

Chapter 5: Locating the Land Issue in the Peace and Security Drive in South Africa

The agricultural sector in South Africa and Zimbabwe as anywhere in the world is a unique instrument for economic, social and political development as it enhances economic growth at national level, livelihood and food security at the local and family levels. In most SADC member states, human insecurity was exacerbated by the attempt to readdress the land issue years after colonial rule. Zimbabwe was greatly affected by its venture into land reform programme which even caused threats to peace and security in South Africa. Most important were similarities and parallels drawn between the two neighbours which were threatened by human insecurity after the respective governments delayed addressing the colonial land imbalances. South Africa and Zimbabwe were under analysis because they shared one thing in common, that of land disputes that most blacks were dispossessed of, during the white colonialist and apartheid regimes. Furthermore, this chapter critically analysed the role of the former colonial power, Britain, in her attempt to protect the interest of the white race that were on farms acquired during the colonial period. Land redistribution became a political and economic security issue in Zimbabwe and South Africa due to migration of people for various reasons ranging from food shortages, unemployment and xenophobic threats among others. In a similar vein, most black South African and Zimbabwean citizens believed that the land was taken unfairly by the white settlers, and this was regarded as a human right abuse since they had no right to the land they had occupied.

Furthermore, the land issue is analysed as a political tool during election time in both countries. Some similarities and differences were drawn between South Africa and Zimbabwe on the impact of political

and economic insecurity caused by politicking the land issue to win the hearts and minds of the electorate for votes. However, the two neighbours faced similar challenges as far as the land redistribution was concerned. Zimbabwe and South Africa found it even more challenging to support the new landowners to succeed in land utilisation. This became a recipe for disaster in Zimbabwe where peace and security were threatened by exodus of people to other countries, particularly South Africa. On the other hand, South Africa was faced with an agitated land hungry people. Unemployment crisis caused by white commercial farmers who preferred to employ foreigners at the expense of citizens exacerbated xenophobic sentiments among the South African community. The two countries went through political and economic insecurity characterised by poor health delivery services, food shortages, unemployment and xenophobic attacks among a plethora of problems.

Land reform is a prickly issue in South Africa and Zimbabwe. For some, it conjured up images of land which was stolen from black people during the apartheid and colonial rule. For others in South Africa particularly, whites, it incited fear of being evicted from the farms, echoing the Zimbabwe's Fast-track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) which caused human insecurity in the country. Reclaiming land was an important rallying cry for liberation movements in both South Africa and Zimbabwe but in the years after white minority rule ended, it became difficult to acquire and redistribute the land fairly and efficiently. The FTLRP which left nearly all white commercial farmers dispossessed of their farms led to Zimbabwe's agricultural sector's demise, while many observers were asking if South Africa was going to be next. Walker (1998) observes that, when Nelson Mandela took power in South Africa in 1994, about 87 percent of the country's land was owned by whites and these represented less than ten percent of the population. The African National Congress (ANC) government wanted to redistribute 30% of the land from whites to blacks in the first five years of the democracy. It then took 16 years of independence for

the ANC government to reallocate only 8% of the land to the land hungry black citizens. Indeed, the land remained a hot issue in both countries because it touched on economic and political nerve centres of individual citizens (Walker, 1998:432-436; Thompson & Leysens, 2000:321).

In failing to redistribute land, the South African government undermined a crucial aspect of the negotiated settlement to end apartheid causing black economic insecurity. According to Section 25 of the new South African Constitution, promulgated in 1994, the white property owners received valid legal title to property, which was acquired under the apartheid regime, despite dubious circumstances of its acquisition. Although black citizens, including people of mixed racial descent and Indians were expecting a fast land reform but still whites continued to keep their property. In fact, political apartheid system had ended in South Africa, but economic apartheid system continued to live on. On the other hand, successful implementation and execution of the Fast-track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe required the intertwining of a host of factors. Chigora & Dewa (2003) argue that the FTLRP could have made significant progress in human security provisions in Zimbabwe if the beneficiaries of the land reform programme had been equipped with the requisite farming knowledge and skills. However, there was an attempt to move beyond the land reform programme in the context of the nexus between land reform and food security in the two countries. Assessing the effectiveness of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe, the move was made taking into consideration its impact on the security of individual peoples and migration of citizens to South Africa. The agricultural sector in Zimbabwe as anywhere else in the world was a unique instrument for economic, social and political development as it enhanced economic growth at national level, livelihood and food security at the local and family levels. The potential for national economic growth in Zimbabwe was rooted in its agricultural

foundation, of which it was not the same scenario for the South African land issue (Kanyenze, 2006:65; Moyo, 2000:45-55; Vale *et al.*, 2001:401-413; Thomas, 1996:120).

In this topic, the land question in Zimbabwe is examined as the core of the country's political, economic and social development. From the occupation of Matabeleland and Mashonaland in the 1890s until today, the land question remains the root of political tension within Zimbabwe and with Britain, the former colonial power. It was Cecil John Rhodes, a British business tycoon who championed the colonisation of Zimbabwe in 1890 and a process of systematic dispossession of land began which belonged to the indigenous black people. The Ndebele War of 1893 saw the local people being driven to the newly created Gwaai and Shangani reserves. The 1896 Ndebele and Shona uprisings took place partly because of the land question. African resistance crumbled under the settler's superior firepower. According to the British Government's Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1898, additional Native Reserves were established based on the policy of racial segregation and the same Order further provided that;

"The Company (BSAC) shall from time to time assign to Natives inhabiting Southern Rhodesia, land sufficient for their occupation and suitable for their agricultural or pastoral requirements."

