Chapter 3: The Evolution of Peace and Security Notions in Southern Africa

A brief history of the concept of Collective Security was dealt with in the preceding chapters, followed by an analysis of the SADC's citizens' security prospects, regional security mechanisms, peace and security developments in South Africa, peace and security impact on business in the region and role of state's security intelligence organisation in ensuring human security. This approach enabled an assessment of the effects of the concept of Collective Security on SADC countries in general and South Africa in particular. Collective Security concept is viewed as a method of controlling war in a world of sovereign states. To ensure peace and security in the region, SADC member states agreed to cooperate to dissuade incipient aggressor from their inclinations towards breaches of regional peace and security. According to this chapter, Southern Africa can hardly be termed a viable integrated regional political, economic or a regional security regime. There is a notable absence of common policy formulation process to uphold human security aspects for both individual citizens and the community at large. The Southern African Development Community is faced with a range of security challenges, all of which require a long-term capacity-building approach to instability and insecurity in SADC and the African Union should champion itself to make sure that the sub-regional body commits itself to the global reforms and initiatives required for an improvement in the current situation.

 SADC is one of the few regional economic and political bodies internationally regarded as having the potential to become a success. The current SADC was initiated as a rather loose, regional functional cooperation approach through which important political,

administrative and infrastructural links were created. In 1992 SADC adopted an "integrationist model" that was further strengthened through the joining of South Africa and Mauritius in 1994. These, then, two newcomers added a considerable economic strength in SADC due to more developed economic base than the others. In particular, South Africa's membership significantly strengthened the idea of integrating SADC through intensified intra-regional trade and by creating a Free Trade Area (FTA).

Regional interests in security and economic integration continue to spawn new regional initiatives especially in SADC. Thus, the creation of a strong sub-regional institution to deal with an array of political and security challenges was necessary. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was not able to simply rely on summitry and relations between Heads of State and Government and their ministries to resolve conflicts and promote democratic governance and eventually democratisation. As Baregu & Landsberg (eds) (2002:2-15) argue that;

> "… Southern Africa is going through a very turbulent time when its mechanisms for dealing with problems are in a state of flux".

The political, economic and individual security challenges which were faced by some SADC countries in the 1990s called for improvement on the democratic scale. During the late 1990s and early 2000, the most urgent issues which caused scepticism among SADC member states included economic, political and social instability. Refugee movements, food insecurity, employment crisis and inter/intra-state war, especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), remained a threat to human security in the SADC region.

The other peace and security challenges which were faced by the Southern African region included a virtual coup d'état in the Lesotho political crisis of 1998, a stubborn civil war of Angola in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a clash between democratisation and social justice in

Zimbabwe over the land reform programme in 1999, a revision of Namibia's decade–old constitution to give President Sam Nujoma a third presidential term, with Malawi's President Bakili Muluzi seeking to do the same in search of a third term and the highly contested elections in Zimbabwe and Zambia (Isakem & Tjonneland, 2001:6-20). The political contestations triggered by the intent to extend the term of office of the leaders was contrary to the aspirations of NGOs which saw a lot of corruption by the incumbent heads of state and government. The DRC went through a turbulent political and security phase which derailed democratic governance and the institutionalisation of centres of power of which such a political and security policy remained a complicating undertaking. In Malawi poverty, HIV&AIDS and under-development continued to coincide, posing significant threats to an already struggling democratisation project.

These security challenges hindered establishment of a strong security community in Southern Africa had political, economic, social and environmental dimensions. The absurdity of colonially inherited frontiers in DRC, South Africa and Namibia, the lack of access to food and the abuse of human rights were regarded as the most serious threat to peace and security of the individual people. This was because they invariably gave rise to security threats between communities and states in SADC, thereby endangering the security of the regional member states (Nathan, 1992:6; Thomas, 1987:35). The implosion of the Zimbabwe's economy in the early 2000s was a serious human security threat to both its citizens and neighbours. There was a severe shortage of foreign exchange reserves in Zimbabwe that was coupled with capital flight and a brain drain to South Africa, Britain and United States of America. Even in countries that have made significant strides in bringing about democratic governance such as Botswana and South Africa, poverty and inequality continued to increase causing more human insecurity (Ngoma, 2005:115-119; Nkiwane, 2000:193).

On the democratic front, most SADC states were caught between semi-authoritarianism and democracy as evidenced by the number of

disputed elections, including those held in Zambia in 2001 and Zimbabwe in 2000. Even in cases of democratic breakthrough such as the 2002 elections in Lesotho, democracy remained highly fragile and under immense security threat. In Swaziland, peace and security of both individuals and community at large was threatened by an increasingly hostile and intolerant monarchy with revolts and industrial actions by workers and opposition movements becoming the daily scenario. Apart from these human security inadequacies, the SADC sub-region continued to face the double-edged sword of weak states that were simultaneously undemocratic and had poor governance records (Ngoma, 2005:119-121).

Although there was wrangling between some SADC leaders as witnessed in the Malawi Summit in 2002 between Presidents Mandela and Mugabe, South Africa never sought to operate outside SADC on matters of security and economy. However, Southern African Customs Union (SACU) arrangement inherited from the apartheid system was never tempered with. In fact, Zambia is now a new member of the grouping. The post-conflict rehabilitation conducted in Angola in the 1990s, prevented the on and off peace process in the DRC from reverting to an all-out war. The search for political stability in Zimbabwe, while trying to address the imperatives of social injustice across the region became a tall order for SADC member states. The land question which also caused political and economic instability in Zimbabwe and the Lesotho constitutional crisis of 1998 worsened the SADC's dilemma to maintain peace and security in the region. It was not only Zimbabwe that was affected by the land question, but there were also signs simmering in Namibia and South Africa where the land question fallouts were very visible. These challenges continued to threaten not only peace, security and stability in many SADC countries, but it eroded some of the democratic gains made at independence (Meyns, 1999:13-19).

HIV&AIDS and the land question in almost all white settler societies along with devastating food insecurity emerged as major threats to human security in the SADC region. It was estimated that 22% of SADC's population was HIV positive in 2001. The HIV&AIDS epidemic was treated as a major governance issue in nearly all SADC member states. It had a massive impact in increasing poverty and inequality in most affected member countries. Furthermore, the improvement of families' social status became very difficult once there was a loss of human capital and a drop in productivity. There were increased health-care costs and a decline in savings. It became clear that reduced spending on education alone was a major threat to human security in SADC (Landsberg, 2002:194).

After the ANC Congress at Polokwane in 2007 and change of leadership, President Jacob Zuma's policies on Public Health have been lauded as remarkable after providing free access to "all those in South Africa" whose immune levels were very low. According to Dinkelman (2004) one medical doctor, Aaron Motswaledi, had done wonders in the opinion of civil society groups when he attended to the new infectious diseases. SADC member states needed political and security structures that went beyond simply managing old-styles of state-centric peace and security challenges. Instead, the challenge was also that of addressing issues of trade, democratic governance, land reform, growing poverty and inequality and eventual HIV&AIDS pandemic. It was not surprising that as early as in 1999, the SADC member states set up a task force to bring about "a SADC society with reduced HIV&AIDS prevalence" (Landsberg, 2002:197). In this case, indications were that the effects of the disease in SADC were rising and was estimated that no less than 48% of people in SADC member states lived below the poverty datum line. This was apart from other human security complexities such as crippling food insecurity. According to the April 2003 food assessment index by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), an estimated 13 million people in

SADC needed food assistance (Kornegay & Chesterman, 2000:56; Baregu, 2002:68; Bekoe, 2002:135). Thus, genuine enduring peace and security was consequently one which was all-encompassing.

The concept of Collective Security was first introduced by the League of Nations under the Treaty of Versailles to "promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security" (Chan, 1984:119; Bennett, 1991:130). Although, the founders of the League of Nations wanted world's member states to fight against any aggressive states that disturbed peace and security in the international system, the agitation was to maintain human security. Bennett (1984) propounded that Collective Security was viewed as a method of controlling war in a world of sovereign states but the capability to maintain peace and security for the individual citizens remained a global challenge. The idea of Collective Security was meant to provide the bridge between the crumbling world of past centuries and the kind of an ideal world which provided the most empowerment thrust in human security.

The theory of Collective Security as it was applied in Southern Africa in the late 1990s rested on the assumption that all nations in the region shared a primary interest in maintaining peace and security of the individuals. Bennett (1984:154) propounded that for collective security to operate, "peace must be viewed as indivisible and threats to peace anywhere must be treated as the concern of all members of the international system". The question of human security provision in a nation or state depended mainly on the effective reaction against threats to peace and security of the citizens and individuals within the state or society. Instead of concentrating on defeating the aggressor nation or individuals in line with the notion of the collective security, the human security aspects became more inclined to issues which undermined the individuals politically, socially and economically. In fact, the use of international peace to dissuade incipient aggressors from breaching peace of nations, individuals or society became less

prevalent in the late 1990s. In situations where the aggressor nation faced an overwhelming opposition from all the other members of the collective security system until peace was restored, the new human security concept demanded that peace and security started with the individual not the state. The state on the other hand was found to be the perpetrator of insecurity (Nolutshungu 1994:310; Punungwe, 1999:116; Mohammed, 2002:38).

SADC member states failed to make any significant improvements on the human security front, due to their failure to create lasting solutions to their political, social and economic insecurities (Nathan, 1992:6). There was a fundamental departure from the very narrow militaristic conception of "security" of the early 1990s to a more inclusive one after 2000. The Peace and Security concept now included individuals and societies as the subjects of security (Chenoy, 2007:348). This break emanated from the realisation that there were more security threats to the individual than previously assumed.

In the SADC region, the threats that undermined peace and security came from political conflicts. From a narrow perspective only the threats to physical safety such as armed conflict and physical torture were more acceptable as the threats to people's security. The Lesotho military crisis of 1998 was viewed as a security problem which needed military intervention by the SADC member states but possible interrelations between threats to food, political, health and economic security and their impact on the other sectors including different levels of vulnerabilities they had caused were not taken into consideration. The Lesotho crisis should have been dealt with after the identification of the most critical and pervasive threats, vulnerabilities and insecurities of the affected state sectors or community and assessing the actors and sectors involved. The deployment of military personnel worsened the community and personal security of many individuals in that country (Mandaza, 1999:81; Changara, 2000:89; Baregu, 1999:149).

The Human Security Agenda also appeared during the time of increased global interest in regional organisations, such as SADC that appreciated that the underlying cause of both inter-state and intra-state conflicts which were afflicting the region were not blamed only on political exclusion, but also on deep-seated social exclusion, relative deprivation and societal disintegration (Walsh, 2015:86). The security element of the SADC has always been crucial and central to the regional political and economic development. Meyns (1999) postulates that the development of SADC's political and security wing originated from the Southern African Development Coordination Conference era of 1980 to 1992. The major change was witnessed with the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, which is one of the SADC's Organisational units, to which all fourteen members belong. The SADC's OPDSC is a security mechanism for conflict prevention management and resolution. It is also responsible for ensuring peace and security in the Southern African region. The OPDSC can be described as an attempt to reach a collective security arrangement designed principally to promote peace and security within member states of the regional body.

