.

Despite this, GDP and income per capita remain the traditional and customary methods of assessing national prosperity commonly used by economists. Estrada *et al.* (2018) note that using GDP as a measure of national prosperity is deceptive as the richest one percent of a society may become richer, resulting in a rise in GDP trickledown. However, this does not always imply an improvement in the great majority's level of life. GDP may rise, and the wealthy, who own the bulk of a country's enterprises, may become even wealthier, but the general public remains impoverished. The extra money just goes into the wallets of business owners and individuals with authority and connections. As a result, measuring social economic elements, such as public access to food, water, housing, transportation and safety or public access to basic education, knowledge, excellent healthcare, and a sustainable environment, is a better method to evaluate national success (Edy-Ewoh *et al.*, 2020). There are also political and governance measures, such as the enjoyment of human rights, the freedom of choice and the absence of prejudice that are important to national prosperity left out by the GDP matrices.

Norway is now regarded as the greatest location on the planet to live in, followed by a handful of countries, such as Sweden, Switzerland, Iceland and New Zealand. All of these countries are democracies with varied levels of tolerance for their minority populations. As a result, measuring social economic elements, such as public access to food, water, shelter, transportation safety, public access to basic education, knowledge, excellent healthcare and a sustainable environment, is a superior method to evaluate national success (Price *et al.*, 2018). There are also political and governance-related matrices, such as the enjoyment of human rights, the freedom to choose and the absence of discrimination. Surprisingly, countries attain comparable degrees of social growth while having widely different GDP per capita levels. Countries with equal amounts of GDP per capita might also have dramatically different degrees of social advancement.

In Africa, Ghana has a smaller GDP per capita than Nigeria, but due to investments in human and social capital, Ghana outperforms Nigeria on major social indicators, including access to water and sanitation, information, science, communications, education and healthcare (Takaya *et al.*, 2020). Costa Rica is another example of a low-income country with good education, health, social systems and a robust and free democratic heritage. Countries, such as Costa Rica, that invest in human and social capital in addition to physical infrastructure, and countries where the GDP is not consumed by corrupt governments, such as Nigeria, have greater life expectancy and literacy rates. GDP fluctuates from year to year based on world conditions, which influences physical development of the country. Estrada *et al.* (2017) explain that national investment in social development provides the country with high-quality human capital when times are tough. This translates into more and better development than just physical infrastructure investment, a lesson for leaders and legislators everywhere. Human capital is what gets a country through tough times (Hutchinson and Das, 2016). Social indicators of a country, such as literacy rates, life expectancy, access to sanitation and water, good education and quality healthcare, are the result of that country's legacy of human and social capital investment, and the basic services provided by the government to its citizens.

The impoverished may not always benefit from a country's investment (Chunling, 2010). For individuals who have insurance in the United States, for example, are offered excellent healthcare. In comparison to affluent nations, however, the impoverished in the United States lack access to healthcare, education, information, water, sanitation and safety. GDP increases must transfer to better social outcomes and that must be the objective of good governance. Better nutrition, access to water and sanitation, basic healthcare, education, information, technology and telecommunications are all indicators of a country's prosperity (Price *et al.*, 2018). Focusing on excellent policies and strong good governance is required to achieve increased quality of life because of human capital investment. It necessitates a vision of a prosperous society. But most importantly, it necessitates an awareness that people is at the root of all societal and economic issues, and that the optimal economic investment is one made directly into people' lives by providing and securing the fullest

possible access to social products, such as great healthcare, great education, public safety, national security and a sustainable environment.

OVERVIEW AND UNDERSTANDING OF EMPOWERMENT

The word 'empowerment' is not new to developing countries, because it is the process of empowering individuals to gain control over their lives, to acquire control over the circumstances and decisions that shape their lives, to enhance their resources and characteristics, and to develop capabilities to gain access, partners, networks and a voice to gain control (Batliwala, 2007). Empowerment is getting widely utilised and associated with social development groups, such as the poor, the youth, the elderly, people with disabilities, indigenous peoples and the marginalised. Empowerment is described by Takaya *et al.* (2020) as an iterative process with key components, such as an enabling environment that encourages public participation in decision-making, that has an impact on the achievement of goals, poverty eradication, social integration and decent work for all, and long-term development, among others.

Empowerment in developed countries is the extension of one's ability to make decisions and take action. It entails gaining power and control over resources and decisions that impact one's life. People have more influence over their lives when they exercise genuine choice. Poor people's options are severely constrained due to their lack of assets and inability to negotiate better terms with a variety of legal and informal organisations (Reed and Stamm, 2004). Because powerlessness is inherent in institutional relationships, an institutional definition of empowerment is relevant in the context of poverty reduction. In diverse sociocultural and political situations, the empowerment has varied connotations, and it does not translate well into all languages. Exploration of local terminology connected with empowerment in different parts of the world usually sparks passionate debate. Self-strength, control, self-power and self-reliance are examples of these words.

Zimbabwe believes that empowerment is both a behavioural (delegating) and a perceptual (enabling) phenomenon. As a result, delegation of authority limits one's capacity to handle both parts of the empowerment construct (Rega *et al.*, 2017). When authority is delegated, it merely

implies that the person who got it can now act on behalf of the original person. It does not mean that the delegated person has complete control over the organisation's transformation and development. The behaviour of a superior delegating authority is the focus of authority delegation, and the psychological condition of the delegated individual is ignored (Conger and Kanungo, 1988; Boren, 1994). For example, if the delegated person is depressed owing to the group's hatred of the superior (now directed towards him instead), it can be said that he is delegated authority, but not empowered.

Empowerment, in its most basic form, is a win-win relationship between a person and the organisation represented by his or her superior. The empowerment viewpoint differs significantly from motivation research's organisation-centred approach. The former argues that a new motivation paradigm is required since the conventional management system is no longer capable of motivating well-educated subordinates with high competence. As a result, empowerment is a new paradigm that differs from the old motivating method (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). This is referred to this as a paradigm shift, since the notion of empowerment has been introduced as a solution to motivational difficulties that could not be resolved using prior theories. As a result, it cannot be simply stated that motivation is broader than empowerment. Motivation cannot be used in place of empowerment.

The empowerment method considers social action to be a necessary component of dealing with individuals (Gutiérrez, Parsons and Cox, 1998). Clients who participate in social action get a sense of personal empowerment and the skills needed to effect social change (Breton, 2001). Empowerment is also connected with citizen engagement and participation in community organisations (Rose, 2000); it is a concept which carries the notion of giving citizens agency and capabilities to refashion their circumstances and environment in life. Citizen involvement is defined by Morone and Marmor (1983) as direct citizen participation in governmental decisions. Citizen participation also refers to the direct engagement of an organisation's constituents in decision-making.

Morone and Marmor (*ibid.*) define empowerment as a process of increasing organisational members' sentiments of self-efficacy, using various methods to empowerment found in both management and psychological research. It is stressed that the psychological condition of improved self-efficacy is important. Building on the work of Conger and Kanungo (1988), Thomas and Velthouse (1990) present a perceptual process model eliciting intrinsic task motivation. They defined empowerment as internal task motivation reflected in four cognitive aspects that influence an employee's approach to his or her job function. Meaningfulness, competence, choice and effect are the four cognitive qualities referred to as 'task evaluations'. The psychological condition of motivation is highlighted. Finally, Spreitzer (1995) defines empowerment as an over-arching concept with four cognitive dimensions: meaning, competence, self-determination and effect.

OVERVIEW AND UNDERSTANDING OF UPPER MIDDLE-CLASS ECONOMY

In recent years, the term 'middle-income' or 'MIC' has become common parlance in the development policy community, particularly in East Asia, where concerns about slower growth following the 1997 regional financial crisis prompted a protracted period of subpar performance. The term itself often has not been precisely defined in incipient literature. In some cases, the phenomenon is described in terms of relative "catch-up" with the United States or some other rich country reference (Woo, 2011; Lin and Rosenblatt, 2012). In others, it is based on stagnation or painfully slow growth in absolute income levels. For example, Felipe *et al* (2012) establish a definition based on the number of years a country takes to move from one income category to another, based on absolute thresholds for low-, lower middle-, upper middle- and high-income countries.

Furthermore, the size indicators used by the various studies do not always converge, as the middle class is a complicated, context-dependent term that cannot be simply measured. The middle class of a country is made up of people who are neither impoverished nor affluent. As a result, several empirical studies have been conducted to assess the middle class in terms of income, using either an absolute, relative or hybrid approach (Easterly, 2001; Banerjee and Duflo, 2008; Birdsall, 2010, 2014). Several studies have sought to find more specific and comprehensive

decompositions of the middle-class income group based on socioeconomic factors appropriate to the studies' setting (Nallet 2014; Handley 2015; Bonfond et al., 2015). However, because these studies rely on micro-economic data from national household surveys, they cannot explore the influence of distinct middle-class characteristics on macroeconomic aspects such as economic growth.

Addressing the growth implications of increasing middle classes in developing countries in the manner it is done in this study, is novel in literature. Nonetheless, this study's fundamental theory, that when the middle class gets numerically large enough in relation to the overall population, its household members tend to adopt behaviour that when aggregated, may have an aggregate influence on economic dynamics is based mainly on past work. These middle classes are characterised by their ability to influence macroeconomic changes through aggregating microeconomic shifts in consumption, labour supply and investment. Clément et al. (2022) cite several examples of such processes, but none have been experimentally explored. Due to the fact that macroeconomic dynamics may be examined from various viewpoints, such as growth or structural change and by looking at multiple routes of transmission, such as investment in human capital, entrepreneurship or political involvement; the problem is complicated.

Besides that, the relationship is not always one way: development dynamics sparked by middle classes may also promote this middle-class behaviour. For example, when improved productivity or industrialisation boosts the skill premium and educational returns, a virtuous loop may emerge in future in which the growth of the middle class stimulates economic transformation. That in turn, is spurred by this economic and political revolution. This study focuses on the influence of middle-class growth on economic growth as it relates to the first connection. Various writers have stressed that the size of the middle class may have a significant beneficial impact on economic growth via a variety of routes, including mass consumption, productivity gains due to scale effects and learning spill overs (Desdoigt and Jaramillo, 2017).

England's big middle class in early 19th century was a significant explanatory driver of the country's early industrialisation, illustrating how a society with a strong middle class becomes progressively capable of achieving global wealth. In developed countries, the middle class has been the engine of economic progress, and, in low-income countries, it is the primary driver of growth. Birdsall (2010) goes even farther, claiming that the growing size and economic power of the middle class is an indication that the underlying growth regime is based on actual productivity increases and wealth creation by a contemporary private sector. However, the link between the middle class and economic progress is not always one way. Ravallion (2010) has presented strong evidence that quicker economic growth leads to faster middle-class expansion, and that growth in emerging nations with a bigger beginning middle class, tends to be more pro-poor. Birdsall (2010) goes a step further by contending that the emergence of the middle-class, partially driven by more people escaping from poverty, may be an outcome of growth, rather than one of its determinants.

Table 1.1: *Middle-class Incidence: Size and Economic Weight (Takaya et al., 2020)*

| | Low income | | Lower Middle-income | | Upper middle-income | | High income | |
|--------|------------|--------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| | Size | Weight | Size | Wight | Size | Weight | Size | Weight |
| Mean | 42.30 | 62.83 | 59.24 | 79.56 | 84.14 | 94.74 | 96.85 | 96.73 |
| Median | 37.93 | 63.65 | 63.15 | 87.66 | 87.26 | 96.54 | 98 | 98.53 |
| Min | 1.02 | 3.24 | 8.91 | 21.93 | 15.04 | 34.40 | 71.76 | 66.56 |

Middle-class size refers to its percentage of the population and middle-class total consumption share is the economic weight of the middle class. The mean and median sizes in underdeveloped countries are 72.52% and 81%, respectively, whereas they are both 98% in developed countries. In terms of economic weight, affluent nations have a mean and median of

95.7% and 97.9%, respectively, whereas developing countries have a mean and median of 86.44% and 95.44%. Table 1.1 provides the indicators for each income group and indicates that the middle class grows in size and weight as development progresses. According to Birdsall's (2010) methodology, the size and economic weight of the middle class is considered separately, as they are two distinct but complementary measures of inclusive growth. Aside from that middle-class depth reflects the average wealth of a country's middle class. The average yearly consumption per capita of the middle class as a measure of its depth, shall be used. As previously stated, the distribution data are based on either consumption or income. In the case of income-based statistics, consumption per capita is computed using the WDI consumption share of GDP.

UNDERSTANDING THE PROVISIONS IN THE NDS1 DOCUMENT

Prosperity is a consequence of an economy's ability to both generate and keep value/ Well-functioning institutions (North, 1990), solid institutional infrastructure, capital accumulation, free trade, efficient markets, personal initiative and an acceptable role for government, have been cited as key drivers of national success. The extent to which a country is open to trade and integrated with the rest of the world, the quality of a country's institutional infrastructure, and the success of its policy-makers in implementing the measures necessary for macroeconomic stability, are three of the most important factors influencing growth today (Greenspan, 2002). There are other factors that contribute to economic growth via competitiveness, such as a highly and appropriately educated labour force which, when combined with the proper infrastructure and clusters, may innovate and produce untradable spill-over effects.

PLANNING, MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Pursuant to the visions of attaining middle-income status by 2030 and "Towards an Empowered Society and a Growing Economy" as espoused by the national socio-economic blueprint, the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) 2013-2018, the Government of Zimbabwe is committed to ensuring a strong culture of monitoring and evaluation of all its policies, programmes and projects. This would be underpinned by the Management for Development Results,

an approach that adheres to the principles of Integrated Results Based Management system. This system ensures government endeavours to manage public resources professionally and guarantee accountability, transparency and quality service delivery.

A robust monitoring and evaluation system in government is imperative for successful the implementation of national development policies, programmes and projects and to ensure efficient and effective service delivery. The development of a National Monitoring and Evaluation Policy for Zimbabwe is, therefore, critical to provide the necessary framework to institutionalise monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in the public sector. The National Monitoring and Evaluation Policy thus aims at providing a systematic, coordinated, simplified, results-oriented, reliable and effective mechanism through a consultative process. The development of the policy, therefore, involved extensive research and drawing lessons from experiences of other countries. It also involved stakeholder consultations, led and coordinated by the Office of the President and Cabinet.

DISCUSSION

An operational and connected sequence of activities is needed to make sustainable development an achievable goal. These actions must integrate the many areas of prosperity that have been examined in this concept paper, because of innovation, creativity, empowerment and entrepreneurship. Productive cities provide a favourable climate for economic growth. Sustainable and productive nations actively attempt to maintain a locally based economy, safeguarding assets and resources and building a strong sense of place that prioritises local competitive advantages, while integrating regional and global markets (Estrada *et al.*, 2017). Quality of life allows individuals to live a more sustainable lifestyle by improving ecological, cultural and social circumstances without putting future generations at risk. Cities that effectively begin on the path to local sustainable development focus on ensuring the well-being of all citizens today and in the future. This presupposes the development of an inclusive society in which the advantages of greater economic prosperity are widely distributed across all aspects of human life. Equity is inextricably tied to long-term viability. It is a moral and people-centred philosophy that assures a reasonable and equitable allocation of resources and wealth

through time (Birnbaum *et al.*, 2018). Cities that strive for equality are interested in expanding freedoms and various types of social, cultural and political involvement to guarantee that no one falls below a certain level of income, welfare or environmental quality.

Infrastructure development is a critical component of long-term growth of a nation. If cities are to develop and offer a reasonable quality of living for their citizens, they must have effective transportation, sanitation, energy and communications infrastructure (Ekeh, 2010). Cities that place a high priority on infrastructure development, generate circumstances for increased growth, productivity, employment and access to market opportunities and critical services, particularly those needed to speed up progress and reduce poverty. Rather than being related to, environmental sustainability, it is nested inside sustainable development. It has to do with how resources are exploited, investments are directed, technical progress is oriented and institutional adjustments are made to meet future and current demands. The process by those cities to produce and distribute prosperity, should not damage or degrade the environment but, rather, aim to safeguard the city's environmental assets, while also contributing to the goals of sustainable urbanisation through the use of clean energy (Roos, 2017). Cities are where problems and solutions for sustainable development may be found. Cities which have the capacity to balance these spatial dimensions with different components of a sustainable city, have more chances to also become prosperous cities

In general, some countries are more prosperous than others because they either have abundant natural resources or have mastered the ability to trade them for other goods, or they have a mix of cultural, economic and human capital that allows them to gain a competitive advantage in value-added activities (the majority of the European countries). Natural resources are a hard factor that will be relevant to the economy's productive capabilities (Estrada, 2017). The ability to trade with others is a crucial source of competitive advantage for a country (Vittal, 2003).

Culture is a particularly important aspect for a country. The degree of national intelligence is determined by cultural exposure (access to education and knowledge, level of corruption, work ethics, freedom of

mobility and support systems). For example, the United Kingdom is now ranked 6th in the sub-index of Entrepreneurship and Opportunity, up from 8th last year. The country is now ranked first in Europe for newcomers. The majority of Britons (88%) feel that if one works hard, one can succeed in life, up from 84% and 78% in the previous two years (Roos, 2017). The entrepreneurial spirit in the UK is on the rise. Growing confidence in the UK market and future economic growth may be explained by an increase in start-ups, creative enterprises and more traditional types of self-employments in recent years. According to Rega *et al.* (2017), “in the span of only two years, the number of new firms being established in the UK has increased by 20% because of empowerment and national prosperity”.

MICs are necessary for global economic growth and stability to persist. Sustainable growth and development of MICs, according to the Globe Bank, has good spill over to the rest of the world. Poverty alleviation, international financial stability and global cross-border challenges, such as climate change, sustainable energy development, food and water security, and international commerce are just a few examples. They have a combined population of five billion people, accounting for more than 70% of the world's seven billion people and 73% of the world's poor. MICs account for around one-third of the global GDP and are a significant driver of global economic growth (Takaya *et al.*, 2020).

Although numerous management academics have explored empowerment, few conceptual studies have been conducted (Conger and Kanungo, 1988). This might be due to the uncertainty of empowerment's meaning and its connotations with other terms. This study may serve as a good starting point for further thought. For further theoretical development and practical implementation of empowerment, conceptual separation of empowerment from related notions is critical. Empowerment theories, based on contingencies, are frequently explored because of the expenses, and the control method is more beneficial than the empowerment approach (Bowen and Lawler, 1992). Nonetheless, this chapter argues that the restricted application of empowerment does not negate the need of defining the term. This is because empowerment is a very novel and unique notion, and that its uniqueness precludes substitution with any of the aforementioned nouns, thought to be quite exhaustive. Boren's (1994)

article, titled "Don't delegate empower", eloquently expresses the appropriateness of adopting the new phrase, 'empowerment'.

When evaluating growth from the middle-class perspective, the specificity of each development level in a preliminary study is looked into. Available results show that most countries, including low-income ones, have all four middle-class sub-categories and account for more than two-thirds of total consumption/ There is a significant gap between developed and developing countries whose average consumption is at least three times lower than that of developed countries (Attanasi, 2012). This chapter's empirical findings are consistent with its hypothesis and descriptive statistics in middle-income nations, the size of the middle class is not the most important factor for growth. A richer middle class has a favourable influence on growth, and the benefit is magnified when paired with size (Chun, 2010, Chunlin, 2010). Given the low percentage of the upper middle class in middle-income nations in particular, upward mobility between middle-class subcategories appears to be difficult in middle-income countries since there are also the chances of a negative trend. Furthermore, an increase in the size of the floating class, made up of fragile middle-class households who have barely avoided poverty, has a negative influence on growth (Chunlin, 2010). This implies that to fully capitalise on the dynamics behind the growth of the middle class, middle-income nations should create policies that are compatible with the demands of middle-class households and improve their resilience.

CONCLUSION AND OPTIONS

In the final analysis, innovation is a key factor in each and every sector of the economy that leads to fast technical advancement, and is a major component that has enabled developed countries to attain high and consistent growth. For example, the case of the Republic of Korea, and Taipei, China, maintained productivity improvements through the development of new technologies by local businesses, and so advanced to greater income levels (Agenor, Canuto, and Jelenic, 2012; Cherif and Hasanov, 2015). The desire for invention was aided by strict intellectual property rights protection. In 1990, five years before the Republic of Korea achieved high income status, the country's number of patent applications per 100 000 inhabitants was equivalent to that of Germany and the

United States (Cherif and Hasanov, 2015). Support from the government had a crucial role in encouraging innovation among less developed countries. A spin-off system in Taipei was a direct result of government involvement, with returnees providing valuable expertise and connections.

To achieve national goals of sustainable national prosperity, empowerment and attaining middle-income status, this chapter recommends that the government should rely on the following strategies: small- and medium-sized enterprises and multinational corporations; focusing on public and quasi-public research institutes to spin-off firms and create new technologies; technological leapfrogging at an early stage of development that is decided and led by the government; large amounts of money to be spent on educating engineers. In other countries, for example, the Republic of Korea, the government has forced numerous large conglomerates to join multiple industries at once and export almost immediately to build worldwide brands. Access to financing from the government was tied to specific and quantifiable export objectives that drove firms, such as Hyundai, to accelerate their research development and technical upgrading.

Besides facilitating innovation, advanced infrastructure networks also helped developed countries to change at a faster speed than they otherwise would have. The deregulation of communications networks and accompanying regulatory reforms made it easier to set up high-speed communication and broadband technology. Countries like the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, with major export-oriented information equipment industries, were compelled to establish powerful broadband and multimedia businesses in their own domestic markets because of the strong drive toward global competitiveness. Large global multimedia businesses now have regional offices in Singapore and Hong Kong, China, thanks to improved infrastructure networks (Agenor, Canuto and Jelenic, 2012).

Because of this, the NIEs were able to become knowledge-based economies through the accumulation of human capital. Investing in human capital can lead to better-trained personnel who can utilise and generate new knowledge. Because knowledge-based economies require

more investment in science and technology R&D, countries must adopt a development strategy that places higher priority upon excellent education. Asian economies, on average, outperform middle-income nations in terms of research and knowledge generation. In conclusion, the NIEs' experience demonstrates that combining R&D and human capital expenditures with a strong institutional framework that encourages efficient knowledge use, may transform an economy from investment-led to innovation-led growth.

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CHAPTER 2: PUTTING STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND VALUE CHAINS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGEM IN ZIMBABWE SINCE 1990

TINASHE MAGANDE, PERCY TORIRO AND INNOCENT CHIRISA

ABSTRACT

Development approaches and models influence the nature and rate of socio-economic transformation of a country. This chapter seeks to evaluate the National Development Strategy 1 (2020-2025) (NDS1) that was implemented by the Government of Zimbabwe in 2021 and draw lessons from other economic blueprints prior to it. The chapter explores four economic blueprints that were put in place prior to the NDS1: the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic transformation (ZIMASSET) and the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP). Zimbabwe has endured economic instability since the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of 2000. This has resulted in numerous policy transformations to try to restore stability. The chapter adopts desk review of secondary sources to collect data from academic journals, papers and policy documents. Furthermore, some data were drawn from interviews made by economic analysts, government officials and academics. Success stories and challenges from the different economic policies were noted. The chapter argues that Zimbabwe's socio-economic policies have been affected by poor implementation strategies, corruption and excessive political expediency. Thus, the chapter concludes that Zimbabwe's economic status continues to degenerate despite several economic blueprints implemented from the year 2000. This is attributed to policy reversals and a lack of protection and security of property rights, leading to a lack of investor confidence.

INTRODUCTION

Economic blueprints started to be more visible in Zimbabwe in the 1990s with the introduction of the infamous ESAP. This was followed by several

similar economic programmes like ZIMPREST, National Economic Revival Programme (NERP), Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP), Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP), ZIMASSET (Munro, 2014) and, TSP. Despite the introduction of all these economic blueprints, Zimbabwe has over the years failed to achieve sustainable economic growth. The macroeconomic environment in the country has largely been too unstable (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), 2019). The economy was characterised by many socio-economic challenges like unemployment, poverty, poor service delivery in urban areas and high inflation, among many others. As revealed by Chukwuemeka and Ugwuanyi (2013), if public policies are properly implemented, they determine the level of provision of social services, industrialisation, employment opportunities, social security, social or economic equality, availability of financial services for economic activities, the availability of health facilities and the pace of educational development. As the country moves towards the realisation of Vision 2030, the introduction of the NDS1 marks a new journey in sustainable economic transformation. Consistent with the aspirations of the Zimbabwean people to achieve an upper middle-income economy by the year 2030, the government launched Vision 2030 to pave the way to transform the economy. The NDS1 runs under the theme “Towards a Prosperous and Empowered Upper Middle-Income Society by 2030” (MoFED, 2020).

To achieve the set objectives for Vision 2030, the strategy endeavours to steer the economy to maintain growth rates above 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per year. The vision seeks to be inclusive and intends to leave no one behind through expanding opportunities for Zimbabweans. Among other objectives the NDS1 seeks to achieve a single digit inflation, increasing foreign currency reserves and creating 760 000 jobs in the coming in the next five years (*ibid.*). Prior to the introduction of the NDS1, the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TPS) was introduced to guide the reform programme during the period 2018-2020. The main objectives of TSP were stabilising the economy and creating a solid foundation for the medium-Term Plans, namely NDS1 and NDS2. As a country, significant progress was made but challenges were met along the way.

The NDS1 is a five-year plan meant to realise Zimbabwe's vision to attain an upper middle-income economy by the year 2030, whilst simultaneously striving to achieve the goals of Agenda 2063 and the aspirations of the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The NDS1 is the successor to the TSP and is underpinned by five annual national budgets. The NDS1 is building on the successes realised under TSP and addressing the TSP challenges and unfinished objectives, particularly merging macroeconomic stability. The strategy outlines policies, legal and institutional reforms and programmes and projects that the country seeks to implement during the five-year period. These will help the country to bring accelerated sustainable growth inclusive of socio-economic transformation and development. The strategy focuses on mainstreaming gender, youth, women and stabilising the economy. The NDS1 will contain strategies, programmes and projects aimed at eradicating poverty and promoting sustainable livelihoods of the poor, women and youth's empowerment and support to people living with disabilities, in line with Vision 2030.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chigudu (2015) uses the content analysis approach to review policy issues and the effectiveness of policy implementation. The study focuses on Africa in general, and Zimbabwe in particular. It reveals that policies have always been formulated to cater for the public to address previous colonial socio-economic imbalances. Findings from the study indicate that policy problems in Zimbabwe are exacerbated by the lack of well-thought out and clear proposals. The study identified implementation gaps that include lack of capacity, inadequate material resources and lack of continuity in government policies. More so, it was revealed that policy is best implemented if it is owned by those charged with the task of implementation.

Imurana *et al.* (2014) contend that public policy implementation problems in developing countries are entangled in basic economic and political conditions, delayed by weak extractive capacity of the state relative to the economy and by the dissipation of public resources through corruption. Agyepong and Adjei (2007) posit that implementation problems in Africa are due to poor leadership, corruption, lack of consensus, rapidity and politicisation of implementation, lack of participation, poor sense of

direction, limited understanding and management of the political challenges, weakened checks and balances and use of shortcuts.

Mupuva (2017) provides a critical analysis of economic policies done prior to ZIMASSET including the notorious Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of 2008 meant to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) but ended up scaring away potential investors. The study indicates that policies in Zimbabwe fail due to challenges like sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe that negatively affects investor confidence and shrinks FDIs, the absence of foreign currency that restricts the country's economic endeavours and lack of adequate funding. Additionally, and more important, it is the lack of ease of doing business in Zimbabwe compared to her regional counterparts in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This culminates in low foreign investment uptake and eventually pushes away potential investors. This concurs with Schneidman (2016), who notes that it takes about 90 days for foreign investors to know their fate regarding prospects of setting up a business in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's huge debt overhang is also a challenge that constrains the success of economic policies in the country. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2017) notes that Zimbabwe has an unsustainable debt.

Ahsan (2003) analysed the situation of national educational policies and plans in Pakistan. The discussion in the study reveals that poorly produced and inadequate implementation of education policies and plans were major hurdles in the development of the education sector in the country. More so, the study highlights that throughout the history of the country, new policies and plans were often prepared without giving due consideration to the causes of failure of previous policies and plans. The practice of extending the time for unmet targets of previous policies can also be seen on several occasions in the country's history. This situation highlights the need for the formulation of rational policies and plans and an adequate system for their implementation. The study also highlights the poor quality of national statistics. National figures in Pakistan are usually doubtful and a source of confusion. There is dire need to generate a complete and detailed database on education and other basic indicators in the country. The study found that it is difficult to achieve the desired objectives when the problem of poor implementation is old and deeply

rooted. The study recommends that the country should learn from its past failures to succeed in future.

Bao (2018) analyses the development of the urban rail transit industry in China from an overall and macroscopic perspective. The study was done based on the present situation of the urban rail transit and future development trends in the country. The analysis is based on national policies and strategic plans between 2016 and 2020. Several factors, such as the degree of urbanisation, non-public vehicle ownership, road capacity, and modal share of public transport in international metropolises, and planning and construction of urban rail transit systems in China's large and extra-large cities, are considered. The major aim of the study was to provide a forecast and outlook on the period's 10 major trends.

By introducing the NDS1, the government sought to address, on a sustainable basis, the numerous challenges affecting quality service delivery and economic growth in Zimbabwe. Saungweme (2014) saw the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) of 2001 in Zimbabwe as a programme aimed at stabilising the economy by speeding land resettlement, reducing duties on all imports, lowering production and capital costs, accelerating privatisation to attract both local and foreign investment, rebuilding confidence in the economy and providing effective and efficient infrastructure services. STERP I and STERP II sought to improve capacity utilisation, promote economic growth and ensure food security, guarantee basic goods and services, strengthen public institutions and re-establish international relations with the western countries, among others (GoZ, Government Political Agreement 2008).

Bonga (2014) analyses the factors that obstruct policy success in Zimbabwe. The chapter discusses the nature of policy formulation, policy support and usefulness of joint policy formulation in Zimbabwe. A critical analysis of the various economic policies adopted by Zimbabwe since 1990s, their success and failure factors are conducted. The study recommends that the business community has to support government policies to reap the desired results. Politics has been found as one of the major constraints of policies through sabotage.

Pedzisai *et al.* (2014) note that there are different ways in which policies can be implemented. These are direct cut-over, parallel, phased and pilot. The choice of the method depends largely on the type of the policy, the implementation approach, whether top-down or bottom-up, and nature of the organisation (Honig, 2006). The direct cut-over method is employed where the new policy's dates and time overrides the old system or in cases where a brand-new system needs to be implemented. For the parallel method, the new policy runs alongside the old system for a given time. It allows the old policy to run as a back-up process as problems of the new system get fixed (Adams and Chen, 1981; Honig, 2006). With respect to the phased method (Bishop, 1995; Honig, 2006), the new system gets implemented stage by stage while the old policy is phased out. According to Bishop (1995) and Honig (2006), the pilot method is put on trial in a particular area before it is implemented on a wider scale.