Various legislative enactments coupled with the use of violence enabled the British South African Company (BSAC) to demarcate land in a racially skewed manner. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which provided for restricted rights of the African to land ownership to designated Native Purchase Areas was enacted and implemented. According to the Act of 1930, land was apportioned as Table 5.2 below indicates:

Table 5; 2 Land-Ownership Patterns after Land Apportionment Act of 1930 Source Mutondi 2001: Table 3:1

CATEGORY	ACRES	% OF COUNTRY
European area	49,149,174	51
Native reserves	21,127,040	22
Unassigned area	17,793,300	18,5
Forest area	590,500	0,6
Undetermined area	88,540	0,1
Total	96,213,120	100

Africans were supposed to have used 28,391,606 acres or 29,8% of land. The African population was estimated to be 1 081 000 in 1930 (Utete, 2003:14). The land /was located in marginal, inhospitable and at times tsetse fly ridden areas. The European settler population was about 50,000 and yet was allocated 49,149,174 acres or 51 percent of the best land in the country. After the Second World War, new settlers escaping the economic hardships in Europe were allocated more land at the expense of blacks. Massive evictions to accommodate the new white settlers took place. The Native Land Husbandry Act was enacted in 1995 to enforce the de-stocking and conservation practices on the African held land (Tindall, 1968:221). The then outspoken Catholic Bishop of Umtali, Donald Lamont, rhetorically asked in 1959;

“Can you in conscience blame the African, if eking out a tenuous existence from the poor soil in an overcrowded reserve, he is swayed by subversive propaganda, while close besides him there lie hundreds of thousands of hectares of fertile soil which he may not cultivate, not occupy, not graze, because although it lies unused and unattended, it belongs to some individual or group of individuals who perhaps do not use the land in the hope of profit from speculation” (Presidential Land Review Committee Report 2003: 14-23).

As overcrowding in the reserves increased, the colonial regime of Ian Douglas Smith pursued segregationist policies with vigour and

abandoned any pretence at accommodating the majority blacks. Against this background, the nationalist struggle, with its many causes, chief of which was the land grievance was launched mainly from Zambia. According to the late Chairman of the Zimbabwe African National Union, (ZANU) Herbert Chitepo, land was the real issue of the armed struggle being waged;

"I could go into the whole theories of discrimination, in legislation, in residency, in economic opportunities, in education. I could go into that, but I will restrict myself to the question of land because I think this is basic. To us the essence of exploitation, the essence of white domination, is domination over land. That is the real issue" (Presidential Land Review Committee Report 2003:15).

All conferences and negotiations over Rhodesia could not solve the crisis because of failure in resolving mainly the land issue. Thus, the Geneva talks of 1976, Malta in 1978 and the Anglo American Proposals known as Detente all revolved on issues of the land reform and compensation to white farmers. The Lancaster House talks of 1979 almost collapsed because of disagreements over the land issue. The Patriotic Front (PF) wanted the recognition that the main reason for the armed struggle was the recovery of the land which was forcibly taken from the black people. The Patriotic Front was composed of two liberation movements ZANU and ZAPU for the purpose of peace negotiations with the Smith regime. Attempts by the British to retain privileges in property and land rights were thwarted by the PF until the British and US governments agreed to the setting up of a fund to finance land reform in a new Zimbabwe. As the final agreement was reached the PF announced;

"We have now obtained assurances that... Britain, the United States of America and other countries will participate in a multinational donor effort to assist in land, agricultural and economic development programmes. These assurances go a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question arising from the great need our people have for land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in Government (Presidential Land Review Committee Report 2003:16) (*Ibid*).

The chairman of the Lancaster House Conference, Lord Carrington on the land issue on 11 October 1979, had this to say;

“We recognise that the future of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership. The costs would be very substantial indeed, well beyond the capacity, in our judgement, of any individual donor country, and the British Government cannot commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them. We should, however, be ready to support the efforts to the Governments of Independent Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for these purposes” (Presidential Land Review Committee Report 2003:17) (*Ibid*).

The centrality of the land issue was, therefore, acknowledged but the British inserted Section 16 of the Draft Constitution which formed part of the Declaration of Rights which sought to prohibit compulsory acquisition of property of any description except under the authority of law. The property could be acquired under certain conditions such as in the interests of the public health, public morality, defence, public safety, and town and country planning. The acquiring authority was required to give reasonable notice of its intention to acquire the property in question and to pay prompt and adequate compensation. Section 16, as part of the Declaration of Rights would be entrenched for ten years from the date of independence. In the meantime the constitution obligated Government to acquire land on a willing seller-willing buyer basis during the first ten years of independence. Not much was achieved as the land was very expensive and the international community gave limited financial support. As a result, only 71,000 families were resettled on a paltry 3, 5 million hectares of land acquired by Government between 1980 and 1990. As pressure mounted on government to speed up the land redistribution exercise, there developed growing impatience on the part of the land hungry (Tizora, 2013:241-243; Utete, 2003:14-18; Presidential Land Review Committee Report, 2003:13-45).

Land reform in Zimbabwe officially began in 1980, while in South Africa it began in 2014, twenty years after the end of apartheid. It remained a contentious issue although a very insignificant number of black people were reallocated pieces of land in South Africa. In this case, the land reform was an effort by the two neighbours to equitably distribute land to the black subsistence farmers. Addressing a meeting of the Central Committee of the ZANU (PF) party on 26 November 1990, in Harare, President Mugabe dubbed the new land reform drive as the 'Third Chimurenga', the last phase of the liberation of Zimbabwe, after the armed liberation struggle of the 1970s and the early uprisings against colonial settlers in the 1890s. Mugabe's pronouncement led to the national desire to seriously revisit the land question in Zimbabwe. Therefore, beginning in 2000, the Government of Zimbabwe adopted a fast-track land resettlement programme which was followed by series of spontaneous farm occupations of white commercial farms by the landless black people. The land reform was received by the populace in different ways because of its political polarisation and racial discrimination. The targeted farms belonged to white commercial farmers, a precedent viewed by the opposition political party elements as a political gimmick by the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF) to consolidate a political powerbase using the land issue (www.voanews.com; Setai,1998:115-120).

