

## **Chapter 6: Governance and Participation in South Africa: Issues and Transition**

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The advancement of progressive, democratic political governance, respect for human rights and rule of law and enhancement of transparency and accountability are issues regarded by individuals of different and antagonistic political, ideological and economic positions. The issue of political participation offers South Africans a platform to express their opinions and related experiences on political and economic issues. These issues were critically important to the citizenry as South Africa continued with its political and economic transitional processes. There was evidence of the country being pulled in all directions in the period 1997 to 2001. South Africans citizens were scared in the party political wars, slow black economic empowerment and electoral challenges witnessed in 1999. In fact, South Africa has the National Assembly of Parliament and the National Councils of Provinces. These two institutions control all the national business of the country. The winning political party controlled the state functions. In this case, the African National Congress (ANC) that won the 1994 plebiscite, had the white dominated New National Party (NNP) as the election serious contender in 1999 second democratic elections.

ANC, however, had the total strategy to circumvent its own electoral defeat by the New National Party that was headed by the former apartheid regime President Fredrick de Klerk. This study revealed that the South African citizens were not sure about what to believe and how to relate to political and economic circumstances during the period 1997 and 2001. They veered between praises for political conditions that had improved and condemnations of the failure to formulate policies that empowered blacks who were racially discriminated before 1994. They leaped from great anticipation that the next 1999 elections were going to bring more change that would

change the lives of the people. South African citizens proclaimed that holding of elections in 1999 and black empowerment were the most important issues that was to bring peace and security in the country.

Undoubtedly, the reasons why South Africans were under pressure to increase economic growth and reduce poverty, became some of the critical issues to address to achieve peace and security. This chapter further explores the 1999 national mood in the country to assess how the economic and political threats changed over time. The series of human security aspects that linked to voting and political party preference were also assessed. The New National Party and the African National Congress Party gave the outlook of expectations and experiences in this analysis of how peace and security was transformed during the 1997 to 2001 period. Assessing the role of the administration of William Jefferson Clinton in Africa's so called "second liberation," particularly in terms of its involvement on issues of democracy and human rights, Korwa Gombe Adar, begins his article in 1998:

There is nothing more fundamental to Africans who are concerned with the future of the continent than the issues of democracy, human liberties, among other concerns, constitute the central driving force behind what is often referred to as Africa's "second liberation".

According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (1992), "second liberation" was developed by the ordinary people who maintain that political independence has failed to improve material conditions and rights and those of their children. Instead of qualitatively improving them, post-colonial leaders have used violent and arbitrary measures against the masses of the people. The South African black people in their opposition to the neo-colonial state, have served as inspiration for the achievement of a genuine political and economic independence.

A substantial and persisting mood of optimism, hope and idealism characterized many of the responses by South African citizens. South

African citizens had not given up on hoping that the moment of turnaround was going to be realized during election time. Since the new political dispensation in 1994 brought hopes of peace and security in the country, South African citizens revealed cynicism and doubt about the African National Congress leadership, the government and public institutions.

South Africans had no complete consensus as to what direction the country was moving towards in the political and economic areas. Mixed feelings prevailed, largely on whether there was economic improvement that could make South African citizens realise the good direction the country was going after decades of colonial and apartheid rule. This was reflected in the citizens' perceptions of their personal economic conditions that by 1997 was still unbearable. In 1998, South Africans were split down in the middle as to the general direction in which the country was moving. There were different views from the citizens because they were not yet sure of the ANC's capability of transforming their human security.

Table 6.1 below indicates the sentiments of South African voters on whether the economy was improving or not, considering political parties ANC and NNP supporters as indicators. Accordingly, 51% of the citizens in 1996 thought that the ANC government was moving towards the right political and economic direction while 26% castigated it. By 1997, the proportion of supporters that was happy with the ANC government's governance had remained on the upper side of 56%. Two factors point to continued overwhelming ANC dominance. One was the ANC's dual character as a liberation movement and political party. It was not merely a party that happened to win the elections, it was a longstanding opponent of white dominated minority party and a key actor in the founding of a legitimate state. A total of 15% was spotted in the two-year period

where ANC voters were sceptical whether the economy was moving on the right or wrong direction. South Africans' motivation for the positive assessment of economic movement direction was overwhelmingly in the domain of political emancipation. The apartheid system had been politically removed and on the same note, racial discrimination against blacks was reduced.