The collective security system in SADC member states would have worked well if power was widely dispersed in the period 1997 and 2007. Although, the theory of Collective Security requires that the possible application of preponderant force against an aggressor reduces the odd effective action of that aggressor, the political and economic developments of member state took the centre stage on the thrust to bring peace and security in Lesotho crisis of 1998 and DRC civil war of 1999. Chan (1994:231) argues that the ideal collective security system requires a membership approaching universality. However, this was not possible in SADC due to different levels of democratisation from country to country. The South African government was not interested to intervene in the DRC conflict that erupted in 1998. The ANC government was then dominated by the

remnants of the apartheid system and the DRC conflict was viewed as the internal conflict which did not need SADC's intervention. The economic downturn that was wreaking havoc in Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia led to these countries to offer moral support to the intervention force comprised of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. The intervention of the SADC force was in line with the DRC government's appeal that the country was being invaded by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi (Baregu, 1999:36; Mandaza, 1999:65).

The theoretical models for the security community that have been provided by Deutsch, Adler and Barnett, Kupchan and Ngoma, give flesh to the human security aspects for the Southern African regional security community. Deutsch (1957) describes a security community as a "real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes in some other way". The DRC conflict which erupted in 1998 displaced women and children who left the country under harsh conditions. The larger part of the DRC population was poised to all vagaries of human rights abuses which included rape, body mutilation and torture under the hands of the rebel movements (Baregu, 1999:206).

According to Baregu (1999), challenges in the development of a security structure for the Southern African region come from the public attention given to SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) by the former colonialist states. Thus, state-centrism concept in the presence of the SADC's Organ lacked the dimensional view to uphold individual peoples' human security. Deutsch's focus on security community was not only preoccupied with matters of state survival as an important consideration for security but also as the creation of viable economic infrastructures that sustain developmental agendas. In the 1997 to 2007 period, like South Africa and Zimbabwe in 1997 to 2007 needed protective mechanisms and entitlement programmes that had an impact on communities' human security.

Ngoma (2005) argues that among such theories as "realism or neo-realism, neo-liberalism, society of states, the Kantian perspective and constructivism, it is the last one that best explains the development of security community". Constructivism is characterised by its views on global politics, the nature of the state and power. Constructivism also concentrates more on the aspect of security community paradigm that concerns itself with protecting the state rather than the individual. Ngoma insists that international relations methods should acknowledge the social identities and the source of state interests. Kupchan (2001) describes a security community as "a zone within which states have stable explanations of peaceful change and those that continue to play more traditional rules of geopolitics. Ngoma (2005), on the other hand, emphasises that states in such relationship may sometimes have differences without resorting to fighting with one another. He further reiterates that regional security communities exist in Africa and elsewhere because their members see themselves as "part of such geographical security arrangement". Thus, more emphasis on traditional rules of geopolitics defeated the essence of human security. Security cooperation is not an obvious element of regional economic integration. Moller (2009:99) argues that a region's members can progress economically without necessarily trusting each other. Despite this, the SADC leaders assumed that countries were supposed to cooperate in the security arena to improve the prospects of economic integration. At times it was unclear to some SADC member states whether or how the region was able to provide human security to the community and individual. Instead, the positions of SADC member states on the key regional challenges such as trade, growth and development, security and stability were driven by national interests rather than regional interest. Realists, such as Vale (2000) argue that national interests are hard and measurable, regional cooperation is hard to measure.

Deutsch's (year) community security theoretical framework conforms to the major tenets of constructivism where a combination of national interest and a cooperative relationship based on shared identities are unfolded. Against the backdrop of Deutsch's security community, remains a vacuum where there are no efforts to promote comprehensive and people-centred solutions that empower the individuals politically and economically. Deutsch (1987) builds upon his ideas on security communities as a group with shared identities, values and meanings with complex sustained interpersonal encounters. Deutsch (1987) regards a security community as groups of countries which "consist of people who have learned to communicate with each other and understand each other". It is critical to note that beyond the mere interchange of goods and services in regional alliances, the protection against food insecurity requires action. Although SADC member states had the primary responsibility of ensuring food security, political security, health security and economic security for their citizens, the responsibility for protection mechanisms also falls upon the international community. For a full peace and security package to protect the individual there is a need to work in close partnership to minimise the negative consequences of international policies related to food security and political security (Deutsch, 1957:145-160; Ngoma 2005:44).

In response to Ngoma (2005), Deutsch (1987) maintains that a model of security community at regional level develops a cohesive entity. Ngoma's (2005) view of Deutsch's (1987) contribution towards the SADC's integration is important for key reasons. It challenges Deutsch's   position on regional transformation and integration. Deutsch (1987) was acting against the realisation that community security has strategic interests of the masses of the people not only of an individual state but of all SADC member countries. Regardless that SADC member states maintained that there was the fundamental and structural need to have a regional integrative system managing key

functions in areas such as the economy, defence and foreign policy, the ultimate objective of peace and co-existence remained more important.

Ngoma (2005) critically fleshes out in detail factors that have been identified as conducive to the development of the Deutschean model are mutual compatibility values, strong economic links and expectation of multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions, growing number of institutionalised relationships, mutual responsiveness, and greater mobility of people and mutual predictability of behaviour. The SADC region, to some extent met the criteria of commodity of values in large movements of people amongst member states especially during the 2008 political problems in Zimbabwe, 1998 DRC civil war and the Lesotho crisis of 1998. Many economic refugees moved out of Zimbabwe, DRC and Malawi to South Africa where economic opportunities were perceived to be better. There were efforts by SADC member states to achieve peace and security in the region, by rationalising migration laws at border posts so that movement across the region was manageable. It was critical that DRC nationals who were running away from the civil war, needed protection by setting up systems that shielded asylum seekers from menaces of the war. Protection of asylum-seekers in SADC means that people who run away from political, social and economic threats need to be provided with secure environment. SADC member states were challenged by threats that were beyond their control because of the rebel fighters who were attacking certain tribes, ethnic groups, women and children. It then transcended that human security aspects needed to be applied to protect people in a systematic, comprehensive and preventive way. Each member state needed laws to accommodate people affected by security threats (Meyns, 1999:10; Vale, 1997: 29-31).

Ngoma (2005), however, argues that the prevalence of a mutual security threat and homogeneity at the cultural, political, social and ideological levels was necessary for a security community, to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhanced human freedoms and human fulfilment. It meant that the people in the SADC

region were protected from severe and pervasive threats and situations caused by various vagaries of political conflicts. On the other hand, Adler and Barnett (1998:138) stipulate that the role of the powerful states or a coalition of states should be designed in a way that provided leadership roles. That notion was to be conceptualised in security fundamentalities where protection became centralised on the state.

The argument which has been advanced by Ngoma (2005) that political and economic integration will only be reached in SADC if and when all SADC members accede to the ideal by way of consensus on good governance systems. For practical reasons, this 100% unanimity is utopian as some SADC member states are under the hegemony of apartheid or imperialism or will never be allowed by their former colonial masters to accede to regional political integration. Such states should not be allowed to hold progress of other SADC member states. While holding a firm belief that a regional security community is the only guarantee of the long-term security, Booth and Vale (1995:290) argue that "the litmus test for the existence of a security community is whether the state's target involves each other militarily". The Lesotho political instability in 1994 and 1998 and the 1998 DRC crisis showed that SADC needed a new human security paradigm to respond to the complexities and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats which ranged from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism and sudden economic and financial downturns. Such security threats tended to acquire transnational dimensions and moved beyond traditional notions of security that focused on a nation's external military aggression alone.

Ideally, human security should have brought together the human security elements conducive for economic development. Human security might have promoted a new integrated, coordinated and people-centred approach to advance peace, security and development in SADC member states. The regional efforts to stop and prevent human insecurities in the region hit a brick wall because threats to human security are mentally reinforcing and interconnected and interlinked in a domino effect way. Violence witnessed in DRC in 1998

bred vicious ethnicity violence across the Great Lakes Region and conflict spill-over effects were felt in Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The movement of refugees from DRC caused conflict spill-over effects in areas of employment, health, ethnic clashes and food insecurity on the countries that accommodated the DRC refugees who feared persecution from their home country. The DRC violent conflict worsened resource depletion, spread of infectious diseases, education deficits and unemployment in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa.

During the period from 1997 to 2007, Southern Africa was characterised by political, economic, social and environmental insecurities and risks which were overshadowed by the post-apartheid South African structural systems. The attempts to address the SADC's human security ills were founded on sensible public policy. The decay and misery remained visible in nearly every community of the SADC member states. Reflecting on what choices the region had to elevate itself out of the economic, political, social and environmental quagmire; it became clear that each SADC member state was expected to view the regional human security viewpoint in an entangled political and economic policy. Despite the diverse views of the contributions, the ranges of disagreements in the SADC region were relatively limited. While this consensus held considerable promise for the future of SADC, it was the political will that determined the way forward for the people in the region. Although, politics in SADC was all about competing interests, ideas and controversy became inevitable due to other human security threats which militated against peace and security in the Southern African region (Alden, 1993:312-320; Nolutshungu, 1993:54-60).

In the late 1990s, the SADC region was militarily volatile. The dangerous by-product of South Africa's era of destabilisation was that the region was awash with arms of war that had come to be treated as commodities. This trade was plied largely by many demobilised conventional soldiers and guerrilla fighters who became socially marginalised and who were also a dangerous and a destabilising legacy during that era. The demobilisation of military personnel by the

newly independent states was meant to cut expenditure costs which had turned out to be national security threats (Dayton, 2002:174-175).

The transformation of Southern African states to democracies was through armed struggles and negotiations. It was not a smooth transfer of power due to the colonial powers' interests in the region. In fact, the governments' political and economic transformations were complex. So serious were the interferences by the former colonial powers remnants to control means of production. The most critical and probable urgent provision of peace and security demanded the restructuring of the government. The ordinary human rights were supposed to be uplifted to enable them to influence the choices they made about their lives and their future (Taylor *et al.*, 1993:9-11).

The idea of societal security remained the cornerstone for understanding the contemporary security agenda. Waever, *et al.* (1993) propound that societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under evolving conditions and possible or actual threat. There was a need for sustainability in areas of culture, association, religion and national identity. Migration remained the SADC's problematic phenomenon where movements of peoples to new homes pose a threat to the societal security of the recipient group due to the capacity limitations. In turn, the resistance to integrate large numbers of migrating nationals caused the stability of society and therefore the ability of the receiving governments to govern (Hesler & Layton, 1993:162).

The SADC region is a product of the geographical proximity of the fourteen member states. Geographical proximity is one factor that aids in determining whether people living within would be protected and empowered against various threats that undermine development. However, the lack of proximity of the members to conform to a neat recognisable geographic area could make it difficult to exclude other states or agencies or organisations from consideration in matters that concern the regional system. Zimbabwe, for example, remained a member of several other organisations that claim regional status that include African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP), Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA) and SADC.

Although some ACP and COMESA member states do not conform to any natural geographic region of SADC, total integration to fully implement human security complexities can be a great challenge (Punungwe, 1997:67-89).

Examining the nature of human security aspects in the SADC, one cannot fail to see the imprint of the regional body's economic and political colonial history. Figure 3:1 shows fourteen members of the SADC, a rather loose regional functional cooperation through which important political, economic and infrastructural links were created. Peace and security in the SADC region has had a direct influence in the change of the spatial outlook of the member states.