Immediately after independence, most Southern African countries faced the challenge of reversing the colonial and apartheid legacies of neglect and underdevelopment. In this case, Zimbabwe began to play a key role in the process of compulsory land acquisition after landless peasants and war veterans had invaded white owned farms. This process led to a deliberate statist development strategy that manifested itself through nationalisation programmes and the expansion of the public sector. For the better part of the 1990s and 2000s, post-colonial states in SADC, particularly Zimbabwe, focused their development

strategies towards addressing the basic needs such as education, health, food and employment. In fact, the social policy occupied centre-stage in statecraft. To this end, development strategy aimed at improving basic social services in Zimbabwe came under the grip of local authorities but agriculture and industry were placed under strong state control in what Mandaza (1996) argues as the emergence of state capitalism. Explaining the predatory nature of most SADC post-colonial states, Mandaza (1996) further posits that one of its main objectives had been to “try to ensure that those who became rich, particularly outside state, do not become prospective contenders for state power.” Indeed, the land issue took a political dimension of which anyone that went against the ruling elites’ decisions was left out of the land redistribution equation. State control in agriculture in Zimbabwe took a new dimension after chaotic land invasions across the country. The white commercial farmers who were booted out from the farms became vindictive to the extent that they sabotaged the agricultural sector and even relocated to other countries, including South Africa. The relocation of white commercial farmers did not only plunge Zimbabwe into human insecurity mode but caused pressure on South Africa’s land demand. The effects of the chaotic land reform programme had caused a lot of Zimbabweans migrating to South Africa running away from political and economic insecurities. The motivation to relocate to South Africa by Zimbabweans had a direct and indirect impact on labour market and migration patterns (Blumfeld, 1991: 1991; Lundahl & Petersson, 1995:243; Smith, 2001:75; Mamdani, 1996:36).

The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 which gave birth to Zimbabwe’s independence sought to provide for equitable redistribution of land to the landless peasants and war veterans without damaging white farmers’ vital contribution to the economy and food security. In this case, on a similar vein South Africa’s Land Restitution Commission, an agency which was pivotal to the land reform efforts in 1999, placed a moratorium on buying land claimed

under the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Bill. Inequalities in land ownership in both countries were worsened by a land hungry growing population, depletion of tracts of arable land and escalating poverty in subsistence farming areas over the preceding decades. There was a sharp underutilisation of land in some white commercial farms in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The land reform programme made the Zimbabwean regime popular among its own people and it attracted a lot of media attention on the international scene. Chigora & Dewa (2003:92) postulate that “there was fatal politicization and internationalisation of the land conflict that led to the imposition of sanctions”. The land grab in Zimbabwe presented President Robert Mugabe great victories against the Western countries and the opposition political parties which were critical of misrule. Mugabe regime capitalised on the popularity and influence of black empowerment to consolidate power, but this exacerbated political and economic turbulences in the country and across the borders. South Africa affected economically because many people trekked there to secure employment and health services (Chigora & Dewa, 2003: 92-98; LEDRIZ, 2011:485-495).

Although, the pressure to redistribute land emanated from nationalist liberation movements, the impetus for land reform was deep-rooted within civil society and opposition political parties. In spite of this, unlike in Zimbabwe, not everyone in South Africa expected instability to actually materialise in the farming sector because land issue inequality in that country was not affecting livelihoods as it did in Zimbabwe. For instance, about three percent of South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was based on agriculture whereas before the 2000 land grab in Zimbabwe, agriculture contributed about 20 percent of the country’s GDP. The Fast-track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 2000 followed political posturing by Britain, the former colonial power that expressed dissatisfaction that democratic tenets were not being followed in acquiring land during the Phase I (1980-1997) of the land resettlement programme. The land occupation then turned more political to the extent that the internationally acclaimed respect for private property rights was negated. Furthermore, the land occupations responded to the social and political pressures for faster implementation of land reforms. The Western countries led by Britain

labelled Mugabe a villain after land grabbing but in SADC and beyond he became a hero for readdressing the colonial ills. Mugabe became more popular even after the British government had indicated that pressure was needed to remove him from power. In a nutshell, despite threats against Mugabe's regime over the alleged land grabbing, Zimbabweans continued to support him regardless of severe food shortages and job dismissals across the country (Madhuku, 2004:213; Boyle, 2001:665-669).

The British government denied that Britain had committed itself to a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. The ZANU-PF grabbed the opportunity to politicise the land issue where Britain was portrayed as a villain intending to fight back the land reform exercise. At every ZANU-PF rally held thereafter, it was Britain and opposition political parties which were accused of intending to reverse the land ownership to the white minority group. The issue of land took an ugly face that plunged the whole country into food insecurity. The turning point of the land reform programme to a political gimmick which caused people to move to South Africa in search of peace and security (Matondi, 2008: 62; www.foreignaffairs.com).

Given the above, Zimbabwe government grabbed the opportunity to blame the British Government for renegeing on the promise made during the political settlement at Lancaster House. Unlike South Africa, Zimbabwe received several interpretations and analyses across the globe on issues of land reform. Leaders of SADC member states were generally supportive of the programme, although the population of the region were sceptical of political and economic challenge that was inevitably simmering. For example, former Mozambican President Joachim Chissano said that the reforms had given the opportunity to millions of previously landless Zimbabweans to possess land and to produce their own food (Speech to Corporate Council on Africa, 2003). In this case, Mugabe was viewed as a hero fighting for the poor peasant black farmers who for the first time had reclaimed their land. Although, Mugabe remained popular after the grabbing of white owned farms, the food insecurity in the country reached the lowest levels. Most rural people witnessed another worst drought seasons of

which the only survival opportunity was to go trek to South Africa for jobs. The large-scale commercial farms which were not invaded, the white farm owners continued to take agricultural sector as “business as usual”. The white farmers, ironically, left the political business to blacks while they concentrated on economic business. The whites did not help the economic recovery after the land invasions, in fact the human insecurity worsened. However, critics of the land reform programme blamed the ZANU-PF government for consolidating its political power using the land reform as a strategy, compromising peace and security of the country (<http://www.saflii.org>; Davenport, 2003:201).

While the aim behind land redistribution in Zimbabwe was to correct the existing imbalances in land ownership, the government’s goal was to enhance food security for the country. The World Food Conference report (1996) defined food security as the availability at all times of adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices. In this case, the notion of food security underscored that all peoples always have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (Napoli, 2011:512; Setai, 1998:78).