The main reasons cited in 1996 for the verdict of "right direction the country was going" was in ascending order that the economy was in a good condition. By then commodities were available, food was affordable and that there was political stability. As the most frequently stated reasons, the citizens noted that the economy was in an improved condition (5%), commodities were available, and food was available. Political stability and peace were the next most frequently cited reasons which was the totality of all reasons cited, plus the 'bit of both' and so forth votes that add up to 100% of ANC voters who were interested in the political and economic development.

It was not surprising that, in 1996 the ANC supporters were more likely than New National Party supporters to believe that the country was heading in a right political and economic direction. According to the Table 6.1, about 51 % of ANC supporters compared to 26% of NNP supporters felt that the country was moving towards economic downturn. By 1997, the ANC supporters were more of the opinion that the economy of the country was moving in the right direction. The New National Party supporters' sentiments remained roughly on the same direction where they felt that the ANC was pushing them on the economic periphery due to their association with the apartheid regime. There was quite an increase in the view that there was too much encroachment of black citizens into the white dominated economic sectors.

**Table 6.1:** Direction South Africa was moving as judged by Party Supporters 1996 and 1997 (*Adapted from Etherington (1996:216), Table 2.4.*)

Direction	POLITICAL PARTY % My vote is my secret			
	ANC		NNP	
	1996	1997	1996	1997
Right direction	51	56	34	35
Wrong direction	26	20	24	25
Bit of both	15	15	28	24
Not moving at all	1	6	8	14
Don't know / Refuse	7	3	6	2

The structural conditions of democratic consolidation commonly identified in literature on the human security aspects can be divided into those of a socio-economic kind and those to do with political culture. Socio-economic conditions conducive to democratisation included higher inherited levels of economic development. South Africa's prognosis on democratic consolidation judged against them was mixed because the country inherited democratic tradition of sorts. The NNP supporters believed that white domination of the economy provided a secure framework in which the ANC government was going to be drawn into the political and bureaucratic structures of state without that leading to a fundamental change in the character of the state (Etherington, 1996:215 -220; Glaser, 2001:232-235).

South Africans linked their hope for further change and a better future to four unfolding phenomena and processes that were going to greatly improve human security aspects. First, there was the practice of the inclusive government in which the labour body, Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the former liberation movement, African National Congress (ANC) became the ruling elite, the processes of policy-formulation, the expected elections of 1998 and

the economic empowerment for the blacks. In this case, the South Africans were very agitated to see political and economic development that was going to consolidate the livelihoods of the blacks who lived under brute racial discrimination during the apartheid era.

The ANC ruling arrangement, policy formulation processes and the 1998 expected elections gave close to 50% of South Africans hope for a better future. With the addition of the 'neither hope nor doubt' responses, these percentages rose to 57, 60 and 59% on the three processes respectively. The same trend, just much stronger emerged on South Africans' hope associated with the pending elections. A total of 62% believed that the next election was going to be conducted in an improved political and economic environment, rising to 74% with the inclusion of the neither hope nor doubt category.

It was simultaneously clear that a substantial amount of cynicism continued, especially around the ANC relations, but also on the policy-formulation processes and the results of the elections. South Africans remained divided, especially on whether ANC Unity was going to lead the country to a better future of which 47% voted yes while 34% voted no citing governance inexperience. Cynicism about the round of elections was far smaller because there were varied opinions in the labor sectors. Workers' unions across the country were not happy with their working conditions; hence, government was expected to address the racial discrimination activities. The 47% of the voters reckoned that the ANC Unity gave them some level of hope and they contrasted with the substantial chunk of 34% that had doubted that peace and security provisions were going to be attained in the country. Table 6.2 below indicates various sentiments of South African citizens on whether human security provisions were going to be delivered during the period 1997 to 2001.

**Table 6.2:** Hope or Doubt leading to a better future in South Africa  
*(Adapted from article by Glaser (2001) titled "Politics and Society in South Africa". Table 6.1 drawn by the author.)*

Level of hope or doubt	Four Processes (%)			
	ANC Government	Policy-making processes	Elections expectations	Economic empowerment
Strong hope	14	17	15	30
Some hope	33	33	33	31
Neither hope or doubt	8	10	11	12
Some doubt	15	12	10	8
Serious doubt	19	9	8	9
Undecided	11	19	23	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

This research revealed that South Africans were optimistic that the ANC was going to recapture the popular imagination as the agent for change. The historical injustices that were perpetrated by the apartheid regime, made the majority blacks to continue supporting the revolutionary party. It was therefore, that the ANC had with small margin lost the confidence of some of its supporters who crossed over to support the New National Party (NNP). Table 6.3 indicated the swinging of votes due to political and economic circumstances that were taking place in the country.