Figure 3.1 The SADC members' states *(Extracted from www.afrol.comsadc, 2014)*

Adler & Barnett (1998) propound that the first regional integration tier is synonymous with the emergence of collective security that interlink

national security and political policies. The second tier is the one which identifies the factors that are conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity. The third tier identifies the development of trust and collective identity formation precipitated by a dynamic positive and reciprocal relationship between the variables of trust (Barnett, 1991:215; Adler & Barnett, 1998:17).

In the first tier, Adler & Barnett (1998) identify a range of factors that pull states in each other's direction, thereby making it imperative that they synchronise their policies. These factors which could be either exogenous or endogenous tend to encourage states to form alliances with the desire to reduce mutual fear through security coordination. A case in point was the 2000 period when South Africa signed economic agreement with the European Union excluding other SADC member states. This was designed to enforce other member states to follow a certain policy making process which adhered to democratisation systems (Matlosa, 2001:56). In SADC, the pull factors between 1997 and 2007, included changes in technology, demography, economics and politics which entailed that the integration process was going to have some simmering inadequacies. The inadequacies were going to be taken advantage of by the European Union which sought to influence SADC states to adhere to the interests which made economic and political fortunes for the European States. The industrial development of SADC was brought in the spotlight, not only in demographic problems in the form of both intra and inter-state migration, but also in areas of environmental degradation on a scale demanding concerted effort by all members of SADC. According to Cawthra *et al.* (2001:23-35) a sub-region like SADC can be defined in many different ways through geographic propinquity or intensity of interactions such as trade and formal declaration in political, historical and cultural developments. As such, SADC in this aspect, represented instances of first resort as far as the peaceful resolution of conflicts were concerned.

According to Isakem (2002), the SADC member states are expected to cooperate according to the regional defence and security pact. In the event of conflict breakup, the use of force or imposition of sanctions and the mandate to intervene rested upon the SADC's Organ. During the late 1990s collaboration on human security in SADC took different forms. These deviated from the traditional analyses of SADC, hence many protestations about how the regional body was going to promote peace and security and to defend democratic governance and democratisation without focusing on the crucial issues to its institutional governance and mechanism for peace, security, governance and democracy. Traditional analyses of the SADC tended to focus on the nature of conflicts in the sub-region, the security landscape, and proposed remedies such as preventive diplomacy, mediation and intervention (Bekoe, 2002:116; Isakem, 2002:103). It was therefore questionable whether SADC had the institutional capabilities and security mechanisms in place adequate or workable enough to provide peace and security of the people in the region.

Although many analysts have taken for granted that SADC region could promote peace, security, governance and democracy, the economic turbulences which erupted caused a lot of political and economic insecurity. There were unprecedented political upheavals which were caused by the land reform programme in Zimbabwe in 1999 and 2000 which triggered a tough period against economic sanctions instigated by the western countries such as Britain and France. The 2002 xenophobic attacks against foreigners in South Africa were caused by competition over employment opportunities. South African employers were in favour of employing cheap labour, especially from Zimbabwe and DRC, then their citizens who wanted wages which were commensurate with the poverty datum line. The DRC conflict of 1998 and the political disturbances in Zimbabwe during the same period caused an exodus of people to South Africa where employers manipulated them in various ways.

Unfortunately, South Africa remained a violent place particularly for women, children and other "disempowered victims," such as refugees. South Africa had one of the highest rates of rape in the world that gave extraordinary urgency to the cause of women's rights. Ballard *et al.* (2005) postulated that 25% of South African children were malnourished and by then whites were still earning ten times as much as blacks in that country. Despite improvements in housing, sanitation and education comparison of South Africa to a double-decker bus remained accurate (Sparks, 2003: 98). The top deck was comprised, of Coloureds, Blacks and Indians and whites. The bottom deck however dwarfed the upper deck that remained poor and black. Organised crimes that were ignored by the apartheid regime during its struggle with the African National Congress, planted deep roots in South African society in the 1990s. Drugs, prostitution and money laundering, among other ills continued unabated (Ballard *et al.*, 2005:142).

In this context, business moguls of South Africa took advantage of human insecurity of other SADC member states' citizens to maximise profits by employing them as cheap labour. The hope for SADC was that an integrated regional body would deal with deep-seated political, economic and military challenges that were simmering in the region. The fulfilment of human security aspects in their variant dimensions became a tall order for the regional body to fulfil. Problems such as epidemics, economic crises, environmental problems and intra-state conflicts became the concern of the entire region. The SADC body needed to protect its member states and their people from the pernicious and inequitable effects of globalisation which continued to militate against the improvement of human security which provided the foundation for achieving sustainable development, peace and security (Campbell, 2009:214).

Nolutshungu (1994:36) stipulates that a collective security structure that the Southern African region witnessed a reaction to severe

security problems for which there is "a requirement for a better solution and which in essence demands a comprehensive dimension". Such an approach includes politics, economics and military security considering the linkages between national levels. The hindrance to military security considering the linkages between national levels. It was also conceived as a special forum for sub-regional political, defence and security cooperation with a focus on conflict management. Although the protocol to govern and guide the work of the OPDS was finalised in 2001, the SADC member states were committed to collective security, collective defence, democratic governance and the protection of human rights, the development of common foreign policy approaches in international fora and the building of joint capacities in areas such as peacekeeping, disaster management and co-ordination of humanitarian assistance. The SADC protocol on defence and security's operationalization fulfilled the human security aspects especially, intervention in the political conflicts of DRC and Lesotho. Member states' poverty, political conflicts, economic downturn and ethnic hatred were going to be extensively worsened in the absence of such security architecture capable of managing issues of security threats (Mandaza, 1999:199; Baregu, 1999:56; Changara, 2000:29-36).

The history of security cooperation in relation to the provision of human security was characterised by multi-dimensionalism or multi-functionalism which combined economic, political, social, cultural and security aspects. It was also to be driven by a combination of economic or security imperatives and ecological and other regional developmental objectives that were going to place the individual security at the safe and protective levels (Honsohm, 2002:157).

Although, there was no consensus on institutions and mechanisms created to promote peace and security in Southern African region, the establishment of the OPDS and the Mutual Defence Pact have promoted and sustained human security in the sub-region. The end of apartheid in South Africa, the settlement of the Lesotho constitutional

crisis of 1998, the DRC conflict of 1998 and the Zimbabwe's 2000-2009 political and economic disturbances were some of the cases the SADC region intervened. According to Ngoma (1999:140), the involvement in the resolution of conflicts in the region was of great relevance.

The DRC conflict erupted at a time when the SADC region had been working towards what Vale (1999) describes as "a community of states in SADC". The Angolan conflict which prompted the OPDS' Committee of Ministers to meet in Luanda, Angola, from 17-18 December 2000 came up with a recommendation commending the Angolan government for holding a sustainable dialogue with the leadership of civil society, political parties and religious denominations in a spirit of national reconciliation (Ngoma, 1999:154-190). The SADC intervention in the Angolan political talks made the region to realise that they were able to resolve the problems thereby providing sustainable human security aspects.

The other relevance of the SADC body in the aspect of upholding human security was the way the Lesotho crisis was handled by the regional body. The fact that Lesotho was geographically inconsequential, poor and imbedded in South Africa, provided an important lesson to which human security aspects of political and economic in nature could be pacified and resolved. Three countries of Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa threatened to restore the constitutionally elected Lesotho government by force. The 1998 SADC involvement in the renewed Lesotho conflict was at the request of that country's government following a re-run of the Monarch's collusion with the opposition parties and some members of the military. Operation Boleas which involved a "Rapid Deployment Force" from Botswana and South Africa engaged the mutinous Lesotho Military (Baregu 1999:36; Mandaza, 1999:62; Meyns, 1999:136; Tsie, 1998:152). But unlike the 1994 intervention, the SADC force did not limit itself to mere threatening postures. Of particular interest in the Lesotho

political debacle of 1998, was the prevention of violence actions by the military against the civilians which came to end after the SADC force intervened (Sabina, 2003:315, http//www.crise-ox.ac.uk).

The question of SADC participation in resolving the crisis in Lesotho was critical in that it showed that the sub-regional body acted as a unified force to uphold human security aspects. The Operation Boleas which the SADC force undertook in Lesotho in 1998 fulfilled the human security aspirations to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhanced human freedom and human fulfilment, (Kofi, 2005:30, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org). According to the Mauritius SADC Communiqué of 13 September 1999, the commission of inquiry established in May 1999, was tasked to interrogate the electoral crisis in Lesotho as a way by SADC to seek a peaceful solution for the country to enjoy peace and security without the use of force. Although Baregu (1999) claims that the Lesotho controversy exposed varying agendas for the collective security community, but the peace and security was restored and the political security was provided for by the regional political initiatives (Baregu, 1999).

Another dimension which sprang from the SADC action in Lesotho was the corrosiveness of its decision to intervene militarily rather than using negotiation methods to pacify the political crisis. In 1999, a newspaper, *The Guardian*, quoted one opposition leader, Evaristis Sekhonyane commenting that the South African military intervention in Lesotho was to secure certain individuals 'interests against those of national interests which the ANC government was supposed to guarantee. This suggested that the members of SADC intervened in conflict infested areas when national interests were visible and unpopular governments were maintained in power against the will of the people (Vale, 1999:65; Nkiwane, 2000:13-28). This view was further interrogated by Baregu (1999) when he says that the South African involvement in the crisis was not "launched out of sheer altruism" but

was driven by self-interests. This meant that peace and security was maintained in Lesotho under conditions which benefited the intervention forces' national interests.

Referring to the rationale for military intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho Crisis of 1998, Zuern (2011) concludes that the SADC force saved lives and protected people from flagrant abuses. There was a constitutional crisis which had gripped the nation due to the leadership wrangle between the King and the Prime Minister. It was widely reported that the Operation Boleas was done to protect certain South African interests, such as the Katse Dam Water Scheme. The dam was of economic interest to the South African hydro-electricity generation. What made the South African intervention controversial was the fact that hardly a month earlier the South African government had refused to intervene militarily in DRC, opting for peaceful negotiation among the warring factions. This was largely because South African was pursuing her national interests outside SADC's collective security pact. Despite controversies over the Lesotho military intervention, South African and Botswana forces managed to effectively deal with the Lesotho conflict where peace and security was finally restored (Zuern, 2011:167).

The decision to intervene in the DRC in 1998 was reached in Harare after the verification committee comprised of Foreign Ministers of Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia, submitted its report reaffirming that Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi troops were invading the DRC. It was at this juncture that countries of the Southern Africa region agreed that those states which were able to send troops to defend the government of Laurent Kabila could do so (Mandaza, 2002:201).

Initially, there were doubts on whether such an intervention by the SADC Allied Force was a SADC initiative. The DRC war erupted at a time when relations between the then chairperson of SADC, President

Nelson Mandela and the then chairperson of the SADC's OPDS President Robert Gabriel Mugabe, were very tense. In fact, President Mugabe wanted the OPDS to work independent of the SADC Summit, but according to Baregu (1999) the then South African President Mandela wanted the OPDS to fall under the SADC Summit.