Although agriculture was not contributing significantly to the South Africa’s GDP, about 35 to 40% of the nation’s population resides in rural areas, so access to land was necessary for the survival of many poor families. Unlike other complex social issues in South Africa such as unemployment and inadequate health care, the land issue that remained contentious had roots in most of the citizens. Indeed, the ZANU-PF government was viewed by the landless peasants as politically gallivanting with the land issue. This came about after a long pause without land being acquired for resettlement due to the direction of government policy on land reform. The government ring-fenced the large-scale commercial farming sector (LSCF) as the anchor for the economy. This was acknowledged by the late Julius Nyerere who recognised the vitality of the agriculture-based economy of Zimbabwe, describing it as ‘the jewel of Africa’. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe’s large-scale agriculture was an enclave developed based

on ruthless land dispossession of blacks by whites for a period of over ninety years, stretching from 1890. The indigenous African populace was condemned to below subsistence farming in neglected, marginalized and overcrowded 'Tribal Trust Lands' which were not able to provide a decent livelihood, thereby forcing many black Zimbabweans into low wage employment. To make matters worse, the large-scale agricultural economy was heavily based on exporting cash crops to the detriment of providing food to the general populace. However, the political and economic insecurity created by the failure to provide land led many Zimbabweans to trek down to South Africa for employment and human rights provisions (Zikhali, 2008:416; Kanyenze, 2006:305; Rukuni, 2006:89).

While the wind of democratic change had been blowing across Africa for over decades now, the land issue remained the contentious problem in many societies. Some Southern African countries were at a stage of change and flux as they struggled to democratize and readdress the land injustices created during the colonial and apartheid era. To curb political, economic and social polarisation in readdressing the land issue, support was needed to be scaled up to strengthen mechanisms for security and protection of the individual peoples, including through formulation and implementation of supporting legislations. Civil society organisations in Zimbabwe and South Africa understood that the land issue could not be separated from good governance. It can be argued that democracy, as a political practice requires an effective state and appropriate legal political institutions to secure people's rights, safeguard their human security and make their own laws. The understanding is that, despite the frequent holding of multi-party elections in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the absence of addressing the land issue remained a serious human insecurity factor (Nathan & Honwana, 1999:212; Nkiwane, 1999:112).

Food insecurity in Zimbabwe had various complexities that emanated from the manner in which the land resettlement exercise was handled. It was the issue of food scarcity which led most of citizens to accuse the government for not being sincere in addressing the concerns of the peasants. The food insecurity became a poor governance issue after the country had suffered food shortages. Zimbabwe faced food deficits

since 1997 and ZANU-PF was blamed for coming up with poor governance policies. Many civil society activists argued that there was no positive development brought about by restructuring the agricultural sector after the white commercial farmers were forced to surrender parts of their land. Households expected to have sufficient food to meet their requirements always had gone through the worst periods of hunger. The food insecurity had been a permanent feature of Zimbabwe from 1990 resulting in perennial food deficits driven by low production and productivity (FAO and WFP, 2009).

One major negative effect of the FTLRP was the loss of land bankability. This completely paralyzed high crop and animal production compromising food security. People who had occupied white commercial farms found their way to South Africa after the agricultural sector was unattainable to farmers who had no capital to do business. As a result, all the land issue problems identified went uncorrected and human insecurity affected the already disadvantaged landless people. South Africa, due to its proximity to Zimbabwe became the only alternative rendezvous for escaping poverty and other related social ills. Although, once became fashionable to some peasant farmers to invade white owned farms across the country, it turned out later that capital injection and government assistance were needed for new farmers to start agricultural production. There was no assistance which came by for the newly resettled farmers to start any production on the farms. The only alternative that came into the minds of most resettled farmers, was to go to South Africa to secure jobs among other business menial activities (Marongwe, 2008:116; Moyo, 2000:582).

Zimbabwe achieved its independence relatively later than the other African countries. Mhone (2000) argues that it was hoped Zimbabwe was going to draw lessons from the mistakes of African countries which plunged into political and economic crises after independence. The ZANU-PF government adopted three policy frameworks which affected the agricultural sector among other economic sectors. Although, the first decade of independence, 1980 to 1990, started promisingly with government pursuing the policy titled 'Growth with Equity' in 1981, it failed to address the colonial legacy in favour of the black majority communal farmers and the war veterans. As a result,

the government latched on to the diametrically opposite programme of 'Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which also impacted negatively on the agricultural sector. Kapoor (1995) says that empirical evidence pointed to the fact that most of the gains made during the first decade of independence was eroded by ESAP and the economic crisis came thereafter. The land resettlement programme which was expected to have addressed the agricultural sector by decongesting the black majority peasants to new arable areas did not succeed due the complexities of the Land Act as per the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979. In fact, the 'willing buyer willing seller' concept which was agreed at Lancaster House made it impossible for the government to confiscate the land from white commercial farmers. The land became the cornerstone of black economic emancipation after the failure by government to achieve a robust economic growth to sustain investment levels. In this case, efforts to rectify land injustices through a 'willing seller, willing buyer' system had been viewed as largely ineffective. The failure by government to provide overcrowded rural farmers with proper agricultural knowledge exposed them to food shortages (Mhone, 2000:214; Kapoor, 1995:4-6).

The productive sector in Zimbabwe faced a litany of problems that included the lack of secure and predictable property rights, a rapidly worsening shortage of manpower skills, uncertain agricultural land rights and land-tenure insecurity. Zimbabwe further experienced worst economic crisis between 1996 and 2009. Average annual inflation had been on an upward trend since 2000 and it recorded its peak in November 2003 at 619.5 %. It dipped slightly to 448% in June 2004. Unemployment reached extremely high levels of 70% while on the other hand, food assessment was predicted to be able to feed about twelve million people. Two million tonnes of grain was supposed to feed the hungry for the period 2004 to 2005 (www.news24.com). Industrial production was 60% below capacity owing to shortages in fuel, power and foreign exchange which made it impossible for companies to buy essential materials. According to Cornish (2004) Zimbabwe was the front-runner for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Southern African states. It was receiving as much as US\$444.3

million in investment by 1998 but this amount dwindled to US\$5.4 in 2006. The challenge for ZANU-PF government to avoid migration of people to South Africa was to effect real transformation without undermining its commercial farming sector (Archbishop Ncube, 2004; Nkiwane, 1999: 70-76).