The consistent and substantial block of non-declarers that was composed of those who chose not to reveal which party they were supporting in an election was also big enough at 47% to change the relative standings of the main political parties, ANC and NNP. South Africans of mixed race refused to disclose which party they anticipated to support, on the event of a next plebiscite. As Table 6.3 shows, the percentage of the people who refused to disclose their political allegiances rose significantly during the period 1998 to 2001. The joint percentages of undeclared and 'will not vote' rose from 31% to 41%

then to 47%. In the same premises, 41% of the people preferred not to disclose which party to support in an election and 40% followed the same trend by declaring their support to a party that agitate for economic development. The other people responded by saying that they did not know or were not sure which party they would support during election time. They were not sure because the political trajectory in the country was still not clear due to the post-apartheid system that was still visible in all sectors of the economy.

**Table 6.3:** Trends in Party Support 1998 – 2001 (*Adapted from an article by Glaser, (2001) titled Politics and Society in South Africa, Table 7.4 (2001: 616)*)

Party	1998 Political Support %	1999 Political Support %	2000 Political Support %	2001 Political Support %
ANC	55	38	19	20
NP	12	17	31	31
Other	2	4	3	2
Undeclared	25	33	40	41
Will not vote	6	8	7	6
Total	100	100	100	100

In terms of the declared support, the ANC unity appeared to have suffered substantial decline levels of support. The decline was witnessed towards the 1998 South African elections where the support base fell from 38% to 20%. On the other hand, the NNP seemed to have experienced a growth in popular support, moving from 17% to 31% in the same period. It was not surprising that smaller political parties had virtually become extinct. In fact, the electioneering campaigns were based on the capacity of the political party to be able to convince the voters that human security aspects were going to be provided for come election. The main political propaganda was supposed to denounce the pathological effects of the entrenched post-apartheid systems or moving with the new unpredictable system. Most of people preferred



to be associated with the new unpredictable dispensation anticipating that new things were going to be achieved.

It was necessary to emphasise the fact of 'declared support' of voters. The undeclared vote was on a very high level, even though higher than that of 1999. The results showed the tendencies of how people voted in an election, and it depended on the circumstances whether one was educated about the plebiscite. If elections were to be held the following day after the voters had been advised, the results of the votes were going to be different from those done after one has been given time to consider preferences to vote for. The findings pointed to the political party's power base and what it stood for in terms of service delivery and in this case though conditions and motivations remained, people made their choices undeterred. The political and economic environment in South Africa between 1998 and 2001 was fluid and experiences and impressions continued to change. People's preferences in an election were determined by the political party's determination to provide peace and security to the South African citizens.

The basic thrust of declared party support was generally borne out through measures such as trust in the political party to economically empower the citizens. Table 6.4 shows how the pattern of voting preferences transcended. Whereas 52% of the people indicated that they trusted the ANC regime, or the trust was lost, the corresponding percentage for the New National Party only reached 16% that was sparingly insignificant. The trust vote that was measured, indicated that there was substance to the party vote determinations in the research. In this research the NNP did not only suffer a notable decline in support, its level of popular support trust had also spun downward, from 16 % to a mere 11% in a roughly 18 month's period.

The drop in declared support for the NNP, compared with the previous election was a vexing issue. The dips in NNP support were illuminated when the perceptions in the ranks of the NNP supporters

themselves reflected the negative activities of the post-apartheid systems that were treacherous on some sections of the population. The NNP was associated with the apartheid systems due to the majority white supporters who wanted to continue dominating in the political and economic sectors of the country. In this case, the NNP exhibited the racial and political discrepancies detrimental to the peace and security of South Africa.