Chitongo *et al.* (2020) seeks to evaluate the prospects and challenges of TSP implemented by the Government of Zimbabwe in 2019. In doing so, the study seeks to further draw lessons from other economic blueprints implemented prior to it. The study conducted a desk review of secondary sources to collect data in academic journals and papers that were used as data sources. Interviews were also used to complement data collected and to draw views made by economic analysts, government officials and academics. The study reveals that there are success stories and challenges from the different implemented economic policies. The study notes that the policies are affected by poor implementation strategies, corruption and excessive political expediency. High-level corruption is the biggest obstacle to the realisation of the transformation agenda that invariably brought stagnation of economic growth and development (Gyang, 2012; Aloa and Aloa, 2013). The study concludes that Zimbabwe's economic status continues to degenerate despite the implementation of these economic blueprints. This is attributed to policy reversals and a lack of protection and security of property rights, leading to a lack of investor confidence. No meaningful investor is willing to pour out new capital when sovereign risk is high. The research recommends a human factor development approach militating against prudent economic management, while genuinely re-engaging the world.

Zvavahera and Chigora (2015) employed both post positivism and interpretivism philosophies applying quantitative and qualitative approaches in gathering research data for their study on ZIMASSET. The research instruments included documentary evidence, face-to-face in-depth interviews and focus groups. Respondents in the study reported that economic blueprints have not made any significant strides in improving the country's agricultural performance and food security since the inception of ZIMASSET in October 2013. The major reason for its lack of success was due to unavailability of resources to support the programme and the fact that land was allocated to unproductive and cellphone farmers. The study also notes that corruption has taken precedence in the implementation of previous economic policies. The study recommends that the programme be funded adequately, so that the country can become self-sufficient.

Uche (2019) critically looks at factors responsible for the development planning failures experienced in Nigeria. The study relies heavily on secondary source of information and identified factors like corruption, policy inconsistency, lack of commitment towards implementation, over-reliance on external doctrines as some of the obstructs on the wheel of Nigeria development. The study recommends that governance in Nigeria must reflect the attribute of a going-concern and not of personal initiatives which can be abandoned at any moment. More so, the study recommends that a home-grown developmental strategy free of external orders, must be initiated and implemented to take Nigeria out of its present situation.

SELECTED BLUEPRINTS IMPLEMENTED BEFORE NDS1

This section reviews policy thrust in four main documents, namely ESAP of 1991 to 1995, ZIMPREST), launched in 1998, ZIMASSET and the TSP, among other documents. There are, however, many policies from various government entities that have been made in the last three decades. Many of these policies were incorporated or developed from ZIMPREST (1998 to 2000).

ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME. (ESAP)

The government embarked on an IMF and World Bank-sponsored five-year ESAP aimed at liberalising the economy to a more market-driven one in

1990. The government abandoned policies in favour of a conventional neoliberal approach to economic development (Conyers, 2003:178). A framework for Economic Reform for 1991 to 1995 that sought privatisation of state-owned enterprises was announced. The major actor in this approach was the private sector, with the government creating a conducive business environment for private investment. The target was to make sure that by the end of 1995, the country would have reaped the anticipated benefits in terms of economic growth and prosperity.

Structural exploitation by industrialised countries of underdeveloped countries made difficult to achieve intended objectives. It presented a structure of global economy controlled by the advanced capitalist states determining the track of political and economic development. With the adoption of ESAP, Zimbabwe's debt increased. Rich countries used debt as a tool to impose disastrous neo-liberal economic policies upon developing countries, bringing poverty and ensuring that the debt remains a permanent condition in the developing world, with high interest rates attached (Manji *et al.*, 2010). The issue of the debt trap was an obstacle in promoting economic growth, as the country struggled, not only with external debt, but it was also subjected to enormous domestic debt increases. Due to the failure of ESAP, socio-economic ills such as poverty, unemployment and social, unrests worsened in Zimbabwe (Nyoni, 2018). There was no fiscal discipline in Zimbabwe, leading to the failure of ESAP. Mumvuma *et al.* (2006) stipulate that the failure was caused by not consulting key stakeholders, who were not aware of the policy reforms introduced, leading to lack of ownership.

ZIMBABWE PROGRAMME FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION (ZIMPREST)

The blueprint was implemented in the second stage of Zimbabwe's ESAP. Chigudu (2015) notes that it focussed on social dimensions like poverty, empowerment, land reform and indigenisation, but the main thrust was on macroeconomic and structural policies, arguably a continuation of ESAP. The rationale behind the adoption of this economic policy was to restore macro-economic stability, poverty alleviation and facilitating public and private savings and investment (Derman *et al.*, 2007). Ruwo (2014) laments that ZIMPREST aimed at creating a stable macroeconomic environment to support increased savings and investment to achieve

higher growth and improvement in the standard of living for the people of Zimbabwe.

Conyers (2001) indicates that the programmes included, among others, the removal of restrictions on foreign trade and currency transactions, the privatisation of parastatals, the removal of price controls and subsidies and various measures to reduce public expenditure. Overall, under ESAP and ZIMPREST, priority was given to poverty reduction and government spending was geared towards social sector expenditures, expansion of rural infrastructure and redressing the social economic inequality, including land reform. The removal of subsidies on basic commodities and an increase in charges for government services (school fees and hospital charges), inflation hit the poorest sector of the population. The removal of government monopoly over the marketing of basic crops benefited mostly large-scale commercial farmers who were able to shop around and get good prices. Derman *et al.* (2007) states that it had a negative impact on small-scale farmers, especially in the remote areas of the country.

The poor areas (with the majority of poor small-scale farmers) were, therefore, made poorer and this exacerbated spatial inequality. As if this was not enough, the period was also characterised by massive retrenchments that had never been seen since the country got independence, hence considered politically suicidal. Adjustment programmes, in essence, resulted in the infringement of citizens' economic and social rights, namely the right to health and the right to an adequate standard of living (Mupedziswa, 1997). As a result, Mkandawire *et al.* (2003) opines that the issue of causation from structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) to poverty has proved particularly to be a hard nut to crack. Just like ESAP, ZIMPREST failed (Nyoni, 2018)

ZIMBABWE AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION (ZIMASSET)

In 2013, the government embarked on ZIMASSET. This was a five-year policy that ran from 2013 to 2018, with the sole mandate of driving Zimbabwe "towards an empowered society and a growing economy and sustainable development and social equity anchored on indigenisation, empowerment and employment creation" (ZIMASSET 2013:24). The major

objective was to bring about accelerated economic growth and wealth creation. ZIMASSET projected the economy to grow by an average 7.3% (Mapuva, 2017). The target was to achieve all this on the basis of the careful exploitation of the country's abundant resources.

The blueprint was divided into four strategic clusters: Social Services and Poverty Reduction, Food Security and Nutrition, Infrastructure and Utilities, and Value Addition and Beneficiation. This was done for ease of ordering and parcelling to various line ministries for implementation. The Social Services and Poverty Reduction cluster targeted ending poverty among Zimbabweans in line with the United Nation SDG 1. The aim of the Food Security and Nutrition cluster was to make sure that Zimbabwe reclaims its status of being the breadbasket of Africa. To achieve all this and attain the goals set for the previously discussed clusters, there is need for adequate infrastructure. The African Economic Development Institute (2016) stipulates that attention should be given to infrastructure development because without it, development cannot be achieved. This has to be provided timely in the form of inputs and development of irrigation agriculture and mechanisation. As for the country's need to derive maximum value from its abundant mineral resources, there is need for value addition.

It was, however, difficult to succeed in some areas of ZIMASSET because of a lack of finances and a clear development strategy. Mapuva (2017) argues that ZIMASSET wanted to achieve too much but had too little resources in a short period of time. Bonga (2014) says that it was difficult to achieve what was set, given that the government had very little fiscal space for development of infrastructural and other things.

TRANSITIONAL STABILISATION PROGRAMME (TSP)

The Transitional Stabilisation Programme was launched in 2018 to run until 2020. The focus was on stabilising the macro-economy and the financial sector, to transform the economy to a private sector-led economy and to introduce institutional reforms to stimulate growth. The TSP prioritised fiscal consolidation, economic stabilisation and stimulation of growth and creation of employment. The programme was underpinned by Vision 2030 which seeks to lead the economy to an upper middle-income

economy. Both fiscal and monetary policies anchor on returning investors who were lost in the past decades, whilst stabilising the economy to create an economic environment conducive to open more businesses. The TSP adopted a fiscal policy that anchors on adherence to fiscal rules in the public finance management Act. This was meant to curb unsustainable and prolonged fiscal deficits that propagate uncontrolled domestic borrowing by Government, crowding out domestic private investment (Chiduku, 2019).

The blueprint targeted the opening of closed mines within the mining sector, whilst expanding those that were operating below capacity (Vu *et al.*, 2022). With respect to infrastructure, the programme prioritised quick-win projects in energy, water and sanitation, information communication technology (ICT), housing and transport, with a focus on expediting completion of ongoing infrastructure projects, thereby contributing to economic recovery (Chitongo *et al.*, 2020). The target was also on restoration of the Zimbabwe's agricultural sector's contribution as a breadbasket of southern Africa. TSP presented some opportunities for Zimbabwe to be self-sufficient, realising food surpluses that would contribute to agricultural production and food security in the region.

The decline in the performance of the economy persuaded the government consider the TSP. The level of inflation in the country was steeply rising as most industries were shutting down. The illegal foreign exchange market emerged due to the introduction of a surrogate currency termed the Bond note. The government introduced austerity measures to curtail these challenges. These included a 2% tax introduced on every \$10 transaction (Mangudya, 2019). This, however, created a serious economic crisis in the country where commodities were disappearing from shelves, inflation skyrocketing, and long bank queues were witnessed. The government started to respond to market changes, increasing prices of fuel and other commodities to which citizens protest against. Rampant corruption affected the implementation of TSP (Zaranyika, 2019). The existence of the parallel market affected economic planning in Zimbabwe. A myriad of economic vulnerabilities arose due to informal money markets and the formal electronic payment methods particularly, Ecocash (Chitongo *et al.*, 2020). The implementation of the TSP was followed by the

implementation of the first five-year NDS1 for 2021-2025 and NDS2, covering 2026-2030. Implementation of these economic blueprints is expected to lead to the achievement of the country's Vision 2030 of being an upper-middle-income country (Ncube, 2019).

PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATION IN NDS1

At policy level, the coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the NDS1 is done by the Cabinet. Ministers, permanent secretaries and programme managers are accountable for the delivery of outcomes.

APPRAISAL OF PLANNING

Planning is a mindful government effort to influence, direct and, in some cases, control variations in the principal economic variables of a certain country or region over the course of time to achieve a predetermined set of objectives (Todaro, 1992; Jhingan, 2011). These economic variables include consumption, investment, exports and imports, to mention a few. Without planning, activities of organisations, institutions, societies and nations may well become a series of random actions without meaningful objectives (Datta, 2010).

Government ministries, departments and agencies have conducted strategic planning workshops to come up with annual plans for the year 2021. This was based on the first three-year macro-economic framework. To ensure that there were decentralised activities in lower levels of the government pyramid, the development strategy strengthen the planning, financing and the implementation capacities at provincial and district levels. The plan was that NDS1 has to run for five years, from 2021 to 2025, whilst replacing TSP.

APPRAISAL OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The monitoring of NDS-1) is done by the Cabinet at policy level. To anchor the national development strategy, the government developed a strong Monitoring and Evaluation system. The strategy complies with Integrated Results Based Management (IRBM) which instils a culture of high performance, quality service delivery, measurement, clarity of goals, continued improvement and accountability across the public sector. This

has proved to be a success in countries like Malaysia, Tanzania, Namibia, Zambia, Rwanda and Botswana in the past years (Ncube, 2021). IRBM would be complemented by public sector reforms. The result-based monitoring and evaluation of the development strategy places great emphasis on the measurement of economic livelihoods transformation.

Periodic reports on result-based monitoring and evaluation of the development strategy would be produced. These are set to be considered by the ministerial committee that is chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Development in Zimbabwe. Monitoring and evaluation of the national development strategy NDS1 commenced at the beginning of the strategy period. It is set to be conducted through the electronic enabled information management system. The monitoring and evaluation framework of the national development strategy is drawn from the Nation Secretarial Development Results framework. This framework outlines key result areas, key performance indicators, national priorities baselines, targets and the outcomes.

Devolution seeks to make sure that communities and the people are at the centre of and are participating on the issues that affect them. This will also help to preserve national unity in the country. In terms of decentralisation results, the chiefs' council and provincial councils are important in monitoring the outcomes of the NDS1. The NDS1 seeks to maintain Zimbabwe as a single peaceful state, with improved service delivery and good governance.

APPRAISAL OF IMPLEMENTATION

To ensure that there is effective and efficient implementation of the NDS1, there are plans to make bi-annual reviews, accompanied by mid-term and terminal reviews. The NDS1 is well constructed and excellent on several features that previous economic blueprints have failed to take into account, and it has all the potential to succeed if properly implemented. Firstly, the development strategy clearly pronounces the implementation plan, emphasizing on a strong need for monitoring and evaluation of progress made. Strictly adhering to the implementation plan is essential in the achievement of Vision 2030. Secondly, the Minister of Finance, Professor Mthuli Ncube said that the NDS1 shall be made available in

different Zimbabwean languages which is a positive move, taking into consideration that previous blueprints were available only in English. Thirdly, the plan to hold road shows countrywide to help launch the NDS1 is admirable because it allows citizens to add their voice, thus enabling collective efforts in realising Vision 2030. When public policies are implemented effectively, they determine the level of provision of social services, industrialisation, employment opportunities, social security, social or economic equality, the availability of financial services for economic activities, the availability of health facilities and the pace of educational development (Chukwuemeka and Ugwuanyi, 2013).

However, the NDS 1 comes with its own shortfalls, and the purpose of this chapter is to give a critical analysis of the development strategy from a socio-economic justice perspective. Focus is on health, education, food security and nutrition, housing, poverty alleviation and job creation. There is a national monitoring and evaluation joint Review Committee chaired the Deputy Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet. The committee consists of the NDS1 thematic working groups, chairs and co-chairs that coordinates the work of the strategy. This team ensures that the implementation of the NDS1 remains consistent with the country's strategic policy directions and will produce the required reports that are considered by the National Steering Committee. In the decentralisation and devolution area, the NDS1 seeks to ensure that there is implementation of a new culture in the management of issues that have to do with public affairs and resources in the government structures.

DISCUSSION

There were several socio-economic blueprints implemented after, with the objective to achieve macroeconomic stability after independence. The problem of implementation in Zimbabwe, like other African countries in Sub-Saharan region, is not about poor policy designs, but failure to implement them. The failure can also be associated with the politics of the country that seems to overlook policy implementation failure. A great deal research has been done to find solutions to solve shortfalls in the political structure. The TSP has also failed to address the socio-economic crisis because the country continues to degenerate in terms of all socio-economic development indicators (Chitongo *et al.*, 2020).

Without planning, the activities of organisations, institutions, societies and nations may well become a series of random actions without meaningful objectives. To ensure that there are decentralised activities in lower levels of the government pyramid, the development strategy strengthens the planning, financing and the implementation capacities at provincial and district levels. The monitoring of the national development strategy is done by the Cabinet at policy level. The government developed a strong monitoring and evaluation system that obeys IRBM which instils a culture of high performance, quality service delivery, measurement, clarity of goals, continued improvement and accountability across the public sector. The result-based monitoring and evaluation of the development strategy places great emphasis on the measurement of economic livelihoods transformation.

Monitoring and evaluation of the NDS1 commenced from the beginning of the strategy. It is set to be conducted through the electronic enabled information management system. This framework outlines the key result areas, the key performance indicators, national priorities Baselines, targets and outcomes. To ensure that there is effective and efficient implementation of the NDS1, there are plans to make bi-annual reviews that are accompanied by mid-term and terminal reviews. The development strategy clearly pronounces the implementation plan, emphasizing on a strong need for monitoring and evaluation of progress made. The NDS1 shall be made available in different Zimbabwean languages, which is a positive move taking into consideration that previous blueprints were available only in English. The plan to hold road shows countrywide will also help launch the NDS1. There is a national monitoring and evaluation joint Review Committee that is chaired by the Ceputy Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet. This team will ensure that the implementation of the strategy remains consistent with the country's strategic policy directions and will produce the required periodic progress reports that are considered by the National Steering Committee.

The NDS1 is a promising economic policy if it is fully implemented and supported. It is critical for countries to come up with implementable economic policies that bring the desired results. Monitoring and evaluation of all programmes and projects have to be prerequisites if success is to be

achieved. No information is made available to the general public on the performance of economic policies so that they can make informed decisions and come up with better plans in the future. A few risk-takers with political backing have managed to take the chance to establish monopolies in the country's production system. The majority have stayed away due to lack of confidence in the country, policy reversal trends and lack of protection of property rights.

CONCLUSION AND OPTIONS

There is need for rigorous policy implementation and consistence in Zimbabwe. The problem has been of long-term planning and short-term implementation that lead to policy inconsistency, particularly when there are regular changes to the programmes. Even if a policy is poor, if there is rigorous implementation, there will be better results. A perfect policy with poor implementation, or which is never implemented, yields nothing. Experiences shows that it is better to have a poor policy that is rigorously implemented than to have a perfect policy that is never implemented. To this end, Government has to capacitate its programmes with enough funding, human capital and other necessary tools needed to drive the strategy. Without adequate financial support, there should be no dream of better results.

Ibietan and Ekhosuehi (2013) observe financial funding must be made available if governments are to achieve the desired goals and objectives of growing their economies. Planning without resources, especially funding at national level, is catastrophic. It is also critical to apprise the general public on the successes or failures of national programmes so that they improve on future programmes and projects.

There must be initiatives aimed at educating not only the general populace, but also those who conduct day-to-day businesses in line with the blueprint. Civil organisations can play a key role by engaging the public on policy issues inclined to the blueprint articulations. In this case, empowerment first comes with education initiatives in which the people are capacitated with knowledge and skills.

Resistance should be set aside and commitment and support on government initiatives shown. There is need to ensure full participation and commitment from all players, private or public, practising what we preach, engaging the general public on issues that affect them. Politicians should abstain from power struggles as reflected in the current political sphere and show political will towards providing solutions to social and economic problems. As for civil organisations and other stakeholders, notwithstanding political parties, the aspect of resistance should not be the norm. A national development plan that is above politics should be created. From past implemented policies, experience shows that the governing political party always influences policy formulation (Chitongo *et al.*, 2020). This lends such policies to criticism from opposition parties and their supporters. Such policies may run the risk of being aborted since the ruling party can lose elections during the period of policy implementation. This means the country should find a way to make sure that everyone is part of the policy implementation, so that the country's vision is not aborted or affected by politics.

Upholding transparency, accountability and increased service delivery whilst reducing government expenditure, the chapter recommends that Government must reduce expenditure and ensure fiscal transparency to fully support the NDS1. What needs to be considered is that social services, equal redistribution of land and effective use of country's resources must be done in a transparent manner. There is need for real action, walking the talk, not just talking.

To ensure that there is effective implementation of the NDS1, there is need to end corruption and rebrand the country. To attract FDI and improve investors' confidence, the focus has to be on creating a good competitive personality for the country. This will open avenues to attract viable lines of credit. More so, with no possible exclusion, there is dire need to uproot corruption by all possible means. Those condemned of corrupt practices have to be brought to book and face the consequences, regardless of how politically powerful they are.

Given that Zimbabwe, as provided by history, produced and formulated sound policies and strategies, notwithstanding lack of adequate

monitoring an implementation structures, there exists a gap between policy formulation and implementation. This, therefore, calls for the need to come up with effective and appropriate mechanisms that would enhance the coordination and monitoring of the same. The results based management aspect enshrined in the blueprint provides the starting point that is not alien to the country. Rather, this is the time to prove the outside world wrong, given the misconceptions and perceptions already held towards the future of the nation. Audits to assess maximum participation of every stakeholder should be applied. This is because the programme is highly involving with various individuals and organisations dependent on each other for prosperity. Therefore, stakeholder involvement should be improved to achieve the goals. There must be the will to transform and not the will to power. Zimbabwe will have a great potential for growth and development if an all-inclusive integrated approach to planning, development and implementation is adopted.

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CHAPTER 3: INFRASTRUCTURE AND UTILITIES

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ABSTRACT

This chapter presents a framework for both public and private sectors to support planning, designing and financing of infrastructure that is economically, financially, socially, environmentally and institutionally sustainable. The chapter intends to generate discussion amongst key stakeholders and serve as a basis for research and experimentation. It should be considered as a working document. Infrastructure covers various sectors which represent a large share of an economy and become a critical index of economic vitality. Both components of infrastructure, physical and social infrastructures, are required to provide the necessary services for public interest. Infrastructure is also important in environmental terms. Infrastructure choices determine whether there is clean power, compact cities and energy efficient buildings and whether infrastructure is resilient to a changing environment and climate. Getting these investments right is critical to whether or not the world locks into a high- or low carbon growth trajectory. Given that infrastructure lasts for decades, the choices made will affect carbon emissions for much of the century.

Keywords *sustainability, sustainable infrastructure, inclusive growth, environmental, SDGs, National Development Strategy.*

INTRODUCTION

Current infrastructure investment methodologies are outdated and unfit for an increasingly complex environment. Several systemic causes are fundamentally altering the value evaluation of infrastructure. First, because of the mounting threats posed by climate change, any new infrastructure must be compliant with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Because infrastructure assets have a long lifespan, long-term infrastructure must transition to zero-emission infrastructure immediately (Musungwini *et al.*, 2016). However, a large portion of the existing profile consists of high-carbon, fossil-based and inefficient

projects. Not only does this increase the risk of stranded assets for investors, but it also jeopardises public property and livelihoods, endangering the habitability of some portions of the planet. On the plus side, new solutions are emerging because of both technological advancements and the low-carbon revolution (Rahman, 2018). Digital technology is also assisting citizens in becoming more active participants in the energy and other industries.

Demand-side management innovations and networked transportation, heat, digital and energy systems can assist in meet climate and sustainability goals. However, these solutions cut across both sectoral and national boundaries, necessitating the consideration of infrastructure systems, rather than individual infrastructure projects. Infrastructure policies and regulations are now too fragmented to effectively manage the interlocking risks posed by climate change, or to take advantage of cross-sectoral technological solutions (Shannon *et al.*, 2018). Fundamental institutional improvements are required, not just incremental policy modifications. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) play a critical role in tackling the sustainability challenge because the majority of new infrastructure is built in developing countries, both in assisting governments with creating an effective enabling environment for sustainable infrastructure and through providing various innovative financial instruments that increase participation of the private sector (Shahtaheri, Flint and Jesús, 2019).

The framework's goal is to increase clarity, reduce risks and capitalise on the opportunities that sustainable infrastructure provides for inclusive growth and productivity, improving the coverage and quality of services embodied in the SDGs, and speeding up the transition to low-carbon growth and climate resilient economies in Southern Africa (Baptista, 2019). The framework outlines four fundamental principles of sustainability, including economic and financial, environmental, social, and institutional elements, and suggests that each of these should be considered throughout the project cycle, including, most importantly, how upstream policy is implemented. Legislation, regulations, planning, and organisational capacities contribute to delivering sustainability (Biancone

and Radwan, 2018; Baptista, 2019). This chapter presents a list of more than 60 criteria for operationalising sustainability within this framework.

Infrastructure encompasses a wide range of industries that make up a significant portion of a country's economy and have become a key indicator of economic health. Both physical and social infrastructures are required to offer the necessary services for the general public's benefit. A productive economy requires reliable public utilities (electricity, telecommunications, water and gas supply, and other utilities), public works (roads, dams and canals, tunnels) and public transportation (urban transportation systems, trains, ports and waterways, and airports) (Gramlich, 1994). As a result, enough infrastructure must be built and maintained to achieve quick and long-term economic growth. The country's essential success elements in growing productivity, expanding trade and industry, coping with population expansion, reducing poverty, enhancing environmental sustainability and raising society's living standards, are all determined by the country's infrastructure (Chirisa *et al.*, 2016).

Infrastructure development cannot be the duty of the government alone, because it necessitates huge expenditure. It is critical to encourage private sector participation in infrastructure development to maintain a long-term infrastructure development (Li *et al.*, 2019). The public-private collaboration will enable a considerable rise in extra funding, improve the project's economic feasibility and improve the existing capital budget's performance. Meanwhile, better management in the private sector can lead to increased project efficiency, harness innovation capability and drive knowledge and technology transfer, all of which will result in better quality and lower cost services (IMF, 2014a).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Infrastructure, economic growth and inclusive and sustainable development are all intertwined. Infrastructure is a critical component of economic development. Infrastructure investment may play a particularly crucial role in the current context of growing concerns about global growth prospects, by raising global aggregate demand today and creating stronger foundations for future growth (Snider and McBean, 2021). It is also a critical component of the fight against climate change and promotion of

long-term prosperity and development. When done poorly, it contributes significantly to the problem as infrastructure accounts for over 60% of global greenhouse gas emissions (Laurance, 2018).

When done correctly, it is a critical component of both climate change mitigation and adaptation. Infrastructure adequacy, affordability, sustainability and resilience are critical for inclusive growth and poverty reduction. The world has a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to make significant progress on this interrelated agenda. Important recent events have established a solid platform on which to build. Climate sustainability is integrated into the global development agenda through SDGs that were agreed on by the international community in September 2005. Infrastructure is intertwined with this goal. The globe has been underinvesting in energy systems, cities, transportation and water infrastructure. However, important international fora, such as the G-20, are now paying attention to the need to significantly increase infrastructure investment and address related policy agendas, resulting in considerable measures to strengthen the investment and financing framework.

Cities are reducing their carbon footprint by utilising new energy technology and increasing energy efficiency. Connectivity has enabled new "smart" solutions to reduce infrastructure costs through higher efficiency, thanks to a revolution in information and communications technologies (ICTs). This change has also thrown business models into disarray, prompting entrepreneurs and policy-makers to seek out new techniques that can help them leapfrog old technologies. Cities in emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, are collaborating with those in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to generate new ideas. Businesses, colleges and civil society organisations are forging new sorts of multi-stakeholder collaborations with public policy-makers to find game-changing answers to local, national and global concerns. These methods must be pursued in ways that are specific to the situation.

In the industrialised world, urban infrastructure networks have already been planned out to a great extent. Planners can only make small

modifications to city designs, but they can concentrate on techniques for rehabilitation and retrofitting, and the use of ICTs to increase efficiency and more aggressive demand management to reduce resource usage and emissions. Cities in developing and growing economies, particularly those in Africa and Asia, can make infrastructure decisions now that will employ emerging technology and procedures to build a more efficient and denser footprint. They can also benefit from more advanced technology when they are available and inexpensive. Given the magnitude of the problem, a revolutionary strategy is required. As a result, to promote the adoption of new infrastructure technologies and new ways of doing business, a supportive enabling environment and novel financing techniques are required.

Infrastructure services, such as the provision of drinking water and electricity, waste disposal and treatment, people and goods movement, and ICT, constitute the backbone of Latin America's economic development, competitiveness and inclusive growth (Calderón and Servén, 2014; Serebrisky, 2014; Serebrisky *et al.*, 2015; Bhattacharya *et al.*, 2016; The New Climate Economy, 2016). Even though the region's infrastructure investment needs are estimated to be 3-8% of GDP, investments are only 2 to 3% of GDP (Serebrisky, 2014; Fay *et al.*, 2017). To accomplish the region's development goals, an increase of US\$120-150 billion per year is required (Serebrisky *et al.*, 2015), with specific problems in the urban setting (Bonilla-Roth and Zapparoli, 2017). Closing the investment gap will necessitate the mobilisation of new long-term financing sources, particularly institutional investors (Bielenberg *et al.*, 2016). Closing the infrastructure deficit will necessitate both increased expenditure on roads, power plants and water sewage systems, and a shift in how infrastructure is planned, produced and operated. The climate future is determined by infrastructure built now. Globally, 60% of carbon emissions are attributed to the building and operation of existing infrastructure, with infrastructure accounting for another 35-60% of the future carbon budget (Müller *et al.*, 2013). Technological lock-in and the inertia of long-lived assets like infrastructure, highlight the importance of carefully considering the viability of additional fossil fuel power generation if the Paris Agreement objective of maintaining the global temperature increase well below 2°C is to be achieved (Hansen *et al.*, 2013). Indeed,

according to Pfeiffer *et al.* (2016), the "2°C capital stock limit for fossil-fuel-based energy generation" had already been crossed in 2017.

Given climate change, environmental issues and societal challenges, delivering infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean is becoming increasingly difficult. At the same time, new technologies will revolutionise the way infrastructure is designed, built and funded. Certain types of infrastructure may become obsolete because of innovative technology and business models, and demographic and demand shifts. The desire to attract new sources of private capital heightens the legal and regulatory hurdles that government agencies must overcome to enhance investment in long-term infrastructure. Climate change or physical climate risk are causing increasing concern, as they reduce the predictability of future infrastructure needs while also increasing asset vulnerability (Reyer *et al.*, 2017). The region is one of the most sensitive to the effects of climate change. In 2017, it suffered significant losses because of natural disasters, including floods in Peru that cost \$3.1 billion and floods in Colombia that killed 329 people (Munichre, 2017).

According to Vergara *et al.* (2014), climate change will cost the region \$100 billion per year in damages by 2050. Social conflicts arise because of the loss of natural resources or ecosystem services, pollution, inadequate local benefits in terms of infrastructural services or job development, and reduced local access to resources. Conflict is causing infrastructure project delays, cost overruns and reputational harm for governments, financiers and the private sector, when combined with poor planning, consultation and transparency (Watkins *et al.*, 2019). Meeting future infrastructure demand competes with the potential for severe environmental and social externalities from these projects that becoming a cause of increased contention between local communities and project sponsors. The growing strength of civil society and the rising use of technology to link people adds to the complexity of completing infrastructure projects (Valenzuela and Studer, 2016; Watkins *et al.*, 2019).

As previously stated, the amount of investment and infrastructure quality in the region impede inclusive growth (International Monetary Fund,

2016). While there is rising support for sustainable infrastructure, present progress is disappointing (Mercer and Inter-American Development Bank, 2016,2017; Fey *et al.*, 2019). Projects can generate both positive and negative externalities that are difficult to measure and control due to the extended time span and extensive spatial implications of infrastructure assets (Bak *et al.*, 2017). The increasing complexity of infrastructure, especially for economic and sectoral decision-makers, along with the need to mobilise new sources of funding, necessitates the development of a framework that promotes common knowledge. As a result, the IDB Group defines sustainable infrastructure as infrastructure projects that are planned, designed, built, operated and decommissioned in such a way as to assure economic, financial, social and environmental sustainability (including climate resilience), and institutional sustainability over the entire life cycle of the project (Muguisha, 2007). The criteria that this definition is based on, are outlined in section 2 and are derived from existing sustainability tools and techniques.