These differences were compounded by the DRC conflict. In fact, there were differences in the DRC crisis resolution, with Nelson Mandela advocating for peaceful negotiations among the warring factions while Robert Mugabe was advocating for military intervention. The SADC Allied Forces intervention was under a SADC undertaking under OPDS, in the sense that there was a consensus among SADC member states that President Laurent Kabila, who had taken power in 1997, was the rightful authority in the DRC and was able to demand respect and assistance for his country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Having received a request for assistance from DRC that was a member of SADC, Zimbabwe which was still chairing the SADC OPDS at the time, called for a meeting of the Inter-State, Defence and Security Community (ISDSC), comprising defence and foreign ministers that was held in Victoria Falls on 7 and 8 August 1998 which set up a Verification Committee to assess the situation in the DRC. It was on the Verification Committee's recommendation that "those countries able to do so could give assistance to President Laurent Kabila" (SADC, MDP 1999; Baregu, 1999:200). It was on this basis that Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent military contingents to the DRC in support of Kabila regime. The ISDSC did not commit itself as a body, but it left it to individual countries to decide. To a certain extent, it was clear that this was a SADC undertaking in which the SADC chair of the OPDS, President Robert Mugabe participated. According to Changara (2000), the intervention could claim legitimacy on the strength of Article 51 of the UN Charter which allows for individual or collective self-defence in cases of violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity (SADC MDP, 1999; Changara, 2000:29-36).

It is important to note that the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee did not have the final authority to make final decision. This was the mandate of the OPDS or the SADC Summit. Even though the SADCs OPDS or Summit had been convened, no decision was going to be upheld. A communiqué on the OPDS' resolution of 23 July 1996 communicated that the SADC Summit and OPDS meeting had called for the conclusion of a Mutual Defence Pact. The significance of the signing of the pacts was to pave way for the region's rules of engagement in times of aggression against peace and security of SADC. The SADC Allied Forces concluded a Mutual Defence Pact in April 1999 which was later signed meaning that all SADC member states began to perceive threats to peace and security to be common to all members and a step forward to a strong and integrated collective security community (Changara, 2000:180; Hanson, 2002:105).

Furthermore, since time was running out for the Kabila government to survive the rebels' onslaught, the OPDSC saw military intervention as a realistic move to save situations. The ISDSC was justified in the military intervention because the war was likely to cause a human security catastrophe for some SADC member states. The SADC member states' military intervention in the DRC conflict managed to prevent the escalation of the civil war that had a potential to cause serious human insecurity. Subsequently, Nelson Mandela accepted the intervention of the SADC Allied Forces on the grounds that Uganda and Rwanda forces had violated DRC's territorial integrity. Hanson *et al.* (2002:136), President Mandela further justified the SADC Allied Forces' intervention on the grounds that President Laurent Kabila had requested their support (Mandaza, 1999:290-300).

Given the dynamics of the DRC Conflict, efforts to resolve the conflict were made by various stakeholders but brutal activities continued against women and children. The region was prone to armed conflicts due to foreign interferences by the industrialised countries that

advocated for democracy. The ISDC and OPDSC's main initiative was the Lusaka peace process which was mainly to avoid the collapse of the DRC government. Zambia was threatened by the movement of refugees who were either resettled in the country or transiting to South Africa. However, the OPDS reacted effectively in the DRC conflict where the rebels were driven out of the capital, Kinshasa. Later, peaceful negotiations took place in Lusaka which finally brought relative human security provisions to the country's citizens.

The enhancement of the human security project requires cooperative, and often multilateral, responses and approaches that emphasised preventive action and engage new partnerships. Human security was advanced through the protection of human rights, respect for the rule of law, democratic governance, sustainable human development and the peaceful resolution of conflict (Cawthra *et al.*, 2001:21-23). Vale (1992:65) argues that in the post-Cold War era security in the Southern African region should have moved away from "the traditional state-centric approach to a people centric one which is guided by collective interest in regional settings". This view gained currency in the region as shown repeatedly by various political statements by SADC leaders and the ultimate creation of the SADC's OPDS in 1996. The vision to have a people-centric approach was, however, more easily articulated in words than in deeds.

Since regional integration in SADC took place in a volatile and unstable environment political and economic crisis sowed seeds of disagreements among political leaders. The first disagreements among the SADC leaders emanated from the Council of Ministers in Windhoek meeting in 1994, where the idea of a creation of the conflict resolution and political cooperation mechanism was proposed as a "sector" of SADC (Nkiwane, 2000:16). The idea of a "sector" was opposed by Angola, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe that argued that peace and security issues were very sensitive to the extent that the

SADC secretariat was not institutionally strong enough to perform the duties required by such an arrangement. However, the idea of a sector was supported by South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and the SADC Secretariat which also argued that the arrangement was consistent with the provisions of the SADC Treaty. After the SADC Council of Ministers failed to reconcile the opposing proposals, the SADC Summit which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August 1995, decided that the security sector on defence and security be allocated to any member state. The idea was again disapproved by South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland and Zambia, on the grounds that there was a possibility that the SADC Chairmanship was going to be concentrated with too much power and influence, a move which was likely to have compromised human security aspects in the region (Mandaza, 1996:66; Breytenbach, 1999:104; SADC Ministerial Meeting, 1998).

South Africa was reluctant to accept Zimbabwe's proposal that the OPDSC operate at SADC Summit level and that its own separate chairmanship should rotate on a troika basis. The OPDS marked a significant turn in Southern Africa although differences of views persisted with respect to the status and its place in the existing SADC structures and institutions. The SADC Ministerial Meeting held in Maputo, Mozambique, on 8 May 1998, broke the political impasse over the OPDS' creation when it was agreed that the "most ideal structure for the Organ's creation was to have a small committee of Heads of State which should have five members only", (Report on the Ministerial Meeting Maputo, 1998). SADC and its OPDS were seriously divided by the war that had started in the DRC on 2 August 1998. Differing views between Zimbabwe and South Africa over the necessity of a SADC military intervention in support of the DRC government widened. It was only after the military intervention in Lesotho by Botswana and South Africa that a common position over the DRC conflict that the military intervention was necessary was

reached. However, the acknowledgement by the SADC members that military intervention in the DRC was necessary incensed Rwanda and Uganda which considered it as a SADC declaration of war against them (Baregu, 1999:7-16; SADC Strategic Indicative Plan, 1999:1-18; Deconing, 1999:4).

The DRC conflict featured the multiplicity of interests of SADC member states, East African Community (EAC), Britain, USA and France. What became of the DRC conflict on the human security concept were the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats such as chronic and persistent poverty, ethnic violence, human trafficking, health pandemics, refugee movements, torture and human rights abuse, rape and arbitrary civilian killings by armed gangs. The Kabila government argued that foreign countries such as Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi had invaded sovereign territory (Baregu, 1999:15). On the one hand, the DRC rebels argued that President Kabila was corrupt and despotic. Uganda argued that it was in the DRC to create a buffer zone against dissidents of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) which were infiltrating into their country from the DRC (Baregu, 1999:6).

Rwanda's position was that President Laurent Kabila had failed to control the Hutu militants and the ex-Forces Armies' Rwanda (FAR) who had encamped in Eastern Congo to launch their attacks on Rwandan territory. The Angolan government's concern included cutting off supply lines to UNITA forces which were passing through the DRC, thereby pre-empting any political alliance between the DRC rebels and the UNITA. Although, the SADC Allied Forces were in DRC to restore regional peace and security, the element of adhering to non-aggression pact took precedence to maintain peace and security in the region (Baregu, 1999:7). The SADC Allied Forces called for consistency and coherence in solidarity interventions, South Africa differed with the other SADC Allied Forces in a regional power

struggle. South Africa was still under apartheid influence such that she was an unacceptable hegemony in the SADC. The South African Defence Forces (SANDF) had not really changed from their apartheid structures and the South African government was not ready to sacrifice their money and men for any regional cause. There was no willingness by the South African government to uphold the required principles of human security (Baregu, 1999:9).

The United States of America, Britain and France, among other Western powers, who had interests in the DRC, argued that Laurent Kabila was "despotic and that he had terminated their mining concessions, while at the same time propagated the 'buffoon theory" (Baregu, 1999:19). Although they supported the rebels who were against Laurent Kabila, their interests were to create an environment in the DRC which was receptive. The human security aspects such as the context-specific where insecurities vary across different settings were not observed. In fact, peaceful advances were proposed contextually to respond to the DRC conflict without resorting to war. Finally, the USA, Britain and France failed to observe and address risks and root causes of insecurities that were threatening the DRC as a country (Baregu, 1999:80; Cilliers, 1999:314).

To have a proper understanding of national peace and security challenges of South Africa, one needs to understand the concept of security and its dynamics. During the early years of the dismantlement of the apartheid system, the concept of security was so weakly developed that it became inadequate for the task of providing peace and security to the South African citizens. The question of peace and security whether for individual, national or international citizens ranked prominently high among the problems that faced humanity in the country (Buzan, 2007: 26-28; Jarvis, 1989:281-2). National security was particularly centralised to dominate conditions that determined security at all South African government's institutions. In this case, it

was important for peace and security to prevail with other Southern African states. Although throughout the history of states, each had been made insecure by the existence of others, the military and economic actions of each in pursuit of own natural security had combined with those of others to produce economic dislocations and at times military confrontational wars. An understanding of national security that was inadequately aware of the contradictions latent with the Peace and Security concept involved high levels of interdependence among the actors trying to make themselves secure (Burk, 2002:7-20; Jenkins, 2002:79).

The South African security, like any other security concept of SADC member state, was not the only concept through which the national security problems were to be approached. In fact, the literature on the security concept mostly analysed concept to power and peace. Walt (1991: 212) has this to say:

> "Security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use and control of military force. It explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects states and societies and the specific policies that states adopt to prepare for, prevent or engage in war."

This definition is based on the traditional understanding of security. Traditionally, security was merely the security of the state which was predominately threatened by the military of other states and was supposed to be defended by the military power of the state itself. While it is true that Walt refers to the effects of the use of force on individuals, states and societies, on the other hand, strategic studies is concerned only with the security of the state, as an institution which claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The effects of the use of force on individuals and societies is well captured in the term from techno-strategic language that gained notoriety during the Marikana Massacre of 2012, where about forty-five (45) mine workers were shot by the South African police. The damage caused by the massacre of these mine workers to individuals and to the society in which the workers lived was termed as "collateral damage" to the main study of strategy. The mine owners were interested in

maximizing profits and the deaths of those who made them to have access to minerals were not regarded as important.

Although, the Marikana Massacre which took the lives of miners had come and gone, the successes of the mining sector in South Africa would continue to be dominated by the pro-apartheid ideological fanatics. The pro-apartheid ideologically group continued to undermine the crude deterministic theories of Marxist dependency theory that saw the white South Africans deliberately seeking to impoverish the blacks. The continuing structural inhibitions against fully "changing up" with the whites remained powerful (Hall & Zhao, 1996:135; Dannreuther, 2008:22). It was salutary to note that since 1994 in South Africa, very few black businesspeople managed to expand their businesses in white dominated areas although, most of the citizens were suffering in the domains of abject poverty. The inherent moral injustice of extreme disparities of wealth was difficult to deny and was intermittently recognised by the white South Africans who continued to own economic resources such as farms, industry and the mining sector in conjunction with international business conglomerates. This was observed, for instance, in the 2000 Millennium Development Goals agreed upon by the United Nations that included the numbers of those in extreme poverty by the year 2015 (Annan, 2000:64). But whether such moral indignation and the responses, they continued to generate specific concern in South Africa since this represented inequalities against the black citizens. The argument for the security implications of such poverty and inequalities had certainly gained in strength since the end of the apartheid system in South Africa (Dannreuther, 2008:33).