**Table 6.4:** Changing Levels of Trust in Two Main Political Parties, 1998 – 2000 (*Adapted from Etherington title “Peace, Politics and Violence in New South Africa, (1996:314:4). Table 7.2.)*)

Extent of trust	ANC (%)		NNP (%)	
	1998	2000	1998	2000
A lot	52	50	16	11
Somewhat	38	30	15	20
Just a little	10	12	55	56
Not at all	10	8	19	18

It is important to note that the NNP did not have an ingrained type of support, when compared to a historical legitimated liberation movement standing that of ANC component had. The NNP’s popular standing was more reliant on shortcomings of the ANC but the revolutionary party’s support was based on their revolutionary struggle gains that liberated the country. The latter used to invoke the inhabitable and severe historical injustices to veil the scope of its own shortcomings, especially on the economic front that the apartheid systems were still dominating.

It was noted that peace and security was important to improve the standards of living of South African citizens. The policy making process was a tall order for the ANC regime due to the post-apartheid systems which continued to exist in public institutions. There were differences of opinion between the supporters of the ANC and the NNP. A total of 59% of those who had declared that they were going to

vote for NNP if elections were to be held the following day, the research reckoned that NNP was going to improve its electoral standing and win elections. This was due to its capacity to be able to convince the electorate that it had the capacity to come up with policy making frameworks basing on their past colonial experiences in government.

The ANC supporters responded differently, of which the biggest block of 65% preferred ANC to win the elections. The NNP was poised to lose the plebiscite and most of its supporters had to join the ANC element so that they were to assist in the policy-making process. The main undeclared category, that of 'my vote is my secret' predominantly remained undeclared, with 40% saying they did not know and a further 20% refusing to respond to the research questions. The third biggest response category of 9%, went along with the predominant New National Party category and 6% with one of the main ANC component categories, the New Party was expected that it was going to improve since it had experts who were able to address peace and security issues of South African citizens.

It was just a few popular reasons for party choice in South Africa that showed clear differences between the two main political parties' supporters. The question of economic emancipation, policy-making processes, land and winning elections differentiated the two political parties. The ANC had crafted itself in many effective election and party choice platforms. The NNP largely relied on its emphasis on change and sometimes on its experiences in governance. The discussion that follows highlights the South African citizens' choice of a political party that was poised to transform individual human security as illustrated in Table 6.5. There were some variables where there were those in South Africa, who denied any normative character to party-political life in the state. It was at this juncture that there was a need to create a democratic society and a commitment to tackle the pressing problems related to political, social and economic injustices.

The NNP favoured constitutional solution which demanded that the various ethnic groups be represented in a way to ensure that no single ethnic group dominated in the South African government. A completely different approach to the political representation and a nation-building was expressed by the various political parties in South Africa, ranging from the ANC to the Pan African Congress and from the Black Consciousness Movement through to Inkatha. This did not start with the concept of the group of the tribe, but with the individual who was political active. All South African political party supporters believed that political representation should have occurred on an individual and non-ethnic basis.

The rest of the party political platforms indicated by the Table 6.5 indicates that whereas the level of support differed between NNP and ANC and undeclared, they differentiate less definitively. There was a high level of consensus between the supporters of these two political parties that the way the parties governed was an important reason for both parties to gain the support of the voters. In this case, the party whose power was more traditionally entrenched such as that of the NNP associated with apartheid regime was less received due to yesteryear repression and racism against the black majority.

**Table 6.5:** South Africans' choice of political party: issues that shape the minds of supporters (*Own compilation, based on Klitgaard (1988:110-120) and Glaser (2001:165-190)*)

	Denominator	Strongly support	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Choose a party that is not corrupt and spends public money accountably	All	58	32	4	4	2
	ANC	60	30	5	2	3
	NNP	59	32	5	2	2
	Undeclared	56	33	2	6	3
Look for a	All	58	28	9	13	8

political party that supports economic reform to SA	ANC	60	25	11	7	4
	NNP	40	15	10	26	4
	Undeclared	38	30	9	10	9
Support a political party that can bring change	All	53	29	9	5	2
	ANC	73	22	3	3	0
	NNP	47	29	8	18	5
	Undeclared	49	34	7	5	1
Go with a political party that supports indigenization in South Africa	All	38	28	10	9	7
	ANC	75	28	12	18	12
	NNP	22	20	55	4	2
	Undeclared	33	29	11	10	7
Choose a party that shows it can deliver services on local level	All	59	33	5	2	1
	ANC	62	32	3	1	2
	NNP	62	31	11	2	1
	Undeclared	54	36	3	2	1
Choose a party that is committed to civil & political freedoms	All	59	30	5	2	2
	ANC	73	32	3	2	1
	NNP	58	29	5	2	2
	Undeclared	54	34	5	2	1
Support a party that defends South Africa against foreigners	All	50	30	4	10	6
	ANC	80	10	5	3	2
	NNP	50	33	6	4	3
	Undeclared	70	20	2	1	7
Look at who it is that liberated South Africa from apartheid	All	27	18	12	14	12
	ANC	70	21	2	2	6
	NNP	32	22	40	7	5
	Undeclared	17	19	14	17	22