Because infrastructure projects are so temporally and spatially complex, many diverse stakeholder groups must be involved in both defining and delivering sustainable infrastructure. Better project preparation, design, building, operations and decommissioning, must accompany improvements in upstream regulation and planning (Momin and Kolekar, 2017). This is determined by national and subnational governments' and sector agencies' capacities and their relationships with and ability to effectively engage the private sector, particularly project developers, construction and operations firms, sustainability standards setters, and private finance. MDBs are well positioned to assist in overcoming the challenges of delivering long-term infrastructure and mobilising large amounts of capital. They are already helping to advance the sustainable infrastructure agenda by supporting knowledge agendas, increasing national and subnational institutional capacities, assisting with project preparation and design, and facilitating access to and delivery of capital (IMF, 2015). Stronger collaboration with organisations like the IMF and the OECD is critical in assisting governments with the institutional adjustments required to regulate, plan, manage their economies and attract financing for pipelines of sustainable infrastructure projects (McKinsey Global Institute, 2013).

UNDERSTANDING THE PROVISIONS IN THE NDS1 DOCUMENT

The quality of infrastructure in an economy is a barometer of a country's residents' well-being. Furthermore, the size of a country's infrastructure has a significant impact on long-term economic growth. Economic challenges have plagued the previous two decades, making it impossible to ensure the continued rehabilitation and maintenance of infrastructure, including the growth of important sectors. Zimbabwe's infrastructure has deteriorated during the last two decades. As a result, Zimbabwe is ranked 127th out of 138 countries in the World Economic Forum's Global Infrastructure Index for 2017-2018.

Several reasons contributed to the reduction in infrastructure, including the following:

- Inadequate public spending on normal and periodic maintenance, including infrastructure network maintenance and repair;
- Lack of an integrated approach to infrastructure investment planning, exacerbated by significant talent loss;
- Lack of development in developing institutional capacities for basic service management and regulation;
- Both public and private sectors are investing in infrastructure at a low level; Inadequate capital and operating expenditure funding,
- Low levels of support from development partners because of arrears and other issues;
- Capacity constraints in managing the entire project cycle, particularly limited implementation capacity; and
- Unviable utility prices that make it impossible for institutions to reinvest in infrastructure, and inadequate monitoring and assessment methods.

The deterioration of the country's fundamental infrastructure has had a major impact on the productive sectors of the economy and the level and quality of services provided to the general public. During the NDS1 period, effective infrastructure delivery is critical to achieving national priorities and overall socioeconomic development. This will entail the restoration of essential infrastructure services like roads and expansion in critical areas such as electricity, transportation, water and sanitation, information and communication technology, and housing. The strategy's targeted

infrastructure sector outcomes are supported by well-defined and realistic sector strategies and interventions, and performance indicators aimed at ensuring the restoration of basic infrastructure services that contribute meaningfully to economic growth and development. Capacity-building programmes for public investment management will also be implemented for implementing agencies involved in infrastructure delivery to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the execution and achievement of sector outcomes.

Energy, water and sanitation, and transportation are the priority sectors for infrastructure and utilities. The following initiatives is implemented to improve infrastructure and access to services:

- Maintaining and repairing existing infrastructure and equipment;
- completing ongoing and stalled projects;
- attracting FDI in infrastructure;
- increasing private sector investment in public infrastructure provision;
- promoting facilities for people with disabilities;
- promoting infrastructure research and development; and
- designing and implementing climate-proofing and resilient infrastructure

APPRAISAL OF PLANNING

There is a requirement to increase and monitor performance improvement to meet benchmarks. This is consistent with the adage, "If you can't watch it, forget it!" A credible monitoring and assessment method puts the operating utility under pressure to enhance performance. The utility must be aware that its performance is being monitored and that something is done to improve it. An evaluation process that does not fully understand the regulator-regulated interaction is useless. The utility must understand that a "bite" will occur in the event of noncompliance and a "carrot" will appear in the event of objective attainment. The evaluation criteria must be published in advance, and no "after-the-facts adjustments" to the evaluation policy are permitted. The Uganda's National Water and Sewerage Corporation (UNWSC) monitoring and incentive framework adheres closely to the 10 parameters proposed by Sappington (1994) for establishing incentive regulation programmes.

- Use incentive regulation to better employ the firm's superior information;
- Prioritise regulatory goals and design incentive regulation to achieve stated goals;
- Link the firm's compensation to sensitive measures of its unobserved activities;
- Avoid basing the firm's compensation on performance measures with excessive variability;
- Limit the firm's financial responsibility for factors beyond its control;
- Adopt broad-based performance measures where possible, unless their variability is excessive;
- Choose exogenous performance benchmarks;
- Allow the firm to choose among regulatory options, while recognising the interdependencies among the regulatory options offered to the firm;
- Promise only what can be delivered and deliver whatever is promised; and
- Plan for the rare, unforeseen event, but minimise after-the-fact adjustments to the announced regulatory policy.

IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The Government of Zimbabwe is committed to ensuring a strong culture of monitoring and evaluation of all its programmes to achieve the visions of achieving middle-income status by 2030 and also “Towards an Empowered Society and a Growing Economy” espoused by the national socio-economic blueprint, the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset) 2013-2018. The MDR approach, which adheres to the principles of the IRBM system, would underpin this. This system ensures that the government manages public resources properly and that accountability, openness and high-quality service delivery are all guaranteed.

For the successful implementation of national development plans, programmes and projects, and for efficient and effective service delivery, the government needs a strong monitoring and evaluation system. The formulation of a national monitoring and evaluation policy for Zimbabwe is

thus crucial in providing the necessary framework for institutionalising M&E in the public sector. Through a consultative approach, the National Monitoring and Evaluation Policy intends to provide a systematic, coordinated, streamlined, results-oriented, dependable and effective framework. As a result, substantial research and learning from the experiences of other countries went into the formation of Zimbabwe's policy. The Office of the President and Cabinet also led and coordinated stakeholder discussions.

Many water utilities in low-income nations begin by investing heavily in infrastructure to improve their performance. Focusing solely on this engineering technique has been ineffective in achieving the desired efficiency increases (Folkman, 2018). Depending on where managerial deficiencies are most prominent in the utility, a variety of orientations is required. Benchmarking and performance monitoring are two major aspects of water infrastructure management that require significant attention. Benchmarking is becoming a powerful performance motivator, particularly in utilities where significant tariff incentive applications are difficult to come by. It is a nice way to keep the regulator-controlled interface active in a meaningful way (Chogugudza-Sithole, 2014). It puts pressure on the operating utility to achieve what was promised if it is adequately constituted. At the same time, it provides the regulator with a proactive framework for implementing its mandate to improve the water industry's performance. In this chapter, the case of Uganda's NWSC, is described, including a summary of performance improvement approaches, accomplishments and lessons learned (Asquer, 2018). Specific empirical evidence demonstrating how balancing engineering and commercial/customer care orientations improves infrastructure performance dramatically is presented.

DISCUSSION

The definition and principles of infrastructure sustainability should be converted into practical and measurable criteria to operationalise infrastructure sustainability. The criterion for delivering sustainability in infrastructure projects must be consistent across all four sustainability aspects and throughout the project cycle. Notably, addressing some aspects of sustainability upstream could be far less expensive than

attempting to address sustainability after projects have been designed or put into operation (Georgoulas and Arrasate, 2016). There are numerous publications that offer insights into how to build sustainable infrastructure, easily the most analysed are approaches to sustainability assessment and guaranteeing environmental and social sustainability during project planning and design. As a result, this chapter begins by looking at how to deliver sustainability during project preparation, and then highlighting measures that may be implemented earlier in the project cycle and during finance to help deliver sustainability.

Governments should foster institutional awareness and keep a close eye on societal demands and trends. They must guarantee that decisions are made using up-to-date and trustworthy demographic and demand data, and formal and functional frameworks for successful stakeholder involvement and community participation. Governments should put in place an institutional framework to ensure equitable benefit sharing and compensation for project-affected communities. They should develop norms and methods for equitable relocation and displacement of impacted persons, and regional and local policies and plans for public amenities, community mobility and connection. Governments should guarantee that universal accessibility standards and norms are adopted to ensure that people with disabilities are not discriminated against (Chirisa *et al.*, 2016). They should also set norms and capacities to safeguard the health, safety and security of the community. Governments should also show commitment and capacity to ensure adherence to occupational health, safety and labour standards, and standards and capacities for vulnerable group protection. They should provide institutional commitment and capacity to ensure gender equality, proper community access to resources, effective cultural resource and heritage management, and indigenous and traditional peoples' participation.

A productive economy requires reliable public utilities such as power, telecommunications, water and gas supply and other utilities, and public works such as roads, dams and canals, tunnels and public transportation (urban transportation systems, railways, ports and waterways, and airports). As a result, enough infrastructure must be built and maintained to achieve quick and long-term economic growth. The country's essential

success elements in growing productivity, expanding trade and industry, coping with population expansion, reducing poverty, enhancing environmental sustainability and raising society's living standards, are all determined by the country's infrastructure. Infrastructure development cannot be the duty solely for the government because it necessitates huge expenditure (Rahman, 2018). It is critical to encourage private sector participation in infrastructure development to maintain a long-term infrastructure development. The public-private collaboration will enable a considerable rise in extra funding, improve the project's economic feasibility and improve the existing capital budget's performance. Meanwhile, better management in the private sector can increase project efficiency, leverage innovation capacity and stimulate knowledge and technology transfer, all of which will result in better quality and lower cost services (Wallis, Ambrose, and Chan, 2009).

In the objective to promote sustainable development and manage climate change through better infrastructure, public policy plays a critical role. This is due, in part, to the fact that the government is a significant infrastructure investor, and its investment decisions and institutional capacity have a direct impact on the quantity and quality of infrastructure provided and how it supports growth, inclusion and sustainability (Stuart and Gallagher, 2018). However, public policy is more significant because it sends signals and establishes the regulatory and institutional frameworks that impact the activities of all parties, including private investors and consumers. Given the scale of the infrastructure challenge, private investment and financing is required to play a far larger role than the previous. The incentives and enabling environment offered by public policy at national and international levels is critical in mobilising private investment at scale and channelling it to sustainable infrastructure. Infrastructure adequacy, efficiency, affordability and sustainability, are all harmed by a variety of governmental, institutional and market shortcomings (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006). These failures produce a wedge between social and private costs and returns by raising costs and lowering returns, increasing risks, limiting institutional capabilities and driving a gap between social and private costs and returns. The role of government policy is to correct these flaws. Given the long-term nature of infrastructure expenditures, the public good character of most of it,

significant associated externalities and the inescapable and intimate links to government policies, soundness, clarity and credibility of public policy are especially critical. Infrastructure financing is particularly difficult due to high upfront expenses with long-term rewards and long-term financing constraints.

CONCLUSION AND OPTIONS

Finally, in the face of significant global environmental concerns, great cities are grabbing possibilities to address expanding infrastructure demands while using innovative technology and approaches to resource conservation. Local policies that promote efficiency, and international and national policy frameworks that provide incentives, such as the price of natural resources like fossil fuels and water to reflect externalities, are required. Some alternative technologies' capital costs are still significant, and a variety of restrictions and dangers must be solved. In the absence of suitable price signals, financial support from market mechanisms or national or international subsidies is also required to fill this gap. However, because public finances are limited, policy-makers are turning to new financing strategies to leverage private investments (Guyatri *et al.*, 2021). Cities are also forming new relationships with the public sector, civil society, business, academia and academics to enable them to speed up the implementation of sustainability plans by sharing their experiences and establishing a conducive atmosphere for sustainable solutions creation. Green growth strategies to support long-term infrastructure development can be found in industrialised, emerging and developing economies.

As indicated by the rapid growth of the green bond market, investor interest in “green financing” targeted investments for climate mitigation, climate resilience/adaptation and environmental sustainability, is expanding. Standardising green finance processes, improving risk transparency and disclosure standards, expanding green investment markets and supporting developing-country sustainable finance roadmaps are all essential for further growth (Berensmann *et al.*, 2017). The country's ability to provide continuous and sustained rehabilitation and maintenance of transportation infrastructure has been harmed by the country's economic woes over the last two decades. Furthermore, an over-

reliance on vehicle traffic places strain on already deteriorated road networks, necessitating considerable rehabilitation (Stuart and Gallagher, 2018). Improved road transportation services are crucial for increasing accessibility and promoting domestic, regional and international trade by allowing products and people to travel more freely.

A substantial portion of the road network is in bad shape, which has had direct and indirect effects on road safety. During the NDS1 period, the goal is to establish high-quality, efficient public transportation services in both rural and urban areas. The goal is to minimise traffic accidents and mortality by a quarter each year. The Zimbabwean government has been responsible for the majority of the country's economic infrastructure, with the private sector having a limited part. As a result, policy-makers may choose to focus public spending on infrastructure projects as a means of boosting short-term economic growth (Marcelo *et al.*, 2015). Through both direct and indirect transmission mechanisms, public investment in infrastructure projects can have a favourable impact on economic growth. Economic growth can be boosted by providing basic infrastructure services that meet the demands of businesses and households. As a result, policy-makers must concentrate, not only on increasing the number of infrastructure stocks, but also on enhancing the quality of infrastructure service delivery. As a result, regulatory organisations must increase their efficiency to assure the delivery of services in the various infrastructure sectors.

The favourable influence of infrastructure development on economic growth, as evidenced by infrastructure indicators, could imply an increase in aggregate demand in the economy through large-scale public works spending. Because of greater job possibilities created by public works, public spending on infrastructure can help stimulate aggregate demand. When issuing tenders for infrastructure projects, it is critical for officials in the Ministry of Transport and Communication, Ministry of Energy and Power Development, State Procurement Board, and other related organisations, to consider local contractors. Tenders awarded to local enterprises rather than foreign contractors would benefit the economy more, as it would lower the risk of capital flight.

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CHAPTER 4: HOUSING DELIVERY IN ZIMBABWE'S NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 1

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ABSTRACT

The paper explores housing delivery in Zimbabwe through the National Development Strategy 1. The NDS1 aims to address the housing inequalities between the low-income communities and the high cost of land in Zimbabwe. Missing is the appraisal on the strides made by the NDS1 in providing housing for the low-income communities. The study is premised on the argument that through the Vision 2030 Zimbabwe has braced for transformation and modernisation through policies that are anchored on sustainable development. The study used a qualitative methodology with a bias towards a case study research design, to analyse the data the study used thematic data analysis. Findings reveals that the NDS1 has improved access to housing in Zimbabwe through partnerships between the government and the private player. Further, NDS1 has developed the sustainable land use through the formalisation and regularisation of informal settlements to provide services and tenure security in these settlements. Conclusions drawn highlighted that NDS1 has gained momentum in Zimbabwe but, it needs to be depoliticised to gain the confidence of the people, as it is part of the SDGs rather than a political campaign rhetoric policy. in light of this we advocate for external monitoring and evaluation of NDS1.

Keywords: *communities, low-income, regularisation, SDGs, political, modernisation, inequalities*

INTRODUCTION

Cities experience rapid population growth both demographically and spatially. This phenomenon is primarily propelled by natural demographic increases and migration from rural to urban areas (Onyekachi, 2014). Massive urbanisation has impact on the urban housing services delivery and infrastructural pressure is also a result of this (Muchadenyika 2015).

Consequently, low-income people cannot afford land and adequate housing due to high land and housing costs and a lack of housing supply (Magina et al. 2020). To respond to this the Government of Zimbabwe created the NDS1 to respond to the challenges in access to housing through multi-partnerships with private players in the housing sector to create housing for low-income people.

Zimbabwe is one of the countries facing housing delivery challenges. The challenge of housing delivery has affected citizens to the extent of erecting informal settlements and being homeless (Chavunduka and Chaonwa-Gaza, 2021). According to the Constitution of Zimbabwe, it is the right of every citizen to access shelter. The Government of Zimbabwe and responsible sectors of housing are working towards curbing the problem of housing delivery; however, policy implementation is slow to non-existent as the challenge continue to emerge (Mlambo, 2020). Low-income housing Policy has been implemented, Vision 2030 of sustainable housing, National Housing Delivery Programme is still in the process but with little results.

In addition, the Government of Zimbabwe has drafted NDS1 with the section of improving housing delivery that this chapter is trying to critique. The study aims to understand how NDS1 has responded to the housing inequalities between the low-income people and the creation of sustainable development in Zimbabwe. It is at the backdrop of the Vision 2030 of living no one behind and the provision of the housing amenities that the study investigates the NDS1.

The article will be structured as follows: following this introductory section the article proceeds to a comprehensive review of the literature, focusing on the provisions in the NDS1 document, appraisal of planning, monitoring, implementation, and evaluation. This review aims to establish the current state of knowledge on the topic and identify gaps that the study seeks to address. The article then presents the methodology used in the study. This section includes a detailed description of the research design, data collection methods, and data analysis techniques employed in the study. The findings of the study are presented in the following section, which highlights the key results of the research. The discussion

section of the article interprets the findings of the study and relates them to the literature review presented earlier. Finally, the article concludes with a summary of the key findings and recommendations. The conclusion also includes options for further research and policy implications, highlighting the potential impact of the study on the housing sector in Zimbabwe.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Several strategies have been considered for housing delivery in Zimbabwe. Some strategies for housing delivery have been pointed from the responsible ministers such as amendment of RTCP Act, abandonment of horizontal development, opting for cluster houses, eradication of corruption in the allocation of land, adjustment in the cost of land, low cost housing development and regularisation of informal settlements (The Herald, 31 December 2020). Such strategies are known but implementation has been slow, the problem being centred on the drying of coffers in the government budget and the shrinking of the economy. The development results achieved have been sub-optimal and insufficient to spur the economy to expected levels of sustainable economic development due to both exogenous and endogenous factors (Government of Zimbabwe, 2021). This suggests that despite the creation of various blueprint plans, their implementation has not been successful in achieving the desired outcomes.. These include ZIMASSET that even tried to consider services for people in Chapter 7, section 7.2 and 7.3 but the results were not commendable (Bonga, 2014). However, several researchers have noticed that inflation rates and collapse rates of the economy of Zimbabwe have been skyrocketed to a level of affecting housing developments in the nation and standards of living. Informality is now part and parcel of urban living in Zimbabwe, therefore creating substandard housing and their services and amenities that consequently affect the standards of urban planning. Therefore, the economy has serious implications on housing and service delivery of the nation (Chirisa et al., 2018).

UNDERSTANDING THE PROVISIONS IN THE NDS1 DOCUMENT

Provisions in the NDS1 documents with reference to housing delivery entails the key areas that the document want to exhume as far as sustainable housing delivery is concerned. By noticing these provisions,

the government will understand and know what they want to address, the challenges that might affect the provisions and what they want to achieve in these provisions. These include increased shelter for households, improved land delivery for urban and rural housing, improved access to basic services infrastructure in rural and urban areas, improved access to social amenities. These include schools, recreational and health care facilities, vendor marts and workspaces for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), increased access to housing finance, and increased regularisation of informal settlements. Table 1 shows the provisions for sustainable housing in the National Development Strategy 1.

Table 1: Provisions for sustainable housing delivery in the NDS1 document (Authors' Creation, 2021)

| | | |
|---|--|---|
| <p>Increased shelter for households</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Targeting 220 000 housing units ▪ Encouraging PPPs and restructure and promote mortgage financing schemes. ▪ Prioritise increase in rental accommodation e.g. flats. ▪ Re engagement with external partners in housing delivery ▪ Reduction of costs of constructing housing units ▪ Reforming land development legislation e.g. Acts and by-laws. ▪ Prioritise provision of institutional accommodation, government pool houses and social housing units to government workers ▪ Increase in rental accommodation especially young professionals. ▪ Conversion of unoccupied space in the CBD into residential units | <p>Improved land delivery for both rural and urban housing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Land acquisition for housing development. ▪ Ensuring conformity to by laws and environmental consideration in rural and urban areas ▪ Enforcing land development Acts e.g. RDC Act, Communal lands Act, Land acquisition Act etc ▪ Transferring of title of acquired land. ▪ Allowing only approved plans to execute development. | <p>Improved access to basic service infrastructure</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Household access to portable water, energy, trafficable roads, ICT ▪ Community engagement where basic service exists is prioritised. ▪ Capacity building for maintenance and rehabilitation of infrastructure ▪ Users pay principle to fund maintenance and rehabilitation ▪ Construction of new on off-site infrastructure using appropriate technology is prioritised. ▪ Densification of buildings to minimise costs of providing basic services. ▪ Minimising environmental pollution by use of off-grid renewable energy solutions ▪ Infrastructure development in support of ICT services |
|---|--|---|

| | | |
|---|---|--|
| <p>Improved access to social amenities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Household access to amenities such as ECD centres, schools, health care facilities, country clubs, vendor marts, work places ▪ Community engagement and rehabilitation of existing amenities ▪ Rehabilitation by local authorities | <p>Improved access to housing finance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Employer assisted scheme. ▪ Promotion of saving and credit cooperative ▪ Removal of the cap on interest rates ▪ Direct contribution by co-operatives into the Cooperative Development Fund | <p>Increased regularisation of informal settlements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increase household access to basic services and minimising the need for demolitions and relocations ▪ Spatial planning and provision of land for decanting ▪ Provision of financial resources and capacitation to implement development projects in rural areas to reduce migration in the cities. |
|---|---|--|

Table 1 indicates that NDS1 has six provisions that it articulates under housing delivery. These include increased shelter for households, improved land delivery for both rural and urban housing, improved access to basic service infrastructure, improved access to social amenities, improved access to housing finance and increased regularisation of informal settlements as mentioned. The NDS1 explains how it is going to ensure that those provisions have made a positive impact to housing delivery in Zimbabwe and there are strategies underneath of every provision as shown in Table 1.

APPRAISAL OF PLANNING

In terms of planning, the NDS1 managed to point out the challenges that might affect the process of housing delivery. In planning, the problems that might affect the outcome of the goal need to be identified. This helps in finding ways in which the housing delivery process can be done unhindered. Section 567 of NDS1 document highlights the problems that might affect the housing delivery process. These include macro-economic instability, rapid urbanisation resulting in growth of informal settlements that lack title to land and access to basic services infrastructure, limited investment in on and off-site infrastructure for the provision of basic services such as roads, water and sanitation services, limited investment in social amenities that include schools, health and recreational facilities

in new settlements and rural areas, limited access to housing finance by land developers, institutional investors and households, unaffordable serviced stands and housing units arising from overpriced services and products for property development and construction leading to rise of informal settlements, scarcity of land for housing development and a cumbersome land delivery process to convert virgin land to individualised freehold title, environmental degradation, lack of an up-to-date housing database for planning purposes including on demographics, housing, land and urban growth patterns, poor urban and environmental planning practices, post-independence planning prioritising the development of rural areas above urban areas resulting in informal urban settlements, outdated urban and building regulatory frameworks and outdated building standards resulting in overcrowded, inadequate and substandard houses, weakening governance frameworks including local public institutions and citizen-led structures, failing to plan and manage settlements. Such information is important in planning on how best housing delivery can be done. Understanding and noting down of the problems helps in formulating strategies logically because the problems are known.

The government through NDS1 understood that provision of housing should not be separated with provision of basic services, therefore planning for the provision of housing and basic services and amenities were done in the NDS1 document (Namangaya and Kiunsi, 2018). Section 590 highlighted that the government will envisage access to portable water, sanitation facilities, energy, trafficable roads and Information Communication and Technology ICT and from section 592 to 602 the government has highlighted how it is going to make sure that these basic services are sustainably provided in both rural and urban areas. Section 604 of the document explains that there is improvement in access to social amenities such Early Childhood Development centres, schools, health care facilities, country clubs, vendor marts, and workspaces and strategies were also highlighted on improving access to social amenities from 606 to 609. This should be the starting point whenever planning for residential properties to get rid of informal settlements.

However, there are no pilot projects to what they are planning to achieve. Testing of tools and testing of what they want to achieve is required in the

preliminary stages of housing delivery (Zbrodoff, 2012). Pilot projects such as testing the instruments of land development is important as it shows if the housing delivery projects are implementable or not but the NDS1 has never mentioned about pilot projects to see on how they are going to execute their project. Therefore, there is no rehearsal on how they are going to execute housing provision with their basic service and amenities. The NDS1 is politically driven, therefore making housing delivery professionals less useful (Cobbinah and Darkwah, 2017). The challenge with the NDS1 is that and quality settlements in urban and rural areas, it is government based. Section 568, in the delivery of affordable settlements in urban and rural areas, the government will through the NDS1 prioritise citizens' access to affordable and quality settlements in urban and rural areas. The government will take a holistic approach in planning for housing settlements. Although section 569 explains of shared responsibilities but still it is under government control. Such government control in housing delivery will make land development practitioners mere spectators without implementing their technocratic ideas in shaping the space.

APPRAISAL OF MONITORING

Most of the strategies in the NDS1 documents haven't been implemented therefore it is difficult to measure the degree of monitoring since their strategies are still on paper. However, there are strategies that shows the urge to monitor activities in the process of housing delivery. The idea to contain informal settlements ensures the monitoring of development, thus development control. Section 613 to 618 explains that the government through NDS1 will regularise informal settlements and increase household access to basic services and amenities through in situ upgrading, provision of financial resources to regularise informal settlements. Section 617 explains that the informal settlements is contained through monitoring adherence to approved master plans.

Setting out the specifications when executing housing delivery is also evident in the NDS1 showing the monitoring aspect in it. Section 576 highlights that building materials should be cost effective when constructing housing units through adoption of appropriate technology, modern housing structures adapted for climate change and resilience and

utilisation of locally available materials (Rossetto, 2007). Section 588 ensure that the construction works will only commence upon approval of settlement and housing plans and local authorities is capacitated for that. This calls for building inspectors to inspect and monitor construction works through stage forms thus development control. There are no specifications that cannot be monitored; therefore, the government will make sure that it will constantly check out if these specifications are being done.

Furthermore, the government through NDS1 will monitor housing delivery through ensuring conformity and compliance to planning laws, by-laws, standards and regulations. To ensure compliance, obviously monitoring is also done to check if people are abiding or not to the development laws of housing delivery (Arimah and Adeagbo, 2000). Section 584 of the NDS1 document explains of ensuring conformity to by-laws whereby the government will make sure that only approved layout and house plans are being used. Section 585 explains of rural areas in conformity to the laws to protect the fragile ecosystems.

Setting out targets in housing delivery ensure the urge to monitor development and provision of housing as highlighted in the NDS1. Setting targets is crucial because it defines the task, shows the effort and the investment to be done and shows how stakeholders will correspond to the targets set (Leal and Azevedo, 2016). The NDS1 set out targets and levels it wants to reach as far as housing delivery is concerned. In provision for shelter for households, section 572, the government is targeting a cumulative 220 000 housing units to be delivered. In terms of shelter for households, section 581, densification will also be done through conversion of unoccupied office space in the CBD into residential accommodation and 40% is given to construction of flats. In addition, in terms of access to basic services infrastructure, section 591 of the NDS1 document improved access to basic services. It ensures that households with access to safe drinking water is expected to increase from 77.3% in 2020 to 90% in 2025. In improving land delivery for rural and urban housing, section 585 explains that in rural areas an initial 124 villagised and planned settlement is delivered during the NDS1 period. Such targets and pegs that the NDS1 wants to reach will enable the government to seriously monitor if these targets are reached and even how the strategies are being implemented bearing in mind the period of the NDS1.

However, the government alone cannot be responsible in monitoring all these strategies alone but the entire document is centred on their leadership role in orchestrating each facet of the strategic provisions. Some disciplines, sectors and experts are needed to lead and make decisions for some of the provisions in the strategy without too much control and interference and an increase in demand for housing and high rate of urbanisation, the government's inability to effectively control population growth has resulted in challenges in monitoring the demand for housing and basic services, as well as the growth of informal settlements. (Muzondi, 2014). The NDS1 could not articulate on how it is going to contain the rise in population yet that's the root cause of the problem in housing delivery.

APPRAISAL OF IMPLEMENTATION

In terms of implementation, not much can be said since all the provisions of housing delivery strategy are still at the planning level. The provisions of housing delivery haven't been implemented yet, but they are still in the process. However, the government through NDS1 is having an assurance that it will implement what has been documented in the NDS1. The planning framework for the NDS1 is there. Having the documented provisions give light on implementation. The provisions were given on what areas to address and give attention adequate service delivery and sustainable housing delivery. The NDS1 document will work as a reference in transferring what is on the chapter into reality and as a progress check.

The need to prioritise provision of housing stands and basic service and amenities ensures the need to implement the strategies. The government managed to pick areas that needs attention as far as housing delivery is concerned. These include, provision of housing stands, regularisation of informal settlements, densification, improvement in the household access to basic services and amenities, access to housing finance to both rural and urban areas. There is no way implementation can be done without identifying key areas that need to be addressed.

Having a time frame to execute the strategy shows the urge to implement. The NDS1 document is targeted to start in 2021 up to 2025. Such time frame show the need to implement such that provided the availability of

necessary resources for housing delivery and ability to thwart the challenges that may rise to affect, by 2025, the impact of NDS1 resonates nationwide, as it outlines various challenges in housing delivery alongside proposed solutions.

However, there is no step-by-step process of how things are going to be done. The whole document is all about “the government will” and that will syndrome affects the implementation process. The idea of speculating the strategies affect the fulfilment of the goal. Therefore, there is no clear road map on how implementation process is going to be done for all the provisions of the strategy of housing delivery. There lacks a clear-cut process delineating how and when to initiate the housing delivery process, given the absence of significant changes in the field of housing delivery.

Public goods and public services require good governance and effective public engagement (Marumahoko *et al.*, 2020). However, the NDS1 is affected by “the government through the NDS1 will”. Such serious involvement of the government in the process might affect the outcome. Section 590 and section 604 highlights the NDS1 need to improve access to basic services and social amenities respectively, that isnefit the public but the involvement of these beneficiaries is not effectively mentioned in the document. Consequently, this has an effect of rise in white elephants whereby those services and amenities provided will not be beneficial to the public but lying idle because the beneficiaries were not consulted in the initial stages of planning of these services and amenities. By consulting the public, location allocation process is effectively done whereby services are located at the right location for the benefit of those adjacent to them.

The period NDS1 was drafted and being expected to achieve the provisions in it is the period the whole world is being affected by deadly COVID19 pandemic. The pandemic restricts movement and working of people. However, the NDS1 document has never mentioned on how it is going to contain the virus for housing delivery process to be executed during the pandemic. The country is in the series of lockdowns that restricts movement and working together of people and development of real estate sector, therefore, planning for the pandemic is necessary so

that no matter the pandemic effects, the delivery process will remain unaffected (Zhanda, 2020). In addition, the national government has been indebted by the effect of the COVID 19 therefore a lot of funds from the national budget has been drawn for the containment of the pandemic, however there is no guarantee that those provisions is implemented because more funds are working towards containing the virus.

