

Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives on the South African Human Security Drive

The continued renewal of interest in democracy and human rights discourse has projected the concept of civil society into a prominent position in terms of intellectual traction and cogence in both social science theory and development policy. Pressures for political and economic reforms have emanated from two quarters. In the late 1980s, the international political and economic developments took a new dimension where the two superpowers, United State of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), reduced and in some cases withdrew their outright support to client states, thereby undercutting authoritarian regimes. With the end of the Cold War era demands for political change in Southern Africa mainly emanated from within as citizens mobilized to rid of themselves from the then ruling military and single-party states. Civil society organisations emerged as popular human security force which threatened to capture the political initiative from the state elites.

Civil society organisations espoused a political style which provided distance from established channels, thereby questioning the legitimacy and the decisions of the government. The members of the civil society organisations usually adopted a wide range of protest acts which included demonstrations, boycotts and political strikes. Some of these acts were generally illegal according to every state's legal provision but in contrast to criminal behaviour, the actors' motives were political (Hague & Harrop, 2007:154).

To appreciate the character of social movements, it is useful to compare them with parties and interest groups (Hague & Harrop, 2007:168). Social movements are loosely organised institutions and

their origins lie outside the country's legislature. Civil society organisations emerge from the community or an organised group of people to challenge the political and economic establishments among others. Civil society organisations possess both similarities and differences with interest groups that focus on areas such as the nuclear disarmaments, feminism or the environmental. In fact, the civil society organisations do not necessarily seek state power but rather to influence government's policy formulations. They promote the pluralisation of political ideas through advocating for legislative changes which allow a broad interpretation of politics (Hogue & Harrop, 2007:169). The civil society organisations are in most cases described as 'new politics' because before the emergence of the modern state more protests were locally based than national in structure (Fisher, 1998: 187).

Regardless of how the civil society organisations are conceptualised, they played a vital role in providing a space for public voice, for the practice of citizenship and for the building of social cohesion. Castells (2000) points out that civil society organisations are imperative as a space for the building of identity in a world where citizens feel that they have little control over their circumstances and where the nation state becomes too big for its citizens and too small in relation to the global world order. It is within this space of vulnerability that the civil society sector grew. Heinrich (2007) also reiterates this, stating that civil society has always been in existence, but that the current climate of political, social and economic insecurity has facilitated the proliferation of civil society organisations across the globe. Although the civil society as an institution has been often painted in glowing terms, Castells & Heinrich (2007) propound that where cultural identity is threatened, fundamentalist organisations are likely to see a growth as people look to them as space in which to express identity. This has certainly been the case over the last decades and it explains some of the shifts experienced by the civil society organisations in South Africa

and other SADC member states in general (Castells & Heinrich, 2007:37).

Non-State Actors (NSAs) are one group of players who are active in the efforts of national and international development targeting the welfare of the poor people in most poor and developing countries. In Southern Africa, NSAs which specialise in human security provision either working independently or alongside bilateral aid agencies which provide 'private-sector infrastructure operations, self-help associations and local governments (Werker & Ahmed; 2007:3). Mostly, NSAs range in size since some were founded by individuals while some showed a complex organisational outlook with managers who are based in developed countries. The steady rise of NSAs captivated the imagination of some policymakers, political activists and analysts, leading some observers to claim that NSAs are in the midst of a "quiet political" revolution (Edwards & Hume, 1996:260; Fisher, 1997:36). Indeed, NGOs are frequently idealized as organisations that are committed to offering services free of charge while making profit or engaging in politics (Zivetz, 1991:18-19; Fisher, 1993:70). As NSAs became more active on developmental issues where their efforts were concentrated on challenging traditional approaches to peace and security paradigm which placed the state at the centre of both economic and political development processes (Dickson 1997; 155). Recent years have witnessed vigorous global transformations from below as social movements and citizen groups built transnational alliances and coalitions to resist and contest some terms of neoliberal economics by promoting an alternative programme which aimed at bolstering markets to work for the people, and vice-versa (UNDP, 1997: 91). In the realm of international development, NSAs have been characterized as the new "favoured child" of the official development agencies and as well proclaimed as a "magic bullet" to target and fix global problems (Mortinussen, 1997:115-116).