When the South African citizens were exposed to a process where they were expected to indicate the ideal political party that they thought was able to represent their political and economic interests, the issue of race and ethnicity took the centre stage. Most whites were found supporting NNP because they believed that it was going to protect them from being disenfranchised by the ANC government in the economic sector. Those who were for ANC, believed strongly that it was only a revolutionary and ruling party which was able to support the economic reform, commit to civil and political freedoms and supported indigenization in the country. The ANC party topped as the favourite political party because many people viewed it as the best embodiment of both political and economic transformation for all South Africans regardless of race or creed.

Life for South Africans was that of optimism and less survival-oriented in the time when new economic changes were greatly accepted. In fact, the citizens reckoned that economic conditions could improve, and they had good hopes that poverty was going to be the thing of the past. The only other thing that worried South African citizens at national level, was the employment. On the local level, the unemployment was roughly equalled by poor services where most of about two-thirds South Africans were formally unemployed (Vale, 2003:114).

Despite that many improvements in the lives of South Africans changed since independence in 1994, citizens consistently rated unemployment as one of the most pervasive problems. The good shortages and other human security shortcomings affected even the political landscape between ANC and NNP. Table 6.6 below shows the changing hierarchies of problems experienced in the country. The most prevalent problems the South African citizens faced during 1996 up to 1998 included unemployment, shortage of foreign currency and food shortages. All these problems were really affecting peace and security

of the country through various ways to the extent that even foreigners found themselves being victims of xenophobic attacks.

**Table 6.6:** Changing Hierarchical of Problems Experienced in the Community (1996-1998) and in the Community of Residence (Own compilation based on Rose-Ackerman (1999, pp.159-160) and Setai (2006:117-127))

Hierarchy of most important problems	Country 1996	%	Community 1997	%	Country 1998	%
1 <sup>st</sup> problem	Unemployment	26	Poor services	20	Unemployment	23
2 <sup>nd</sup> problem	Foreign currency	15	Unemployment	26	Foreign currency	12
3 <sup>rd</sup> problem	Food shortages	22	Food shortages	18	Food shortages	17
4 <sup>th</sup> problem	Poor services	15	Poverty	17	Poor services	23
5 <sup>th</sup> problem	Bad governance	5	Bad governance	3	Bad governance	7
6 <sup>th</sup> problem	Political instability	4	Education	10	Poverty	16
7 <sup>th</sup> problem	Poor services	10	Health	2	Education	22

In this case, exploration of the conditions of South Africa indicated that the most problematic areas that threatened peace and security in the country, included unemployment, poor service delivery, shortages of goods and foreign currency. Primarily the black people who were once ostracised by the apartheid regime faced all these challenges. The political preference of the majority was on the political party which was going to address the economic problems faced by the country. Most of the South Africans in this research were not emphasising political instability but bad governance or other related issues as they were concentrating on issues that made them economically empowered. The ANC and NNP stated that they could provide the economic security to the people all this was meant to win the popular vote.

In typical cases where political and economic variables of human security pose insecurity in South Africa, as discussed above, a new approach to address these aspects seem to provide peace and security to the state, community and individuals. The South African citizens based their hope on further political transformations that gave citizens the rights to determine their sovereign rights. There was agitation for a better future where individuals' basic needs were provided without racial discriminations. The political party preferred by the citizens to govern the country was the one with the capacity to economically empower people, create employment and provide basic service delivery. The white apartheid rule that ruled South Africa for decades, subjecting black citizens to poor and brute conditions, made most blacks citizens to be skeptical of a political party connected to the post-apartheid ideology. The NNP, a white dominated political party, lost elections in 1998 because of its political past. On the other hand, ANC got overwhelming support from the citizens because of the black empowerment development programme which were undertaken, without considering one's race or creed. The country's independence opened new opportunities for black majority to exercise their constitutional rights that included rights to political and economic freedoms that was associated with founding principles of the ANC. The citizens' political party affiliations were stemmed mainly on the ethnicity and racism factors of various supporters. The provision of individual security was measured on the political party's capacity to prevent threats that exposed citizens to the vagaries of poverty and economic deprivation.