The NDS1 ensure that it will apply the user pay principle. The NDS1 in improving access to basic service infrastructure highlights that continuous maintenance and rehabilitation of those services requires funding, there is nothing new on that to the general Zimbabwe as they are paying basic service bills monthly without even changes in maintenance and rehabilitation. Bills and rates are being reviewed without the citizens enjoying what they are paying for. This is supported by Section 595 that explains that maintenance and rehabilitation require funding, hence the user-pay principle is employed were appropriate, mindful of citizens' rights. There is nothing new on the public paying for their benefits, but they are not even getting adequate services tallying to what they are paying.

The NDS1 explains that it will acquire land for the provision of housing stands but it is not clear on how they want to acquire. Land acquisition results are obviously the displacement of people and to make matters worse, the government has never mentioned if the land to be acquired is going to be state land or not. Section 586 to 589 of the NDS1, in the improvement in and delivery for urban and rural housing, explains that land acquisition process is employed, and it is not clear on where is this land is going to be acquired. Land acquisition process have effects to some of the people already residing and even to landowners with proper registrations and property rights as their land is taken uncompensated.

APPRAISAL OF EVALUATION

Some of the NDS1 strategies are not convincing and some are convincing. Although most strategies are being prioritised, it is convincing that the NDS1 is focused on the transformation in the delivery of housing and basic services and amenities by 2025. Again, the recognition by the government that housing is a constitutional right for every citizen is commendable (ZIMCODD, 2020). However, the applicability of increase in

rentals is not applicable to the economic situation affecting Zimbabwe. The county has been experiencing economic challenges for a significant period of time characterised high inflation and high unemployment rate (Hawkins et al., 2008). However, section 574 of NDS1 document explains that the rental accommodation that caters for young professionals has not been growing in Zimbabwe. During the NDS1 Period, measures to increase rental accommodation such as flats is prioritised. In this regard, the rental Policy is reviewed in order attract Pension Funds to invest in rental accommodation. Such increase in rental accommodation price is conducive to thriving economy, not the economy of Zimbabwe.

The government through the NDS1 explains of shared responsibility with other partners and sectors of development as highlighted in section 569. However, these various sectors and partners cannot just come and take the responsibility on reality. The creation of a conducive or enabling environment is essential to attract partners and investors to drive the strategies outlined in NDS1 and support the vision of Zimbabwe for 2030. However, the NDS1 fails to address the establishment of such an environment for potential stakeholders.

Some of the NDS1 strategies are utopian idea and inapplicable (Slodczyk, 2016). There is no total perfection in addressing a challenge of housing delivery. Smart settlements cannot be achievable considering that financial resources, availability of investors, control of urbanisation and other dynamic changes can affect the delivery process along the way. Section 568 explains that government will take a holistic approach in planning for housing settlements that will include planning for provision of key basic infrastructure such as ICTs for the development of smart settlements for both urban and rural areas. This is not realistic because Zimbabwe tried the same thing through ZIMASSET but never achieved its intended goal.

The Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development in its analysis of the National Development strategy 1 have found out that the issue of illegal housing cannot be contained as it is in the National Development strategy and in ability to cater for the affected individuals as far as housing is concerned. ZIMCODD, (2020:4) evaluated “However, the development

strategy fails to mention and address the issue of illegal housing structures that has dominated the headlines in recent times. There have been situations where houses were being demolished in Harare and Chitungwiza, leaving hundreds of people homeless (Mavedzenge and Coltrat, 2014; Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, 2015). What is of concern is that most of these housing schemes that are deemed illegal in suburbs especially in Harare were acquired on political grounds as a vote buying tool. The land barons who are involved in these deals are rarely prosecuted with the poor having to bear the brunt (Chigwata and Chigwata, 2019). On humanitarian grounds, this poses a few questions: If the government could not afford suitable accommodation for affected individuals how will it manage to provide accommodation for 220 000 households? What policies has the government put in place to protect individuals who will face the risk of getting their houses demolished?

Further, the development strategy does not make a provision for households that are affected by natural disasters such as cyclones and earthquakes. Despite efforts to provide housing, some of the victims of Cyclone Idai to date have no proper housing facilities (Chimbwanda, 2020). As with the 2021 Budget Strategy Paper, the NDS1 intends to revive the Housing Fund and the National Housing Guarantee Fund. However, these initiatives are not inclusive since they benefit the high- and middle-income class, thus neglecting vulnerable women and youths who are largely informally employed. Again, they are targeted especially for the urban areas, leaving out people in rural areas without decent shelter, and usually women are the most affected since majority of them live in rural areas (Moyo, 2014). This cannot be disputed because that's what the NDS1 failed to address in its document.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed in this study is predominantly qualitative, with a focus on desk review. Primary data sources included books, journal articles, and searches conducted through platforms such as Google Scholar, supplemented by policy documents. Utilising a case study research design, the study embedded a review of literature within its framework. This involved examining various secondary data sources, including newspaper articles and scholarly publications, to elucidate and

identify gaps in the NDS1 housing policy pertaining to modernization in Zimbabwe. For data analysis, a thematic approach was adopted to dissect the findings of the study comprehensively. This method allowed for the identification of recurring themes and patterns within the data, ultimately facilitating the formulation of a robust conclusion.

FINDINGS

In terms of planning, the NDS1 managed to point out the challenges that might affect the process of housing delivery. In planning, the problems that might affect the outcome of the goal need to be identified. The Herald (30 June 2022) highlighted some of the Key driver of NDS1 as to address the inadequacies pertaining to infrastructure and provide citizens with access to affordable and quality settlements. The newspaper indicated that NDS1 is anchored towards that attainment of Vision 2030 around providing human settlements that meets the aspirations of the Zimbabwean people, while addressing affordability and modernisation aspects. Moreover, in efforts to address the housing challenge, the Ministry is spearheading implementation of National Housing Delivery Programme (NHDP), a massive plan aimed at delivering 220 000 housing units by 2025 and over 470 000 in the long term. It further alludes that as part of the mechanisms to address the housing backlog and enhance human settlement delivery, the regularisation or sanitation of informal dysfunctional settlements is now gathering momentum with efforts meant to bring sanity in Gimboki, Harare South, Hatcliffe North and Cowdray Park in Bulawayo.

The Chronicles published on 26 September 2022 reported that a total of 150 000 housing units have been delivered under NDS1 through collaboration involving private sector, local authorities and Government. It further highlighted that to achieve the targets of NDS1 the government has committed to providing a conducive environment that allows broader Public, Private Partnerships participation in housing delivery through the conversion of Figtree settlements into smart city taking shape in Bulilima Rural District Council as the government moves to create smart cities in line with the recently launched climate policy. The Sunday Mail (14 March 2024) indicates that CFI Holdings is prioritising low-cost housing delivery in Harare South as part of its long-term plans to support Government

Vision 2030 in the NDS1 to address housing shortages, and to provide Zimbabweans with affordable and quality settlements.

The Zimbabwean newspaper, The Sunday Mail, reported on April 23, 2023, that the regularisation process in Epworth, under the National Development Strategy 1 (NDS1), is set to transform informal urban areas and build resilience in these areas through service provision (The Sunday Mail, 2023). Furthermore, The Sunday Mail (30 April 2023) quoted Legal Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Permanent Secretary Mrs Virginia Mabiza stating that the regularisation exercise aligns with the President's vision of ensuring no one is left behind, emphasizing the government's commitment to addressing the needs of marginalised communities. These reports highlight the potential of the regularisation process to improve the living conditions of residents in informal settlements and promote inclusive development in line with the NDS1 objectives.

According to The Herald (24 April 2023), Vice President Dr Constantino Chiwenga stated that the Title Deeds and Settlement Regularisation Programme is part of the NDS1 towards Vision 2030 of modernisation and transformation of formerly settlements that had earned the infamous marginalised urban title of illegal settlements (Chiwenga, as cited in The Herald, 2023). The 18th Post Cabinet Press briefing (29th June 2023) revealed that the National Housing Delivery Programme on Economic Development, presented by Minister of National Housing and Social Amenities Honourable Daniel Garwe, aims at building resilience through creation of employment in the formalisation and regularisation of informal settlements and the building of service points such as schools, roads and hospitals (Garwe, as cited in The Herald, 2023). The Herald (04 December 2023) observed that the NDS1 mid-term review for January 2021-June 2023 showed that 344 068 flats and houses were completed or stands fully serviced by December 2022, giving hope for achieving the one million target by 2025 (The Herald, 2023).

DISCUSSION

The study reveals that there are shifts in the housing and settlements policy in Zimbabwe with the government prioritising the housing policy towards reducing the demand for housing through densification and

sustainable development of smart cities in line with climate policies. The study reveals that the NDS1 is moving in line with the SDG 11 of the provision of sustainable housing and cities that are built with service provision. The study shows that the NDS1 has become a key driver of the housing policy to address the inequalities pertaining to infrastructure and provide citizens with access to affordable and quality settlements. The NDS1 aims to address the aberrations in access to land that was created by the colonial rule through the creation of low-cost housing settlements that cater for the poor. The study shows that NDS1 is anchored on the Vision 2030 around providing human settlements that meets the aspirations of Zimbabwean people addressing affordability and modernisation. In support of the study are Namangaya and Kiunsi (2018) that posits that the government through NDS1 understood that provision of housing should not be separated with provision of basic services, therefore planning for the provision of housing and basic services and amenities were done in the NDS1 document.

The study reveals that the NDS1 managed to point out to the challenges that might affect the process of housing delivery and created the partnerships with private players and local authorities to create sustainable housing provision. The study shows that the private sector is prioritising low-cost housing for the inclusion of all the people in need of housing even the poor. The study shows that the government has prioritised the provision of housing to the low-income section of the community through private sector. The study reveals that the NDS1 has prioritised the development of climate smart cities to keep up with the advent of climate change in housing to respond to climate change. However, the government alone cannot be responsible in monitoring all these strategies alone but the whole document is talking about them leading each provision of the strategy. Some disciplines, sectors and experts are needed to lead and make decisions for some of the provisions in the strategy without too much control and interference and an increase in demand for housing and high rate of urbanisation, the government is already failing to control the growth of population consequently unable to monitor the demand for housing and basic services and the growth of informal settlement (Muzondi, 2014). The provision of housing policies

that are in line with current climate policies is important and as such the NDS1 offers the planning that is in line with creation of smart cities.

The study reveals that the regularisation process in Epworth under the NDS1 is set to transform the informal urban areas and build resilience in these areas through service provision in these settlements. The study shows that the Title Deeds and Settlement Regularisation Programme is part of the NDS1 towards Vision 2030 of modernisation and transformation of formerly settlements that had earned the infamous marginalised urban title of illegal settlements. The study reveals that the NDS1 has moved towards the improvement of service delivery in settlement that were once neglected and not formalised leading to the economic development and employment creation. The need to prioritise provision of housing stands and basic service and amenities ensures the need to implement the strategies. The government managed to pick areas that needs attention as far as housing delivery is concerned. These include, provision of housing stands, regularisation of informal settlements, densification, improvement in the household access to basic services and amenities, access to housing finance to both rural and urban areas.

CONCLUSION AND OPTIONS

The analysis of the National Development Strategy 1 (NDS1) in Zimbabwe's housing delivery sector reveals a comprehensive framework aimed at addressing the country's housing challenges. Despite its ambitious goals and detailed provisions, several areas require attention to ensure effective implementation and achievement of desired outcomes. The NDS1 identifies key challenges such as economic instability, rapid urbanisation, and inadequate infrastructure, underscoring the need for holistic planning and robust strategies. However, there are gaps in clarity regarding specific implementation processes, stakeholder engagement, and inclusivity in housing initiatives. Furthermore, concerns about illegal housing structures, vulnerability to natural disasters, and inclusivity in housing programs remain unaddressed, posing significant hurdles to sustainable housing delivery. In light of this, the study recommends the following:

- The government should prioritise active involvement of stakeholders, including local communities, private sector entities, and civil society organisations, in the planning and implementation of housing delivery initiatives. This engagement will ensure inclusivity, transparency, and accountability throughout the process.
- Develop a detailed and actionable implementation plan for the NDS1 housing provisions, outlining specific timelines, responsibilities, and resource allocations. This roadmap should include pilot projects to test strategies, monitor progress, and make necessary adjustments based on feedback and outcomes.
- Review and update existing legislation, regulations, and planning frameworks to address current challenges and facilitate sustainable housing delivery. This includes streamlining land acquisition processes, strengthening enforcement mechanisms, and incorporating climate-resilient and environmentally sustainable practices.
- Incorporate measures for disaster preparedness and resilience into housing delivery initiatives, considering the increased vulnerability of communities to natural disasters. This includes adequate infrastructure planning, land use management, and provision of social support mechanisms for affected populations.
- Ensure that housing programs and policies prioritise inclusivity, particularly for vulnerable groups such as women, youth, and informal settlements residents. This may involve targeted interventions, subsidies, and support mechanisms to enhance access to affordable and quality housing for all segments of society.
- Establish robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to track progress, assess outcomes, and identify areas for improvement in housing delivery efforts. This should involve regular data collection, performance indicators, and feedback loops to inform evidence-based decision-making and policy adjustments.
- Remain flexible and adaptive in response to evolving socio-economic, environmental, and political dynamics that may impact housing delivery initiatives. This includes continuous review and adaptation of strategies to address emerging challenges and capitalize on new opportunities for innovation and improvement.

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CHAPTER 5: IMAGE-BUILDING, INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT AND RE-ENGAGEMENT

AURTHUR CHIVAMBE, ENOCK MUSARA AND OLIVER KUWA

ABSTRACT

This chapter seeks to discuss and examine image-building, international engagement and re-engagement in Zimbabwe. The background to this subject is that the National Development Strategy 1: 2021-2025 (NDS1) is the successor to the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP) and is the first five-year medium-term plan aimed at realising the country's Vision 2030. The NDS1 outlines the strategies, policies, legal and institutional reforms and the programmes and projects to be implemented over the five-year period, 2021 -2025, to achieve accelerated, high, inclusive, broad-based and sustainable economic growth and socio-economic transformation and development. The methodology used in this chapter includes the desktop study and case study method. Textual and contextual are methods used to analyse the data collected. Findings noted are Zimbabwe's re-entry into the global system brings with it the challenge and opportunity of engaging potential investors not in terms of ideological divisions but of competitive advantage. Western policy should move away from singling out Zimbabwe and become more regionally focused, consistently supporting sustainable economic growth and transformation, grounded in good governance and human rights. The chapter recommends that Zimbabwe's government should seek to re-engage in international diplomatic and business fora,, including seeking to re-join the Commonwealth. It is concluded that on she is mindful of the need for new alliances, new investment partners and the need to be reintegrated into the global society.

INTRODUCTION

The Second Republic of Zimbabwe ushered in an opportunity to improve the country's image and international relations, allowing Zimbabwe to claim her rightful place among the community of nations (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020). In Zimbabwe, engaging the international community is

of great significance because it will attract investment, promote economic growth and national wealth creation within the context of the global economy. The engagement is also important since the locals benefit from the creation of jobs, better living standards and foreign currency will enable good international trade relations in Africa and other countries in the world. Improved international relations play a key role in the social, economic and cultural growth of the country. As a result, in Zimbabwe, there is great competition for inward investment and increased exports to support Vision 2030.

LITERATURE REVIEW

It is important to understand how Zimbabwe conceptualises foreign policy. Stern (2000) conceives foreign policy as a sequence of positions or courses of action in pursuit of objectives. Foreign policy is about actions, reactions and interactions to situations, events, issues, demands and pressures from the international arena. Kegley and Wittkopf (2001) posit that a state's foreign policy is determined by interrelated factors such as international, inter-domestic and domestic. Rosenau (1976) views foreign policy from three dimensions, that is, orientations, foreign policy as commitments and foreign policy as activities (behaviours). In Zimbabwe, the formulation of foreign policy is guided and informed by the President. This is spelt out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade which states that 'the creation and enunciation of Foreign Policy is a prerogative of the Head of State or Government' (Chan and Patel, 2006).

The relationship between China and Africa has developed noticeably over the last five decades and three separate periods can be distinguished within this time frame (Kanza, 2006). Initially, relationships were established between China and African nation states as they gained independence and the second period when China was given a UN Security Council seat during the period of 1971. The last phase included the post-Maoist period where it is characterised by growth and liberalisation of the Chinese economy. It can be noted that it was during the 1950s that China's relationship with Africa started to develop. Before 1955, Africa was of no significant importance to China, but from then onwards, China sought international recognition and political allies, hoping to strengthen

international alliances against the capitalist West and the revisionist communist Soviet Union (*ibid.*).

In the Sudan, international development assistance plummeted from 1.9 billion in 1985 to \$50 million by the late 1990s. This was due to non-governmental organisation (NGOs) changing and tending to focus their attention on humanitarian relief in the late 1980s through the so-called Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). OLS has played a significant role in humanitarian assistance in delivering the Southern Sudan. It is a tripartite agreement between the Government of the Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the UN to deliver humanitarian assistance, based on the principles of neutrality, impartiality and transparency. The OLS disburses about \$200 million a year from donor funds, mainly for food assistance. Of this, an estimated 60-70% is devoted to logistics, security and transport.

In most African countries, governments are keen to re-enter the community of nations through opening up of trade, foreign financing and investment. Within the government and civil society, debate is beginning on specific aspects of economic policy. The key cross-cutting issues that run through these debates relate to reforming governance and fiscal federalism and unleashing pro-poor growth. At a national level, the question of federal relations and revenue-sharing lies at the heart of hopes for peaceful unified African countries, but in the medium-to-long term, it will also provide the critical context for policy reform across the sectors. Pro-poor growth will require the reversal of elite policies in agriculture, a refocus on food security, especially in the war-affected areas and other poor regions, a rebalancing of spending towards primary level health and education and fixing social services delivery mechanisms. A reduction in military spending and improved management of oil revenues is central. Under the umbrella of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the Bank in Africa should have the possibility of engaging governments and other stakeholders to define an inclusive poverty reduction strategy for a unified Africa, with all the capacity for sector reform planning, consultations and civil society involvement that this implies.

In the local context of Zimbabwe, the country needs to re-engage with the West, as the country cannot remain isolated. Engagement with the international community is of great importance and Zimbabwe should be also be part and parcel of the forward-looking international community (Nyangani, 2015). Crucially, re-engagement of the West will help the country access foreign capital and investment that she needs to resuscitate her economy.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter provides a systematic literature review of peer-reviewed journal articles, published magazines, secondary government reports and newspapers. Inductive content analysis was applied to identify major themes and impact areas addressed in the literature to develop a conceptual framework, detailing image-building, international engagement and re-engagement in Zimbabwe.

UNDERSTANDING THE PROVISIONS IN THE NDS1 DOCUMENT

The National Development Strategy 1: 2021-2025 (NDS1) is the successor to the TSP and is the first five-year Medium-Term Plan aimed at realising the country's Vision 2030. National priorities were crafted, taking into consideration the TSP Mid-Term Review, Vision 2030, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Africa Agenda 2063, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and provincial and district profiles (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020). As a result, Zimbabwe has implemented different blueprints to improve Vision 2030, development and economic growth. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe has, in the past implemented different blueprints but failed due socio-economic and political factors. The introduction of the NDS1 is believed will transform itself to the current levels of development.

In the NDS1, there is the introduction and achievement goal set to reach the so-called "Upper Middle-income Society" by the government through the formulation and implementation of bold and robust policies and other interventions that the government will undertake through short and medium-term National Development Plans (NDP). More so, the NDS1 came as an anchor to the backdrop of the TSP that was aimed at

stabilising the macroeconomy and the financial sector, introducing necessary policy and institutional reforms to transform the economy to a private sector led economy, and launching quick-wins to stimulate growth (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020). The TSP was introduced to deal with long-term effects that include unsustainable budget and debt and inflationary pressures in Zimbabwe, would retard the economy. Because of this, the TSP implementation came with significant progress as many changes, including fiscal consolidation, restoration of monetary policy, stabilisation of the exchange rate, the undertaking of governance and institutional reforms, entrenched engagement and re-engagement with the international community, facilitation of investment and infrastructure development, were witnessed (*ibid.*).

The NDS1 is underpinned by the Integrated Result Based Management (IRBM) system and National and Sectoral Results Frameworks to systematically guide its formulation and implementation process. The National and Sectoral Development Results Frameworks allow for horizontal and vertical linkages, hence improving efficacy in programming. Consequently, the two are to transform the economy to growth and development and institutions to enhance public sector efficiency and effective service delivery.

APPRAISAL OF PLANNING

The NDS1 is an important policy document that recognises Zimbabwe's external image problem. It also recognises that foreign policy and the national economic policy are interlinked. In addition, pointing out key foreign policy challenges, it is aimed at asserting the strategic importance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs relative to other ministries. The plan needs to be buttressed by strategic processes that describe in greater depth how the ministry aims to achieve key goals such as a national diaspora policy, public diplomacy and re-engagement with the West (*ibid.*). Indeed, the strategy for re-engagement is probably the most vital immediate objective and one that needs to be articulated clearly. The plan is undoubtedly key to economic policy, but this presents a challenge since the ministry also has to explain and 'sell' Zimbabwe's economy and economic policy abroad (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) . This is not

always easy to do at the best of times, but it is particularly difficult during the current economic crisis in Zimbabwe.

The robust economic growth and transformative thrust of moving up the value chain during the NDS1 period is premised on availability of efficient key enablers such as energy, transport and water (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020). Moving the economy up the value chain and domesticating these value chains will also depend on the availability of throughput from primary sectors such as agriculture and mining. Priority under the NDS1 is to increase investment in new infrastructure and rehabilitation and upgrading of existing infrastructure. Focus will also be on increasing production and productivity through resolving bottlenecks such as the land tenure in agriculture, legislative gaps in mining and operationalising the productivity centre.

As far as modern international relations are concerned, the notion of sovereignty entails non-deference to outside powers and authority beyond that of international/multilateral institutions such as SADC, the African Union (AU), the International Court of Justice, and the United Nations (Chitiyo and Kibble, 2014). If Harare and London were to engage in the context of the ongoing crisis, there is no way they were going to relate on an even keel. The latter would give conditionalities and the former simply has to comply (*ibid.*).

A restrictive visa regime, in comparison with other countries in the region, has created a huge disincentive for tourists and investors who are opting to take their patronage and business elsewhere. Consequently, Zimbabwe's ranking on several internationally recognised indices that project the country's image declined over the past two decades. For instance, the 2014 Good Country Index ranked Zimbabwe 120 out of 125.

APPRAISAL OF MONITORING

In this regard, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) has also developed a robust monitoring and evaluation system that will anchor the NDS1. Under the SMART Zimbabwe 2030, a broad strategy that includes the e-Government Programme, a Whole of Government Performance Management Solution (WoGPMS) is used to monitor all programmes and

projects implemented by the government on a real time basis during the NDS1. This strategy, therefore, requires acceleration and intensification of the implementation of ICT systems in both the public and private sectors (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020).

In terms of monitoring, there is need for transparency in government processes such as in justice delivery, the tendering process and the fight against corruption. According to the Republic of Zimbabwe (2020), these includes:

- National unity that is blind to race, colour, ethnic origin, creed, etc.
- To develop a disciplined public service, including the uniformed services.
- Re-engagement with IFIs (international financial institutions) (IMF, WB).
- Compensation of former farm owners
- Re-admission into the Commonwealth
- Facilitating factors towards re-engagement
- Prospects are high - land valuations to be complete by the end of May 2019 to compensate former white commercial farmers - RTGS\$53 million (US\$12 million) has been budgeted as interim compensation. - The Ad Hoc Compensation Working Group, comprising government officials and representatives of former farm owners, has been created to establish the Compensation Quantum figure.

The monitoring of an agreement is an issue that has been much discussed by Zimbabwean civil society and its international partners, and there have been several exercises to specify the kinds of benchmarks that should be put in place to determine the efficacy of any agreement (Chitiyo and Kibble, 2014). These benchmarks, however, should not be specified without determining how and who will monitor these. It is not enough to merely provide a list of indicators without an equivalent measuring process. Some of this should be done by Zimbabwean civil society organisations that have been doing an excellent job already, and some may need to be done by new initiatives (*ibid.*). This local process should be complemented by external bodies, with at least a small team from SADC/AU to act as arbiters over the validity of reports.

There should be agreement by Zimbabwean civil society to insist that no economic re-engagement, balance of payment support or development assistance, takes place without there being satisfactory compliance with the benchmarks. There should be no removal of personal sanctions. The only assistance that is acceptable in the short term is direct humanitarian assistance to the ordinary people of Zimbabwe, delivered through churches and NGOs in the case of food, and through local government structures in the case of health (*ibid.*).

Corruption remains a major economic challenge and a major disincentive to local and foreign institutional investment. The currently moribund Zimbabwe Anti-corruption Commission (ZACC) needs to be re-activated and given a proper mandate, independence and powers to investigate, report on and end the culture of financial impunity. This, in turn, requires political will and support at the highest level.

APPRAISAL OF IMPLEMENTATION

Several strides were made in transforming the governance ecosystem to ensure that the country's institutions, systems and practices conform to the provisions of the new Constitution. To guarantee constitutional provisions, including fundamental rights, freedoms and responsibilities under the TSP, Government aligned more than 75% of the laws to the Constitution (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020). This was also further complemented by implementation of various public sector reform measures to enhance institutional and individual performance towards provision of quality services to the citizenry (*ibid.*). Notwithstanding these achievements, the TSP faced several challenges during its implementation. These include, among others, high inflationary pressures, exchange rate volatility, continued illegal sanctions against the country, and exogenous shocks like droughts, Cyclone Idai and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The implementation of the NDS1 will require a change of mindset and a new way of thinking and doing business (*ibid.*). This mindset change will require public officials and the private sector to think, act and produce desired outcomes and outputs timeously. This includes ease of doing business reforms, upholding the rule of law and combating corruption

through the ZACC. Further, successful implementation of the NDS1 prioritised programmes and projects is premised on the predictability of the national budget. In this regard, the NDS1 will prioritise timely availing of funds to support identified programmes and projects in the strategy that is implemented to deliver the desired outcomes.

Within the implementation of the NDS1, Zimbabwe should also consider re-engagement with multilateral fora such as the Commonwealth. This would help it to reach out to several different countries and engage in trade promotion initiatives, through the Commonwealth Business Council (Chitiyo and Kibble, 2014), for instance. For example, there are indications that the government is re-engaging with Western organisations and the extension of the IMF staff monitoring team in Harare through tentative re-engagement with the international financial institutions. The Foreign Ministry's efforts through the NDS1 could be supplemented by a White Paper outlining the changing context of regional, continental and global relations, and the implications for Zimbabwe (*ibid.*).

APPRAISAL OF EVALUATION

On the domestic front, consolidating macroeconomic stability during the NDS1 period is critical for enhancing certainty and confidence in the economy by anchoring exchange rate and inflation (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020). During period, the priority is to strengthen fiscal and monetary coordination, ending all quasi-fiscal activities, curbing all unbudgeted expenditures and deepening the market-based foreign exchange rate system. To evaluate, there is need for the government to have relevant, skilled and motivated human resources who will deliver the desired outcomes of the NDS1. In this regard, evaluation is done through appropriate skills mix and regular review of conditions of service.

Consequently, Zimbabwe's ranking on several internationally recognised indices that project the country's image declined over the past two decades (*ibid.*). For instance, the 2014 Good Country Index ranked Zimbabwe 120 out of 125 and, in addition, Zimbabwe ranked 19 out of 48 African countries in the Country Brand ranking index in 2019. However, ongoing reforms, including the ease of doing business, saw the country

moving up the Good Country Index ranking of 102 out of 153 in 2019 (*ibid.*).

According to ZIDERAA (2018) demands for re-engagement and some of the conditions set out by the US Senate committee for re-engagement with Zimbabwe include,

- Non-involvement of the defences forces in elections.
- Release of provisional and final voters' roll.
- International observers (US, AU, SADC, EU (European Union)).
- Impartial media access for all political parties.
- Compensation for white farmers for land.
- Currency reform, including reform of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ).
- Genuine reconciliation efforts.

DISCUSSION

Zimbabwe's international goodwill was damaged following the implementation of the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme and the backlash from the international community was immediate through the imposition of illegal sanctions and unfavourable international media coverage (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020). The Land Reform Programme happened in the late 2000 period and was also perceived as a necessary evil. This because of the repossession of land to the blacks through willing-buyer-willing-seller during. The situation was worsened by lack of a clear commitment and actual redress of external debt arrears, a critical factor slowing the re-engagement process with the IFIs and bilateral partners. By the turn of the 20th century, Zimbabwe's fortunes on the international arena had turned upside down. This scenario because of the ruling party's (ZANU PF) waning legitimacy in the late 1990s. The Zimbabwean economy began to collapse in the mid-1990s. Fiscal deficits, foreign currency shortages and fuel scarcity became common. Mismanagement and corruption, unfair terms of trade and indiscriminate servicing of foreign debt were the reasons for the underperformance of the economy. Unemployment levels increased along with reduced government expenditure on social services.

The Diaspora Engagement Programme is implemented during the strategy period. The Zimbabwean diaspora has an important part to play in the

country's recovery and in its own success abroad. The diaspora in the United Kingdom will need to manage its internal differences and craft a collective vision if it is to be seen in Harare as a serious partner in Zimbabwe's development, and in London as a partner in UK policy-making on the country and the region (*ibid.*). A dedicated ministry for the diaspora should be established in Zimbabwe to address issues such as investment, remittances, the diaspora vote, diaspora return, the economy and wider diaspora-Zimbabwe partnerships. This would give more impetus to the current re-engagement drive between Zimbabwe and the diaspora.

Following some concerns over the credibility of the electoral process, the future of Zimbabwe's re-engagement with the international community remains somewhat uncertain (*ibid.*). More so, the non-resolution of external debt arrears will continue imposing significant limits on the amount of support available from development partners and constrain Zimbabwe's access to international capital markets and private investment. Among them is the pace of the global economy recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. The recovery will have implications on domestic socio-economic progress. To this end, a robust information management and dissemination process to project Zimbabwe as an attractive investment destination and building a highly competitive national brand is critical for re-engagement and image-building. The shift from traditional diplomacy to economic diplomacy has huge potential to improve the country's image, strengthening cooperation with the international community, thus improving economic recovery growth prospects (*ibid.*).

There is need for critical engagement defined by key benchmarks around the operationalisation of the constitution. However, in adopting this approach, international partners and civil society must move away from dictating a roadmap to government (Ward, 2015), but through sustained dialogues, develop a local-based and mutually accepted general framework. There is need to increase engagement at diplomatic and staff levels, especially between international partners and the GoZ (*ibid.*). There is a danger of missing the opportunity for positively influencing reforms, if Zimbabwe is not engaged with constructively.