Even though this argument qualifies an unqualified direct causal connection between poverty and conflict, it does not take away many more subtle and indirect ways in which poverty and inequality contribute to conditions of South African national security threat. There were three ways in which this can be seen to be the case in the South African situation in the popularity of the concept of human security. The first is related to the actual conditions of absolute poverty in which over 20 million of South Africa's population lived. For these citizens, life was inherently insecure since they lacked the necessary

protection against internal economic shock perpetuated by the apartheid legacy and suffered multiple vulnerabilities originated from the race structure. In the South African context, the period between 1997 and 2007 saw minor changes in the environmental degradation which inhibited citizen's access to clean water or primary energy resources (Mattes, 1999:154). South Africans who lived in the Bantustan environments during apartheid system, their major causes of poverty and insecurity was the prevalence of endemic societal violence, racism and xenophobic attacks. Refugees from the Great Lakes region, especially the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Ethiopia were the national symbols of such chronic insecurity (Dowthy & Fleischer, 1996:81). The return of refugees to their countries of origin remained a challenge in the South African context, because most of the refugees were mainly economic refugees who wanted to find jobs and work in that country. As long as the source of insecurities still remained in their home, their return was impossible. Refugees who had flooded South Africa in search of economic, political or religious security provisions later realised that prospects to get the same was not easy due to challenges the country was going through. National security and development are in these ways inextricably linked such that South African economic prosperity and security remained doomed by the increasing numbers of foreigners who continued to claim normal life and the alleviation of their poverty (Swelling *et al.*, 2004:95).

The second dimension related to the processes and trajectories leading from poverty to prosperity. Although security was seen as an essential vehicle for development, it became clear that development did not necessarily lead to national security. Indeed, as depicted in Polanyi's (1944) seminal work on European industrialisation, development remained a wrenching, disruptive and socially destabilising force that brings with it significant increases in inequality, personal alienation and societal conflict.

The security and stability that brought development to South Africa were prizes which were yet to be gained after the end of apartheid system that had dominated governance structures (Stieglitz, 2002:25;

Mazower, 1999:54). The South African government faced challenges of intermediate security that could dismantle post-apartheid systems while, on the other hand, seeking to contain the multiple conflicts generated by this very process (Huntington, 1968:234).

The third dimension emphasises on the security implications of the subjective rather than the strictly objective perceptions of poverty and inequality. One of the major insights in conflict theory is that it is relative deprivation, rather than absolute deprivation that is the most significant determinant of conflict in countries such as those of SADC (Finkel & Rue, 1986:314). The path taken by the South African government to empower the once marginalised blacks to embark on the path of development, faced challenges of injustices in national distribution of wealth and political power motives. The fears and resentments which were generated by the erstwhile protagonists, blacks and the apartheid system, brought into play perceived exclusionary anathema whose purpose was to place obstacles to job creation and peace environment in the country. South Africans viewed their SADC neighbours as the principal sources of criminality, illegal migration and ethnic conflict. Such fears and mutual concerns, driven by a mix of substantial inequalities, caused by a broader national insecurity in South Africa (Madlala, 2005).

The socio-political legacies of South Africa's colonial and apartheid past has rendered human security processes at national level extremely complex. This was because the legacies of apartheid (poverty, marginalisation and unequally distributed resources) persisted in the country. The apartheid system used to emphasise the significance of racial and cultural identity above other identities, although identities as a whole were supposed to be dynamic and continuously contracted. It was in the apartheid setting that identity was imposed and treated as a fixed, primordial and assigned at birth. This view of ethnicity persisted in the post-apartheid setting or at times being reinstituted

after the ANC government observed distinct advantages to emphasise ethnic purity to give blacks a political space Author, (2011). South Africa was viewed through skewed lenses which contributed to racial segregation in social and economic life (Sharp, 1986:16-36; Muthien *et al*., 2000:134).

The ideologies of apartheid system were difficult and continued to be difficult to dissolve in South Africa. There were problems which emanated from the racial inequalities of outcomes which prompted to have a look on the past inequalities of opportunity and to focus on the sheer inequalities of outcomes. One other important reason why South Africa needed to address inequalities of outcomes was the extreme spectrum of wealth in that country that meant the very poor citizens in the townships simply did not have sufficient means to lead a dignified and humane life. There was a need to keep pace with peace and security of South Africa through providing a minimum standard of life to individual citizens of that country. Furthermore, there was need to identify the unjust acts under apartheid and colonialism. Inequalities of outcomes had not arisen as per chance but it was specifically engineered through repression and robbery of black people in the South Africa farms, townships and industries. This again raised difficult questions of blaming others as guilt and how practical was restitution in the face of intergenerational injustice. These two questions of basic standards of living and restitution whether land or money was rigorously debated to provide peace and security to South Africa citizens. The most nuanced reason that demanded consideration was that inequalities of outcomes in South Africa fundamentally obscured the conception of what it meant to have an equal opportunity and thus hindered the ability to deliver to a society which had existed in maximised nation of inequalities of opportunity (Herald, 2013; Klandermans, 2001:43; Kihato, 2001:107).

The extreme inequality of outcomes meant that South African politicians did not appreciate what the barriers to opportunities were. Indeed, there was an extreme ignorance from those who were supposed to help the people, to extricate from racial and economic impoverished systems that had remained starkly segregated. As such, the way the private power, economic class, culture, geography and race were viewed, continued to divide the people. Segregation ensured that the white middle class South Africans were able to live their lives in isolation from poor black South Africans. Thus, the white professionals such as professors, business leaders did not understand the extent and nature of inequalities of opportunities (Buijs, 1998:661-682). It was in fact that without structures to ensure a proliferation of views of what the conception of equal opportunity was, it was difficult to even know what needed to be done to ensure it. Alexis de Tocqueville, a French philosopher, is said to have remarked when he arrived in America that he had never seen a country which was free and equally led. Tocqueville was not being amazed or surprised by the fact that everyone in America was earning the same but that the equality meant that the leaders were governing in full cognisant of the circumstances of their fellow citizens. It was along this vein, that the South African leadership was expected to balance axiom of political system to remove disparities along ethnic lines. In fact, inequality of both outcomes and opportunities was so problematic in South Africa that opportunities remained suppressed such that the poor, corporate and government leadership continued to be out of touch with the realities (Campbell, 2009:52-58).

During the period from 1997 to 2007, South Africa's trade with and investment in Africa precipitated a plethora of changes in the SADC region and beyond. The ANC government propelled the growth of the private sector as a way of providing the civil society sector roles in addressing the development challenges facing their societies. It was in this vein that the growth of South African investment and trade with

the SADC members and others in the continent was viewed as a benevolent to promote peace and security in South Africa and the region. This was a way of doing business since the demise of the apartheid system. In fact, there was a processing of crowding out formerly protected monopolies which had close links with the governing elites, thereby invoking a wave of criticism from both citizens and foreigners. Although there was a high critique on the South African way of approaching trade and investment in the late 1990s and early 2000, the SADC region and beyond welcomed the two tier approach of investment and trade as a tool to pacify labour practices and racial discrepancies (Karume, 2003:176; Kihato, 2001:65).

According to Waltz (1998) the combined capability of a state (military, economic and political) shapes the behaviour of actors in the anarchic international system, when they fear the wrath of a more powerful state. South Africa's defence spending by 1997 was more than the annual gross national product (GDP) of most SADC member states. South Africa was therefore, capable of playing a hegemonic role in SADC region. South Africa was committed to entrench a power-sharing and reconciliation policy model that brought democracy in 1994. Under President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa interpreted the policy model to mean that "South Africa cannot impose its will on others but it can help to deal with instability by offering its resources and leadership to maintain peace and security". While it has been argued that international relations in the 21st Century are devoid of power politics, the extension of democracy has rendered them obsolete, it is also reasonable to argue that most SADC states are yet to experience this trend. South Africa is surrounded by many states whose internal instability and commitment to democracy were in doubt. Because of political and economic uncertainty in most SADC member states in the late 1990s, South Africa's challenges to expansion became within the context of power politics and relations between states. South Africa's dominance was able to influence the regional's

economic development, although in areas of security cooperation, she continued to be viewed with proposed suspicion (Brogden, 2004:623-626; Bratton, 2004:16; Waltz, 1998:112-113; Hills, 2000:421-431).

South Africa remained an economic giant dwarfing other SADC member states' economies. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1998 was $169 billion (R945 billion) (The World Group, Total GDP 2003, Quick Reference Tables' online at http://www.worldbank.org/data, quickreference/quickref.html). Its economy was 82 times larger than the GDP of the average state in Africa as a whole. Since 1998, it reasserted its economic dominance in the bilateral trade with the SADC member states and others beyond, and expanding this relationship into a significant investment (Grobbelaar, 2004:200-203). Since 1994, the priority of the South African government was to search for peace and security of the nation which was battered during the apartheid period. Trade and investments became prominent to build good relations with the neighbouring, countries, especially those of SADC. South Africa's total trade in 1997 with SADC had grown by just under 400% and these exports had increased from R8.6 billion in 1997 to R38.8 billion in 2008. Although, there was an apparent increase in the importation of goods from other SADC member states, there was also an export growth in South Africa which was fuelled by the growth of investment especially, in the food, retail, tourism and construction sectors. This investment growth indicated that the opening of opportunities for other nationalities to come to South Africa for jobs and trading. The movement of other nationalities to South Africa meant that there was a growth challenge to the country's human security, especially, in the areas of politics, economy and environment. The political and economic gaps which were occupied by the foreigners in South Africa agitated the South African citizens to wage xenophobic attacks in 2001 and 2005 as a way of out flanking foreigners they accused of taking their jobs (www.thedti.gov.za, 2014).

The South African political and economic sectors became the pace setters of social stability, thereby providing peace and security to the country's citizens. Although the South African investment into the SADC region and Africa grew significantly during the 1997 to 2007 period, this was due to the country's end of economic isolation by the international community over the apartheid system. The economic growth had limited effect on the black population because they were not involved in the development programmes. According to the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) estimates, the investment into SADC grew from R10 billion in 1998 to just over R29 billion in 2005 (SARB Quarterly Bulletin, September 2005: 86-9). Although this figure represented about 5% of total South African investment of R819 billion abroad in 2004, the impact of this investment on SADC and African societies far outweighed its modest value (Media Monitoring Project 2014; Ntsebeza, 2005:23).

Table 3.1: South African Foreign Assets by Region, 2005 *(SARB, SARB Quarterly Bulletin, 2004)*

Region	Value (Rand millions)	%
Africa	31.8	4.3
Asia	13.0	3.2
Europe	600.0	70.1
International Organisations	55.4	6.2
North & South America	158.9	15.1
Oceania	8.5	1.1
Total	**867.6**	**100**

South African investors distinguished themselves well from the traditional investors in SADC and Africa by their willingness to invest in risky sectors. A 2004 study by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) indicated that 86% of the investment in Africa was resource-based predominately in the extractive industries and low-technology sectors. Although most South

African investors had moved aggressively beyond investment in mining, (a leading sector in terms of value and employment generation) other sectors such as banking, retail, tourism, manufacturing, construction and telecommunications remained contentious sectors against foreigners who competed against South African nationals. This became a peace and security threat to the South African societies because segregation became rife (SADC Paper 19, 2004).