Since 1997, South Africa became a major political player in attempting to resolve conflicts in Africa. However, the political crisis which dogged the country remained unresolved. South Africa on the other hand was accused of not adopting a strong position against Zimbabwe to stop political persecution against opposition political elements. Although, South Africa maintained that it was in constant dialogue with the Zimbabwean leadership in both ZANU-PF and opposition political parties, peace and security provision for the larger part of the population was threatened. Pretoria claimed that it was using discussion and persuasion in its effort to restore law and order in Zimbabwe. During all these developments, the political and economic insecurity became invincible that the migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa became rampant being exacerbated by those who wanted to find employment. Many in South Africa and NGO elements were of the view that South Africa was the strongest and most influential country in SADC to influence Zimbabwe to address the human rights abuse issues. However, it meant that Pretoria was expected to come up with a drastic foreign policy measure that was going to persuade Zimbabwe to democratise. South Africa became a focal point for those countries whose nationals were dispossessed of their land. Pretoria was pressured by the British and United States of America among others, to persuade Mugabe regime to reverse the land reform programme (Rutherford, 2001:89; Stolten, 2007:312).

The Zimbabwe's human insecurity became a regular centre of discussion at various public forums. South Africa's alleged soft approach against Zimbabwe's alleged undemocratic tendencies gave

pressure to Mbeki regime to take drastic measures. Mbeki did not accept to be forced to take any action against Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's dependency on South Africa for electricity and other imports were the necessary options which the Mbeki regime might have utilised to persuade Mugabe regime to accommodate opposition elements. However, the SADC region developed mixed political perception after Zimbabwe was alleged to have perpetrated violence against the people leading to the exodus of people to South Africa (Manyeruke, 2007: 214; Rugube, 2004:98; Moyo, 1999:48).

However, approximately two million Zimbabweans had already entered South Africa illegally by 2000, fleeing the harsh economic conditions and political repression in the country (Madhuku, 2004:450). If Pretoria were to force the ZANU-PF government into submission, consequently fewer refugees were going to cross the borders. South Africa had no economic capacity to absorb Zimbabweans, especially given the high levels of her domestic unemployment. Zimbabweans among other migrants sparked more internal fissures considering xenophobic attitudes that many South African citizens had (Stolten, 2007:35).

South Africa was unwilling to intervene in Zimbabwe's political and economic problems beyond diplomatic persuasions. President Thabo Mbeki had once stated that the solution to the Zimbabwe's political and economic debacles lay in the hands of Zimbabweans themselves. He feared that further political and economic chaos in Zimbabwe was going to affect South African citizens. Sadomba (2008: 89) says that the obvious consequence of Pretoria's making a strong move against Harare without the support of other African states was going to have negative effects on both South Africa and Zimbabwe economies and political dispensations. Pretoria continued to assert a policy of limited engagement with Zimbabwe, where it encouraged the leaders of ZANU-PF and the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change, to come together and seek reconciliation. The migration of

Zimbabweans into South Africa revealed that SADC had no strong capability to maintain peace, security, good governance and democracy in the region. SADC as institutions should have committed itself to maintain peace and security and promote democratic governance and economic growth in the region. The organisation's lack of strategic policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe had shown weaknesses that threatened human security in the region (Maylam, 2001: 418).

ZANU-PF's political message at the height of the land reform and during elections of 2000 was 'Land is the Economy and the Economy is Land' (Sadomba, 2008). This political rhetoric paid dividends to the party because it gave ZANU-PF party advantage to win the elections against the opposition political parties which were heavily supported by various stakeholders who were opposed to the land reform programme. According to Madhuku (2004), the Zimbabwe government dealt with the land occupations while on the other hand effecting some constitutional changes to give legality to the land occupations. The government parcelled out large tracts of land to the people basing their arguments on the constitutional amendments which allowed the state to acquire land compulsorily without compensation except for the improvements on the farm. Capacitating poor people with physical assets such as farm equipment, tools, irrigation and market infrastructure, transport, processing facilities and other types of inputs needed to support production for sustainable empowerment (Madhuku, 2004:211).

The rejection of the draft constitution of 2000 by the electorate exposed the former colonial power Britain because it became clear that it wanted a regime change in Zimbabwe. According to Rugube (2004), the British government supported the opposition political parties and civil society organisations to mobilize the electorates to vote against the draft constitution to stop the invasion of white owned commercial farms. The British government cited many other things to oppose the

Fast-track Land Reform Programme. Britain picked up that the FTLRP was characterized by double standards and irregularities which were coupled with issues such as government's poor planning and unfair allocation of land to politicians and war veterans of the ruling ZANU (PF) party (LEDRIZ, 2011). The land reform programme became too politicised, and the population at large was divided on political party affiliation. The political polarisation of citizens divided the communities to the extent that even government aid was distributed along political party lines. The nation was exposed to political and economic insecurity, hence the desire to cross to South Africa for job opportunities and humanitarian assistance (Carey & Pope, 2000:68-70; Bujra, 2002:49).

Indeed, the ZANU-PF government managed to resettle some peasant farmers on farms vacated by white commercial farmers. However, the country suffered food shortages due to uncoordinated agricultural activities which saw some farmers grow crops in areas suitable for animal husbandry. The basic agricultural rules, regulations, administrative mechanisms, and issues of resource mobilization were ignored by government in the resettlement process. They were viewed as a hindrance to achieve the objectives of the land reform programme. Constitutional and legal imperatives were also suspended in favour of a free for all scenarios in the agricultural sector. The existing legal frameworks that white commercial farmers attempted to challenge government actions with, were quickly amended to suit the intentions of resettling peasant farmers. In a short space of time, white commercial farmers lost hope, confidence and a sense of ownership in the Zimbabwean body politic and started to vacate the farms en masse (Bond: 2000:235; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011:349-355).

The government of Zimbabwe as a measure to revive the agricultural sector invited the European development partners for a land conference in Harare in September 1998. The conference brought together key domestic and foreign agricultural stakeholders such as

farmers and civil society organisations, international donors and multilateral institutions. Although, the conference agreed on fundamental principles which were supposed to give direction to a democratic way of land resettlement, issues of lack of transparency in land allocation, rule of law, and politicisation of land caused donors to withdraw their assistance to the land reform programme. Furthermore, the Commercial Farmers Union, a white farmers' organisation, tried to negotiate with government by offering land for resettlement where about a Z\$15 billion aid package was offered through the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (Commercial Farmers' Union Policy Documents, 2006). The initiative did not materialize because the ZANU-PF regime had taken the position that the British government and white commercial farmers were against the land reform programme. Indeed, the land became a battle ground for political expedience for all stakeholders. This caused food insecurity in both towns and rural areas across the country (LEDRIZ, 2011; Napoli, 2011: 98).