Non-state actors can also be categorised differently as international governmental organisations or public international organisations which have added a platform and a plausible voice to states' foreign policy and diplomacy. NSAs promote common interests as defined by the country they originated from. They fund programmes, activities or personalities that saw interests and objectives implemented according to the design of the state, individual personality or institution (Weiner, 2010:35-40). According to Vale (2004) NSAs were established in great numbers and for many purposes in the second half of the 20th century. Because of their diversity, NSAs presented a confusing sight in the way they handle and engage national governments on issues of human security. In Southern Africa, in general and South Africa in particular, one can easily distinguish between universal, regional and national organisations such as the United National High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). One can also distinguish between the Southern African Development Community and the Organ on Peace, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) which is a special SADC organ which deals with military and security issues of member states in the Southern African region. One can also classify NGOs according to the reasons they were established. As was shown above, COSATU stands for labour related issues while UNHCR stands for social, political and economic refugees and many other related institutions. The most pushing factor for the mushrooming of these civil society organisations has been the wish for closer social and political ties with the ruling institutions and the need for redrawing a new democratization process. Arguably, the driving force for the setting up of most of non-governmental organisations has been the desire to influence the electorate to subvert the state as an institution. The NGOs and CSOs in most instances were established to make sure that objectives and aspirations of the founders of the institutions were fulfilled (Weiner, 2010:285-295).

Although, states have far-reaching and comprehensive powers on governance policy formulation processes, the NSA had the autonomy to set up some structures which can compete with the state's institutions or complemented government's efforts to address a Human Security Agenda. Between 1997 and 2007, the Congress of Southern African Trade Unions (COSATU) had the mandate to represent South Africa's workers at any level on labour related issues. In the face of global political and economic trends which dictated negatively against the country's economic growth, COSATU competed and challenged government on various areas of policy formulation (Vale: 2004:210-11). Unlike the state, an NSA has only limited powers which are defined by the organisation's functions not by the national public. Since 1945, the establishment of NSAs has been legitimised by Article 105, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter which mandated them as authorities that are necessary for the independent exercise of its functions. This functional approach to the powers of a NSA was used by the Southern African Human Rights Organisation in its advisory opinion on SADC member states' government systems (Davis, 1997:211; Closson, 2006:97).

To determine and interpret the functions of NSA, one must take recourse to the rules of the organisation. These rules consist of; (as can be argued by analogy of UN Article 2 paragraph 1, letter (j), of Treaties between states and international organisations which primarily are of the constituent instruments, decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance with the NGOs and established practice of the organisation (Kleiner, 2010:284). The interpretation of these instruments shows the limits of international governmental organisations' functions. However, an NSA which operates in a host country that has domesticated the international law has national rights and obligations to venture into other domains of national structure. Thus, the NSA can operate independently without the government's interferences but if activities were politically motivated, logistical barricades are always

visible due to the states' motivated desire to monopolize the sovereign rights of the statehood (Kaufmann, 2008:100).

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The NSAs in South Africa operate with state sanctioning and linked through individuals to public officials and private institutions. The main areas of focus included the executive branch of government, legislature and the judiciary. The core business of most civil society organisations (CSOs), especially the protective ones, is influencing public policy. Thus, states institutions that shaped and applied policy became the main targets. Their ideal way of influencing policy hinges on direct conversations with the government ministers who formed the political executive. If a NSA engaged the government ministers before the specific policies have been crystallized that would enabled the institution to enter the policy formulation process at an early formative stage. In most developing countries where nearly all SADC member states are found, a regional representative group usually was appointed to a joint advisory through which the concerns or motives of the NGO/CSO were made known to the relevant departments of governments (Curry, 1999:36).


The bureaucracy was undoubtedly the main pressure point by the NGOs/CSOs in any government setup. In fact, these interest groups followed where power was concentrated, and it was in civil servants' offices that detailed decisions were formed. As Matthews (1989:219) comments:

"The bureaucracy's significance is reinforced by its policy- making and policy- implementing roles. Many routines, technical and less important decisions which are nonetheless of vital concern to interest groups, are made by public servants."