With the focus on Zimbabwe having thus shifted from the regional and international radar, the seemingly available opportunity for influencing

issues of policy and reform in Zimbabwe is through the empowerment of citizen and civic-led initiatives (Dialogue Online, 2015:3). This chapter calls for the Zimbabwean civil society to come up with a roadmap that seeks incremental engagement that is gradual and aligned to institutional reforms based on the new constitution. International and regional partners may aid the reform process in Zimbabwe through provision of support that seeks to complement their diplomatic efforts. Adopting an engagement strategy of this nature may help to hedge against potential democratic regression as Africa has had significant cases where democratic constitutions have been changed to accommodate the wishes of the incumbents (*ibid.*). Already, in Zimbabwe there is talk on the part of government 'reviewing the constitution on the arguments of fiscal austerity' (Zimbabwe Situation 2015) that may potentially threaten the survival of some democratic institutions (*Newsday*, 2015). It is at this point that engagement with Zimbabwe by international and regional partners has to take on full board civil society to ensure the broadening and deepening of democratic systems and values to guarantee sustainable rule of law and democratic stability.

The Zimbabwean government should take the initiative in normalising relations with the international community. It should seek to re-engage in international diplomatic and business fora, including seeking to rejoin the Commonwealth. The government has stated that the main obstacle to re-entry into the Commonwealth is the levy (Mzembi, 2013). Western policy should also not single out Zimbabwe, but should become more regionally focused, consistently supporting economic growth, good governance and human rights. The normalisation of Zimbabwe's international relations with the West is essential for economic recovery. The electoral legitimacy debate will continue to divide Zimbabweans and the international community alike, but the reality is that for the time being ZANU-PF is the dominant force in Zimbabwean politics (Chitiyo and Kibble, 2014).

CONCLUSION AND OPTIONS

In a nutshell, international and regional partners may also intensify diplomatic efforts and at the same time include civil society in their engagement strategies to broaden and deepen democratic practice. Taking such an approach will most likely ensure entrenchment and

sustainability of democratic institutions and systems in the long term and make Zimbabwe a law abiding player within the community of nations. To be admitted and accepted by the international community, Zimbabwe is aware that she has to play by the rules of the globe, being open for business is one of these. Be that as it may, one notes that conservatism, change and continuity dominate the country's foreign policy. Despite a change in administration, Zimbabwe's foreign policy remains informed by regional integration, African integration, multilateralism and territorial sovereignty.

Regional and international actors cannot continue to wait for regime change as a prerequisite for constructive engagement. The problems in Zimbabwe are not unique to the country. To varying degrees, issues of governance, corruption and inequality, and the difficulties of translating growth into jobs, are of concern to governments across the region. The promotion of the 'region brand' is as important as that of the 'nation-brand', and this requires the southern African region, as a whole, to address human development issues, implement pro-poor policies and tackle increasing food insecurity. To end isolationism, Zimbabwe should re-engage with friends from which it had become estranged. There is need for urgent economic recovery opening up Zimbabwe to international investment that is protected through binding international agreements such as Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements (BIPPAS) and need for civil and political reforms to transform the political landscape. Nevertheless, following some concerns over the credibility of the electoral process, the future of Zimbabwe's re-engagement with the international community remains somewhat uncertain.

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CHAPTER 6: DEVOLUTION AND DECENTRALISATION

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ABSTRACT

Cognisant of the evolution in the global socio economic and technological structures, Zimbabwe decided to launch, the Vision 2030 Agenda in an effort to boost the country's growth. Thus, various programmes have been implemented, the Transitional Stabilisation Programme, 2018-2020 (TSP) piloting the Vision 2030 Agenda and currently the National Development Strategy 2021-2025 (NDS1) is underway. Clearly, the NDS1 is aimed at providing economic expansion, sustainable development, health and food security, to name a few. The programme stands on these distinctive pillars that are focused on addressing current affairs in the country. The NDS1 is particularly a short-term strategy enforced under the Vision 2030 Agenda, hence proffers growth in respective stages and areas. However, an up-close assessment of the NDS1 reveals that as stated before, the agenda is planned in a transformative, transparent and accountable manner which will ensure delivery of targeted services in a vigorous way and bring about development to the masses. The NDS1, additionally bears solutions to address global challenges which include natural resources conservation, climate change response, social stability in context of gender equality and promoting the handicapped and youth empowerment. Among these is notably autonomy to the lower governing structures through decentralisation and devolution. That is a major shift in terms of administrative or governance transformation in the country. Devolution and decentralisation will play a pivotal role in proffering development in all the sectors, hence its value in the NDS programme is fundamental. The chapter bears an assessment of the NDS1, in particular and the emphasis being on devolution and decentralisation, in context of its planning, monitoring and evaluation.

INTRODUCTION.

The GoZ, in the Second Republic, has harnessed the Vision 2030 programme in response to collapsing socio-economic and governance structures (ZCDD, 2021). Since 2018, the country has faced various

challenges across all sectors in terms of transformative economic development. Hence the TSP, under the wing of the Vision 2030 programme, pioneered the way and functioned from October 2018 to December 2020. The two-year economic programme was a success as it managed to induce macro-economic stability. Furthermore, the TSP tactic evidently produced fiscal consolidation, external sector balance and exchange rate stability (Pasipanodya, 2020). In January 2021, the NDS1 then succeeded the TSP in a bid to achieve the socio-economic and macroeconomic goals within Vision 2030.

NDS1 directs solutions in various sectors as mentioned before, such as the macroeconomic sector, social stability, environmental awareness and conservation and, lastly, of great interest is the realisation of governance modification towards an inclusive and participatory governance. Chapter 11 of the NDS1 states that the GoZ, since 1984, has embarked on decentralisation programmes that have misfired instead at most. Therefore, Vision 2030 has restructured the decentralisation approach through the NDS1's decentralisation and devolution tactic. In consonance with Yuliani (2004), decentralisation is the conveying of power from central governance to lower levels in a political administrative and territorial hierarchy, hence the NDS1 seeks to proffer such an adjustment with the aim of transforming governance through decentralisation that, in turn, will engender socio-economic transformation through inclusive and participatory local authorities.

Its involvement in the NDS programme provides a panel for the people to control development rather than in the traditional way of governance, where central government dictates the projects and how they should be carried out.

Devolution has been explained by Yuliani, (*ibid.*) as the “delegation of rights and resources to local governance”, this clearly unveiling government's effort to bring about equal utilisation of resources to all the communities. The present chapter hence practically dissects the NDS1 in an effort to explore the configuration of decentralisation and devolution and how it has been applied, and particularly the monitoring and the probable impacts in the agenda.

LITREATURE REVIEW

Devolution and decentralisation have been priority policies aimed at addressing governance and utilisation of resources since 1980 (Conyers, 2003). Masunungure and Ndoma (2013) maintain devolution as the highest degree of power transfer that diffuses governance powers, authority resources and responsibilities to local authorities. The local authorities then have the limited power to administer their own development. However, the power has thresholds. Decentralisation, on the other hand, is the general term used to describe the transfer of power from central governance to the lower governance (Moyo and Ncube, 2014). Therefore, after the attainment of independence, the country was in a bid to promote immediate socio-economic transformation, that is provide health care, education and the housing policy and decentralisation was done in a structure that transferred power from a central body to provincial, district and local authorities.

This then produced social and economic goals, these being decentralisation and devolution. These two were centred on equal participation of communities and authorities in decision-making and resource mobilisation. Furthermore, they were to safeguard local and human capital resources in communities. Although the power was theoretically transferred, according to Conyers (2003), less practical power had been conveyed to the lower tier authorities and this resulted in the misuse of the power and resources.

The decentralisation structure in the 1990s consisted mainly of fiscal decentralisation and sectorial decentralisation. According to Zinyama (2021), devolution in the early years of Zimbabwe's independence was not effective. The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013), in Chapter 14, notably recognises the urgency of devolution in transformation of the country through development. The reintroduction of the decentralisation and devolution was a bold move, though it was not appreciated by the respective authorities, hence the policy was ineffective.

UNDERSTANDING THE Nds1

Zimbabwe's socio-economic standing has not been stable since independence/ this explains the numerous policies the country has

implemented since 1980, directed at various sectors but to no avail. Munro (2014) states the policies, however, produced sprinkles of breakthroughs and these include ZIMASSET STEM, ZIMPREST, NERP and ESAP, and TSP to name a few. These plans have been implemented in a bid to achieve a stable GDP and robust social and economic development. This section then investigates the, NDS1 structure and provides a comprehensive version of the programme structure.

The NDS1, unlike the previous blueprints, its main focus is on driving socio-economic factors that address challenges by utilising existing and modern methodologies. The programme has 14 main elements that are implemented in the mandate of transforming the socio-economic, environment.

The NDS1 programme, as stated before is the successor to the economic TSP and its value to the Vision 2030 agenda is to proffer the most needed solutions in the social and economic environment. The uniqueness of this me can be seen in the clear implementation plan or matrix as alluded to by ZCDD (2021), that the implementation is closely followed by monitoring and evaluation, which are major attributes of a successful action. Emphasis on devolution shows that the programme automatically facilitates cohesion with other sectors such as health, social infrastructure and food production through participatory governance and local resource manipulation.

The national development plan has full potential of developing the country as it is an inclusive blueprint established through consultative processes. The programme bears crystal clear plan frames that are backed by competent systems such as the Implementation Result Based Management (IRBM), that are the driving factors within the programme. On another note, the NDS1 proves to be much more effective as it has its priorities closely linked to each other and this then creates simultaneous development of all sectors. The 14 priorities are generally converging. The programme, however, is on the edge as this insinuates that if one programme fails to properly function, then the whole system will collapse.

Macroeconomic stability is the cornerstone of the NDS1 guidelines. As a result, the blueprint applies a dynamic stance to end misappropriation of

finances, wipe-out poverty and, lastly, creates strong ties with the international community. The main priority of the NDS1 is the stabilisation of the economy. The NDS programme basically evolves around the macroeconomic sector. Though the macroeconomic sector contends with the COVID-19 pandemic, the programme has been designed to easily adapt. The proposed strategies are implemented, and these include investment in energy, water and sanitation and the use of domestic and foreign fiscal policies. More so, the creation of employment and social umbrellas will also be highly dependent on the successfulness of the macroeconomic strategies.

Value addition and value chain creations are part of the NDS1 goals in improving industrial networking and, consequently, the industry, to have the required efficacy for a stable economy. Value chains will interlink the transport, energy, water and ICT infrastructure. Infrastructure development in the country is at a critical stage, in response to this. The NDS intends to revive infrastructure, through private investment, research in infrastructure and completing stagnant projects. In addition, according to the NDS1 (2021), economic re-engagement with the international community is one of the vital components of boosting the country's economy.

Poverty remains a threat in the country despite the previous policies, hence the Second Republic designed a section within the NDS1 that places particular emphasis on how poverty is alienated, within the five-year plan. According to NANGO (2021), poverty levels over the years have risen drastically due to increased occurrences of natural phenomena such as droughts and this has left the populace vulnerable to food insecurity. Economic recessions over the years have left both the urban and rural populace exposed to serious poverty. The current five-year plan proposes to increase food self-sufficiency by 55% and reduce food insecurity by 49%. Additionally, the NDS1 also targets to increase maize produce from the current 907 629 tonnes to 3 million tonnes by 2025, so poverty alleviation is targeted through vigorous agricultural transformation. Although the government has the capacity to deliver the above mentioned, natural disasters can be very costly and difficult for a country in its

beginning stages of developing. Droughts, floods and pests can destroy large volumes of produce and cripple the country.

Agriculture is basically the backbone of the country's food production but poor outputs in the sector have exacerbated poverty in Zimbabwe. Additionally, bottlenecks in engineering mechanisms, limited access to regional markets and low inputs have worsened poverty in the country. A close observation of the NDS1 reveals its efforts to tackle the above-mentioned challenges. First and foremost, the strategy is poised at introducing resilience and sustainable agriculture through community-based programmes, such as the *Pfumbudza/Intwasa* programme which has been appreciated greatly by large- and small-scale farmers.

The NDS1 is also designed to revitalise major agricultural giants such as the Cold Storage Commission in a bid to ameliorate the agricultural industry. Research and experimentation are the key features in upscaling the industry with this, new resilient breeds are discovered. Sustainable agriculture is highly considered in the programme, therefore, diversification and introduction of global standard modes of agriculture have been singularly proposed as the solutions to these challenges in the country.

Mechanisation has also been considered in the NDS1. The importation of global standard machinery is proposed in the strategy and the introduction of public-private sector initiatives have been targeted as the drivers for a stable agricultural sector. Land tenure and distribution have affected agriculture, the government, through the NDS, has introduced new land mandates that enable farmers to easily access land. The government has further re-instituted the Agribank as the official land bank and with this; the programme facilitates accessibility for farmers who need land. Spatial issues or disparities are resolved through regulatory frameworks that also proffer spatial planning services and mapping to produce robust agricultural functions. In this context, the government signed the Global Compensation Deed on July 2020 (NDS, 2021). The deed creates the pathway to international reengagement, one of the key elements.

Housing in Zimbabwe has also been one of the greatest threats as it is clear how all other government's efforts to resolve this challenge have

failed. The government has battled the housing challenge, coming up with strategies such as the *Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle* programmes, but these have not done well. Through the NDS1, the housing challenges are planned to be reduced by the production of 220 000 housing units for the populace. Zimbabwe's housing issues have always been because of the economic instability, leading to mushrooming of informal settlements, especially in urban areas.

Illegal spatial processes facilitated by land barons have led to the creation of informal settlements in urban centres. In response to this, the NDS1 envisaged the re-introduction of 'mortgage financing schemes. These will enable all working citizens to purchase affordable houses. This method is beneficial mostly to civil servants. The restoration of the Housing Guarantee Fund (HGF) is a significant stance in the NDS1 programme as it will be a catalyst for housing delivery across the country. The introduction of new industrial technology will reduce costs in construction and, in turn, will create affordable housing to all. Government housing revitalisation is the crucial step in housing backlogs.

Land delivery has been considered in the NDS 1as one of the main factors affecting proper settlement structures. The programme intends to acquire 10 000 hectares for housing development in urban areas, and through this land, housing is delivered by efficient land developers under rigorous supervision by local authorities. The programme will produce 124 fully planned formal rural settlements. Land disputes are addressed through the restructuring of legal acts pertaining to land acquisition and occupation. Decentralisation of the approval from bodies such as the Department of Physical Planning will fast-track approval processes. The current poor service infrastructure such as water, communication, roads and sanitation facilities, is also addressed by the NDS1.

The consideration of informal settlements in the NDS1 programme indicates government's concern over the housing crisis, through the regularisation of the informal settlements housing demand. The health system has not been in a stable state over the past decade, with shortage of resources and staff, leading to poor health service delivery. The NDS1 provides access to health care and seeks to improve health infrastructure.

That would be a substantive step towards provision for primary health and hospital care, which are priorities of the programme.

Furthermore, the rebranding and remodelling of the health personnel and infrastructure will lead to the attainment of world health standards. To boot this notion, local appreciation of drug manufacturers will improve drug availability and, in turn, increase the refinement of health in the country. The NDS road map will also accommodate resilience against mortality through tackling the most threatening communicable diseases. Water and sanitation transmutation are also the primary targets of the NDS blueprint in the health sector.

Focus on environmental conservation is made in the NDS1 road map, evidencing its uniqueness compared to previous ones. The strategy seeks to take several global stances in managing local natural resources through sustainable natural resources utilisation and protection of the climate (NDS, 2021).

Environmental disasters have shaken the global community, and their constant frequency needs to be carefully addressed. The most recent natural hazard, Cyclone Idai, exposed the country's poor preparedness to natural disasters, hence the NDS1 will facilitate strategies to provide possible ways of preparedness. The NDS1 will also tackle the current global warming threat through resource capitalisation and awareness to the population. Sustainable development can then be achieved through these tactics.

One of the primal components of the NDS1 blueprint is to tender participation and control of local resources in the decision-making processes to local authorities through decentralisation. Decentralisation as mentioned earlier is the transfer of power from a central governing body to a lower one, local authorities being the lower tiers will receive authority to mobilise resources through NDS1 programmes that include the introduction of policies which promote devolution, revisit and alter the constitution to meet devolution standards and supplement new legislation to increase the effectiveness of decentralisation.

Governance, in line with the NDS1 will shift from a centred form to that of a participatory one. Local authorities will govern resources under a scheduled and properly monitored umbrella whilst the central government promotes the management of the funds to be dispersed. In line with constitutional provision, the central government will issue out 5% of the gross domestic product (GDP) to all local authorities as the devolution fund and, consequently, local authorities will utilise these funds in their planned programmes and submit periodical reports to their respective provincial superiors for monitoring and evaluation.

Devolution is an inclusive mode of governance; hence the NDS1 will implement development propellers such as human capital development which will improve the skill base, economic development and technology. Moreover, the remodelling of local governance structures, from provincial levels to village levels, will promote developmental cohesion and this is directly linked to national structures. Project plans will be created by local authorities and monitored by provincial boards, and, with this setup, alignment of national projects and local projects is possible. Devolution will also ease the need for infrastructure, health care and employment through its various development strategies, more so projects facilitated by the respective communities. This reduces the occurrences of white elephant projects.

Social protection in the country seems to be lacking and the NDS1 has targeted the following strategic points to manage the situation. The idea is to increase ease of access to all social commodities by the populace, the government to implement this through devolution and also through socio-economic strategies. The government has proved their bid for change to be valid; however, the social protection strategy may fail as it is highly dependent on the economy which, at the moment, is under negative forces.

To add on to social protection, it is augmented by human capital development, a method of increasing the skill base in the country and in turn boost the economy of the country to desired outcomes. This initiative was once enacted by the Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts and Mathematics (STEAM), a projected developmental strategy to create an

increased number of technological students to enhance technology and natural sciences in the county. Therefore, the NDS1 proposes to induce a similar strategy that will enhance skills for the industry and, in turn, resuscitate the country's manufacturing sector.

More so, this approach will increase innovation and, in turn, technology, invention and industrial transformation will emerge. This approach to industrialisation will boost the country and indeed fast track the transformation process, but if the industrial market is not accommodative, then the initiative will meet many challenges.

APPRAISAL OF PLANNING

The devolution master plan is generally understandable and generic to follow through. The devolution initiative is implemented gradually in stages to fully achieve transparency and this creates a platform for easier evaluation for amendments and/or additions. Government, through the NDS1, plans to provide full transfer of political power to local authorities and this will result in the management of projects by local authorities and enhance efficiency through community participation and utilisation of local resources. Furthermore, fiscal transfer of power will be superimposed to enable local authorities to manipulate funds and disburse the finances to respective projects.

The whole national development plan is anchored by the IRBM, an efficiency stabiliser that maintains the motive to attain the desired results. The IRBM, as planned, will focus on five main angles: integrated development planning, results-based budgeting, personal performance system, monitoring and evaluation, and management of information systems. These points are the main veins of development as they determine each and every process in the programme. The IRBM plays a strategic role in the efficiency of the NDS1. However, its implementation may encounter difficulties due to poor follow-ups and the resources for such programmes may take long to reach remote areas.

This system has been implemented by many countries and the end result shows positive growth, therefore the IRBM implementation by the government, indicates the efforts and potential the programme has in

transforming the country's economic and social atmosphere. The government has set a very expectations on its self, considering the current unstable governance system being run on outdated structures and the economic state. The programme might be just another machine gun shooting blanks.

The introduction of devolution is aimed at facilitating good governance through transparency inclusiveness and participatory decision-making (Madzimore, 2021). These have been aligned with the Constitution and the government has set up frameworks mandated to achieve these goals. Devolution and decentralisation will bring about a new system of governance, that is, the national government, provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. With this hierarchy in place, the planning will flow in a bottom-up manner. However, the monitoring and evaluation is centralised.

Planning processes that usually involve problem-identification, evaluation of possible solutions and implementing the solutions are administered by the lower tiers at their own discretion, but under a budget funded by the central government. According to the NDS1 blueprint, all governing bodies will function under the guidelines of the Constitution. Therefore, government aims to strengthen all existing local or lower-tier authorities to ensure the proper implementation of decentralisation in the communities.

As planned, the introduction of ICT for smooth operation of the decentralisation programme has been proposed in the NDS1, with proper computerisation in the authorities, efficiency, speed, accuracy and accountability achieved. Furthermore, local authorities are independent of the central governance, as stated by the constitution of the country. The devolution process is also planned appreciating people's rights, hence political power is directly transferred to the provincial and local authorities to facilitate efficient governance and administration.

Among targeted goals are infrastructure development, roads, institutional buildings and standard water and sanitation and services. These are tackled by local authorities through devolution via projects funded by the central government. Participatory planning is initiated through community

engagement in projects and these processes will all be transparent and in line with the then current national projects. The decentralisation of authority by government may induce practical transformation and change, but communities have to fully cooperate and, with the current political and economic atmosphere, there is not much participation that can be achieved as the communities may sense differences in various forms and cooperation will not be achieved.

APPRAISAL OF MONITORING

Monitoring is the constant assessment and restricting of an on-going process to achieve set goals by the end of the process. This concept is implemented to provide a platform for one to check for flows and make possible predictions of the near future. Monitoring in the NDS1 programme has been greatly appreciated as evidenced in the IRBM which purports that monitoring and evaluation factors are important aspects in the programme. This approach will ensure clear and constant consultations on project proposals and will also increase efficiency. The structured monitoring will induce a transparent platform for development. Devolution will then be transparent with the utilisation of resources closely observed for any untoward practices.

The thematic group responsible for monitoring and evaluation for this priority is the Ministry of Local Government and Public Works, with emphasis on zero corruption, excellent service delivery and project banking. Decentralisation will ensure that the concept is implemented correctly and that the desired outcomes are achieved. From another perspective, the monitoring process may not be fully successful due to incompetent resource mobilisation and, most importantly, without an effective anti-corruption attitude, funds may be misappropriated.

The monitoring will also serve as a control system to check for any inefficiencies in all the planned sections of the devolution programme. It will ensure transparency in all local and provincial authorities. Though this system applies to all the other NDS sectors, in the devolution sector monitoring is one of the prerequisites for success as there is too much risk in the utilisation of resources at local level. Monitoring, as mentioned before, will follow the hierarchy as evidenced by the instance where

provincial personnel will constantly check progress reports on its respective districts, whilst district administrators will also check progress on their respective local authorities. This system of devolution in governance will ensure efficacy of the devolution concept.

APPRAISAL OF IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation of the devolution in the NDS1 basically follows the format mentioned in the planning section. The implementation of the devolution initiative is systematically programmed to follow the blueprint and simultaneously accommodate any adjustments along its course of implementation. The NDS1, as stated in the policy, has been implemented through various strategies, including thematic groups which initiated sectorial consultations for accuracy in focusing on projects. In the devolution sector, the consultations were conducted at provincial level to include the people's decisions in the implementation of the project.

Implementation stages will involve the gradual introduction of the devolution process such as the consultation, approval of the projects and financing by the government. The NDS1 states that this manner of implementation will prevent inconsistency, corruption and inefficiency. After being submitted to the relevant ministries, the implementation of the project proposals then proceeds to the commencement of the projects, with local authorities constantly providing progress reports and attending symposia for further familiarisation with the agenda and to proffer any negative factors. There is evidence that the implementation has met the targeted goal of efficiency. Even so, there are possible negative implications and these have to be closely monitored to avoid failure of the programme.

APPRAISAL OF EVALUATION

The evaluation process within the NDS1 fully facilitates the detection any negative elements in the programme and provides a prediction system for the agenda, as aforementioned. Evaluation, as defined by the Oxford Electronic Dictionary (2021), is the act of ascertaining or fixing value to a certain component, hence in the context of the NDS agenda, the evaluation will account for all its possible strengths and weaknesses and excellently proffer, best adjustments to the weak points.

Evaluation, as stated by the NDS1 (2021), is a mandate that is constantly met in all the NDS1 agendas and is facilitated by thematic groups or bodies responsible for each respective area. Most importantly, the evaluation will closely monitor project stages and evaluate the progress of the projects in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. The evaluation process will ensure that the devolution process is efficiently initiated and all possible anomalies are fished out.

DISCUSSION

The NDS1 is a masterpiece that will determine country's transformation from a lower-income class to a higher one. The 14 priorities set to drive the transformation system are, interconnected and proffer a comprehensive form of development structure, whilst at the same time, they bring about modern technology. From its crafting, the policy, explains the various problems the country is facing; hence, the crafted policies are set at clinically dissecting the issues and proffering the best possible solutions, but highly cautious of any anomalies and possible failures, through monitoring and evaluation.

Through these lenses the NDS becomes a 99.9 % success policy, with all the possible methods of avoiding failure, but this is a mere theoretical view. A literature review of the past polices indicates that most of the programmes never saw light of day, or that resources never made it to the intended destinations (ZIMCDD, 2021). Conscious of this fact, the certainty of the success of this programme becomes questionable. With the current economic conditions and the political, environment, the NDS1 can be one of the many theoretically perfect policies but with poor implementation and, consequently, no development at all.

More so the NDS1 comes at a time when the government also battles with major problems such as the COVID-19 and the natural Cyclone Idai-induced disaster in Chimanimani. With such a load of pressure, the implementation matrix is greatly affected as there is need to adapt to these conditions, hence the success of the programme is minimised, and this needs government to have powerful adaptation responses to these new conditions. Therefore, one can state that the success of the NDS is

highly dependent on the efficiency of the government in all the above-mentioned sectors.

The success of full devolution will ascertain the full, implementation of development, especially in the rural areas through full participation of the communities and local authorities (Conyers, 2003), However, in Zimbabwe the decentralisation, concept has been biased towards wrong targets, and that explains the failure of the devolution initiative.

With the current agenda, the devolution has been implemented in a peculiar form that will prosper or perform well if implemented without biasness, the constant monitoring and evaluation will provide a control system for the devolution, process to be implemented efficiently.

CONCLUSIONS AND OPTIONS

The socio-economic conditions are at a critical point, and there is need for intensive implementation of a model such as the, proposed NDS1. With such a programme, the much needed socio-economic, transformation can be achieved. The first note to make concerns transparency within the ministries and all the authorities that are facilitating, the NDS1. Transparency will induce proper facilitation of resources the government will disburse for the project.

The first method of creating transparency would be to establish an independent board within the NDS1, is responsible for controlling corruption and the use of funds in the system. Although a similar, system already exists within the NDS1, an independent one would involve less conspiracy and nepotism.

Awareness of the structure of the NDS1 should be intensified, especially in the remote countryside, as the current awareness strategy in the NDS1 was initiated before the COVID-19 pandemic, hence the lockdown needed a much-digitalised mode of conveying information to the populace through television and radio broad casts. Even the social media can be used to channel out summarised versions of the national development programme. The awareness will help in educating the populace who are the main stakeholders in the programme as purported by the NDS1.

There is need to have a flexible, revenue stream that will initiate an equal wave of development in all the areas that need development. Revenue streams can be, initiated through local decentralisation of the fiscal system and have local authorities raise certain amounts that are then scheduled into the devolution programme.

The devolution initiative will have to be fully implemented and avoid a situation whereby the programme is made to suit certain conditions. If the devolution agenda is wrongly implemented, the development control and focus is lost, leading to another wasted policy implementation and continuous struggling of the people. In a nutshell, the National Development Strategy is one of the most important policies as it bears ideas to fully bring about development in Zimbabwe, on the same note, the implementation of this programme and its success are highly sensitive and have to be implemented in a way that will guarantee improvements in the social-economic sector.

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CHAPTER 7: AGE AND GENDER: NEEDS, ASSESSMENT AND WELL-BEING

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ABSTRACT

This chapter discusses cross-cutting issues that include youth, sport, art, culture and gender mainstreaming in Zimbabwe. It examines the strategies, policies, legal and institutional reforms and the programmes and projects implemented over a five-year period, 2021-2025, to achieve holistic, accelerated, high, inclusive, broad-based and sustainable economic growth and socio-economic transformation and development. The background to this subject is that the National Development Strategy 1: 2021-2025 (NDS1) is the successor to the Transitional Stabilisation Programme (TSP) and is the first five-year medium-term plan aimed at realising the country's Vision 2030 of an Upper Middle and Prosperous economy. Methodically, the chapter deploys the case study method. Data were collected from secondary data sources, Google Scholar, government gazettes and reports. Findings indicate that Zimbabwe has of late implemented many blueprints but failed because of social, economic and political factors. It is concluded that cross-cutting issues, gender and social exclusion issues, if not addressed, could undermine the achievement of the intermediate results expected under the resilience and sustainability concept. The chapter recommends that governments and other actors should promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programmes, so that before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effect on women and men.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses cross-cutting issues that include youth, sport, art, culture and gender mainstreaming in Zimbabwe. Young people constitute a major source of the human capital base that hold and drive the socio-cultural, economic and political development of their countries all over the world (Hoetu, 2011). Their intellectual abilities, coupled with their productive acumen when properly harnessed, underpin social progress.

Youth are a valuable resource, especially if they are allowed and empowered to build and strengthen qualities that enable them to grow

and flourish into responsible citizens (*ibid.*). Thus, by so doing, gender mainstreaming creates a cohesive national social fabric and reduces social tensions emanating from exclusion of a large segment of the population. Sport, art and culture ensure unity, influence identity, debate and dialogue. Culture is important for nation-building, promotion of family values and for peace and reconciliation. They also enhance quality of life and increase overall well-being and happiness for individuals, families and communities.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In a demographically young continent like Africa, young people represent immense potential, as both threat and opportunity. Political leaders demanding change and those seeking to defend the existing order, seek to mobilise and deploy young people to their side in the physical sense and ideologically (*ibid.*). In effect, the energies and abilities of young people are exploited positively through various activities that promote development and negatively through their involvement in violent conflict and other social vices that undermine social progress (*ibid./*). Young people are gullible to manipulation to engage in violence. In most conflicts across Ghana and elsewhere in the world, the youth are used to prosecute violence in religious, ethnic, political, land and other natural resource-related conflicts (USAID, 2005). Youth and women are exposed to the trade and use of illicit drugs and arms. Other vices in society where the youth are most vulnerable include armed robbery, alcohol abuse, and sex abuse, among others. Box 1 elaborates a classical example on women's organisations and sustainable change.

Box 1: Women's organisations and sustainable change

In Peru, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) support for women's organisations resulted in improved gender focus and programming in local non-governmental organisations (NGO)s, women's involvement in decision-making and leadership at community and local political levels. The election of women as municipal councillors increased the ability of women's organisations to negotiate with local government and other institutions, responsiveness of those institutions to women's demands, and evidence of men supporting these changes in women's roles. In Vietnam, training and institutional strengthening for women's organisations by CIDA have resulted in more women in economic and political decision-making at local and national levels and improved capacity of public and private institutions to deliver programmes that benefit women.