The need to address the land question in South Africa and Zimbabwe arose from racially discriminatory laws and practices which were in place for the largest part of the twentieth century, especially related to land ownership. According to Kloppers & Pienaar (2014) postulate that the formation of a stronger, richer and unified settler states in 1910- the Union of South Africa- ushered in a policy environment which suppressed and isolated African farmers from mainstream agriculture to facilitate their transformation into rural and urban labourers. The whites in both Zimbabwe and South Africa during the colonial and apartheid era respectively segregated blacks in the land ownership and usage to the extent that they remained viable as cheap labour. The advents of political independence, the ruling political parties were forced by circumstances to review the land issues. Vale (2003:34) argues that addressing the land inequalities in Zimbabwe and South Africa was the most important issue for waging the armed struggles

which saw many lives lost (Kloppers & Pienaar, 2004:412; www.saflii.org.za).

The land reform in South Africa was different from the way it was carried out in Zimbabwe. This was due to economic repercussions it was going to cause in the economic sector. Zimbabwe's economy is agro-based, as such without land being given back to the people there was no black empowerment. South Africa had the mining, manufacturing and hospitality industries which augmented agriculture in human security provisions. The apartheid regime land law, the Native Lands Act of 1913, prohibited the establishment of the new farming operations, sharecropping or cash rentals by blacks outside of their reserves, where they were forced to live. During the armed struggle for independence, ANC promised the masses that it was to come up with the 'Land Restitution' to address the land inequalities at independence. The black land ownership was important to economically empower overcrowded peasant farmers in reserves. Indeed, it was also important to reduce inequality between black and white (Vale, 2003:145-157).

The land reform process in South Africa focused on restitution, land tenure reform and land redistribution. Restitution was all about government compensating individuals in monetary terms, the farms they were forcefully removed. According to Makhado (2012), redistribution of land was the most important component of the land reform in South Africa. The concept of redistributing land through buying land from its owners (willing buyer) by the government (willing seller) did not produce dividends in South Africa because the owners were not involved when the land were purchased. The government reviewed the land redistribution and tenure process in 2000, to a more decentralised based planning process. In this case, more community participation approach was adopted at district levels

where land redistribution was undertaken (Vale, 2003:90; Cilliers, 1996:65; Crush, 1999:134).

There were various concerns and challenges that emerged during the land redistribution at district levels. Although, the government appointed agricultural extension officers to work with the community leadership to distribute land take away from the white commercial farmers, the political elites corruptly gave themselves farms to the detriment of the peasants. Unlike in Zimbabwe where farms expropriated were not compensated due to lack of funds while those of South Africa were timeously compensated. South Africa's land reform programme remained hugely unequal with blacks still dispossessed of land and homeless. The ANC government faced challenges to improve the various bureaucratic processes and to give citizens secure land tenure (Crush, 1999:160-170).

According to Hall (2004) the main model of land reform implemented in South Africa was based on the Market- led Agrarian Reform (MLAR). The MLAR model faced various challenges. Hall and the South Africa Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (2008) came up with the following challenges of MLAR:

Willing seller-willing buyer principle: It took a long time to negotiate land price with the landowners. The whites who used to own the land did not want to part away with their farms. It took a long time for government to persuade whites with access land they were not utilising to sell it for resettlement purposes.

Capacity: There was lack of institutional capacity for community legal entities. The communal people who were overcrowded were not able to legally challenge their positions due to the rules of the Land Appropriation Act of 1848 which gave land rights of occupation to the white race.

Claim disputes: There was a long process to mediate and resolve claim disputes among those who would have been resettled. The land disputes took years to pacify because of resources which were needed to be availed to the one who was selling the farm. Most of whites who hesitated to sell their farms had to go through several legal processes to protect their interests at the farms. On the other hand, the blacks who wanted to be resettled had to satisfy the legal statutes of the country laws for them to occupy land under the custody the white farmers.

Beneficiary selection: It was a lengthy and time-consuming process to select the rightful beneficiaries for land redistribution. The government had limited capacities to be able to select the beneficiaries of those pieces of land which might have been submitted for resettling blacks by whites on a willing seller-willing buyer principle. The government took time to select the rightful beneficiaries for land allocation as mitigatory measure to curb corruption by the political elites who used to manipulate the process.

Resettlement support: The agrarian reform in South Africa during 1997 to 2007 period required enough resources and time to effectively facilitate post-resettlement support to new land owners. The country needed to a big financial budget to be able to move people to new places where land had been acquired. The white commercial farmers who had sold their farms wanted cash upfront which made the ANC government failed to meet within the limited timeframes.

Monitoring and evaluation: There was lack of reliable monitoring systems and evaluation by the South Africa Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. South Africa was still young in terms of democratic transformation by 1997. There were no proper land resettlement systems in place to monitor and evaluate the whole agricultural processes which were supposed to be undertaken across

the provinces. The evaluation of farms remained a problem for the government to be able to give conclusive evaluations of the land.

Policy: There were gaps in the policies that governed the land reform processes that were compromising effective implementation of land reform programme. The land acquisition policy in South Africa was in favour of the white race because of historical land acquisition processes of 1848. The land policy was possible to be changed if the legislature, judiciary and the executive arms of government were to unite in the formulation of policies which were to correct the land resettlement processes in relation to ownership imbalances.

Different political views: There was lack of common consensus among political parties on land reform debate. The Government of South Africa in the period 1997 to 2007 was composed of political parties with political ideological diversity. The whites who were in parliament were in favour of whites to remain on farms while most of blacks wanted land ownership to be revisited.

The ANC government was criticised for not taking keen interest to fund the land reform programme. In this case, it was to address and implement Section 25(6) of the Constitution which reinforces equalities between races and assist the beneficiaries of the land reform to obtain the capital and skills necessary to use the newly acquired land productively. The MLAR approach was different to the FTLRP which was hawkish and disastrous to the agricultural sector. Although, the MLAR managed to maintain agricultural sector productive but blacks remained dispossessed of their land while the Zimbabwe scenario, most of the peasant landless were able to be resettled in farms which once belonged to white commercial farms (Vale, 2003:90; Cilliers, 1996:65; Makhado, 2012:312).