In most cases, shrewd NSAs focus on the hidden agendas which gave the government advantage over its people. They modified the details to suit their operational desires and their financiers' aspirations.

Other civil society organisations usually secured influence through their relationship with the political party that formed government. This has been the case in South Africa since 1994 when the workers' movement, COSATU became the leading partner to the ruling political party ANC to discuss and formulate industrial affairs. This politically fashioned link with the South African government's ministerial component of the executive guaranteed human security to all the citizens of South Africa regardless of race or ethnic background.

Table 2: Channels of Interest Groups Influence (*Jackie Selebi Building Collaborative Security in Southern Africa, 2012) Table 6 (page 67)*



The demise of the apartheid system in South Africa gave birth to a regime with a parliament which was a departure from the erstwhile parliamentary sovereignty regime which had a more reactive rather than proactive approach to different policy issues. This was due to the composition of members of parliament who were suspicious of each other on political and racial grounds. Accordingly governance systems suffered to the extent of derailing revolutionarisation of good democratic transformation. The attainment of a negotiated South African independence in 1994, the white minority remained in control of nearly all governance systems and security operational dynamics. As a result, NSAs treated members of parliament as opinion-leaders rather than decision-makers. Whenever COSATU began to challenge government on labour related issues, the blame was directed towards the bureaucracy. Landes (1995:488) posits that,

“Interest groups have an acute sense of smell when tracking the scent of power. Interaction with the bureaucracy and not with MPs is the goal of most groups and one reason why interest group activity is not highly visible to the untrained eye”.

Whenever COSATU was left in the cold in policy-making process, they managed to seek redress through the courts or through lobbying to the executive arm of government. However, in most cases the trade union used to engage in labour boycott or industrial strikes. The donor entities, both domestic and foreign based, provided technical advice which became instrumental to the political and economic transformation in the country. The close links that existed between NSA and the government started in 1994, all democratic transformation were done by bureaucracy consulting other stakeholders. The government became sceptical of NSAs’ activities when they interfere in political activities (Brehn, 2004:316).

When it comes to human security aspects in South Africa and SADC at large, the participation of NSA was greatly cherished through the public awareness on policy formulation. During the 1994 to 1999 period when South African government was under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, the formalization of democratic practices moved from participatory to consultative. The NGOs were roped in by the African National Congress government to provide defence, security, economic and social advice on policy formulation (Cawthra *et al.*, 2000: 162). Unlike the Mandela era, President Thabo Mbeki’s government (1999-2008) witnessed limited NSA participation. Participation of NSAs became more visible in specialized areas only. Those that was technical in nature utilised outsiders where expertise was not available in South Africa. The NSAs complemented the ANC government on the peace support environments. The South Africa Department of Defence received assistance from NSAs in the early stages of policy formulation. The latter possessed specialized knowledge and

experience from involvement in the peace and society sector in the SADC region (Khanyle, 2003: 116).

In South Africa, interactions between the state and the NSAs were not necessarily solicited by the former but in democratic societies, it is normal practice where the NSA sector complements government in service provision (Motumi, 2003:28). Another function of NSAs in South Africa was to engage with the state with a view to influence state policy on issues that have a national character. According to Jackie Cilliers of the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), the South African government engaged the civil society and NSAs to provide agricultural inputs to legitimize policies and build support for government actions. The aim was to achieve what was called the “social consent” to avoid criticism and antagonism by those resisting the new political dispensation of ANC government. In fact, some people were wishing for the failure of the ANC government in human security aspects (Hough and Du Plessis, 2000: 14). The new government benefitted a lot from the expertise which was provided by the NSA sector. For instance, the NSA sector engaged in various discussions with the South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on a range of policy formulation processes which included the 1998 Whitepaper Policy Document on peacekeeping and many other various aspects related to the New Partnerships for Africa Development (NEPAD) and ultimately the establishment of the African Union (UN) and its various organs. This again evidently showed that human security aspects cannot be left to the state alone, but the NGO needed to complement the service delivery by the government (Cawthra, 2007:31; Jacobeit, 1998:412).