The investment and trade drive in South Africa was supposed to manifest more on the thrust to promote peace and security in the country but due to challenges militated against the government individual security of citizens remained static. Black empowerment became a challenge up to 2007, the ANC government's institutional framework did not do enough to dismantle perpetuated colonial economic legacy. The black owned businesses in South Africa were rooted in resentment, foreign businesses were capitalising on poorly managed and undercapitalised businesses. The economic sector was conditioned in such a way that black owned businesses were finding it difficult to compete with the white owned businesses. However, foreign owned businesspeople capitalised on the weaknesses of the local business sector. The government failed to create institutions and frameworks within which all resource-based organisations operated efficiently due to the entrenched apartheid systems which entangled all economic facets of the country's production sector (Muthien, 2003: 16-19; Pottie & Shireen, 2003:15; Sparks, 1995:45).

The South African government had to play its economic development thrust accurately to be able to penetrate foreign markets, and to be responsive to the dominant trends in the global trading system. The globalisation process had a great effect on the South Africa's global economic strategy needs which in turn have a lot of human security effects to the generality of the populace (Ismail, 2001:231-236). The

government of South Africa set up a policy document in 2001 which rolled out the global economic strategy which was sponsored by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The document responding to challenges ranging from participation in the multilateral trading system under the umbrella of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to select key strategic partners for investment and market access (Ismail, 2001:301-310). South Africa needed to join with other SADC member states economically, notwithstanding the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the European Union and the Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur) which promoted trading at regional level as one other means of integration into the global economy. In this global economic strategy, South Africa considered peace and security of its people as most important thing in the measurement of all fundamental human rights and freedoms (Karume, 2003:154).

To give citizens a belief of new spectrum of human security, it was important for the South African government to identify key strategic partners within the global trading environment to give citizens a new lease of human security. The so called "butterfly" strategy in the South African context was in line with the country's relations with the South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Besides dealing with the ASEAN grouping SADC and Africa were viewed as the starting point of the body of the butterfly in developing trade relations. Trading with Latin America constituted the west wing and Asia the east wing of the butterfly, thereby positioning South Africa economically advantageous because of rapid growth in trade and a high proportion of value-added exports. Although in this case, government to government interactions created various political and security windows which promoted human security in South Africa, the black people in that country remained marginalised due to entrenched post-apartheid system in nearly all government systems (Matshego, 2003:19; Frazer, 2004:39, http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/mbeko31012.html.).

Although, the butterfly strategy had visible trade benefits to the private sector, the black communities remained marginalised. In this case, the visibly consummated and glaring positive trade results remained out of reach for once black marginalised societies. South Africa's trade deficit with Asia which increased to R15.7 billion in 2001, from R2 billion in 1995, was caused by the strong growth in imports. Asian countries invested in the South African economy, thereby creating opportunities for the working class in that country (Matshego, 2003:160; Fraser, 2004:91; Snow, 1996:1-6). A sharp increase in the imports from the Asian region into South African economy meant that Asian nationals flocked to manipulate the opening up of the economic sector. Asian businesses occupied and dominated most sectors of the economy thereby displacing black citizens who were excavating to start new businesses. The Asian investors who had access to capital start businesses further displaced the poorly capitalised black South African citizens from the business sector. Lack of capital injection into the black owned economic business ventures failed the black empowerment consolidation in that country. The Asian member states which exported to South Africa in 2003 increased their total shares to 7.3% from 1.2% recorded in 1994. This increase in imports from the Asian countries into South Africa meant that the South African citizens' human security was at stake. In fact, there was need for the ANC government to come up with an economic policy which would boost the country's exports to the Asian region especially to China. Although the Asian market presented South Africa with immense opportunities in the metals, automotive components and the agro-processing sectors, this opportunity went on to revolve over those South Africans who were on the business advantage during the apartheid era (Aglionby, 2003, http://www.daf.gov.za/docs/ mbek031012.htm). Although, the South African government had proposed and cemented economic partnerships with the Asian countries, the effort did not impact on the life style of the blacks, who

continued to suffer from marginalisation due to the failure of the empowerment drive (White, 2003).

The multilateral coalitions of South Africa and the Asian countries were supposed to be based on the principles of respect for international law, especially on the eradication of poverty, diseases and social injustice to improve peace and security of the individual peoples. This initiative made Brazil, India and other economically sound economies to strategically translate into lofty ideals that improved the individual security. South African leadership during the period between 1997 and 2007 became an instrument used to dominate the economies of SADC, thereby making the process of empowering the economically marginalised vulnerable societies' fate economically vulnerable. Lack of pragmatic or constructive objectives had resulted in little direction and poor participation from many other South African alternative interest groups such as labour unions and human rights advocacy groups. These groups were supposed to play a critical role in developing a more realistic strategy of engagement and offering incentives that added substance to the ambitious agenda. The inclusion of the civil society groups as wished was not acceptable to the ANC government because there was still a lot of scepticism between the two. Civil societies groups were accused of manipulating the political system to return the colonial hegemony to the forum (Snow, 1996:35-40). The "butterfly" approach to economic development in South Africa during the period 1997 to 2004 was meant to shift the trade and investment thrust from the traditional business connections of the Western European countries to that of the Asian states. The apartheid system which was dismantled by the first South Africa democratic elections of 1994 had been trading with the Western European countries for more than a century hence the black citizens of that country had no economic opportunities to open new corridors to sustain their economic opportunities. The opening of the Asian economic corridor for trade and investment indicated a new paradigm

shift for a new economic order where all races in South Africa were to be involved in economic emancipation. However, that thrust failed to create a conducive environment for peace and security in that country (Snow, 1996:48-52).

The previous sub-topics that touched on the intelligence security mantra have situated many national and regional studies in the context of a wider understanding of security, both human security and state security. These discussions have been grounded in an understanding of collective security dimension as being context –specific, relational and situated within regional and global imperatives. This role of intelligence security locates the role of the national security intelligence institutions in the context of wider security national transformation and security governance that hinges on the growth of a political culture that rejects violence in politics and on positive economic growth. This returns us to the wider themes of state, individual and community and their role in security. However, SADC member states located the role of intelligence organisations in wider security and societal context but expresses reservations about whether the South African experience can be replicated or generalised again stressing the importance of historical and societal context. The Southern African region puts some faith, in the emergence of a SADC wide intelligence cooperation organisation that she felt was going to be a vehicle for spreading good governance practices within the regional members' intelligence community. From the notion of peace and security stratagem, there were spatial hubs of dense political and economic webs that spanned across SADC member states' national boundaries. The role and significance of the national security intelligence institution is discussed to buttress the concept of peace and security which consolidates the provision of human security aspects. In this topic, the South African and Zimbabwean national security intelligence organisations' experiences were taken as a point of departure to examine the wider implications for SADC.

In the SADC region, the intelligence agencies continued to be created without input from interest groups or members of the national congresses. The absence of the civil societies in matters of peace and security also continued to hamper the growth of democratic systems. According to George & Kline, (2006), intelligence is described as the only area of high complex government activity where overall management across departmental and agency lines is seriously attempted. The role of the intelligence agency in a national security framework continued to be balanced between the need for central direction and imperative to preserve national intelligence organisations in SADC member states. The secret service institutions must provide policy makers with the best possible information and to coordinate clandestine operations for the benefit of the state. In fact, the intelligence agency remained largely supportive of the government enthusiasm for covertly countering the worldwide influence of those states which might want to threaten peace and security of the citizens (Rishikof, 2003:486-487). The secret agencies in any state remain a loose association of individual fortresses that seldom give up information about their clandestine activities. To benefit maximum benefits from the intelligence sector, governments must keep the names of its secret agents concealed especially all those deployed in different parts of the world. The government must also keep the people better informed about the activities of its security agencies that can be made public, especially events that took many years back before total liberation of the member states (Johnson, 1996:83-86).

Since intelligence services exist in national government system to promote national formulation policy, it also provides peace and security to the individual citizen. The main thrust lies in the responsibility to monitor the entire domestic and foreign environment to explain the full scope of the nature of events and threats including the impact on national security and stability (Global Investment and Business Centre 2007). Intelligence is simply a relevant information

policy that has been collected from all available sources of information, evaluated and analysed for a specific decision-maker. The intelligence needs to be relevant, accurate and should have timeliness for it to be relied upon for decision-making purposes. Furthermore, a society which is anchored on democratic values, social justice and fundamental upholds the human security aspects (Hutton, 2009:13). Fundamentally, intelligence to be relevant and accurate for policy-makers to formulate policies which provide peace and security national security, it should be collected by covert means. The need for secret information in the intelligence sector propels the state leadership to fully understand and appreciate threats which might befall the nation.

Once intelligence business is defined, it becomes apparent that as a concept, intelligence is as elusive as the daring fictional agents who have cemented it in the popular imagination. Since intelligence is greatly associated with security, secrecy is a means to its end. The end is the security and the prosperity of the entity that provides for the collection and subsequent analysis of intelligence. Since the states are the principal customers of intelligence and the key organisers of collection and analysis, their overall mission is to provide peace and security of the state. According to the Global Investment and Business Centre (2007), the national intelligence service is responsible for domestic and counterintelligence to enhance national security and defend the constitution and to conduct intelligence in relation to external threats and opportunities. External intelligence is that security information gathered from outside the borders of the state and if analysed by counterintelligence experts other issues that affect and pose threats to the wellbeing of nationals can be prevented and contained without harm to security interests of the country and its citizens. The intelligence organisations of SADC member states are responsible for peace and security of their respective member states through providing intelligence information for the strategic

management of the economic, political and national security of the states. It is upon individual SADC government, to consider the intelligence as the most reliable source of information on political, economic and social developments and other events that impact positively or negatively on national interests' abroad (Smith, 1990: 30-45; Miller, 1998:15).

According to Probst (2006), General Carl von Clausewitz, the great theorist on war, defined intelligence as "every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis, in short of our own plans and operations." The author branded the intelligence business as unreliable and transient of which he asserted that flimsy plans and operations were the cause of failure for the state to sustain peace and security for the citizens. In 2007, the Minister of Intelligence services in South Africa, Ronnie Kasrils, defined the internal environment of the secret sector in a country;

> "The role of the public in stimulating debate on the way intelligence services should function in an open and democratic society is essential … we welcome the public's involvement that can only strengthen our intelligence services and build the necessary trust and confidence required in democracy."

The main thrust for the intelligence organisation was to provide peace and security for the national citizens. In most cases' whenever intelligence information was provided, the nation's human security aspects were at least attended to. Democracy that is another yardstick for measuring peace and security in a state, remained a contested issue to citizens in SADC member states. Why it continued to be a contested issue rested, on the SADC member states' failure to arm the intelligence services to spearhead security ethos to address the citizens' peace and security exuberance.