The land reform interventions in post-apartheid South Africa focused on the reduction of asset poverty amongst the rural poor and utilising their expertise to mitigate food insecurity, poor incomes and unemployment through creating conditions for diverse forms of commodity production. Such a restructuring process focused on providing the rural poor with assets needed for livelihoods and developing diversified agriculture while creating conditions for accumulation from below. The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP), the South African government land and agrarian project was meant to improve the food security situation of poverty-stricken rural communities through land reform.

The Zimbabwe land reform required a lot of resources, to identify land which was to be allocated to individuals. In this case most of the beneficiaries had no knowledge and financial capacity to fully utilise the acquired farms. The government of Zimbabwe faced resistance to unlock militating challenges which included economic sanctions imposed by the Western countries, poor economic investment environment and poor foreign direct capital injection. Under the FTLRP, the land acquisition process was compulsory in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 20:10) as amended. The following categories of land were targeted for acquisition:

- Derelict and under-utilised land
- Land under multiple ownership
- Foreign owned land
- Land contiguous to communal areas.

The four categories of land which were supposed to be identified for resettlement were shrouded with scepticism. To identify derelict and under-utilised land in a country with no foreign capital injection made the government fail to fulfil social needs of the people. Few white commercial farmers who survived the land invasions failed to produce good harvest due to natural phenomenon of weather. Land that was under multiple ownership, was targeted but it was difficult to identify

it, some peasants were hiding information pertaining to white commercial farmers' ownership of multiple farms. It was even difficult for the government to know which farms were still under foreign ownership and those lands near communal areas. The hurdles derived from the government systems resourced to venture on the ground to concretise the land reform programme (Bond: 2000:213; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011:39-55).

The government spared other pieces of land from acquisition due legal challenges and other fundamental intricacies of government-to-government bilateral agreements. These were the farms which created more economic damages to Zimbabwe after they were acquired. The following special categories of land were excluded for acquisition:

- Agro-industrial properties involved in the large-scale production of tea, coffee, timber, citrus fruit, etc.;
- Properties with Export Processing Zone (EPZ) permits and those with Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC) certificates,
- Farms belonging to church or mission organisations; and
- Farms subject to Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPA).

The government of Zimbabwe had put the land acquisition procedures under Statutory Instrument 419 of 1999. This statutory device set out the maximum permissible land sizes per natural region, considering climate and the surrounding ecological system. Zimbabwe has a total area of 39, 6 million hectares of land, of which 33 million hectares are suitable for agriculture while the rest is reserved for national parks, forests and urban settlements. The country has a variable rainfall pattern, occurring mainly between October and March, and the total rainfall and its distribution are the over-riding factors limiting agricultural production. Average annual rainfall varies from below 300mm in low-lying areas of the country to over 1000mm on the central watershed. It is generally, a small area in the eastern border mountains which receives over 1500mm annually. The reliability of

rainfall increases with altitude and only 37% of the country receives more than the 700mm annual average considered necessary for semi-intensive farming, with less than a third of the area being arable (Muir-Leresche, 2006:84).

Initially, the FTLRP was intended to de-congest communal lands, but was further extended to incorporate the creation of indigenous commercial farming sector. The Model A1 farming scheme was to decongest communal lands and to empower peasant farmers to produce enough food for both cash and consumption purposes. The Model A2 farming scheme was to create a cadre of black commercial farmers based on the concept of full cost recovery from the beneficiary. The Model A2 farmers were expected to be self-sufficient of government support, although the land was unbankable, the difference between the two models could not be easily depicted in many respects. In terms of food production, the Model A1 performed far much better than the Model A2. Model A2 agricultural overheads in terms of infrastructure development and maintenance proved too expensive. Zimbabwe was going through the worst economic situation ever (Rugube, 2004:98; Moyo, 1999: 48).

The Model A1 resettlement scheme managed to settle 145 775 farmers. These farmers received minimum support from government. It was structured in a villagised manner where residential areas, separate fields and common grazing areas were demarcated. On the other hand, the Model A2 scheme that the government saw as providing opportunities for the development of black commercial farmers, accommodated about 16 386 farmers. The A2 resettlement model beneficiaries were provided with medium to large-sized landholdings and were expected to provide their own resources (Sadomba, 2008). Model A2 scheme beneficiaries were allocated land by the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement through the offices of the Minister for Provincial Affairs. Table 5.1 shows the results of land distribution by

2008 where the coordination of land-allocation activities met several challenges, and accordingly figures for the total number of people allocated land by province showed wide variations. There were several institutions at district and provincial level that had different figures of people who were on the list waiting to be allocated land. Given that the government had very few resources to assist resettled farmers, the beneficiaries were supposed to oversee the construction of their own residences. The land reform, therefore assumed a political dimension, with politicians taking advantage of the reality that most of the blacks favoured land repossession based upon grievances over historical injustices. It also turned out to be a major political issue as it entailed a deep-seated challenge to the property rights of a powerful propertied class,

Table 5.1 Land Distributed to A1 and A2 Farmers by 2008 by Province (*Beyond the Enclave, Towards a Pro-Poor and Inclusive Development Strategy for Zimbabwe (2011:97), Table 3.7.*)

Province	A1 Resettlement (subsistence)		A2 resettlement (commercial)	
	Area (ha)	Beneficiaries	Area (ha)	Beneficiaries
Manicaland	215 427	12 309	102 215	1 232
Mashonaland Central	568 197	16 853	259 489	2 434
Mashonaland East	437 269	17 731	314 233	4 703
Mashonaland West	811 033	28 435	873 111	4 460
Masvingo	750 563	33 197	341 000	1 351
Matabeleland North	520 214	9 394	259 659	421
Matabeleland South	383 140	10 812	288 324	765
Midlands	451 242	17 044	243 611	1 019
Total	4 137 085	145 775	2 681 642	16 386

The fast-track land reform programme adversely affected the Zimbabwean economy due to challenges faced by the country's agricultural sector. Arable land was largely underutilised because the

beneficiaries of the FTLRP lacked resources to prepare land while the high cost of inputs became detrimental to achieve set targets. As a result, production suffered across the whole range of agricultural commodities. During the 2000-2009 periods, land utilisation in any farming season was around 40% in the new resettlement areas as compared to the production levels before the FTLRP, a rapid decrease in agricultural production. Consequently, the country faced serious food shortages. At the same time the unemployment of farm workers rose significantly, the loss of seed production increased, and the industrial production related to irrigation dropped (LEDRIZ, 2011; Napoli, 2011:98).