The most remarkable roles of civil society and NGOs in Southern Africa were observed in issues related to defence and security and more broadly foreign affairs (Cawthra *et al.*, 2007.167). The coming in of the ANC government in 1994 also brought in also a new phase of civil society actions in terms of governance systems. Firstly, there was

the adoption of a critical stance regarding government policy by the white South Africa media. Most NGOs were aware of the corrupt deals by ANC politicians and the nature and cost of the defence equipment procured fraudulently and how contracts were granted. The Mbeki government was forced to change defence and security policy after it was heavily criticized by the white media for allowing the then Deputy President Zuma's alleged benefits deriving from the various arms contracts, especially the procurement package. Since a host of NGOs were involved in policy issues in areas of transformation of the military and the nature of a post-apartheid security and defence, the policy formulation processes were often developed without the appropriate oversight by and accountability to parliament and the executive (Pere & Vickers, 2004:113-117). The NSAs which were involved in political clandestine activities were found arm twisting the government to formulate policies favouring their financiers. The agenda was to destroy footprints left by the apartheid era where economic and political manipulations were rampant. Accordingly, the Mandela era saw a vibrancy of civil society activity formalized to participate on the formulation of policy and the development of legislation. The 'White Paper Document' on defence and peacekeeping operations was compressively "workshopped", as was the defence policy review. In the post 1999 period, the Defence Act of 2001 was drawn up not only by the military and justice and legal experts, but experts from the NSA sector. The policy formulation in defence and security of South Africa was dominated by the white racial supremacy bias due to the nature of political, social and economic dictates which contributed as inputs for document formulation and crafting. The experts from the NSA side had interests making sure that the defence and security policy was in favour of their capitalistic aspirations which had a bias towards the post-apartheid systems (Khanyle, 2003:68).

During the period 1997 to 2007, NSA activity in South Africa was increasingly confined to the services of research provisions to government's development programmes. NSAs provided the

government with various policy framework proposals because they had stronger research capacity. Jackie Cilliers of the Institute of Security Studies posits that:

“We can look at every sector of South African society including the areas that engage in security, where government has been weak and has been so mistrustful that government of its own people and particularly the old guard that government almost laid its self-bare to policy influence on anything from the land reform to security issues” (quoted in LePere & Vickers 2001: 68).

The Mbeki government faced challenges and competition of policy implementation and service delivery from the NSAs much more than in the Mandela era. During the latter’s reign, NSAs were more concerned with peace and security issues particularly what was going to face those who benefitted politically, economically and socially during the apartheid era (Motumi, 2003: 91). Their participation was to a very large measure supportive of government policy and was aimed at contributing to the building of a democratic South Africa. NSAs provided necessary capacity skills and knowledge for the country to realize its domestic and international objectives. The fact that the South African Department of Defence solicited civil society organisations’ input through various boards, among them the Equal Opportunity Board, Military Veterans Board and Military Arbitration Board, confirmed that there was a force to reckon with in terms of providing expertise in policy formulation system of government (Motumi, 2003:168; Vale, 2007:215; Riddell, 2007:18). The range and influence of the modern civil society organisations raised awkward questions about the distribution of power in liberal democracies like that of South Africa. Despite only representing a small minority and interest groups of white race of Boer origin in South Africa, the civil society groups were deeply entrenched in the formulation of a policy that directed government functions in support of their interests. Since such CSOs possessed power to influence the changes without accountability they took advantages of having access to the centre of policy making

process simply because of their historical alignment to the ruling elite of the apartheid era (Mutua, 2009:15).

The crises that erupted in some Southern African states in the 1990s illustrated that human security threats were beyond the control of any individual government or governments. These human security threats such as political, social and economic highlighted the need for greater collaboration among SADC member states, international and regional organisations, civil society organisations and community-based actors. The human security of the regional framework involves various entities of the society to provide the requisite peace and security provisions. Thomas (2000) argues that:

"People's practice of collective action has existed throughout history, political, socio-cultural and socio-economic changes over the last decades, however, have provided a uniquely fertile ground for the emergence of new forms of civic engagement on an unprecedented scale." (Henrich, 2007:xxi)

Forms of collective action that existed outside of the family, state and market have increased and taken on new forms over the last half century and particularly in the 1990s. These structures form a very powerful space for social cohesion and solidarity, service delivery and a voice of critique and expression. The civil society organisations were, therefore, a key partner in a democratic and free society, especially in the third world countries. This is particularly pertinent in South Africa, where they played a fundamental role in the transition to democracy. Under the apartheid regime, civil society organisations had been defined by their relationship to the state. It was either they were serving the white interests and aligned to the state, or in opposition to the state. Considering the ANC government's failure in delivering on its promises, the non-state actors decided to focus on serving poor communities in most cases, without government's assistance or interest (Thomas, 2000:118).