The South African intelligence service established a special unit in 1996 that was mandated with the objective of providing evaluated

intelligence information on every sector of state system to compliment human security complexities (South Africa Intelligence, Security Activities and Operations Handbook, 2007; Hutton, 2009:14-15). The intelligence services in South Africa, just like any other SADC member states, set out their noble security purpose by providing national security that reflected the resolve of the South Africans, individuals and the nation at large. This mandate is premised on promoting citizens to live as equals, in peace and harmony with each other and to be free from fear and want which is among other human insecurities. Accordingly, the work of intelligence remains surrounded with too much scepticism and secrecy hence the generality of the citizens suspects that intelligence services abuse, manipulate and coerce people hence they are taken as tools of oppression and control Lathrop (215-217).

To be able to manage all human security aspects and its complexities, the intelligence services should be viewed by citizens as an indispensable adjunct to statecraft. Given the security threats in the unpredictable global world that know no borders, intelligence services sector cannot be discarded since it continued to provide peace and stability for both the community and individuals. Intelligence services are associated with spies who provide intelligence advice to the state's principal on impending national threats to the state's vital interests and institutions. Lathrop (2004:11) has this to say about the significance of intelligence information for the benefit of the state:

> "From time immemorial the Byzantines had maintained many agents who used to travel among our enemies … they would make detailed inquiries of all that was afoot and were able to report on …. The enemy's secret plans to government, who, forewarned."

Procopius (1971) as cited in Lathrop's (2004) work cautions against the neglect of the intelligence. In fact intelligence has been employed by every SADC member state in pursuit of different objectives depending on the character and nature of the state. Above all, peace and security

remained the goal to be achieved through intelligence information. The South African National Intelligence Agency (NIA) continued to provide the government with intelligence on domestic threats or potential threats to national stability. This allowed the government to implement policies to deal with potential threats and thus improve their policies. Besides dealing with domestic threats, NIA is mandated to fulfil the national counterintelligence responsibility that is on one hand, defensive and offensive on the other. This includes identifying, monitoring and neutralising foreign or hostile intelligence services that might seek to gain access to the classified information. The intelligence sector in any state needs to know and identify the manifestation of threats to security before it happens. The potential threats need to be known so that corrective measures could be taken before they cause catastrophic disastrous damage to the society. The outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa in 2000, opened the debate on the role and function of the intelligence service (NIA) and the debate gained considerable significance because the conflict could have been prevented if the intelligence organisation had known the simmering tension among different nationals from other African states against South African citizens.

The failure to detect the security threats implied that many social problems in South Africa's poorer communities became susceptible to the downstream ills such as sexual abuse and drug abuse among others. The manifestation of human insecurity issues in societies emerge in environments where individual peoples were exposed to threats of want and safety from vagaries organised crimes. Gang-related activities and trafficking in illegal goods and people often offered fertile ground for insecurity. The NIA should have identified the tension build-up over economic space which was dominated by the foreigners, where black indigenous nationals were on the economic periphery. The impoverished nature of black communities in South Africa, especially during the period 1997 to 2007, offered real potential

by the communities to commit crime en masse while protesting against ostracisation of blacks from the economic activity. The intelligence units should have picked up and reported timeously that the occupation by foreigners in the economic environment in South Africa was going to start xenophobic attacks (Johwa, 2008:49). The human security of South African citizens was put at risk by both the intelligence sector and the government policy-makers due to their failed pre-emptive attacks against foreigners in their midst. This conflict could have been prevented by correcting the economic insecurity which had simmered in the country. If the intelligence units had reported timeously the blame was going to be directed to government for failing to take sufficient precautionary action on intelligence reports.

In fact, the blame was going to be heavily ascribed to the ANC government's lack of understanding or prioritisation of the role of the intelligence service and the problems of integrating the state intelligence structures in the larger body politic (Hutton, 2007:346). The South African government should have aptly prevented the xenophobic attacks if it was quick to respond to intelligence reports that highlighted the simmering tensions between foreign businesspeople and impoverished communities of South African citizens. Indeed, the Special Browse Mole Report of 2007, indicated that the government departments that were supposed to have addressed the economic problems were reluctant to make use of intelligence services reports. The impact of the economic insecurity had caused a lot of suffering among both the South African communities and foreigners in areas of job losses, damage to property, deaths to foreigners and the whole episode which threatened the investment opportunities for the country's economic development.

It is important to interrogate the nature and the prioritization of the role of intelligence service in South Africa, hence deductions as to

whether NIA was able to gather intelligence information and advise the government timeously. Equally, some security intelligence practitioners have alluded to the fact that the South African government was suffering from the so-called 'eternal dilemma' that was incumbent upon the political leaders to act upon intelligence reports. Just like any other African intelligence organisation, NIA has its own challenges ascribed to the lack of understanding of the political dynamics affecting the society and the individuals (Research Interview with Joshie, former NIA Officer based in Pretoria, 2014).

According to Johwa (2008:28) the greatest problem for South Africa in 2000 was that the intelligence services were deflected from their collective role as protector of the nation to being the handmaiden of the ruling party and its government. The intelligence services should have been the protector of the nation in terms of human security so that peace and security would have been guaranteed in the country where post-apartheid system was still entrenched. The case of Project Avani and the allegations of spying on businessman Saki Macozoma were perfect examples of the sacrifice of the open society to service of the party. The intelligence services were dragged into self-serving manipulative deals at the expense of the peace and stability of the whole populace (Johwa, 2008:83).

An interview with one senior NIA official, who joined the intelligence service in 1984 revealed that, the ANC government and those served in the apartheid regime were suspicious against each other on security matters. He clearly stated that;

> "The ANC government's top leadership in the security sector treats us as spies for the defunct Botha government. If I bring intelligence information which indicates that there is simmering conflict between whites and blacks, there is no action taken until they verify with the political activists who are ANC members. In most cases the whites are blamed for provoking the blacks thereby disregarding our reports which give the true picture on the ground. We are forced to see no evil committed by blacks in the economic and political fronts. To write a report denigrating a member of ANC

involved in corruption or any illegal activity is a dismissible offence. For me to be safe, I just keep a distance from political and economic intelligence information associated with these ANC guys. There is no way I could survive if I report the ills of the ANC guys to the government. My friends whom I have joined this service with, were either frustrated or segregated after they indicated impartiality at work."

The problem of intelligence services deviating from the realm of upholding national human security aspects was not only peculiar to South Africa but extended to most of SADC member states as well. The Zimbabwean economic environment should not have gone wayward if the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) had managed to advise the government against upholding national policies in the period 1998 to 2010 which scared away the investors to come to do business in the country (Mandaza, 2004:210). The economic downturn which was witnessed in Zimbabwe led to a massive movement of people to search for economic opportunities to South Africa and other European countries. The exodus of the Zimbabwean working age and professionals led to wanton human resources deficit in the country hence, many sectors of the economy collapsed. According to UNDP Report of 2008, about a million of Zimbabweans migrated to other countries for job opportunities. This exodus of the productive age was disastrous since it exposed the country to the vigor of human insecurity, where food and medical shortages became the order of the day and many lives were lost due to lack of peace and security for the Zimbabwean individuals (Botha, 2008:23).

By 2003, the macro-economic policies of Zimbabwe, especially the liberalisation, had not created better conditions for the development of agricultural sector (Integrated Framework 2003:129). However, the continued operational problems in the agricultural sector due to land invasions by the landless blacks of white owned farms drove away investors. The land invasions by the landless blacks worsened the

country's economic downturn while on the other hand, lack of rule of law caused the economy to suffocate.

The collapse of the agricultural sector that was supposed to be a source of economic diversification and investment worsened the circumstances of the country's poor. Had the policy been successful some 8,1 million Zimbabweans should have lived on more than one US dollar per day and more people would not have migrated to other countries in search of a better livelihood (Christie & Crompton 2003:321; World Bank 2008,2). The economic problem that bedevilled Zimbabwe in the late 1990s to 2007 caused a lot of human insecurity in the country and security of the individual citizens and the societies at large. The insecurity which was felt by most of Zimbabweans in the country was equally felt by citizens of Botswana and South Africa because their economies were greatly undermined by Zimbabwean refugees. Ironically, the exodus of Zimbabweans to South Africa and Botswana provided surplus cheap labour for the receiving countries (Webner, 1998:209).

The intelligence sector in any country should issue guidelines that regulate and expedite the provision of the government intelligence interests. The main thrust of the intelligence sector remained anchored on providing peace and security of the citizens of the country. They were three major problems with the South African National Intelligence Agency's (NIA) mandate in the period running up to the 2000. The mandate was too broad and opens to various interpretations. The National Strategic Intelligence Act required NIA to focus on threats and potential threats to the security of the Republic and its people, internal activities, threats and potential threats to the constitutional order of the people of South Africa (Hutton, 2009:96).

NIA had interpreted the mandate in so broad a fashion as to encompass the thematic focus of virtually every state department. This

was impractical and unnecessary, and it detracted it from focusing on serious criminal threats and the potential for violence which elements were causing insecurity to individual citizens. The terms "security of the Republic and its people", 'national stability' and "threats to the constitutional order" were imprecise and open to interpretation. NIA's mandate was in fact interpreted three times since 1994 but the results of the process were never subjected to open and vigorous parliamentary and public debate. The broad mandate of the secret agency's political intelligence function might have been too politicized to the extent that it gave rise to an inappropriate focus on political activities. The political intelligence function had entailed monitoring and reporting on transformation within the ANC government institutions, on competition within and between political parties and on the impact of political policy decisions.

However, the working environment of the secret agency remained torrid, given that operational powers acceded to NIA infringed constitutional rights of the South African citizens. In fact, the intelligence agency was supposed not to violate the rights of the people who were behaving lawfully although that was a threat to national security. The intelligence sector is all about secrecy for it to do the actual work and function properly and feed the government with good policy making intelligence. Intelligence work goes hand in glove with spying. Spying in the intelligence sector is like policing, prosecuting and even journalism of which it should be professionally handled to gain legitimacy. But to what extent are good intentions matched by positive outcomes? To gather intelligence of value, which is usable in statecraft, the process of acquiring it needs to be highly covert and discreet to avoid bias and opinion of the one who is acquiring it.

To this end, the intelligence sector cannot be divulged of their covert operations. One can never be informed on where intelligence

organisation gets its work, what can only be heard of by the generality of the people in a national set up is when it goes wrong in its operations. Secrecy in government systems generally reduces accountability, and it promotes abuse of power and hides incompetence. The secrecy that surrounded the intelligence work in a democratic state like South Africa, has negative effects to the security of individual citizens. In the analysis of intelligence governance in South Africa, Hutton (2007:345) makes the point that;

> "The intelligence sector is possibly the most difficult one for civil society to engage in, and yet it holds civil liberties and the rights and freedoms of citizens. The challenge for intelligence services is to overcome the tendency to formalise the bureaucracy of secrecy that has resulted in an obsession with secrecy."

Taking the South African intelligence sector into consideration, to provide peace and security of the individuals, the essence of democracy was just merely the potential for self-correction. The more operational clandestine NIA became, the more it was likely to affect the system in ways that reduced the security of the people. This was especially important when it came to intelligence. By the early years of 2000, the intelligence information was supposed to be particularly powerful in nature to prevent xenophobic attacks against foreigners.