Essentially, food security can be described as a phenomenon related to availability of food and the individual's access to it. For a variety of reasons, food security in Zimbabwe has been a perennial problem since the Fast-track Land Reform Programme started. During the land reform programme, remunerations failed to keep pace with inflation and the ordinary person's access to food was negatively affected, worsened by unsuitable pricing policies that created shortages of basic commodities and policies that restricted the movement of grain. For example, restrictions placed on the movement of maize grain in 2003 resulted in acute shortages of food across the country (Muchena, 2006). Because of price controls on basic commodities, most commodities vanished from the formal markets, although they were widely available on the black market at much higher prices.

Zimbabwe experienced food deficits since the year 2000 which marked the beginning of the FTRLRP. This led to a humanitarian crisis as indicated by the fact that over two million Zimbabweans were food insecure, especially in 2008. Table 5.2 shows that crop production decreased due to the FTRLRP. Although, maize, sorghum and millet were grown during the period 2006/9, the food security in the country decreased due to the challenges farmers faced to revive the agricultural

sector which had suffered due the land invasions. The area under maize crop that is the country's staple food, decreased between 2006 and 2007, while from 2007 to 2008 the total yield decreased significantly, only to increase in the 2008/9 agricultural season. On the same note, the acreage under sorghum in the period 2007 and 2008 was low compared to that of 2006/7. The acreage under sorghum was comparable to that in the 1980s, but the area under millets continued to decrease to the levels which caused severe food shortages in low lying areas of the country. Production of maize, millet and sorghum decreased in the period 2008/9 compared to the yields of 2006/7 season.

Table 5.2 National Crop Productivity Trends 2006/9 (*Beyond the Enclave, Towards a Pro- Poor and Inclusive Development Strategy for Zimbabwe (2011:305), Table 3.10.*)

Crop	Production (1000 t/ha)		
	2006/7	2007/8	2008/9
Maize	1,446	496	1 140
Sorghum	225	75	156
Millet	194	37	74
Wheat	-	31	12
All cereals	-	639	1 382

Crop production was a key livelihood strategy in the livelihood zone where food security availability was assessed and analysed. The livelihood zones covered vast area composed of districts which fell in the same or similar natural regions. The area shared an average annual rainfall which varied across the zones. As noted above, the FTLRP led to a general underutilisation of land by most of the resettled farmers, particularly the A2 farmers. Significantly, crop production of maize, sorghum, millet and sweet potatoes contributed to three quarters of very poor household food consumption in the reference period of 2000

to 2009. The level of crop production in livelihood zones across the country during the FTLRP was very poor due to various reasons included poor rains. It is important to note that poverty which befell the country caused people to go to South Africa among other countries to secure employment and other trading businesses (Muchena, 2006:286).

It should be appreciated that Zimbabwe's agricultural sector to be productive, required a favourable socio-political climate, adequate governance and macro-economic fundamentals underpinned by robust and responsive institutions. The negative impact of the fast-track land reform programme in terms of food shortages had been much wider than the architects of the programme envisaged. The wider speculative thinking by government officials and peasant farmers that the restructuring of the agricultural sector was going to affect the white commercial farmers proved to be wrong. The assumption was based on various baseless presumptions proffered by some top government officials who argued that smallholder farmers were the ones who were producing the bulk of maize, cotton and wheat and therefore deserved to be given first preference on land allocation. The smallholder farmers used to produce the bulk of cotton and maize before 1998 but the functional commercial sector was there to balance out food production such that poverty did not reach levels of the period 2000 up to 2009. It was perceived that white commercial farmers had abandoned maize production in the 1990s for political reasons and were engaging in livestock production which was commercially viable. That departure from producing staple food exposed the country to extreme vagaries of food insufficiency and exploitation by the foreign food merchants (Rugube, 2004:135).

In general, the situation in Zimbabwe became complex under the FTLRP because, as food production continued to decline substantially, even those with entitlements to the land were failing to access food on

the markets. The prime movers of agriculture had been decimated, including research and development services; equipment wasted while dams and irrigation infrastructure were either underutilised or rarely serviced. The agricultural sector had become a victim of entrenched difficulties.

Everything pertaining to food insecurity in Zimbabwe from 2000 pointed to the multi-dimensional impact of the fast-track land reform programme and the politics surrounding it. Although, new settlers felt empowered in the early years of the land reform period up to 2004, expectations for high food production waned when there was no funding from government. The hardships associated with minimum support to the agricultural sector affected the ability of the producers to feed the nation. It also emerged that not all the Model A1 and Model A2 resettled farmers had the agricultural expertise to use the land productively. There was a need for government to have retained renowned white farmers who were going to extend their knowledge of farming to newly settled farmers.

After the commencement of the FTLRP in 2000, commercial farming areas became target areas for acquiring assets by the elite rather than for competing in food production and effective use of land. To reverse this process and make the agricultural sector function like business for the country to have adequate food security, there was need for farmer education, training and extension on efficient land utilisation. The government should have subsidised inputs to boost productivity rather than the continued programme of giving resettled farmers government free inputs. The government was supposed to have pre-planned land allocation. For example, it should have prioritised land allocation to agricultural professionals so that the land was used as collateral security to attract investors.

Although, the land reform programme remained a noble and appreciated idea, it lacked proper planning and prioritization in land allocations. There was no financial training and extension support to ensure that the goal of human security for the citizens was achieved. In fact, the exodus of young and professional Zimbabweans to South Africa was triggered by the failure of the land reform programme which also paralysed other economic sectors that depended on the agricultural sector. However, Zimbabweans who resettled in South Africa from 1997 to 2010 were self-declared economic refugees who caused citizens to lose out economically. Stolten (2007) postulated that the arrival of Zimbabweans in that country displaced the citizens to the economically peripheral sources. In places where South African black citizens used to sale their wares, they were taken over by foreigners, including Zimbabweans. It was places such as Soweto where even vegetables and onions were sold along the roads by Zimbabweans among other nations.