The National Development Agency (NDA) that was established in South Africa in 1998 through the Act of Parliament is "aimed to

promote an appropriate and sustainable partnership between the state and the civil society organisations to eradicate poverty and its causes” (NDA Act, 1998). It was established primarily to develop partnership between government and NSAs for service delivery and poverty alleviation. It carried out projects or programmes that met and developed needs of the poor black South Africans who had for a long time been under racial degradation. Although the establishment of the NDA was viewed as a milestone for a partnership between government and NSAs, it paradoxically remained clear that the ANC government was skeptical of the roles the non-state actors were to undertake. NDA was one NSA which took the initiative to ensure that economic power was passed on to the blacks who were both economic and politically vulnerable. In fact, the NSAs presented an opportunity for government to develop effective and efficient partnerships that provided human security aspects to the citizen of the country (Valentine, 2010:4-7; Webner, 1999:210).

Non-State actors that were close to and familiar with the realities on the ground were important in building responses that were proactive, preventive and sustainable. Civil society organisations played a critical role in mobilizing support and advancing collective action. With the knowledge of the threats that deprived their countries of peace and security, these non-state actors were crucial partners of government in promoting human security (Mutua, 2009: 285).

The Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) was instrumental in the application of human security in South Africa during and after apartheid era. In the 1980s and early 1990s, IDASA effectively participated in the struggle to end apartheid and the ushering in of the new society in 1994. It decided to focus on democracy with the aim of generating discussions and engagement across the highly polarized South African society. In a nutshell, IDASA was founded on the ideological premises to work for political

advocacy to end racial discrimination (Gupta & Kellman, 2009:284). It was instrumental in the initiation of a process theory which insinuated that change was to occur if white South Africans resistance to change was undertaken and addressed. It was IDASA that stressed the strategic importance of involving the white community in the struggle for non-racial democracy out of their self-interest in change, not mainly by moral exhortation (Gupta & Kellman, 2009:285). While in the period 1997 to 2007 each NSA had its own individual political, economic and social circumstances, IDASA's social developmental thrust suggested that its institutional policy shifts were moulded into general methodologies for organisations that hoped to facilitate transition and consolidate democracy in South Africa and SADC region. The roles of the NGOs in national policy formulation during and after conflict were huge in that, some regimes such as the apartheid system needed to be recreated and realigned to be adoptable to the new regime's dictates (Roitberg, 2004: 30-36).

In 2008, IDASA went into an institutional reconciliatory approach that was based on the government's democratic approach on fundamental issues of human security in South Africa. The first step which was embarked on was to understand the fundamental issues South Africa were facing considering that a new democratic government was in power. IDASA then committed itself to constantly analyse the socio-economic and political situation of the country. During the early months of 2008, IDASA in partnership with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation of Germany hosted conferences to discuss the South African economy, political developments, human rights abuse and security sector reforms. This was an attempt to bring together political organisations, labour and business to analyse and understand the country's political developmental realignment and to force an economic policy that addressed the inequalities left by the apartheid system. Through discussions and an engagement with the ANC delegates in government it concluded that "a non-racial democratic

political system would be meaningless without economic restructuring” (Valentine, 2010:18; Dodson 1990: 1-2). The participation of IDASA in the South African democratic transition in the period 1994 to 2007 brought political, social and economic advantages that uplifted human security aspects of the citizens (Smouts, 1999:312).