Source: CIDA (2000a)

The term 'gender mainstreaming' was originally used in the 1970s by experts in the field of education and subsequently became institutionalised at the launch of the United Nations (UN) Decade for Women in Mexico in 1975. The concern was how to integrate women into existing structures of development (Charlesworth, 2005). The Beijing Platform for Action reaffirmed the need for all organisations and governments to ensure that gender equality was promoted in all areas of social and economic development, including education, health, domestic violence, armed conflict, the economy, decision-making and human rights. Therefore, gender mainstreaming involves bringing about institutional changes to ensure the empowerment of both women and men through equal participation in decision-making on issues that affect their lives; analysing all government policies and practices to examine the different impacts they have on men and women and providing training and capacity-building to enhance gender management skills and raise the general level of gender awareness within institutions of government and society in general (Charlesworth, 2005; Walby, 2005). Table 1 illustrates the different levels of the rating scale and provides explanations for each level.

Table 1: Gender Representation Rating Scale (Commission for Gender Equality, 2014)

| | | |
|---------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Level 5 | Balanced Gender Representation | Between 45% and 50% of the Senior Management of males and females. Service/Team |
| Level 4 | Critical Mass Gender Representation | Minority Gender represents between 30% and 45% of the Senior Management Service/Team |
| Level 3 | Progressive Gender Representation | Minority Gender makes up between 15% and 30% of Senior Management Service/Team |
| Level 2 | Symbolic/Token Gender Representation | Minority Gender constitutes up to 15% of the Senior Management Service/Team |
| Level 1 | Failed Gender Representation | Institution's Senior Management Service/Team is exclusively one Gender to the exclusion of another Gender |

This means that, based on the number of women represented in the SMS division, compared to their male counterparts, a department's performance would be rated between Level 1 (for poor performance) and Level 5 (for best performance).

In Uganda, exclusion is anchored on the basis of identity. These identities constitute what is described in Uganda's policies as vulnerable groups. They include orphans and other vulnerable children (OVCs), persons with disabilities (PWDs), unemployed youth, displaced persons, marginalised women, older persons and ethnic minorities (MGLSD, 2016). PWDs constitute about 18% of the population (UNHS, 2010). About 46% of girls are married below the age of 18 (UNICEF, 2015), while youth unemployment stands at 18% (MGLSD, 2016). Despite vulnerabilities caused by disability and old age, only 5% of the population have access to government social safety nets (World Bank, 2016). For instance, although women constitute 84% of agricultural the labour force, they own only 27% of registered land (NPA, 2013). Women are disproportionately represented in unpaid care work – spending over three hours a day on housework compared to less than one hour spent by men (Action Aid, 2014). This and the low number of women in technical and professional jobs limit their incomes. Men earn more than twice (US\$2 535) as much as their female counterparts (US\$1 008) annually (WEF, 2016). Other forms of exclusion from markets include: exclusion of youth, due to limited skills and experience, exclusion of PWDs, due to limited labour capacity; and exclusion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or intersex (LGBTI) people, due to low social tolerance for their sexual orientation.

In African countries, unemployment is still a challenge, particularly among the youth and women. Although the average unemployment rate in Uganda is 9.4% (PSR, 2014), the bulk of the population (81.5%) is in unpaid subsistence employment. High unemployment and underemployment among the youth particularly results in low incomes and exclusion from markets and a range of social services. Women occupy only 33% of parliamentary seats and only 30% ministerial positions (WEF, 2016). These statistics mirror women's representation in local councils. Cultural barriers to women's participation in politics, and a general apathy

by marginalised groups towards political participation, are explored further in the governance system's programme area.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The chapter is based on a desktop study involving interrogation of literature and documents mined from Google Scholar, Ebscor and websites with news and polices, statuses and related material. For data analysis, the study engaged textual analysis mainly. Textual and content analysis have been applied to decipher and pigeonhole into different issues towards clustering them into meaningful themes, hence moulding the debate of the chapter. The information used was taken from different parts of the world due to the fact that cross cutting-,issues that include youth, sport, art, culture and gender mainstreaming concepts, debates and ideas are more prevalent in developing countries.

UNDERSTANDING THE PROVISIONS IN THE NDS1 DOCUMENT

The NDS1 is the successor to the TSP and is the first five-year medium-term plan aimed at realising the country's Vision 2030 (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020). National priorities were crafted taking into consideration the TSP Mid-Term Review, Vision 2030, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Africa Agenda 2063, SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and provincial and district profiles. Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has implemented several economic blueprints aimed at promoting sustainable economic growth, development and poverty alleviation. Through the implementation of these blueprints, the country has managed develop and achieve good results. However, the development results achieved have not been enough to spur the economy to expected levels of sustainable economic development due to both exogenous and endogenous factors (*ibid.*).

To achieve upper middle-income society, Zimbabwe will need to develop the formulation and implementation of bold and robust policies. The government will need to undertake interventions through medium- and short-term national development plans. The TSP (October 2018-December 2020) was implemented as a first step of a three-phase process to attain the country's Vision 2030 outcomes. It was aimed at stabilising the macro economy and the financial sector, introducing necessary policy and

institutional reforms to transform the economy to a private sector-led economy, and launching quick-wins to stimulate growth (*ibid.*). The TSP was created to deal with challenges affecting the country's economic development in the long run. These include persistent and unsustainable budget deficits, inflationary pressures, uncontrolled domestic borrowing and unsustainable debt levels (*ibid.*).

The NDS1 is underpinned by the Integrated Result Based Management (IRBM) system. IRBM inculcates a culture of high performance, quality service delivery, measurement, goal clarity, continuous improvement and accountability across the public sector (*ibid.*). In Zimbabwe, significant progress was made in the implementation of the TSP across various pillars and these include fiscal consolidation, restoration of monetary policy, stabilisation of the exchange rate, the undertaking of governance and institutional reforms, entrenched engagement and re-engagement with the international community, facilitation of investment and infrastructure development.

The GoZ has, for the first time in the history of crafting national blueprints, designed National and Sectoral Results Frameworks to systematically guide the formulation and implementation process of the NDS1. These frameworks allow for horizontal and vertical linkages, thus doing systems approach method. There is also need for improving efficacy in programming and effective policy management by the GoZ. Therefore, national priorities are aimed at contributing towards economic growth and development, reducing poverty and inequality and transforming institutions to enhance public sector efficiency and effective service delivery (*ibid.*).

APPRAISAL OF PLANNING

The robust economic growth and transformative thrust of moving up the value chain during the NDS1 is premised on availability of efficient key enablers such as energy, transport and water. Moving the economy up the value chain and domesticating them will also depend on the availability of throughput from primary sectors such as agriculture and mining, and priority under the NDS1 is to increase investment in new infrastructure and rehabilitation and upgrading of existing infrastructure (*ibid.*). As a

result, the focus will also be on increasing production and productivity through resolving bottlenecks such as land tenure in agriculture, legislative gaps in mining and operationalising the productivity centre.

Zimbabwe has the advantage accruing to most developing economies – the youth dividend. The total population is estimated at 14.8 million and growing at 1.4% per annum and a life expectancy of 61 years at birth. In Zimbabwe, as much as 53.6% of the population is below 20 years, while 62.9% of the population is below 24 years and of those below 24 years, 31.7% are females, while 31.2% are males (*ibid.*).

In terms of gender, the GoZ has prioritised gender equality to enhance women’s participation in the development process, in line with the Constitution, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Gender and Development, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (*ibid.*). This is supported by SDG5, which states to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. This is imperative because if all women have been included in the political, economic and social activity, it is critical for the attainment of Vision 2030.

In recent years, participation in sport and recreation in the country has been declining due to weak economic activity and, more, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in Zimbabwe and the rest of the world being affected. Given the new normal under COVID-19, which has disrupted economic activities across the globe, particularly tourism and the global travel services industry, the GoZ must adapt fast with these changing scenarios as the future pattern of this disease and its full impacts remain uncertain (*ibid.*). Despite this, Zimbabwe has inadequate sporting and recreational facilities, and some have deteriorated due to lack of maintenance. A case example includes that of Gwanzura Stadium where lack of maintenance has caused the stadium to become low standard.

To increase promotion and safeguarding of arts, culture and heritage, the country needs effective strategies that provide the framework to understand, preserve, manage, integrate, interpret and promote heritage and strengthen family values, both in the immediate and long-term future

(*ibid.*). Effective ways is through education, learning of history and philosophy, awareness campaigns and ritual ceremonies to be constantly practised as a way to preserve culture, promote heritage and strengthen family values and beliefs. A classical example is that of the Ndebele and Tonga people are usually identified through their dressing of beads and how they speak English.

Gender equality is a fundamental goal of development and belongs to the basic and universally recognised civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. Worldwide, women are less frequently seen participating in sports activities than men (Brady and Khan, 2002). Sport can promote mental and physical wellbeing, and studies have shown that it reduces the risk of chronic diseases later in life. Thus, sport for girls and for boys should be encouraged. Women are also under-represented in the decision-making bodies of sporting institutions. Increased participation by women would diversify the talent pool of administrators, coaches and officials (White and Scoretz, 2002). Sport-related development projects would become more effective in reaching all groups within target populations and communities.

APPRAISAL OF MONITORING

In this regard, Government has also developed a robust monitoring and evaluation system that will anchor the NDS1. Under the SMART Zimbabwe 2030, that is a broad strategy that includes the e-Government Programme, a Whole of Government Performance Management Solution (WoGPMS) is used to monitor all programmes and projects implemented by the Government on a real time bases during the NDS1. This strategy, therefore, requires acceleration and intensification of the implementation of ICT systems in both the public and private sectors.

Engagement of women in training, campaigns and awareness programmes will enhance women development projects in different areas. This is supported by SDG5, which states to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. This is imperative because if all women have been included in the political, economic and social activity it is critical for the attainment of Vision 2030. During the NDS1, integration of gender mainstreaming across all sectors will be strengthened, cognisant that

gender equality is fundamental to achieving equitable, sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development. This builds on GoZ's commitment under the Constitution, the Gender Responsive Budgeting Strategy, the National Gender Policy and Gender Equality and Women Empowerment Framework (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020). For example, this means that national budgets will only support programmes, projects and interventions that contribute to the achievement of national outcomes and realisation of national priorities as defined in the NDS1.

Mainstreaming youth comes with several benefits. First of all, it tends to make interventions such as policies, programmes and projects, more responsive to the needs of young people since their views are carefully considered in the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation (Hoetu, 2011). Again, the participation and partnership with young people in addressing their challenges help them build their capacities and prepare them for future leadership roles. It also helps them better appreciate challenges and makes them more reasonable in their demands.

In Rwanda, the USAID provided funding to rural women's associations for agricultural, livestock and micro-enterprise activities (USAID, 1999). Women's associations were successful at targeting the most vulnerable, including female-headed households. Through these small projects, women gained experience in decision-making and in managing local development activities (*ibid.*). As a result, women were more likely to participate in new political structures. This helped to reduce social tensions and promote unity. Increasing the number of female food monitors has increased the World Food Programme's effectiveness at reaching female target groups, and ensuring they are aware of their entitlements (WFP, 2002). Supporting women from different ethnic groups to participate jointly in food management and distribution committees has also helped to overcome ethnic divides that caused civil strife and conflict (*ibid.*2).

APPRAISAL OF IMPLEMENTATION

Various methods and mechanisms were used in transforming the governance ecosystem to ensure that the country's institutions, systems

and practices conform to the provisions of the new Constitution. To guarantee constitutional provisions, including fundamental rights, freedoms and responsibilities under the TSP, Government aligned more than 75% of the laws to the Constitution (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020). There was further implementation of various public sector reforms. For instance, vendors license is one such example where women emancipation has taken place and the creation of the two banks known as Microfinance Bank and the Women Empower Bank. Therefore, these public sector reforms are essential, enhance institutional and individual performance towards provision of quality services to the citizenry.

Notwithstanding these achievements, the TSP faced several challenges during its implementation. These include, among others, high inflationary pressures, exchange rate volatility, continued illegal sanctions against the country and exogenous shocks like droughts, Cyclone Idai and the COVID-19 pandemic (*ibid.*). In terms of exogenous shocks, the COVID-19 pandemic was the hardest of all time due to its uncertainty about how long it would last end and no one knew how it would end. For instance, the year 2020 changed everything in the real estate development sector. This was due to COVID-19 outbreak announced by the World Health Organisation as a world phenomenon. COVID-19 is a pandemic that hit the whole world and had negative impacts on human lives as many lost their lives. The lockdown closed many workplaces, reducing the requirement for all but essential service wee to be at work.

The implementation of the NDS1 will require a mindset change and a new way of thinking and doing business (*ibid.*). This mindset change will require public officials and the private sector to think, act and produce desired outcomes and outputs timeously. For example, successful implementation of the NDS1 prioritised programmes and projects should be implemented, taking into consideration the issue of the budget. Therefore, this means that the GoZ, when implementing a project, should timely avail funds to support identified programmes and projects in the strategy.

Effective implementation of programmes and projects is also dependent on the ease of doing business environment. Swift implementation of ease

of doing business reforms, strengthening of property rights, upholding the rule of law and combating corruption are the key tenets of the NDS1 (*ibid.*). Thus, the successful implementation of the NDS1 requires accountability, good governance and transparency, but this has been so difficult in Zimbabwe due to issues of corruption, nepotism and silo mentality. Therefore, the GoZ will need to upscale the change management strategy and fully implement the whole of government approach through systems approach and ensure that aspirations of disabilities, employment creation, and environment and information communication technology are realised within the context of the NDS1.

Globalisation requires inclusiveness in development processes that involve a bottom-up approach to social planning and implementation of programmes for sustainable socio-economic and cultural development. Thus, this sector focuses strongly on community capacity building programmes to enable members of the public prioritise areas of development that impact their livelihoods. For example, community-based assessment programmes, conservation of culture and heritage sites, identification and development of community projects, youth empowerment and, last but not least, gender mainstreaming.

APPRAISAL OF EVALUATION

On the domestic front, consolidating macroeconomic stability during the NDS1 is critical for enhancing certainty and confidence in the economy by anchoring the exchange rate and inflation (*Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020*). During the strategy, priority is to strengthen fiscal and monetary coordination, ending all quasi fiscal activities, curbing all unbudgeted expenditures and deepening the market-based foreign exchange rate system. Thus, financial resources without adequate, relevant, skilled and motivated human resources, will not deliver the desired outcomes of the NDS1. In this regard, during the NDS1, priority is to ensure timeous filling of posts in the public service with appropriate skills mix and regular reviews of conditions of service.

Policy and programme formulation needs to start with a comprehensive involvement and appropriate decision-taking of youth at all levels, including communities, schools and universities at provincial and national

levels (*ibid.*). AusAID's evaluation of a community development project in China found that women were poorly served by credit, training and "cash for work" inputs, with men dominating in all areas (AusAID, 2000). However, employing female credit extension agents improved targeting both to the poor in general and women. Working with women's groups reinforced patterns of cohesiveness and social support. This resulted in better loan recovery performance, even where loan repayments placed exceptional demands on women's and children's labour (*ibid.*).

A USAID-funded programme in Nepal aimed to empower women by providing literacy and legal rights training and credit (SIDA, 2000). The evaluation found increased decision-making by women on household matters. More household resources are being spent on family well-being, including food, clothing, education and health care. This has a direct impact on poverty reduction. Indirect impacts on poverty are due to women taking individual or collective action with local authorities to improve various aspects of their lives - for example, on domestic violence, alcohol abuse and property settlement after divorce, polygamy and community perceptions of women's work and appropriate behaviour (USAID 2001).

DISCUSSION

The change management strategy of Systems and Whole of Government Approach that is being championed by the Tripartite, namely Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC), Public Service Commission (PSC) and Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, will anchor the NDS1 (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020). Among them is the pace of the global economy recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. The recovery will have implications on domestic socio-economic progress. It has been noted that most youth in Zimbabwe have not embraced the culture of hard work and the principle that hard and honest work pays. During the NDS1, there is need to develop a mental construct for the youth in respect of the importance of hard honest work and that development in other countries has been a result of this most productive and most energetic group in society (*ibid.*). As a result, there are clear benefits for Zimbabwe to exploit both the Youth Dividend and Gender mainstreaming.




Figure 1: The demographic structure of the Population in Zimbabwe

Although Government has made some progress with regards to Gender Mainstreaming, the current situation is characterised largely by pronounced youth exclusion and limited Gender Mainstreaming. Women still face hurdles in respect of opportunities to ascend to commanding heights in the national economy, including:

- i. Limited access to finance;
- ii. Limited access to land and freehold property;
- iii. Limited opportunities to influence policy; and
- iv. Legal, cultural and patriarchal barriers (*ibid.*).

Sport development includes regulated, formalised and structured sporting activities. Sport entails an active involvement in physical exertion and skills that is governed by a set of rules or customs and often undertaken competitively (*ibid.*). Sport development ensures equitable access to all sporting opportunities that lead to the enjoyment of economic, social, psychological and environmental elements. This development, when fully harnessed, unleashes competitive abilities of Zimbabwean sports persons to participate in local, regional, continental and international sport competitions. Sport also enhances peace, national tranquillity and social cohesion by bringing people together for a common goal and can be used to achieve and promote developmental initiatives at local, national, regional and international levels (*ibid.*).

In Zimbabwe in recent years, participation in sport and recreation in the country has been declining due to the weak economic activity and, more recently, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (*ibid.*). Moreover, culture has the power to transform entire societies, strengthen local communities, foster strong family values and forge a sense of identity and belonging for people of all ages. It plays an essential role in promoting sustainable social and economic development for future generations. As a collective phenomenon, national identity can arise as a direct result of the presence of elements from the "common points" in people's daily lives. These include national symbols, music, language, the nation's history, national consciousness and cultural artefacts (*ibid.*).

In Zimbabwe, there is lack of a business enabling environment and opportunities for the youth. While over 300 000 young people enter the labour market annually, less than 10% of these are absorbed into formal employment in Africa (Hoetu, 2011). Members of the youth that have adequate skills to become self-employed entrepreneurs are hampered by limited access to credit. Limited employment opportunities have left millions of youths stuck in the vicious poverty cycle. For the same reason, micro and small business start-ups are unable to grow into medium-scale businesses that can provide more and better job opportunities. Meanwhile, young people are naturally creative and dynamic and must be considered as actors, players and partners. Indeed, they are strategic catalysts for new ideas contributing to peace and human development, and to the renewal of the human society, especially in a globalising world (*ibid.*).

Dialogue to develop partnerships on gender equality is needed when agencies are developing country assistance strategies, and also at the activity level during design and implementation. This means that development workers need to talk with partners about how women's needs, benefits and rights are relevant to the development activities being planned and implemented, taking into account the social, economic and political context; and how equal benefits will increase the effectiveness of activities and the sustainability of outcomes. Ideally, this dialogue and negotiation will result in agreement on investments and activities, with a clear understanding of how benefits for both women and men are realised.

This section is presented in two parts. The first part is a process plan (Figure 2) providing procedural guidance on how to operationalise the recommendations proposed under the respective PADs. The second part proposes an implementation plan with outcomes, indicators and activities.




Figure 2: Proposed Gender and Inclusive Development Actions in Usaid's Programme's Cycle (USAID, 2017)

CONCLUSION AND OPTIONS

Briefly, young people are also seeking their own alternatives and developmental trajectories. They present the vision of a social order struggling to emerge in the face of repression and economic hardship, and seeking to have a voice in societies whose basic structures are not

conducive to listening to young voices. Nevertheless, the reality is that today's youth no longer accept or respect those structures and increasingly demand a voice of their own. The popular cliché that youth are the future leaders raises an important question as to the quality of investments being made in young people to prepare them for their role as leaders. Mainstreaming youth is the surest way of achieving effective youth development.

Gender and social exclusion issues, if not addressed, could undermine the achievement of the intermediate results expected under the resilience PAD. They include: removal of gender barriers to asset ownership; reduction in large family sizes; and an expansion of resilient livelihoods options for excluded groups. Other challenges include: the limited agency of women over safe sex; the unique challenges faced by PWDs and LGBTI people that limit their resilience to HIV; and social norms that encourage early sexual debut and multiple concurrent partnerships by men as a symbol of masculinity, and particularly put youth at risk of HIV infection.

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CHAPTER 8: ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

EDWIN NYAMUGADZA, HALLELUAH CHIRISA AND NYASHA NDEMO

ABSTRACT

This chapter critically explores and delve deep into the overall climate change scenario and environment in Zimbabwe as the country works towards the realisation of aspirations enshrined in its National Development Strategy 1 (NDS1). From the environment perspective, Zimbabwe is fighting tirelessly against the adverse effects of climate change which has had devastating effects over the past years, whilst restoring degraded areas through various ways in the form of environmental protection and sustainable natural resource management. This would result in the country's improved biodiversity protection and management of various environmental domains, including wetlands, national gazetted forests, national parks and other wildlife protected areas. In light of this, Zimbabwe has set several possible ways to be used to attain the NDS1 goals from the environmental and climate point of view. The most notable and priority areas of concern from the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) include improved forests research, coupled with forest inventories, thereby ensuring increase in forests production as well as working on maintaining the improved status of other protected areas. This chapter makes use of geographical information systems (GIS) to map current locations of major protected areas, including wetlands, forests and national parks, which are key in the implementation of intended key strategies towards the NDS1.

INTRODUCTION

Zimbabwe is a landlocked Southern African country located between the Zambezi and Limpopo Rivers and bordering Mozambique to the east, Zambia to the north, Botswana to the south-west and South Africa to the south. The country is steered up by its national agenda, the Zimbabwe NDS1. It is in this NDS that several the country's main goals in different sectors of the country are outlined and envisaged to be attained by the year 2025. Climatically, Zimbabwe lies within the sub-tropical climate made up of summer, winter, autumn and spring seasons. As such, these

climate variabilities vary, with some areas, especially in the lowveld, receiving less rainfall, usually about 350 to 400mm, than the highveld areas of the Eastern highlands which receives above 1 000mm per year (Dube, 2021). It is the same with average temperatures ranges in Zimbabwe, which are mainly influenced and controlled by altitude.




Figure 1: Zimbabwe elevation variability

Lowveld areas, including areas like Chiredzi and Muzarabani, tend to have predominantly higher temperatures, reaching close to 35°C, than the highveld areas like the Eastern highlands which tend to maintain lower and cooler temperatures of a maximum of 18°C around October, the hottest month in Zimbabwe. In terms of vegetation distribution, the country is a mainly savanna type of an ecosystem that is heavily dominated by a variety of species including the *mopane*, the *miombo*, teak, acacia, the *combretum* and the *terminalia*. This distribution of

vegetation around the country is naturally based on elevation, soil type and rainfall variability. Soils type constitutes the main cause of the distribution of vegetation species in Matebeleland North and some parts of Midlands that tend to be heavily dominated by a hard wood called *Baikiaea plurijuga*. The same is associated with the *mopane* and the *combretum* species which are usually associated with poor shallow soils found mostly in areas around the south east lowveld of the country. It is from this vegetation distribution background that Zimbabwe is working as she drives towards the attainment of the NDS1 agenda from the environment perspective. The country's vegetation distribution is dominant in protected areas, including state gazetted forests, national parks and other wildlife areas like conservancies and safaris. However, due to the increasing population, deforestation is increasing daily with some people actually involved in charcoal-making by burning trees, thereby posing a major threat to the vegetation distribution and concentration. Agricultural practices are also among the major contributors of deforestation in Zimbabwe, especially in tobacco-growing areas as farmers use a lot of trees for tobacco-curing, posing a threat of climate change effects. In terms of agriculture, one of the sustaining sectors of the economy, Zimbabwe is divided into five farming regions based on the amount of rainfall received, from Region 1 that receives high rainfall, to Region 5 with little sporadic rainfall.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Like many other countries around the world, Zimbabwe is facing climate change-related extreme events and disasters like of very high temperatures which can be linked to heat waves, cyclones and drought (GoZ, 2019). These and other extreme events have been affecting the unprivileged within society and, unless urgent and continued support on fighting against climate change has been prioritised, society will continue to suffer from these extreme events. Kutyauro et al. (2021) note that most Sub-Saharan countries tend to be affected much by climate change because of high their dependence on rain-fed crops that tend to yield less when there is little rainfall, hence are vulnerable to any changes in rainfall patterns. Drought in Zimbabwe does not affect only crop farming, but livestock farming also, as increase in drought levels has a significant effect on pastures and exposing large herds of livestock to various

diseases. The occurrence of these events has been a major threat to progress of various sectors of the economy, including, and most notably, tourism, forests and agriculture.

In December 2019, the famous Victoria Falls almost dried up after its average flow dropped by almost 50%, indicating a huge threat that climate change can pose to the tourism sector (Baynes, 2019). Such devastating effects can be felt in various sectors of the country, affecting its GDP. Prolonged dry spells associated with extreme high temperatures are among the factors that increase cases and occurrence of wild fires (Silveira *et al.*, 2021), which contribute to overall greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration in the atmosphere through carbon dioxide emissions. Consequently, climate change effects from wildfires and deforestation are severe and long-lasting not countered by afforestation programmes.

Climate change has also been posing threats to wildlife in protected areas and it is projected that these threats will continue, affecting wildlife population as they heavily depend on availability of grazing. Rotich (2021), in a study carried out in the Masai Mara Game Reserve, notes that climate change has substantively been affecting wildlife population due to drying of vegetation and several water spots in and around the game reserve. The Masai Mara Game Reserve's research also 'speaks' to Zimbabwe's wildlife in the present case of climate change that in some cases, there has been wildlife-human conflict as surrounding communities are now encroaching on protected areas in search of wood fuel and wild fruits as resilience methods at local level. As such, this calls for implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies like the bee-keeping projects that were implemented by the STINGZ-NDC project by the GoZ in partnership with UNDP-Zimbabwe in Bulilima District (Mhaka *et al.*, 2020), within less privileged societies of Zimbabwe. Climate change has been a major cause of wildlife-human conflicts. Habakkuk Trust (2019) shows that the 2019 drought in Zimbabwe was a major contributor to increase in wildlife-human conflicts in the same district as grazing pastures are getting scarce and, in search of pasture, wildlife is invading surrounding small-scale farmers and causing serious problems. In the same report, (*ibid.*) is shown that only as recent as 2019, the Hwange National Park lost about 55 elephants which starved to death due

to shortages of grazing pasture, forcing them to encroach onto surrounding villages. In the Mbire District of Mashonaland Central, there are also reported cases of escalation of conflicts between humans and – wildlife, with elephants, being the major cause of the conflict with surrounding communities (Zamasiya, 2021) .As way of fighting the elephants, local people use strings dipped in used oil and chilli to deter the elephants from encroaching on their fields.

Furthermore, climate change has not been friendly with local wetlands in Zimbabwe. Several wetlands are disappearing by being easily converted to cropland. In study carried out in Marambanyika *et al.* (2021) note that in Driefontein, one of the largest wetlands by area in Zimbabwe and part of the Ramsar Sites, climate change effects are already being felt by the local community who were heavily depend on the resource. To local community used to access clean water and at times drew water for irrigation from the wetland, but with the current climate change scenario, the water table has seriously declined owing to drying of some parts of the wetland. Disappearance of wetlands does not only a cause lack of adequate supply of clean water to surrounding area, but also loss of biodiversity. For example, the Driefontein is known to be home to Grey Crowned and Wattled range birds, listed as endangered species on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list (AEWA, 2019). The drying and disappearance of this wetland contributes to the distribution of these birds.

APPRAISAL OF PLANNING

In its efforts to sustainably use natural resource, the GoZ has proposed various key areas of concern that shall help the use of natural resources. Among the major notable areas of concern are fostering the sustainable management of wetlands across the country. In so doing, the protection and sustainable use of wetlands guarantees availability of clean water for human consumption and also for livestock and wild animals. Unsustainable farming practices by the majority of small-scale farmers is one of the major activities targeted as potential threats to proper functioning of wetlands. This is the case, especially with farmers along the Harare-Beitbridge Road in Chirumhanzu District. As such the GoZ is focusing more on increasing wetland area under proper and sustainable

use to approximately 1 051 650 hectares. This hectarage is a major milestone in the wetland restoration agenda for Zimbabwe (GoZ, 2020).

Furthermore, as a way of rehabilitation and restoration of degraded areas, the GoZ has decided to make it one of its goals over the period of NDS1 implementation to restore all previously mined areas that were abandoned when the mining operations ceased. These areas are currently a threat to local people, wild animals as well livestock. This is true in many areas in Zimbabwe, including the greater part of the Midlands Province which is dominated by Chinese mining operations. Mavhudzi, (2021) expresses deep regret and fear for the people of Mberengwa in the province where White ASB Gold Mine, a Chinese mining company, is heavily involved in alluvial mining along the Dowe River. Mavhudzi, (2021) indicates that there is evidence of death when a minor fell into a disused mining pit. It is the same in Shurugwi. This calls for the intensification of the call for the GoZ to prioritise rehabilitation of previously used mining areas and mining dumps. This guarantees the provision of safe drinking water to the community, thereby fighting land pollution and diseases. Mining operations in the Hwange District have also become a major cause of land degradation over the past three years with several Chinese mining companies involved in coal extraction within the Hwange National Park (Dube, 2021). This has become a major threat to the survival of wild animals within the park.

APPRAISAL OF IMPLEMENTATION OF NDS1

In a bid to achieve the outlined and documented road map for the NDS1, Zimbabwe has stipulated various implementation strategies and policies that will guide the progress and ensure the success of all outlined plans. These strategies have been designed to cut across all sectors of the economy. However, this chapter stresses the implementation strategies outlined to boost the climate and environment sector. To ensure sustainable use, management and restoration of wetlands and other sensitive ecosystems, various policies have been reviewed to cater for the present changing climate. Muleya (2021) narrates the idea of a national wetland master plan brought by the GoZ which is a key enabler in wetland monitoring and protection to ensure sustained provision of ecosystem goods and services to enhance livelihoods of surrounding communities.

This recently published national wetland master plan is meant to reinforce the sustainable management agenda towards the attainment of NDS1 goals and this is to be reinforced through wetland identification and mapping from local ward-level to national level. Other sensitive ecosystems, including forests and national parks area are also under sustainable and controlled management to protect and conserve various animal and plant species.

Furthermore, besides coming up and adopting new policies for conservation and protection of sensitive ecosystems, the GoZ has taken a major step in its implementation of strategies towards the attainment of the NDS1. Implementation strategies, including mapping, gazetting, adoption and protection of sensitive ecosystems, have already been lined up to ensure their sound management (GoZ, 2020). Mapping and gazetting of more sensitive areas in the country is a key enabler in biodiversity conservation to a greater extent, as mapping will review the real extent and other natural features, including what exists within those protected areas. This will enable policy-makers and funders to know how much resources to use and invest in each of the areas as a way of achieving sustainable utilisation of resources. For example, mapping the location of the present known wetlands will enable policy-makers, decision-makers and regulatory bodies to put substantive measures in place to fight against any form of unsustainable use of resources, thereby restricting any further encroachment of people into the gazetted areas. Also, mapping of national forests and other private protected areas, including conservancies, will enable management and the government to quantify and model the likely existing biomass stock that is key in fighting against climate change as forests are valuable for carbon sequestration.