Since intelligence information was secretly provided and supplied by spies from sources with supposedly privileged access, it carried with it a weight, an aura and an incontestability that placed it above others, perhaps countervailing information (Hutton, 2009:56; Galison & Moss, 2008:281; Sole, 2007:56; Early, 1997:64). Because intelligence was supplied in secrecy, it became obvious that it was not open to credibility checks or to peer review in the marketplace of ideas. Furthermore, the special nature of intelligence information made it open to abuse, with the potential to influence policy outcomes that had been rejected by the policy makers. The special credibility which was given to intelligence information in South Africa ignored the historical

fact that apartheid was behind the events curve, not in front. To be considered for example, was the killing of socially disadvantaged people, especially those who lost their lives during the xenophobic attacks which erupted in 1998 in many places in South Africa.

Despite the above assertions contributing to exacerbating absence of constructive contribution by the intelligence services in ensuring the political and economic stability of democracy in SADC, particularly South Africa, the promotion of accountability and operational effectiveness upholds the national constitutional principles. A lot of issues were brought into limelight among them failure to arm the intelligence services to spear heard national peace and security ethos. The intelligence services need to be able to identify the manifestation of threats to national security before anything interrupts government business. In a nutshell, failure to detect security threats against the state, society and the individuals cause downstream ills that can affect the whole region. Usually, intelligence gathering by security intelligence services should, therefore be permissible if only is within strictly defined parameters, with intelligence oversight acting as the bridging activity connecting the seemingly divergent worlds of secrecy and transparency within such democratic framework.

The ANC government had a clear distinction between the domestic and the external levels of national security. In fact, the domestic approach to security meant that domestic security was the responsibility of the South African police service while the external security was mainly the task of the South African defence forces. Although South Africa's orientation to external national threat had changed from an explicit offensive strategy, the objectives of the then current set up included the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the South African estate and the promotion of regional security in Southern Africa (Hough & Du Plessis 2000:65). According to Hough & Du Plessis (2000), lack of

security in terms of underdevelopment, poverty and absence of democratic values promote conflicts within and between states. For peace and security to prevail it should not be restricted to the military, police and intelligence organs of the state but in critical areas such as political, economic, social and environmental insecurities that need to be holistically safeguarded (Hough & Du Plessis, 2000:16–17).

The human security matters were worsened in South Africa by the upsurge of regional insecurity (Hough & Du Plessis, 2000:69). The South African National Intelligence Agency can be blamed for failing to recognise and foresee many threats that were related to the economic, political and societal dimensions emanating from the regional grouping. The South African government was heavily overwhelmed by security problems brought on by foreigners running away from military conflicts, economic downturn and chronic underdevelopment of their countries (Ngoma, 2003:201). The South African government faced the transnational threats such as the spread of disease, the burden of refugees, DRC civil war (1998-2000) and the proliferation of weapons. Zimbabwe's chaotic land reform programme from 1999 to 2005 made South Africa a safe haven and more insecure in terms of institutional framework and capacity-building. The National Intelligence Agencies of South Africa was supposed to create a clear link between democracy and the type of security paradigm in which the country was to operate internally and regionally. In 1998, there was a paradigm shift within the security sector's roles where peace processes were improved to provide the human security to every citizen in the country.

Human security development in a country determines peace and security provisions for the citizens. The Zimbabwean human security index went down in 1998 after the National Security Council (NSC) decided that the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) should intervene in the Democratic Republic of Congo war. The Zimbabwe government

through ZNA intervened to protect the DRC sovereignty and legitimacy although the intervention was viewed by many as a selfish move with the ZNA top brass allegedly accused of personally benefitting from their military intervention. The Zimbabwe Central Intelligence Organisation should have identified both the economic and political threats which were going to affect Zimbabwe by intervening in the Congo before the war erupted (EDC News, 200). The major criticism was all about the amount of money that the government was spending in DRC in 1998 to 2001. Zimbabwe's economy was not able to sustain the needs of the citizens (The Financial Gazette, 1999). The Zimbabwe's security organisation (CIO) made their assessment in terms of Peace and Security concepts, where national security aspects were followed, but the human factor was not considered.

The rebels who were fighting the DRC government also intended to remove the ruling party ZANU-PF from power using opposition elements (Shire, 2003:149; Financial Gazette, Harare, 1999; Bond & Manyanya, 2002:56-61). The scheme according to George Shire, the SADC region was perceived as a dangerous and insecure region in terms of lack of democratisation. All liberation movements which were ruling, especially, Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF, Namibia's SWAPO, Angola's MPLA and Mozambique's FRELIMO, were all perceived as resistant to democratisation. The political developments in Zimbabwe where the rule of law was perceived as having been thrown away by the ZANU-PF government, triggered the international community and civil society organisations to demonise the government of autocratic rule. All revolutionary political parties which were ruling in the period 1997 to 2007 were accused of being resistant to democracy (Cilliers, 1997:50). On the same, the relations that emerged between DRC and Zimbabwe were criticised, as it was alleged that the links benefited individuals and not the country. These accusations of plundering resources by the former revolutionary freedom fighters extended to governments in Mozambique, Namibia and Angola. The quest for

peace and security for the region was put in limbo because the whole region was plunged into economic insecurity, the movement of refugees intensified, poverty became the order of the day in societies and unemployment and atrocities among tribal groups was rampant in SADC in the years 1997 to 2007.

Linnington, (2004) a lawyer and lecturer in the Department of Politics and Administration, at the University of Zimbabwe, stated that Zimbabwe was in economic and political problems because the government was not addressing the issues of peace and security which were negatively affecting the citizens. The ZANU-PF government was under siege after it failed to formulate and implement its national security policy. The emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), an opposition political party in Zimbabwe presented problems for the government internally because the political arena changed. The ZANU-PF government was not used to facing a challenge such as that presented by the MDC. The country was plunged into political violence during the 2000 electoral campaign period. Internal security was threatened as both ZANU-PF and MDC exchanged accusations as to who was initiating the violence. This violence affected the regional security as refugees left Zimbabwe for Botswana and South Africa. Most of the migrants fleeing the alleged political violence between ZANU-PF and MDC supporters found themselves roaming around commercial towns of South Africa for employment. There was no red-carpet reception for the refugees from Zimbabwe from either the governments or the ordinary people of Botswana and South Africa. The government of Botswana and South Africa on the other hand accused the Zimbabwean refugees of criminal activities including providing cheap labour against the interests of the citizens' demands of fair labour wages (Shire, 2003:314; Baker, 1990:36; Mandaza & Nabudere, 2002:163).

Although, Zimbabwe became a focal point during the 2000 period where human insecurity was at its worst ebb, the problems of

instability emanated from the colonial past. The political violence that was witnessed in Zimbabwe had a bearing of the colonial history which a minority group had overseen all economic resources. The economic revolution which saw the white owned farms being invaded were meant to correct the injustices plunged the country into political and economic chaos. The ZANU-PF government was being led by those who participated in the liberation war and most of the leaders were still in power since independence hence this contributed to the way the country's problems were perceived by the European countries whose natives were economically disempowered (Shire, 2003:300).

Those who were accusing the ZANU-PF of plunging the country into human insecurity, especially the Western countries, hardly knew that problems which were in Zimbabwe existed until the land invasions of 2000. Shire (2003:317), a Zimbabwe government sympathiser had accused the British government of fuelling the Zimbabwean political, economic, and social and security insecurity while blaming lack of democracy. The political and economic insecurities witnessed during peak of the land reform programme were a contestation between the majority blacks and the minority whites. The chaotic "land grab" in 2000 land reform triggered food insecurity across the country. The human security threats which affected Zimbabwe in 2000 and beyond had ripple effects on South Africa's economic development. The intelligence sector in South Africa failed to identify threats which were caused by the Zimbabwean political turmoil to that country's economic threats. However, SADC member states need to ensure and guarantee political and economic security to the citizens through practicing democratic governance systems (Mandaza & Nabudere, 2002:125).

As one interviewee from the South African Embassy in Harare avers;

"The security challenges of armed robberies, prostitution, smuggling, drug abuse and high rate of unemployment are caused by foreigners running away from their countries to seek refuge in South Africa. Surely, our neighbours are not doing justice to my country because they allow their people to flood South Africa without proper immigration papers. Political instability in some SADC member states is a cause of great concern because most of those people affected by such conflicts end up in South Africa seeking both political and economic refugee status. Our country is home to

political and economic asylum seekers, who continue to strain social and economic services."

South Africa and her neighbours need to put consented efforts to stabilize the uncoordinated movements of undocumented immigrants. Evidently, both the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2002 in Zimbabwe were flawed because of too much conflict. The main issues rendered these elections not free and fair were the allegations of vote buying, violence against opposition political parties among many others raised by the National Constitutional Assembly of Zimbabwe. South Africa's social and economic services were severely constrained by the ever-populated movement of immigrates into the country (Wole, 2005:37; Raflopoulous & Mlambo, 2009:123).

The examination of the concept of a community security is largely conceptual in manner. The Human Security paradigm responds to the complexities and the interrelatedness of new and old security threats that affected SADC region during the period 1994 and 2008. Such threats that included political insecurity, food insecurity and health insecurity, were leading for derailing the process of political integration in the SADC region. Apparently, the need to broaden and deepen the understanding of a community security was supposed to have been tackled through regional conventional mechanisms that address peace and security threats. The SADC integration thrust assisted the member states to acknowledge the linkages and the interdependences between development, human rights and national security, especially in Lesotho, DRC and Zimbabwe's land reform programme. These countries' economies were deprived of the much-needed balance of payments from the international financial institutions which feared to invest in unstable environments.

The Southern African region went through a very turbulent period between 1997 and 2007 when its security and political mechanisms for dealing with the regional problems in terms of human insecurities were in a state of flux. The agreement by SADC member states to establish the SADC's OPDS was a great stride towards addressing political and security threats which traditionally had relegated the

regional citizens to chronic poverty, food insecurity, unemployment, displacement and refugee movement.

The interface of security threats at national and regional levels existence of peace and stability become the panacea to provision of human security aspects for citizens. The assumption that security and stability in a state are inextricably intertwined and mutually reinforcing underpins all the SADC member states' peace and security aspects. This chapter has demonstrated that much progress has been registered in respect of the human security aspects in the region where the intelligence sector is called upon to entrench values that promote peace and security of the individual citizens. Although, the slow democratisation process has caused human insecurity in the region, meddling by the Western countries in SADC politics continues to be a serious threat to human security (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995:13).

The debate on the security architecture in the SADC region was seen as robust as the democracy and governance discourse. Although, this debate revolves around different conceptions of security, there was a distinction between narrow security which concerns the security sector and the so-called widened security with issues such as economics, the environment, food and society were regarded as having security threat dimensions.

As Cawthra (2009) concludes, regional security cooperation in the developing regions like SADC is clearly aimed at stability and regime security rather than human security. In this scheme of things, the state tends to be the only agent of security to the exclusion of other critical actors in society such as the civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations. Zacharias (1999) posits that;

> "The state is not and it should not be the only agent of security, it has limited initiative and resources. It does not constitute the totality of social life. There are other agents equally important for securities that complement the activities of the state, and it's their empowerment that is likely to make a

difference in security. These include societal organisations such as civic, charity and various interest groups."

It must be noted, however, that civil society in itself is not a panacea to problems of individuals or citizens in human security. For human security to be adequately addressed to enjoy peace and stability the state, non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations need to complement each other's effort to provide peace and security to the people (Zacharias, 1999:154-156).