The changing political face of South Africa in the late 1990s saw the role of NGOs such as IDASA, taking the leading role in the transition process to democracy. The NGOs continued with the role of facilitating governance systems where human security breakdowns occurred during mediations between groups, institutions and individuals (Boraine, 1994:6-7). It became apparent that NGOs in South Africa became committed to work in the field of political and economic development where greater understanding of democracy and human rights was needed to be conscientised. In their effort of conscientising the citizens about human security perspectives, NSAs became active agencies of change (Boraine, 1994:8-1) In the 1999 xenophobic attacks which erupted in South Africa, they called for a concerted effort of all human security stakeholders to take part in support of a process to pacify the political situation. The civil society groups such as IDASA, COSATU and South African Human Rights Organisation came on board to compliment ANC government’s efforts to agitate for peace between foreigners and the South African citizens. The NSAs set up institutions such as the Johannesburg-based Training Centre for Democracy (TCD) where workshops, seminars and conferences offering in-depth training on the philosophy of democracy (Curry, 1999:33-34). They complimented government’s effort to create a conducive environment for foreigners. However, the government was castigated for failing to preserve peace and security of South Africans who pitted foreigners in the habit of accepting an upper class in society. This came about due to better standards of living which foreigners were enjoying compared to South African citizens. In fact, foreigners were more acceptable than locals by the employment sector

which was dominated by post-apartheid elements. Equally intriguing, foreign unskilled labour was the most favoured because it was cheaper to pay and manipulate (UNDP, 1997; Vale, 2003:48).

In the quest of upholding of the human security aspects, NGOs such as IDASA and TCD facilitated cooperation with government of ANC in 1997 through the establishment of the Public Information Centre (PIC) with the mission to collect, collate, analyse and provide information on public policy. The main purpose of the PIC was to enhance the ANC government's transparency, accountability and effectiveness. The NGOs became monitoring agencies to make sure that the government followed certain policy framework that were in tandem with their dictates. Through using institutions such as PIC, the NGOs managed to provide key information for good governance and to facilitate the election and appointment to public offices at all levels of government people who were acceptable to NGOs dictates to serve the society in an open manner (Mutua, 2009: 295). The initiatives of the South African NGOs in the early years of that country's independence were extensively to maintain peace and security in that country and the region at large. Venturing into the community security policing, NGOs wanted to guide the methodology of policing which was already an existing framework in the security field (Davies, 1997:613-620).

The NGOs' argument on spearheading a government's sacrosanct area was based on the assumption that the objective of policing which was the provision and maintenance of safety and security for all individuals and communities became the regulatory tool to restrain ANC government from making arbitrary policy formulation processes without the involvement of all so-called stakeholders. NGOs believed that the ANC government during the period under review was going to face challenges in society that included high levels of crime and violence, increasing unemployment, poverty and the perceived inability of the government to make things happen. All these

machinations by the NGOs were meant to empower the society so that the government of South Africa became tamed in such a way that the policymaking process was thoroughly exhausted for popular support where policy development and implementation remained the domain of all and not the government alone (Thomas, 2000:418; IDASA, 1999).

When NGOs or non-state actors operate within the context of a donor-recipient relationship, it remained clear that the relationships contribute very little to strengthening constituency bases. The relationship between the NGOs and their donors operating in South Africa in particular, were neither to enhance horizontal linkages between autonomous actors nor vertical relations of independence (Brehm, 2004:11-15). In South Africa, NGOs were administered by the agents of political and economic transformation which were donor countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Japan, among other developed countries. Both international and domestic donor institutions became, to a larger extent, victims of donor dictated projects and programmes (Davis, 1997:299). It was difficult for NGOs to remain independent of government's control which funded the strategic direction and development of the humanitarian aid. Government or individual institutions which usually funded NGO activities have in most of cases determined to have their national or individual interests successfully implemented. In South Africa and other SADC member states, it was the discretion of the western developed states which pumped in humanitarian assistance to influence democratic transitions (Davis, 1997:23).

For any NGO to preserve a high level of independence, it had to create an overall mission of what it wanted to achieve without reference to donors. The strategic direction, according to Mutua (2009), was to collectively decide its mission, search for ways to achieve the mission objectives and then sought funding opportunities. Most NGOs which largely depended on donor intervention suffered lack of resources

because whenever the objectives of the donors were not properly observed and religiously followed, it became obviously clear in South Africa that the funding for the recipients would dry up. It became fundamentally clear for the NGOs to maintain their objectives despite donor intervention because IDASA, one of the South African civil society groups, remained autonomous of donor influences due to its reputation as a productive organisation of high-quality work with results-oriented projects and commitment to change. However, in 2009 the institution was hard hit by the lack of donor funding hence, it closed its doors. Its buildings were inherited by other independent peace and security agencies (Mutua: 2009).