Moreover, there is the on-going capacitation of environmental protection institutions to work on restoration and protection of sensitive ecosystems and protection of ground water. The capacitation is meant for both private and government organisations to take the lead in ecosystem protection and restoration. To fight against water pollution of underground water, authorities from the local catchments and sub-catchments are heavily involved as key players in combating the spread of polluted water into

other water sources like rivers and dams. Capacitated environmental institutions will work strongly with communities on the ground in the restoration of degraded ecosystems. This means that all areas that were degraded through various activities like brick-moulding and stream bank cultivation are restored. Currently the GoZ, through the Forestry Commission, is working on a project called Tobacco Wood Energy Programme which is meant to ensure that degraded areas are reforested by communities. The programme has been successfully implemented in all provinces that grow tobacco (Lupande-Mwenebitu *et al.*, 2020). There are also other initiatives running to reforest deforested environments in the country and this is done as the country is rallying against changing climate, thereby mitigating GHG emissions. For example, under the Bon Challenge, Zimbabwe has pledged to plant about two million trees by 2030, a major milestone in fighting climate change.

Early warning systems have also formed part of the implementation strategy of the NDS1 of Zimbabwe as the country has been haunted by uncompromising natural disasters that have led to loss of lives and destruction of infrastructure in the past few years. This means that strengthening the early warning systems will help greatly in the overall fight against climate change as the country attempts to minimise losses associated with the occurrence of natural disasters. In Zimbabwe, the government is on track towards building and strengthening early warning systems as the country is on its way to the launch of the country's first satellite mission called ZIMSAT-1 (Adetola, 2021). This is because the use of geospatial technologies and earth observing satellites has gained momentum around the world as one of the most proper ways of providing early warning systems service as they provide near-real-time data in the event of a possible occurrence of a disaster.

Strengthening of capacity-building and awareness on climate change mitigation and adaptation have also been adopted as implementation strategies that will drive the climate change mitigation agenda towards attainment of the NDS1. Currently, the GoZ is on its toes through the Department of Climate Change Management (CCMD) in Ministry of Environment, Tourism and Hospitality, through the delivering capacity-

building training programmes to various stakeholders as a way of fighting climate change. In light of that, various programmes were conducted by the CCMD, in partnership with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) throughout 2021 with youths taking the lead in spreading the news on climate change mitigation and adaptation. All these programmes were key in preparation of the country's Nationally Determined Contribution, a requirement for reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC). Therefore, the CCMD is working tirelessly on capacity-building of other ministries within the government, thereby making sure that the four key sectors of GHG emissions are covered, so promoting reduction of GHGs.

APPRAISAL OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Various monitoring strategies have been implemented to keep track of outlined plans during the period of NDS1 to make sure that the 2025 agenda for environment and climate change is attained. In terms of forestry resources, the GoZ, through the Forestry Commission, is actively involved in community engagement in areas under the Tobacco Wood Energy Programme (TWEP) as it consistently monitors forestry resources. This is being done by villagers in rural areas who were supplied with tablets by the Forestry Commission, and they record information on cases of deforestation, wood poaching and charcoal production and upload the information on a server that can be accessed only at Forestry Commission. Such information is key as it helps in making informed decisions on either organising an urgent field trip to the area or organising field ambush surveys in selected areas, especially those areas facing high levels of timber harvesting to charcoal production, for example, in Mudzi and Muzarabani. However, the success of this initiative has been limited by the unavailability of sufficient resources in terms of tablets and, more importantly, lack consistent capacity-building of communities in the use of these mobile phones in data collection. As this calls for sufficient, capacity-building that is consistent by availing more financial resources to the initiative.

Through the mapping and inventory unit of the Forestry Commission, vegetation mapping and monitoring in Zimbabwe is being carried out with

Zimbabwe national 2020 land cover map currently being worked on. Results of the map are key in detailing land use changes that have been occurring over time and, in this case, from 2017 when another national land cover map was produced. Land use changes over time are key in showing the causes associated with given land use change and as such deforestation rates can be estimated from district to national levels. Furthermore, land use change information, especially the area extent, is key input data into the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) software when carrying out the nation's greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories. This means that, through data produced from a national land cover, GHG experts and compilers can easily calculate the amount, in tonnes of carbon stocks, that could have been lost through deforestation or that could have been gained. Such information on GHG is a key enabler in reporting requirements of national communications and Biennial Update Report as required by the UNFCCC. However, the process of mapping and carrying out inventories required for proper mapping takes much time and financial resources have proven to be a major setback along the way. With the support from the UNDP-Zimbabwe, the national land use land cover map for 2020 has been greatly worked on. This calls for the need for GoZ to fulfil its strategies outlined in the NDS1 for forestry inventories in which they pledged to strengthen funding and carrying of forest surveys and inventories around the country.

Climate-change related workshops and capacity-building engagements with various sectors of the economy, including the four main sectors required for national GHG accounting, are carried out followed, by some reporting on what each sector is doing towards the attainment of set strategies. Among other key sectors to be monitored in response to fighting climate change are the energy, agriculture, forestry and waste management sectors. As such, monitoring strategies are mainstreamed along these key sectors that are pre-requisites in national GHG accounting for reporting of the climate change position of the country. However, these kinds of engagements require substantial financial resources, hence calling for financial support from the government and other non-governmental organisations actively involved in fighting climate change.

This calls for more massive actions on engagements in sustainable climate finance.

DISCUSSION

Under the NDS1, the country is on high alert to fight climate change through working tirelessly towards the attainment of the set 2025 NDS1 agenda. In so doing, Zimbabwe is not only fighting climate change effects and environmental protection, but is also working towards the set global agenda on sustainable development goals mainly numbers 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 (GoZ, 2020). Pursuant to that, as part of main aspects meant to ensure the attainment of sustainable use of natural resources, the GoZ has outlined the key environmental enablers for protection and conservation of forests, national parks, wetlands and other sensitive ecosystems. Under the NDS1, the GoZ is working on increasing forest research coupled with forest inventories across major state forests in Zimbabwe. This is key in quantifying the biomass stock contained within a given forest which is used to estimate the level of carbon that can be sequestered by that particular forest. This information is very useful in making informed climate change decisions on GHG emission reduction. This is important as the inventory information is also used in coming up with reporting requirements necessary for the compilation of the country's national communications and update reports of the forestry sector, one of the important GHG emission sectors. Furthermore, to increase area under forest which had greatly decreased due to various anthropogenic activities, the GoZ, supported by private organisations like the Sustainable Afforestation Association (SAA), has started strengthening massive afforestation programmes. The Forestry Commission Zimbabwe and the SAA have already started working on massive afforestation programmes under the TWEP programme in which new woodlots are being established across tobacco growing areas, hence increasing the country's capacity to absorb GHG emissions.




Figure 2: *Vegetation distribution of Zimbabwe*

Currently, wetlands around the country are under threat as they are under serious mismanagement by local people who are involved in unsustainable farming practices right in the wetlands. For example, the Monavale Vlei in Harare is under serious threat from local people who are encroaching through urban farming and housing development projects (Sharai *et al.*, 2020). Such unsustainable activities pose negative impacts to the provision of ecosystem goods and services, including provision of clean water and sustaining biodiversity. Among other threatened wetlands, include the Driefontein wetland, which borders Mashonaland East and Masvingo Provinces. This wetland forms part of the catchment for major rivers Shashe, Sebakwe, Devure and Mutirikwi, which are major sources of water for Masvingo City (Marambanyika *et al.*, 2021). Such increasing levels of agriculture are a threat to the survival of the wetland as it is

losing its real extent to cropland every day, and will likely dry up, hence posing a major threat to the present animal habitat.

Furthermore, increasing levels of climate change in the country have greatly affected wildlife survival around major national parks and safari areas. This has intensified human-wildlife conflicts as animals are now moving out of parks into neighbouring communities in search of pastures, thereby posing threats to humans. Such scenarios have been witnessed in communities close to wildlife areas, for example, in Bulilima District, where cases of elephants ravaging small-scale farmers' crops have been reported. The same is being experienced in the South East Lowveld of Zimbabwe, with large herbivores, including elephants, in some instances reported to be encroaching local communities especially those around the Save Valley Conservancy (Mashapa *et al.*, 2020) as graphically shown below.




Figure 3: Zimbabwe protected areas

During the NDS1 period, the GoZ is also fighting any form of environmental degradation, especially that caused by mining operations around the country. Most mining companies are responsible for massive environmental degradation associated with high levels of water pollution and unclaimed mining pits. In the Midlands, several reports of abandoned mining pits have been reported to be a threat to human lives and livestock. The same has also been reported in Penhalonga in Manicaland at Redwing Gold Mine who are also leaving behind open pits causing much environmental degradation and water pollution in the Mutare River (Mlevu, 2020).

CONCLUSIONS AND OPTIONS

In conclusion, the GoZ is working intensively across all environmental sectors to make sure that the detailed NDS1 goals are achieved by 2025. As such, various programmes have been set up and some have already been implemented to guarantee the outlined results. More robust monitoring and evaluation programmes have been set up to make sure the attainment of set goals is a reality. However, in fighting natural disasters associated climate change, the GoZ can now, through the Zimbabwe National Geospatial and Space Agency (ZINGSA), come up with intensive geospatial technology applications to help in early warning systems. This is now easier as the country has already taken great strides in embracing geospatial technology by investing in the soon-to-come national earth observing satellite called ZIMSAT-1. Geo-fencing is another way of preventing human-wildlife conflicts, which can be adopted during this NDS1 period. This can be implemented through the Zimbabwe National Parks, thereby making use of the global positioning system (GPS) tool that works by sending near-real time alert messages to people in surrounding communities whenever elephants are reaching set buffer zones. This minimises cases of human attacks by elephants and other wild animals, as people are notified via their cell phones whenever elephants come closer to their community and villages. Strengthening capacity building on smart agriculture techniques in most areas of the country can be intensified, making sure a guaranteed increased output.

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CHAPTER 9: FITTING ZIMBABWE INTO THE DIGITAL ECONOMY MATRIX

TINASHE MAGANDE, JUSTIN MAKOTA, TOBIAS NHARO AND ABEL MOYO

ABSTRACT

The chapter explores and examines how Zimbabwe fits into the digital world/economy grid. It analyses the pre- and post-independence policies and traces how they detract from or geared towards adoption and practice of digitalisation. The chapter also looks at the steps taken by Zimbabwe, with the help of the World Bank's statutes and publications such as the Zimbabwe Digital Economy Diagnostic reports, to establish digitalisation in full capacity. The background to the study shows that during the colonial era, most policies were grafted targeting mainly the agricultural sector which was and still is the backbone of the economy and there was little to no digitalisation throughout the world except for, maybe, use of computers. However, this study notes that Zimbabwe is gradually adopting the digital way of running her business as noted by the 96% record in the payment system, with only 4% left for cash payments. The chapter utilised a content analysis of literature based predominantly on desktop review to establish the arguments in this study. Qualitative research methods were used, drawing literature in books, journal articles, theses and other publications available on Google Scholar and other useful academic and developmental-oriented websites. For data analysis, the study engaged textual analysis. This study found out that in order for Zimbabwe to perfectly fit into the digital economy matrix, there is need for strategic action towards the pillars of digital transformation, with more and careful attention on digital infrastructure and digital government platforms. The chapter, therefore, recommends high collaboration and coordination across government's ministries, departments and agencies as digital economy is a cross-cutting issue that affects and involves the whole nation.

INTRODUCTION

The digital economy is growing fast, especially in developing countries. Information communication technologies (ICTs) accounted for 17% of

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in developing countries in the past years, but the growth has been more constrained in the global south than in the global north (World Bank, 2016). Over the past 20 years, there has been a significant expansion in the uptake of the Internet and mobile phones in Zimbabwe. Between 2000 and 2019, the mobile penetration rate rose from 2.3% to 90.6% of the total population (POTRAZ, 2019). Bukht and Heeks (2017:1) define the digital economy as “...that part of economic output derived solely or primarily from digital technologies with a business model based on digital goods or services”. The study further estimates that the global economy makes up around 5% of global GDP and 3% of global employment. The access to global Internet must be open to all countries as it helps to link countries everywhere in the world. The Group of Eight (G8) Countries acknowledges that Internet brings a wide range of benefits to everyone through links and empowerment (G8 Countries, 2000). With the advanced development in global telecommunication networks, there are high expectations that developing countries will benefit more in the global systems (Mansell, 2001). These benefits may come through firms having a substantial benefit that may help to boost the GDP in the developing world.

The implementation of electronic commerce helps to get access to new international markets. Small firms in the developing world are also bound to have a massive gain as they reposition themselves in the global value chains. Through establishing electronic commerce, firms would reduce the cost of transacting, thereby increasing economic efficiency (Xie, 2000). Countries in the developing world are much further into the Internet digital economy as they save on costs of going through the steps that their developed counterparts had to go (Panagariya, 2000). Despite all these expected gains from the digital economy, Mansell (2001) posits that there is limited evidence to support any significant gains for developing countries at the macroeconomic level.

A rapid process of technological leap is needed if the digital divide that exists between the developing and the developed world is to be narrowed. That would be followed by fulfilment of the optimistic expectations which advanced technology helps to increase economic growth in developing countries. There is significant optimism that the digital economy will boost

growth of the economy in developing countries (Dahlman *et al.*, 2016). The author further postulates that digitalisation will also boost productivity of capital and labour, lower transaction costs and facilitate access to global markets. All this needs a rapid technological catch-up if the divide is to be reduced. Despite this unevenness, the global south, which holds a small share of the economy, is growing at a faster rate than the holders of the lion's share, the global north. The WEF (2015) estimates a double-digit growth rate around the globe, with a strong growth being witnessed in the global south.

There are a lot of potential actions that a firm or a country that gets involved in the digital system can undertake within the environment in which they function (Heeks, 2017). Heeks (2016) identifies them as digitalisation that involves converting systems from analogue to digital systems; datafication, virtualisation and generativity, involving using data and technology in a way that was not initially intended through reprogramming and recombination. The impact of the digital economy is a rapid phenomenon that has reshaped business interactions, consumer behaviours and business models at large (Dahlman *et al.*, 2016).

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The digital economy in Zimbabwe has to be developed and strengthened against the background of the nation struggling in the context of the economic crises it is facing and the world at large. These economic problems have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic which has attacked the world and created boundaries of physical trade, putting developing countries under macroeconomic difficulties. The information communications and technology sector (ICT), a sector lying at the core of Zimbabwe's digital economy, is seen as central to turning Zimbabwe back to prosperity as a Jewel of Africa (World Bank, 2021). Africa tried to integrate itself into a single market through the creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The continent started trading under this agreement at a time when Covid -19 was taking its toll. The only way developing countries, Zimbabwe being no exception, can bring their macroeconomics back on track is through electronic trading.

The ICT sector was one of the fastest growing sectors in the year 2019. The sector affects the daily lives of almost everyone in the country, hence it has a bearing on both the public and private sectors in Zimbabwe. The macroeconomic woes and the COVID-19 pandemic have presented both challenges and opportunities for the Zimbabwe digital economy to further develop through innovation. In Zimbabwe, digital infrastructure is one of the strongest in ICT. However, the macroeconomic environment in the country has always obstructed its success. Zimbabwe is well connected internationally, especially the urban areas that are fibre connected. The connectivity in rural areas is, however, still lagging behind. According to the World Bank (2021), the fixed line in Zimbabwe is still limited, a situation that makes mobile the primary means of carrying data traffic in the country. The ICT sector has the potential of creating 40 000 jobs. It is regarded as a sector with a serious potential to create lots of revenues whilst deepening Zimbabwe's economic growth. Having seen this, the government took a step through its fiscal policy targeting the use of ICT through e- government and e-learning programmes.

There are huge prospects that Zimbabwe could improve its government digital platforms if interoperability and coordination are prioritised. The country still lags behind, if compared to her international peers. The government is still using ageing infrastructure, though it has developed some innovative digital services and accessible government portals. The country can develop much in the industry if there is improvement in the supply of electricity, connectivity and monitoring macroeconomic woes that are distressing country. However, the country's digital financial system is stronger even in the presence of the macroeconomic problem that it is facing. The country has a well-developed payment system such that approximately 96% of its transactions are online and the rest still cash-based. The government has also developed a strong base in the exclusive use of digital money. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) controls Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) platforms, which have become key in most public and private settlements. The private sector has become acclimatised to the use of mobile money wallets in settling payments. These are dominated by Ecocash, One Money, Mycash and Telecash, whose subscribers currently stand at about 7.1 million (World Bank, 2021). Zimbabwe is ranked as one of Africa's leaders, after Kenya and

Uganda, in mobile financial inclusion, with over 40% of adults using a mobile financial account on the global financial inclusion database (UNCTAD, 2018). The cost of transaction is still a major problem in this sector. Furthermore, some places in rural areas are still having difficulties with mobile network and Internet connectivity.

Expanding the digital economy in Zimbabwe is backed by a lot of recent developments. However, advancing in technology in the current era does not require following all the paths followed by industrialised countries as it can be done through leapfrogging. The country adopted an Information communication policy in 2016. A Ministry of ICT, Postal and Courier Services was established, in association with other bodies such as the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) and the Postal and Regulatory Authority Zimbabwe (POTRAZ). In order to strengthen this, the government adopted a policy that allowed the importation of ICT equipment without tariffs. The government also introduced the computerisation programme which boosted the rate of computer literacy in the country. However, the policy has faced a lot of challenges, as already alluded to in this chapter. The government has introduced some reforms to deal with these challenges so that the sector can forward and foster the ICT technology innovations in the country. In 2018, POTRAZ introduced an innovation drive that sought to promote innovations in the sector (World Bank, 2021). To centralise data storage, the government embarked on establishing a data centre. This would also help in the management and protection of data and take advantage of computer clouding.

IMPORTANCE OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY TO ZIMBABWE

The expansion of digital infrastructure in Zimbabwe will potentially accelerate Zimbabwe's economic development (Kim, Kelly and Raja, 2010). The use of high-speed Internet in the country is a tool that will complement the development in achieving this, and huge investment in this sector would lead to high economic growth too. Estimates from the World Bank (2021) reveal that a 10% upsurge in broadband penetration in developing countries is usually correlated with a 1.4% growth in GDP.

As postulated by Aker and Blumenstock (2015), with internet connectivity, the country is also poised to benefit from increasing productivity, lowering transaction costs and maximising supply chains. Developing the digital

economy will bridge the problem of information asymmetry and improve communication in the country. Those who were once marginalised, especially people residing the rural areas, will find an opportunity to market their products through electronic platforms. The digital economy enables trade of goods and services through e-commerce by using the Internet (OECD, 2013). An improved digital economy effectively connects the citizens in a cost-effective way.

The Internet is set to create a lot of opportunities for the country to grow its economy through external trade, employment creation, increased literacy (human capital) and increased use of capital goods. The digital economy contributes significantly to employment (OECD, 2014; World Bank, 2016). Nottebohm *et al.* (2012) asserts that globally, the Internet creates 3.1 jobs for every job that it destroys on average. It also promotes entrepreneurship in the country, where small-scale businesses can advertise their goods using online platforms. This becomes a means of facilitating their entry into international markets. This is a practice that is known as e-commerce. Advanced ICTs and their use to support applications such as e-commerce leads to significant productivity improvement (Mansell, 2001). Digital innovation has helped to integrate the global market into a single market, a trend that has helped developing countries like Zimbabwe to benefit much.

Broadband provision came as a game-changer in Zimbabwe's digital service delivery, especially critical service sectors such as education and health. In the same vain, the digital economy has allowed the public sector to effectively deliver services more effectively than before. By making sure that better policies are introduced in the ICT, the country is set to benefit more in transforming the economy. ICTs are an enabler of all sectors of the economy that will help them to advance in their development. Advanced ICTs have the potential to support 'technological leap frogging' (Soete, 1985). To increase resilience in the service sectors such as tourism during the COVID-19 era, the country focused greatly on digital technologies. The government, individuals and businesses, through the use of technology, have found a way to cope with shocks imposed by the global pandemic. Social distancing may have caused interruption in

service provision in Zimbabwe and the world at large without digital technologies.

POLICY TOWARDS ICT IN ZIMBABWE

The acceptance and use of ICTs have enlarged greatly in recent years, with this acceptance seeing a dramatic reduction in the digital divide between rural and urban areas. The government targets to increase the rate of Internet and mobile penetration rate in the country from 59.1% in 2020 to 75.42% and to 100% by 2025, respectively (NDS1, 2020). The Zimbabwean government has made great efforts in strengthening the use of ICTs by introducing e-Government to the nation. Investments have been made, particularly in the area of ICT backbone Infrastructure development, education, research and development, community information centres, training of legislators and other government officials in the usage of ICTs.

The government has shown the importance of the digital economy through embedding ICT as a development tool across all National development strategies and the Vision 2030. Policy towards the ICTs targets increased investment in the sector eyeing universal access by 2030. Zimbabwe foresees Internet access from village level, through the extension of the fibre optic backbone, and last mile connectivity (GoZ, 2018). The policy envisages introducing smart programmes such as smart Government systems, smart agriculture, smart health and smart transport, and safe cities through using ICTs (NDS1, 2020). There has been progress in the introduction of e-services in the sectors of agriculture, health, education, transport, research and development, among others.

The government needs support from the private sector and other stakeholders as it cannot carry out this national exercise on its own. Apart from the private sector, there other stakeholders that include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), existing and new public and private sector institutions, the media, to mention a few across all sectors of the economy, who are expected to formulate programmes to implement ICT leading projects. Such projects will enhance skills in the ICT sector and in research and training. The ICT policy also seeks to ensure that private sector interests and expertise create investment in which the ICT sector

generates jobs, increases national productivity and empowers citizens through the amplification of choices brought by unfettered connectivity.

The government's priority is mainly on:

... the development of e-Government Enterprise Architecture and Interoperability Framework, implementation of National Data Centre, improved coverage of the PFMS [Public Financial Management System], as well as enhancement and optimisation of Government common connectivity infrastructure in order to realise improved efficiency and effectiveness in Government internal operations and administration. (NDS1, 2020:131).

The primary objective is to ensure that the country has affordable and reliable Internet and ICT infrastructure that is accessible from village level in order to increase digital economy inclusivity. To achieve that, the government must ensure that there is enough broadband infrastructure and connectivity. ICTs will also be improved from analogue to digitalised radio and television transmission.

The government also seeks to create an investor-friendly environment in the ICT sector to promote private investment. This will be encouraged through introducing investor-friendly policies and provision of incentives among others. With its citizenry at heart, the government seeks to protect consumers and nurture a reliable online environment. Cyber security strategies will be implemented to reinforce consumer satisfaction and protection in the use of digital systems. There are also targets to improve literacy in the use of ICTs in the country. The country has introduced ICT into the national education curriculum from primary up to tertiary level.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To understand the nature of the digital economy, focus should be placed on theories which provide conceptual lenses to the trope of digital economy. The concept of “digital economy” was introduced in 1995 by Dan Tapscott, a business consultant. This section analyses the digital economy in the developing world from a theoretical perspective. The section focuses on the knowledge gap hypothesis, the 4As perspective.

The knowledge gap hypothesis explains that the distribution of knowledge is uneven across the social system in the world. Just like wealth, the theory

posits that people of high socio-economic status are in the lead because they get to find out new sources of information first and as they can afford access to them while they are new. The knowledge gap hypothesis is often mentioned in connection with social consequences of information sharing. However, the assertion of the theory can also be transferred to fit in what happens in the digital economy. The flow of digital infrastructure is not homogenous across the divide due to the social structure of society. As the new digital systems are infused into the world, developed countries are always ahead and poor countries will always lag behind technologically. As such, the rich will always receive the material first than the poor. Developed countries acquire digital systems at a faster rate than the less developed countries. The gap in the knowledge between these two groups tend to increase rather than decrease (Tichenor et al., 1970). The educated are also ahead of the uneducated because of the Internet. Internet on its own is a factor that widens the digital gap (Nie and Erbring, 2000). With the supply of information by Internet, new factors emerge, not captured by traditional media, like televisions and radios on which the marginalised depend on. In most African countries, access to Internet is to some extent restricted, with those who have access to it facing exorbitant data charges.

The notion of leapfrogging was originally used in the area of economic growth theories and industrial organisation studies focussing on competition among firms. It says areas that have poorly developed technologies or economic bases can move themselves forward faster through adopting modern systems, without taking middle steps, “by passing intermediate stages of technology through which countries have historically passed during the development process” (UNCTAD, 2018:84). The hypothesis proposes that big companies holding monopolies based on incumbent technologies are less likely to innovate. Small and incremental innovations leads a dominant firm to staying ahead. Sometimes major innovations permit new firms to leapfrog the traditional dominant firm. This phenomenon can also apply to leading countries in the digital economy. Developing countries can skip the stages of the path taken by developed countries in the digital economy, enabling them to catch up quicker in terms of economic growth. The leapfrog can arise from the fact that a developed country has reduced earning rents from old technologies.

Developed countries have less incentive to innovate as compared to their potential rivals, the developing countries. A good example of leapfrogging in the technological sector is the rapid uptake of mobile phones in Africa. The UNCTAD (2018) posits that Africa has opportunities to leapfrog, though it has limited capabilities to innovate.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Tempest (2020) carried out a study focusing on the digital economy, particularly at e-commerce in Africa. The study explored the benefits and challenges of creating a digital economy. This was against the backdrop of the AfCFTA which, when implemented in the COVID-19 pandemic era, a lot of trade was based on digital economy and online transactions. The intra Africa trade that the AfCFTA promotes is facilitated by the digital economy. The study reveals that there are some obstacles to the development of e-commerce which African countries need to resolve before the AfCFTA can benefit from the digital economy. Amongst these are limited access to the Internet, poor logistics, constraints on online payment systems and differing regulations. It was found that the digital economy will provide remedies to bank the unbanked through addressing the un-addressed throughout the African continent. This brings overall inclusivity closer for the marginalised, especially women, the youth and rural communities in Africa. The study recommends that countries need to encourage public and private funding in order to support the digital economy. Achieving a robust and successful small and medium enterprise (SME) environment requires proper funding. There is critical need for training to promote success in digital economy and, in particular, for business-to-business e-commerce. The study also puts an emphasis on assuring that African governments put efforts to revise their data costs and keep them at a minimum for a technologically empowered Africa.

Denis (2021) carried a study with the purpose of presenting support for the African continent's transition to a digital economy, predominantly in response to the problems raised by the COVID-19 crisis and with the aim of building inclusive, long-term economic resilience. The study acknowledges that the pandemic was taking lives and calls for economic resilience, digital technologies and solutions that could significantly alleviate the effects should be created and made available to all African

people. The COVID-19 pandemic activated a call for solutions through exceptional demand for digital health technology. The Internet is a vital communications tool that can help communities deal with the crisis. The study also reveals that the technology sector was helping many industries to adapt to this new situation and reducing the risks induced by the pandemic. However, while the growth figures are still remarkable, a huge digital divide still remains in the continent. Close to nine hundred million people are still not connected to the Internet. The article recommends that there is need for sufficient savings and investment in digital technologies to positively stimulate all sectors of the economy and society. The growing importance of the digital sector was found as an instant reaction to COVID-19 economic shocks that has a potential to bring back strength in all sectors of the economy.

Korovkin (2019) conducted a study on 17 African countries with the major aim of comparing their national digital strategies. The major aim of the study was to find effective approaches for the formulation of digital strategies so as to offer policies targeting national economic strategising in the 17 African countries with market and partly-market economies. African countries, in particular, must find a niche in the global digital economy to accelerate inclusive social and economic development using technology. The study revealed that from the perspective of the 17 developing countries under study, developing strategies for the digital economy is not yet part of their national digital strategy. The majority of the African countries do not have dedicated documents for digital strategy. They have not yet addressed the issue with strong commitment within their overall national strategies. Some nations like Algeria, have taken up the process of national digital strategising, but consequently abandoned it. The study highlights that the same problem is also present in west Asia, only yet to be adopted by some stakeholders. The study acknowledges that the African continent still faces digital infrastructure challenges going forward. The study recommends that Africa should nurture some commendable solutions to help its nations to leapfrog into digital development. This can be done only by constructing modern digital systems and developing markets for the new digital enterprises.

A study by the World Bank (2018) outlines the impetus for creating a single digital market (SDM) in East Africa. There is optimism that this would drive deeper integration and spur increased dynamism of the digital economies of six East African countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The study reveals that the rise of digital technologies offers a chance to unlock new pathways for rapid economic growth, innovation, job creation and access to services that were unimaginable long back. East African countries would benefit more through working together rather than in competition. A mutual benefit is certain for all these countries, whether they are digitally advanced or not. Improved transport infrastructure, creating a business environment, implementing policies that encourage innovation and increase access to capital were seen as key enablers for the development of an effective digital economy in the region. However, persistent digital skills deficit, both in terms of the basic digital literacy that consumers require to use digital services and the availability of more advanced ICT skills needed to support development of the technological industry was seen as one of the most factors constraining regional digital economy in East Africa.

The World Bank (2020) analysis finds that Zambia has made significant strides on its path to digital transformation over the past few years. The country made progress in digital infrastructure, digital financial services and digital platforms. However, significant gaps remain in digital skills and digital entrepreneurship. The study says that reaching the goal of universal and affordable Internet coverage can raise growth per capita by two percentage points per year and reduce the poverty headcount by one percentage point per year. Complementing Internet coverage with human capital investments tends to increase growth per head by approximately five percentage points and the poverty headcount falls by 2.5 percentage points per year. Digital transformation is thus a critical component of economic transformation in an economy. The study estimates that developing countries could collectively save 0.9 to 1.1% of the GDP. This is equivalent to US\$220 billion to US\$330 billion annually (IMF, 2017). Equipping government officials responsible for public service delivery with access to data and digital tools will make the country realise some effective gains. The study says improving the digital economy is a strong

tool in the quest to increase private and public sector productivity and accountability in both the private and public sectors. Use of mobile phones has increased in the country, but the cost of connectivity remains a great barrier. Digital financial inclusion increased significantly in the country since 2016. Increase of mobile money providers in Zambia was a driver of the growth of financial inclusion. Digitalising the government payslip system decreased transaction costs by 85% and helped to identify and remove some ghost workers in the system. With these initial gains, the government looks forward to increasing the digitalisation of the economy for efficiency gains in the country. The study recommends that individuals, businesses and government acquire the requisite digital skills to enable the country to use digital technologies as a transformation tool. There is also greater need to improve e-commerce benefits through dealing with improvements in addressing logistics. There is need to make some reforms in the energy sector to ensure that the country has digital economy reliability. The private sector can and should take the lead in providing Internet networks and services. The country should consider cases in which one-time subsidies are needed to drive private sector investment though the bulk of the investment required to achieve universal Internet access can come from the private sector.