COSATU received the trade agreement between South Africa and the European Union on condition that they were going to be significant effects in shaping the country's future trade relations especially developments in domestic industrial structure and employment levels. Although COSATU's relationship with the ruling party African National Congress was very cordial before relationship turned sour over political and economic fundamental issues, the labour union had a bigger role to play in shaping the future of the country. The government had no absolute autonomy to independently rule the country without criticism from the NGOs or civil society groups. In the late 1990s, COSATU felt that in the long-term, it was appropriate for South Africa to cultivate strong relationships with the developing countries, especially those she shared with the same world outlook (SAIIA, 2000:109-111). COSATU remained a cornerstone to partner government in trade negotiations with the European Union since its opposition to the trade agreement was going to derail the policy formulation and implementation. By courting COSATU in 1999, the ANC government realized that South Africa's productive capacity was going to be locked into a particular mode by the labour unions. COSATU's had a change of mind after realizing that the agreement with European Union was going to transform colonial trading

relationships and moved up the value-adding chain. The government receive support from different quotas because the move was meant to transform the economic development for the citizens (Kaufmann, 2009:60-62).

The crisis that was created by job losses in South Africa in the early 2000 made COSATU reconsider its stance on employment. While it was critical for COSATU to represent the interest of workers in matters of tariff liberalisation, export orientation and employment, the government was not allowed to enter into an agreement without consultations with the labour body. COSATU asserted that job creation and the prevention of job losses in South Africa were their primary criteria in evaluating and informing policy. Although the trade pact between the EU and South Africa was concluded, COSATU influenced the government to make sure that the interests of workers and employers were considered in the policy formulation. This is what made the agreement possible. NGOs have become an increasingly common phenomenon of social life for the people in South Africa and SADC (Gupta & Kellman, 2009:101).

Accordingly, proliferations of both international, regional and national non- governmental institutions (Shanks *et al.*, 1996:125), the growth in treaty arrangement among states (Goldstein *et al.*, 2000:160-170) and the deepening of regional integration efforts in SADC all represent the extent to which regional and national politics have become more institutionalized (Carlsnaes *et al.*, 2007;192-193). Between the 1990s and 2000, NGOs were viewed as actors providing regional and national collective and redistributive goods (Gregg, 1995:206). However, they also came to regulate many of the social, political and economic problems traditionally within nation states' purview (Smouts, 1995:441-450). Through the development of specific competencies for both regional and national policy formulation processes, SADC member states managed to transform the agendas and goals that they

were grappling with, in an effort to come up with a roadmap for peoples' human security provision. NSA had a lot of influence in South Africa's policy formulation policies, especially in the 1997 to 1999 period when the country was reorganising and aligning her policies to suit the new political dispensation a few years after the apartheid system's demise. These institutions had an agenda which was to influence and socialize influences that were very critical for the white minority to remain relevant in the new democratic system (Kingsbury, 1998:345; Olsen, 1997:157).

After independence, the South African government, went through a process of coming up with a political and economic system to accommodate the ostracised black majority. On the other hand, to dislodge the apartheid system the ANC had to tread with caution because random and aggressive actions against the whites would result in economic and political confrontations. The major sustained effort at bringing together the analysis of non-actors particularly NSAs, have been Keck & Sikkinks (1998). They found out that different NSAs were able to work with institutions which promoted respect for human rights norms and those which were able to change state behaviour in many profound ways. Haas (1992) posits that epistemic communities in different states interacted with non-governmental organisations to change national outcomes. Jacobeit (1998) postulated that "debt-for-nature swaps" found that NSAs were dominant actors in organising and implementing policies that supported their agenda. The most fundamental issue on this argument was that non-state actors were able to use the South African government institutions as leverage to promote their political and economic agenda. Where states fear that the benefits of cooperation with NSAs were disproportionately militating against them, the NSAs were able to provide influence to the states about their fears to realize that cooperation was going to bring more political and economic benefits to

improve human security for the individual citizens (Kaufman, 2008:38).

The proliferation of the security sector in the SADC member states, emanated from how some rulers of weak states contributed to change of traditional role of the state to protect and safeguard the citizens within the national borders. The military and police services were traditionally the domain of the state. The privatisation of the security sector neglected issues of “comprador states’. The weak states in Southern Africa remained not as an innocent political formation that required humanitarian rehabilitation. From a security perspective, it was a dangerous phenomenon for the state to invite the private security entity to execute peace and security roles beyond the realm of legal accountability and public oversight. The weak SADC state rulers engaged in all sorts of complex survival techniques including inviting into their countries NGOs and international outlook NSAs that were able to sell military and state food resources. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique transformed into what Rodney (1982:12-18) termed comprador regimes that were regimes that do not care about the welfare of their citizens but the economic interests and foreign economic interests of the business moguls. Closson (2006:1) conceptualizes weak states in security terms as an arena for the operations of trans-territorial networks locked in a struggle for resources. Thus, the weak state became vulnerable because its sovereignty was highly contested by both local and global non-state actors. According to Doyle (2003:8-12) during the DRC conflict (1998-2001), the South African government covertly invited a private military company, the Executive Outcomes, to help the rebels to thwart President Laurent Kabila’s efforts to nationalize the economy. This private military company assisted the rebel groups to repel the government forces and other rival forces to install imperialism of manipulation (Gumedze, 2007:18). The traditional argument concerning weak states is that they are dominated by protectionist

policies of developed countries that weaken them due to their state of failure to provide human security. This approach is sympathetic to weak states as it presents them as victims of external manipulation by the NGOs and other foreign entities. Rotberg (2002: 341) notes that;

"Failure and weakness can flow from nation's geographical physical, historical and political circumstances, such as colonial errors and Cold War policy mistakes. More than structural or institutional weaknesses, human agency is also capable usually in a fate of war."

The importance of Ruberg's (2006) observation is that it captures the often-ignored human security agency and the role of leaders in the weakening of their states. The role of Mobutu Sese Seko in the weakening led to the most notable DRC crisis of 1998-2001 which was largely blamed on his weak leadership. Mobutu was responsible for the instrumentalisation of disorder that opened the gates for several private military groups and pseudo militant NGOs to intervene in the political conflict. According to Weber (1998:336), the problems of weak states emanate from allowing powerful forces to proffer their interests in every domain of states systems.

The interest in democracy and human rights issues had really brought into the limelight the Peace and Security paradigm. This interest was led by civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations that came to dominate sacrosanct areas of influences formerly exclusive to the state. The importance accorded to the non-state actors in the international relations compromised the state's legitimate power to rule independently. The state continued to receive a barrage of attacks from the non-state actors especially in the political, economic and security sectors that were regarded as centres of manipulation by illegitimate power systems of governance.

The non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations were supposed to complement the government efforts in human security aspects such as food security, health security, personal

security and political security. However, they tended to be critical symbols of governance systems. They wrestled power from the state especially in areas of policymaking and policy formulation processes. Non-governmental organisations have an added platform to state's foreign policy and diplomacy. Thus, they were to take care of the state's common interests at international forums and other global settings where due to donor funding structure the civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations voices were heard. Although states had far-reaching and comprehensive powers on governance policy formulation processes, there were many areas the non-state actors had structures which were able to compete with states institutions to address the Human Security Agenda.

The human security principles and aspects have been interlocked into the states' primary roles for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of populations. The human security threats such as political, food and economic developments have highlighted the need for greater collaboration among regional and international structures including civil society organisations where they were accorded the right to address issues at other international forums. Although the civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations were driven by the interests of those who fund them to compliment states' effort to address human security, the influences were usually targeted to specific competencies for both regional and national policy formulation processes which had a gender-setting and socializing influence for the governance systems.

Regardless of major concern of civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations had to pursue policy makers to consider their views and then to act on upon them. This involved inducing policy makers either to adopt a course of action that they had not initially intended to embark upon or to abandon a measure which they had originally decided to introduce. As a result, these included

participating in the formulation of policy to achieve the objectives that complement government efforts to provide human security aspects.