Dahlman *et al.* (2016) singled out the point that digital economy matters for developing countries and what they need to consider when developing a national digital strategy. The study revealed that the world is experiencing a digital revolution with more important effects for global economies and their incomes. This was attached to the revolution of the ever-increasing pace of technological advance and diffusion. It is important for countries to encompass the digital economy in their national strategies. The study acknowledges that the digital revolution is too important for every country to overlook, especially the developing world. Dahlman *et al.* (*ibid.*) further articulate that the digital economy can be harnessed for inclusive and sustainable growth. These technologies make life easier for consumers, citizens and the government. The paper recommends that the governments must engage in strategic planning to maximise the development impact of digitalisation and ensure that its benefits are evenly distributed.

Lovelock (2018) acknowledges that digital technologies have been deployed in different parts of national economies for years, especially in communications networks. His study distinguishes between Internet economy and the digital economy. The study takes the Internet economy as defined by ISOC (2015:5). They define it as “... the economic activities, inputs, outputs and employment directly associated with the use of the Internet”. In contrast, the digital economy relies on enhanced interconnectivity of networks and the interoperability of digital platforms in all sectors of the economy and society to offer convergent services. The study identifies two new important things that build the digital economy, and these are interconnectivity and interoperability. Interconnectivity of networks means that traffic can travel across and between networks. Interoperability of operating platforms means that traffic can run effectively across different types of networks. The study recommends that governments should engage the private sector, civil society and academia in setting the agenda for digital development, creating appropriate regulations and implementing digital initiatives. The study further recommends agility, *vis-a-vis* the fact that the pace of innovation has accelerated and rapid technological changes require governments to gauge, understand, make and implement regulatory decisions faster. For a strong digital economy to be realised in any developing country, innovation and value creation have to be strengthened. Every public servant, industry professional and citizen must embrace digital transformation, and have access to learning opportunities to develop deep and holistic skills to thrive in this new era.

METHODOLOGY

This chapter adopted a mixed methods design. The chapter used a content analysis of literature based primarily on desk review to concretise the arguments. Qualitative research methods were predominantly used drawing literature in books, journal articles and other publications. For data analysis, the study engaged textual analysis. Secondary literature review of previous studies was done on the digital economy in developing countries, especially Africa’s sub-Saharan region. This has been also supplemented by direct interviews which were carried out to gather information from experts on the digital issues. Policy and statutory documents were visited in order to assess the current standing and

provisions by the government on information, communication and technology in African countries. Thus, the chapter classifies various policies that have a hold on the nourishment of the digital economy in order to recognise where policy alternatives and improvements are needed.

DISCUSSION

In order for Zimbabwe to perfectly fit into the digital economy matrix, there is need for strategic action towards the pillars of digital transformation with more and careful attention on digital infrastructure and digital government platforms. The access to global Internet must be open to all countries as it helps to link countries everywhere in the world. Zimbabwe is gradually adopting the digital way of running its business as noted by the 96% record in the payment system, with only 4% left for cash payments. Over the past 20 years, there has been a significant expansion in the uptake of the Internet and mobile phones in Zimbabwe. Between 2000 and 2019, the mobile penetration rate rose from 2.3% to 90.6% of the total population.

Due to the general use of mobile money and digital transactions in the Zimbabwean digital economy, digital financial services are actually leading the way to growth. Digital financial services are growing further at an unprecedented rate and are soon to approach the advanced phase in the country. The digital infrastructure is also fairly well developed and is in the growth phase. The growth of this sector is fundamental for supporting the growth needs of other pillars of growth in the country. Digital skills are also improving going forward. This has been complemented by an excellent education system in the country, which has the ability to reap good results through focusing on digital learning. Digital skills are also crucial for supporting other pillars of growth in the country which helps to further development.

Digital entrepreneurship and digital systems implemented by the government are promising and have potential to grow that is if a better macroeconomic environment is created for them to work well. The Internet brings a wide range of benefits to everyone through links and empowerment. With the advanced development in global

telecommunication networks, there are high expectations that developing countries will benefit more in the global systems. The implementation of e-commerce helps to get access to new international markets. Small firms in the developing world are also bound to have massive gains as they reposition themselves in the global value chains. Through establishing e-commerce, firms will reduce the cost of transacting, thereby increasing economic efficiency.

Countries in the developing world are much further into the Internet digital economy as they save on costs of going through the steps that which developed counterparts had to go. A rapid process of technological catch-up is needed if the digital divide that exists between the developing and the developed world is to be reduced. There is significant optimism that the digital economy will boost growth of the economies in developing countries. The developing countries that hold a small share of the economy are growing at a faster rate than the holders of the lion's share, the developed countries. The digital economy in Zimbabwe has to be developed and strengthened against the background that the nation is struggling in the context of economic crises it is facing and the world at large.

The COVID-19 pandemic attacked the world and created boundaries of physical trade, putting developing countries under macroeconomic difficulties and exacerbated economic problems in Zimbabwe and other developing countries. Despite the macroeconomic woes, the COVID-19 pandemic presented both challenges and opportunities to the Zimbabwe digital economy to further develop through innovation. The country's digital financial system is stronger even in the presence of macroeconomic problems that it is facing. The country has developed its payment system such that approximately 96% of its transactions are online and the rest still cash-based. The government also developed a strong base in the exclusive use of digital money. There are huge prospects that Zimbabwe can improve its government digital platforms if interoperability and coordination are prioritised. The only way developing countries, where Zimbabwe being no exception, can bring back their macroeconomic performance back on track is through electronic trading. The ICT a sector lies at the core of Zimbabwe's digital economy. The sector was one of the

fastest growing sectors in the year 2019. The sector creates lots of revenues whilst deepening Zimbabwe's economic growth. Having realised this, the government took a step through its fiscal policy targeting the use of ICT through e- government and e-learning programmes.

Zimbabwe is well connected internationally, especially the urban areas which are fibre-connected. Connectivity in the rural areas is, however, still lagging behind and the fixed line in Zimbabwe is still limited, a situation that makes mobile phones the primary means of carrying data traffic in the country. The country still lags behind, if compared to its international counterparts. The government is still using ageing infrastructure, though it has developed some innovative digital services and accessible government portals. The private sector has become acclimatised to the use of mobile money wallets in settling payments.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the setbacks, the government has a clear opportunity to foster the digital government platforms by further strengthening coordination, adopting an interoperability framework, consolidating the digital services and investing in institutional and human ICT capacity. These include, but not limited to the environment, limited financial support from central government, insufficient coordination between government and key private players, low skill levels, and poor data. These education-specific challenges are compounded by the economy-wide poor infrastructure (electricity coverage, Internet connectivity; limited devices, especially in rural areas), and more generally, rural exclusion and urban bias. With COVID-19, a key opportunity for building digital skills has arisen, where private entities are doing more innovating, including digital platforms for learning. The opportunities for the government to leverage the strengths and address the challenges include scaling up digital skills training for both students and teachers at all levels of education; establishing a multi-stakeholder coordinating group for digital skills; bridging the rural-urban divide in digital skills; and strengthening databases and information flows.

Zimbabwe has a good foundation upon which digital skills could be leveraged, if training for both teachers and students is scaled up, and coordination and data flows improved. The country boasts a high literacy

rate (about 90%), one of the best basic education access and enrolment ratios in Africa with almost perfect gender parity, and the country's workforce is well educated by regional standards. However, the rapid pace of innovation, together with a supply side failure to deliver the required digital skills, means that many businesses, service providers and organisations struggle to get employees with the right skills to harness technological opportunities.

Zimbabwe needs to make regulatory improvements as well as investments in four areas: policy and regulatory framework, resource management and coordination, governance, and capacity-building. Innovating out of the crisis is not a panacea, and much work remains to be done both on fixing the macroeconomic fundamentals and on addressing the inherent weaknesses within each foundational pillar for the digital economy. The recommendations in this report identify several interconnected areas to be addressed across all pillars.

Interoperability and coordination need to be prioritised if huge opportunities are to be created for Zimbabwe to improve its government digital platforms. The country has the opportunity to develop much in the industry if there is improvement in the supply of electricity, connectivity and monitoring macroeconomic woes that are distressing the country.

The fiscal policy should target the use of ICTs through e- government and e-learning programmes. The cost of transactions is still a major problem in this sector. The Zimbabwean government should make efforts to revise its data costs and keep them at a minimum for a technologically empowered Zimbabwe. Hence, both monetary and the fiscal policies should work on resolving this challenge. Furthermore, some places in rural areas are still having problems with mobile network and Internet connectivity. The fiscal policy should budget for investments into this sector to improve connectivity in marginalised areas.

There is also strong need to encourage public and private funding in order to support the digital economy. The government needs to engage the private sector, civil society and academia in setting the agenda for digital development, creating appropriate regulations and implementing digital

initiatives. Achieving a healthy and successful SME environment requires proper funding. There is a critical need for training to promote success in the digital economy and, in particular, for business to business e-commerce.

There is need for sufficient savings and investment in digital technologies to positively stimulate all sectors of the economy and society. The growing importance of the digital sector was found as an instant reaction to COVID-19 economic shocks that has a potential to bring back strength in all sectors of the economy. The government should nurture some commendable solutions to help it to leapfrog into digital development. This can be done only by constructing modern digital systems and developing markets for new digital enterprises.

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CHAPTER 10: WHY PEOPLE, PERFORMANCE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS MATTER: LESSONS FOR THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 2

CHRISTINE CHIVANDIRE, INNOCENT CHIRISA AND NYASHA NDEMO

ABSTRACT

This chapter critically examines why people are crucial for the development of an upper-middle economy by 2030, together with performance and strong institutions. The chapter identifies contributions made by these three to the growth of the economy. The chapter was produced through a desktop study in which data from previous studies were used to identify the importance of people, performance and strong institutions to the development of the national economy. Both qualitative and quantitative techniques were applied in this research. Validation of data were done through triangulation of different data sources for reliability purposes. Results indicate that strong institutions, people and performance are significant to the development of an upper-middle-class economy by 2030 in Zimbabwe, as these are the centre of economic growth. Through participation in decision-making, people contribute to how development is implemented. Strong institutions promote the development process and increase the production of different sectors within the economy. It is argued that the vitality of these is recognisable as the strategies set for the national development intertwine with them. Conclusively, there is a great deal in the development of the economy that is measured by the importance of people, performance and institutions. It is recommended that more effort should be made to accommodate and value the people, the performance of different sectors and strong institutions in as far as development is anticipated.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter demonstrates the importance of strong institutes, people and performance to the development of the NDS. It sets lessons that could be harnessed in future decision-making in the development of the NDS2, which is the other guideline leading to the development of an upper

middle-class economy by 2030 in Zimbabwe. It is important to understand what is meant by obtaining an upper-middle class economy. According to World Bank Group (2020), upper-middle-class economies are those with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method of more than \$4 125. The chapter, therefore, highlights the role which the people perform and the importance of the performance of different sectors within the economy and the vitality of strong institutions that surround development and economic growth. These three are taken as the core attributes to the growth of an economy. This study seeks to analyse the performance of different sectors of the economy of Zimbabwe. It is set to discuss how they are going about regarding the development of the country' economy. These sectors include agriculture, mining, transport, education, health and many more others in which the participation of people is noticed and different institutions are brought together. According to the NDS1 (2020), the key economic sectors of Zimbabwe are mining, manufacturing, agriculture and tourism. Therefore, the study discusses how these sectors can result in the upgrading of the economy from the status to an upper-middle-income economy by 2030. Though the economy is centred on these, it should be noted that the development of the economy constitutes the natural and built environment, service provision, the health and education of the people, not forgetting innovation and technology embracement throughout all the economic sectors of the economy. Institutions which include both private and public sectors are analysed in terms of how strong they are with regards to the growth of the economy and how they can be modified to become strong institutions that increase the capacity of the shoot of the economy into the vision of the country of becoming an upper-middle-class economy by the year 2030 using the strategies set by the government through the NDS1.

The study took a desktop analysis and managed to read several secondary data sources that included articles, journals, books from the already existing studies and studies. Data triangulation was involved for validation purposes and reliability purposes. It was discovered from the results that the three aspects are crucial for the development of the economy of Zimbabwe. The contribution of the people through their participation was found to have both positive and adverse impacts on the growth of the country's economy. The flexibility of people's attitude towards

development is seen to be a threat to development, hence precepts need to be laid for the preference of the government and the country to be met.

Performance of different sectors that make the economy was analysed and results indicated that the best performance of these sectors will only lead to the achievement of a middle-income economy by the year 2030, while the availability of strong institutions reflected a potential for growth of the economy as anticipated by the government. It is argued that the development and growth of the economy relies on these three, thus they should be handled with caution to avoid the degradation of the economy. In conclusion, performance, people and strong institutions are very vital to the economy as they project how the economy is improving in the region or country, in this case, Zimbabwe. This is not something that is attainable without introspecting their functionality that rates whether there is progression or recession. The chapter recommends that a close eye should be kept on these to facilitate the upgrading of the economy to its full capacity that enables the country to fulfil its vision of being an upper-middle-income country by 2030.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Institutions support economic development through four broad channels: determining the costs of economic transactions, the degree of appropriability of return to investment, the level for oppression and expropriation, and the degree to which the environment is conducive to cooperation and increased social capital (Ferrini, 2012). In North (1990), institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly-devised constraints that shape human interaction and have an impact on the economy over time. To understand the contribution of institutions to the development of an economy, it is important to understand the relationship that exists between the rules and the players which North (1990) defines as organisations and their interactions with human beings. It has been discovered that in previous years, the deterioration and weakness of institutions pervaded government, local authorities and public enterprises such that they became a major source of risks in the economy, who are responsible for setting them and changing them, thus the importance of this chapter as it exhibits the three, that is, the people, performance and institutions. The strength of these

institutions contributes to the growth of the economy. Therefore, it should be noted that weak institutions are associated with low economic growth. It is argued that weakened public institutions are characterised by fiscal and debt mismanagement, corruption accompanied by infrastructure and public service degeneration. Thus, institutions determine the extent to which those in power are able to expropriate the economy's resources to their private advantage. Unequal institutions strongly limit development by reducing the capacity of individuals to access resources, expand production and increase their incomes (Ferrini, 2012).

The need for the formulation of strong institutions for the success of the country's vision can be noted in the previous occurrences within the economy due to elasticity of the institutions that seemed to favour the interests of the government instead of the whole population. In Zimbabwe, the prevailing downfall of the economy is attributed to weak institutions that prevailed for several decades, thus making them difficult to be handled. Absence of rules governing government spending is believed to have affected the economy in a negative way as a fiscal deficit caused by uncontrolled spending on government salaries and benefits, is noted. International debt has fallen into arrears, resulting in the country being unable to access external financing. There are low and falling levels of tax collection and letting political goals take precedence over inclusive economic prosperity. It is noted in the previous studies that weak institutions in Zimbabwe have resulted in critical aspects of public goods and services suffering from a lack of funds with a subsequent degeneration in basic infrastructure, health and education services.

This chapter, therefore, puts up ways in which institutions can be strengthened for the development of the country's economy, whereby everyone benefits from them. It identifies whether acts of the Parliament, among other legislatures, are being utilised in different organisations, both private and public, to uplift the economy in all areas within the economic space. Institutions' capacity to control the economy has always been affected by corruption. The Transparency-International Corruption Perception Index (2016) notes that Zimbabwe is one of the countries with a high prevalence of corruption, ranking it at 154 out of 176 countries. Nevertheless, it should be noted that institutions are there to guide

development in different organisations within the current economy to ensure that just development is being partaken and the negative influence of these organisations in which their interests are at the top, are limited for the benefit of all the citizens which is the goal of the vision 2030 that seeks to ensure everyone benefits from the economic growth and prosperity. This chapter, therefore, involves some of the organisations that influence economic growth in Zimbabwe, including service providers, among others, to find out in which way they are promoting growth.

Zimbabwe is rich in mineral resources including platinum, diamonds and gold. Despite the availability of such minerals, the economy of Zimbabwe still struggles to rise and the country is one of those counted as less developed countries in the world. This is because of several factors as noted by the Mid-term Fiscal Review Statement of 2015 which says that though minerals are readily available in the country, they are failing to benefit the economy to full capacity. It is argued in the Budget Statement of 2016 that though Zimbabwe has plentiful of diamonds, this resource seems to have not benefitted the generality of our people. In this case, it is proven that Zimbabwe's mining sector is underperforming, and it is failing to add value to the economy of the country due to theft within mining industries that is noticed through the smuggling of minerals for personal benefit by certain individuals. As one of the main sectors that the economy relies on, this chapter argues that something should be done to correct the problem the sector is facing through the introduction of strong binding institutions.

Secondly, the chapter seeks to discuss the performance of different sectors that contribute to the growth of the economy. How these sectors function is very crucial to the achievement of the upper-middle class economy status by 2030. The economy of Zimbabwe has been performing poorly due to several factors identified in the economic sector by different studies. The economic performance was supported by the inflation of commodity prices and increased global demand that led to rapidly rising exports of these products (Kanyenze, Chitambara and Tyson, 2017). Poor performance is associated with limited outputs, the reason there is a negative growth of the economy, hence the need to enhance the functionality of the sector by looking into the causes of the poor

performance. Lack of transparency and accountability around mineral resources has been a sticking issue for a long time. With the mineral level of the country, the economy of Zimbabwe should be bouncing among other countries, but the existence of some gaps has led to its poor performance. The mining sector, one of the main activities which raise the country's economy, has been performing poorly in previous years due to bad administration and corruption resulting in government losing US\$1.8 billion annually through smuggling, illegal dealing in gold and precious stones, fraud, tax evasion and externalisation, among others.

In a study to investigate public performance among Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, Curristine, Londi and Joumard (2007) postulate that institutional factors that influence the performance of the public sector and their introduction will improve their performance, among them decentralisation of political power and allowing subnational governments to inherit the power in their areas which has been already done by the Government of Zimbabwe in a bid to increase economic growth and development. The other is the presence of appropriate human resource management practices in which education and health systems increase the scale of operations for efficiency purposes.

METHODOLOGY

A desktop study was used to compile the information contained in this chapter. Contributions from previous studies were used to justify the dichotomy that economic development is achieved through the people, performance and strong institutes. Secondary data were revealed from different sources which includes journals, books, articles and some other published documents. Statutory instruments and other government gazettes, including the NDS1 that is already being implemented since the beginning of 2021, were also used to figure out the plans of the government towards the goal of being an upper-middle-income economy, whereby the strategies for this development are laid down. A qualitative analysis was done where a descriptive interpretation was done to ensure that there was understandable information presented. The use of more than one data source was initiated for the sake of validation and reliability.

RESULTS

People are crucial for the development of the economy throughout the world. Their standards of living are an indication of economic growth; hence, they cannot be ignored in the measurement of development in any country.

The development of a country's economy is determined by the attitude of the people. It has been found out that local people are the ones that raise the economy or help it collapse due to their different activities within society. Through participative planning, it is noted that people are a vital part of the economy in different areas as they contribute to the decision-making process in which they are made to decide on the different aspects of development at local, district, provincial and national levels. Public participation is important for the development of the economy of a country. It is the people who approves of certain local plans, master plans and schemes that are meant for the development of the area, taking into consideration the benefits of certain developments in their areas and the negative impacts brought by some developments, thus denouncing or approving them for the benefit of their economy.

People are an integral part of the economy and their contribution has a lot to do with the development of an upper-middle-class economy by 2030 in Zimbabwe. The participation of people in economy-enhancing projects in different economic sectors is an advantage to the government's vision to obtain the status of being an upper-middle-class economy by year 2030. With regards to the people, it is noted that several them have skills but the employment rate is very low in the absence of industries to employ them and showcase their talents and knowledge, thus indicating a negative growth on the economy, as employment rate is used to measure the performance of the economy.

Through the implementation of human capital for economic growth, it has been discovered that people are a real component of development. They increase productivity through their skills, knowledge and technological advancement; hence they cannot be ignored on the road to the attainment of the Vision 2030. The economy of the country is measured by the Human Development Index (HCI) (Omnari, Alizadeh, Amimi, 2019; Jílková

and Skaličkov, 2019). On the other hand, it was found out that people can strain economic development due to their selfish ambitions. Corruption is contributing to the decline of the country's GDP. Using power, resources meant for the development of the country's economy are utilised for the upkeep of positions by certain individuals.

Results also show that performance is measurable for the development of an economy. By looking at the performance of different sectors that align with the development of the country's economy, it is noted that good performance increases the GDP of the country, while a negative growth is associated with poor performance. The performance of sectors such as education, health, agriculture, mining and tourism sports, among others, influences the growth of the economy in different ways.

By looking at the sectors surrounding the economy and analysing their performance, it was discovered that many sectors are under-performing as seen by the absence of some services which include water reticulation and wastewater management together with solid waste management in major cities such as Harare. This is evidenced by land pollution in different suburbs and the central business districts themselves. Running sewer water and lack of garbage collection lowers the standards of living of the local people which is an indicator of the behaviour of the economy, thus it can be said that unless these problems of service provision are resolved, the country's economy will still struggle in the long run and the anticipated status to be attained by 2030 will still remain a pipedream.

Furthermore, the provision of energy in the country remains very poor with a lot of load-shedding which is limiting factories and manufacturers to work to their full capacity, when they are the main sources of a good economy of the country. Results indicate that there is need for the improvement of the energy supply system in Zimbabwe that is sufficient for the operations of different firms and allow them to manufacture goods that are sold locally and exported to different countries around the globe.

Lack of investment in new and efficient technology in different sectors has been noted in this chapter. The country's industries are deteriorating due to lack of advancement in new innovative technologies that are more

reliable and faster to use. It has been discovered that existing machinery is in use has exceeded its lifespan and is hard to repair as it is outdated, hence there are no more companies that specialise in producing spare parts for them. This is lowering production in several sectors, hence slowing the rate of economic growth. This is also associated with a negative performance of the sectors and the economy at large.

Institutions are very crucial for the development of the economy as they create an environment where monopolisation is discouraged. It allows the market to diversify through legal frameworks which control and manage the operations of different organisations and companies, both private and public entities. This results in the growth of the economy as prices are controlled by certain laws, thus the importance of institutions with regards to the development of the country's vision 2030.

Results show that with the institutional arrangement by the central government of devolving power to promote economic growth, its utilisation to full capacity is an advantage to the growth of the economy as decision-making will not only be by the central government, but also by different local areas, on certain issues pertaining to the development and utilisation of resources in their areas of legislation.

Apart from that, devolution deals with self-ambitions of different sectors and organisations whereby they maximise on their profits at the expense of the public. Concerning themselves only with their interests than with working for the improvement of the economy at national level will result only in the decline of the economy and a regression in the anticipated growth of the country's 2030 vision agenda. Institutions work as directives that will not only limit the above, but also curb corruption which is a threat to the development of the country and its economy. The availability of strict legislation to deal with corruption will result in the proper disposition of resources and their equal distribution with little occurrence of diverting the scarce resource meant for the development of the country towards self-desires. Besides, this will control both investors and local operators in the externalisation of resources. Strong institutions are a magnet for investment because investors seek the protection of their capital, hence the availability of investors is a benefit to the country's economy.

Therefore, setting strong institutions will promote more investments from all sides of the country.

The economy of the country is held within different sectors that operate throughout the country. It has been discovered that the performance of different sectors within the economic structure of the country is vital for the development of the country's economy. Zimbabwe is a country with a lot of minerals and should utilise them in such a way that boosts the economy.

DISCUSSION

The development of the country and its economy is connected to the performance of its sectors, the attitude of the people and their contribution and the availability of strong institutions. As noted in the literature review and the results sections, it is argued that strong institutions bring about development and direction to the economic sectors, leading to the growth of the economy, hence their availability in Zimbabwe will not only help manage the day-to-day legality of the country, but pave way for the success of Vision 2030. Without addressing the issues that arise in different sectors of the economy, it is hard to increase the growth of the economy as there is room for self-interest to be facilitated and raise alarm for corruption and price inflation as well. The presence of strong institutions is an advantage to economic growth as there is control of the sectors. However, it is argued that in the presence of corruption, it is difficult to increase the growth of the economy as there are a lot of resources being lost for personal gain and also weak institutions, evidenced by the catch-and-release practice by the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), hence the continuation of trespassing will multiply since there is little justice for such cases. The existing gap within the legal framework is a weakness in the balancing of economic growth and power, especially state power. It can be said that the vision of becoming an upper middle-income country by 2030 is absolutely possible only if they are procedures in place to cover the gaps that exist that lower the importance of institutions, the people and performance in the country. Although the majority of the countries have engaged in some institutional reforms, the empirical evidence of their impact on efficiency is little so far due to the lack of resources to conduct evaluations; the lack of pre-reform

measures of performance; the complexities in measuring efficiency in the public sector, and the problem of isolating the effects of specific institutional reforms on efficiency from other external influences.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The chapter analysed the importance of the people, performance and strong institutions in the development of the country's economy with the main aim of picking up some lessons that can be used in the development of the second NDS that will cover the second phase of the planning strategy of an upper-middle-income economy by 2030. These three are critical to the economy as they project how the economy is improving around the region or a certain country and in this case Zimbabwe. This is not something that is attainable without introspecting their functionality that rate whether there is progression or recession. Both positive and negative influence has been noted on them towards the growth of the economy therefore the government should make use of the good that they deliver for the economy and maximise on that whilst curbing the adverse contributions that brings about a negative growth to the economy thus going against its vision 2030. Performance, people and strong institutions are super vital to the economy as they project how the economy is improving around the region or a certain country and in this case Zimbabwe. This is not something that is attainable without introspecting their functionality that rate whether there is progression or recession.

This chapter has come up with several recommendations that can be used as lessons in the development of the NDS2 for the initiation of the rise of the country to an upper-middle-income economy by 2030. With regards to setting of strong institutions, it is recommended that there be strict legislation that governs development in different sectors and organisation at local, regional and national levels of development.

There is need to formulate political representation and governance in cities and regions that promote the development of legal frameworks and mechanisms that guide the performance of the economy. Creating strong institutions that guarantee the collaboration and coordination between different sectors and levels of government should be done as this will lead to the transfer of information from one point to the other and also help in

resolving the prevailing challenges that can act as obstacles to the development of the economy.

It is recommended that there be room opened for the free participation of the public. The participation enables a greater degree of social cohesion and allows for the exercise of citizen's democratic rights. There should be public participation in all processes and direct access to information for decision making about planning and projects within different sectors as this will only help increase the workforce of the people and their morale as outputs is clear to everyone within the organisations and the country at large. Community participation and coordination among the different economic sectors and shared management plans will build cooperation that will result in clear guidelines and frameworks that will minimise the duplication of ideas hence diversify development processes.

Transparency within different sectors is also crucial. This will minimise the smuggling of resources especially in the mining sector where several reports have been unveiled. The occurrence within different sectors should be open to the public as a way of encouraging hard work through the knowledge of the outcomes both positive and negative helps encourage the citizens and the workers at large.

Legislative framework is also important to deal with the breakers of the law.in recent years of the new dispensation. The chapter also recommend that there be connection, coordination, and cooperation between different policies implemented at the local, national or regional level, in conjunction with the private sector and civil society. Strict laws should be implemented especially with regards to smuggling and externalisation of resources that are meant to benefit the whole multitude of Zimbabwe and do away with the catch and realise that has been happening in this second dispensation that will only increase the number of corruption cases as they have someone's back on them. Coordinated institutions are very crucial as well for economic growth and the fulfilment of the vision 2030.

The chapter suggests that there be measurables of the performance of different sectors of the economy. Each sector should come up with measurables for its performance that will determine whether the outcome

is increasing or falling and to evaluate how each sector is benefiting the growth of the economy.

Investment in new technology and innovation is also required in the sectors that control economic growth. In the changing dynamics of the world's technology many things have gone digital through smart technologies hence the country needs to invest in such technology that is more reliable to increase production. With regards to sufficient energy supply it is recommended that its high time the government should take the available renewable energy seriously and invest in it through the development of solar energy infrastructures that will substitute hydro-electricity that has been to be insufficient over the previous decades and due to climate change the dropping of the water levels at Kariba has far affected it.

These organisations and institutions require solid legal frameworks and governance models that ensure the participation of all actors, both public and private, in decision making, to meet the challenges faced in increasing the growth of the economy. It is necessary to avoid institutional fragmentation and create partnerships between the public and the private sector that will attract investments from different countries as a way of improving production and technology use.

Investment attraction through the installation of strong institutions through legal framework that guides the development of different sectors and all levels of economic growth from the local scale until the national capacity. Attraction of human capital. Transfers from central government. Centralisation and decentralisation together with devolution are way to go for the development of the economy and in as far as the attainment of an upper-middle class economy is concerned.

Investment in infrastructure development especially the transport systems that will enable free movement of goods from one place to the other with the suggestion of using the already existing railway line that connects different cities and towns around the country with different economic activities taking place.

The chapter suggests that these organisations and institutions require solid legal frameworks and governance models as this will ensure the participation of all actors, both public and private in decision making for the uplifting of the economy. It is recommended that institutional fragmentation should be avoided and create partnerships between the public and private sectors for the convergence of ideas that subdue to development of the vision of Zimbabwe.

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Synopsis

The objective overall of this book is to examine the extent to which the Zimbabwean community has embraced the National Development Strategy 1 (NDS1) as Zimbabwe's socio-economic and transformative and inclusive development blueprint. The chapters are based mainly on a desktop study involving critical interrogation of literature from other countries that have implemented such strategies and documents mined from Google Scholar, Ebsco and websites with news and policies, statutes and related literature. The chapters herein are holistic in orientation and critically engage with NDS1 from a multiplicity of entry points ranging from Information and Communication Technology, Climate Change and adaptation and building resilience strategies, the broad social sciences and developmental perspectives. Some interviews/focus group discussions are also used to gather information from the players mentioned in the objective. Each chapter then critically looks into some individual sectors of the Strategy, identifies and engages the major players and institutions that have the mandate to implement the NDS1 sectors. This engagement allows the interrogation of what strategies are on the ground in response to NDS1, critique of the plans and timelines for implementation and major gaps obtaining (monitoring and evaluation). Recommendations and policy options are then made on how best the gaps may be bridged. These are derived from studying similar strategies implemented in other countries, mainly developed countries. These might have to be tweaked to work accordingly in a developing nation, such as Zimbabwe, with the intention of advancing economic growth, social development and environmental sustainability for the welfare and well-being of the communities.

ISBN 978-1-77933-836-5
EAN 9781779338365