#### Chapter 7: Xenophobia: Elephant in the Room in the South African Human Insecurity Environment

History does not repeat itself. It does not deal with whatever might have happened has happened and what has not happened has not happened. This reality does not prevent South African citizens and



immigrants from raising questions as to what should have happened if xenophobic attacks did not take place. To borrow from Dani Wadada Nabudere, a distinguished African scholar of Uganda with a high academic and scholarly transdisciplinary reputation, Europe and America's violence abroad is a key reason why people are forced to run away from places where they were born and raised but which have become uninhabitable. It became apparent that the overall human insecurity of citizens and immigrants in SADC member states, particularly South Africa were exacerbated. The previous chapters concentrated on political party activities and governance oversights which have impacts on peace and security of the countries' citizens. The movement of people across the borders in the SADC region was discussed to complement previous discussions where political and economic overtones were analysed as the agents of human insecurity. Political leaders declared emigrants unpatriotic and self, while the media made wild and unsubstantiated statements about the extent of emigration and the motivation for it. Southern Africa is no different in this respect where emigration of both skilled and unskilled nationals has generated considerable public attention in South Africa.

South Africa exhibited another human insecurity turning point after afro-phobia or xenophobia sentiments became rampant within the citizens disgruntled by influx of foreigners into their country. Foreigners competed with the citizens in nearly every sector of the economy, consequently South Africa's citizens became vulnerable due among others, poor education background and unemployment. Political parties' activities discussed in the previous chapter continued to epitomize the political transitional process that dove tails into the country's human security dynamics. The migration issues in South Africa affected political participation of citizens because they were scarred of party political wars which erupted after every plebiscite held since 1994. The traditional state-centric security conceptions have been changed to concentrate on the safety of the individuals. The xenophobic violence that occurred in South Africa after the country attained independence in 1994 led to a consensus among scholars of

international relations that human security conceptual framework should shift attention from the state to the people-centred approach to security.

The approaches towards human security aspects through the assessment and vulnerabilities of the rising tide of xenophobia in South Africa address key issues in South African political and economic challenges. The xenophobic attacks had direct impact on illegal and legal immigrants because their stay in South Africa was viewed by some sectors of the communities as a threat to their economic, political and social securities.

The most notable xenophobic attack in South Africa occurred in March 1990, in Hlaphekani, near Giyani the capital of the former Gazankulu homeland. The locals burnt almost 300 huts belonging to Mozambicans (Booth, 1991:36; Carim, 1990:49; Adepoju, 1995:65). In October 1994 fighting erupted in one of South Africa's squatter camps, ImizamoYethu Squatter Camp in Hout Bay between Xhosa fishermen and illegal immigrants of the Ovambos from Namibia. In late December 1994 and January 1995 a campaign dubbed Operation Buyelekhaya (Go back home) began in Alexandra Township. This campaign of intimidation and terror was aimed at ridding off the township of illegal aliens (Minaar and Hough, 1996:44; Reitzes, 1997:44). In another incident in 2000, three foreign traders, a Mozambican and two Senegalese, were chased through the carriages of a train by a mob of locals shouting xenophobic slogans. They were hounded onto the roof of the train where one fell off and was hit by another train and the other two were electrocuted by the overhead cables (Business Day, 2001).

However, xenophobia did not always take the form of popular violence in South Africa. In fact, criminal elements viewed illegal immigrants as 'soft' targets. Knowing that illegal aliens were unwilling to report their attackers for fear of deportation if they reported, there was increasing evidence that they became the victims of choice for certain criminal gangs (Solomon, 1996:12). The security of the illegal aliens was exploited in different ways. For instance, Minaar & Hough

(1996) noted that in one of South Africa's towns, Kangwane in Johannesburg, aliens were killed for *muti* (magic potion to ward off evil spirits). Since these illegal aliens had no identification and no ready family members in South Africa to report them missing, such killings were difficult to resolve.

Minaar & Hough (1996) further report cases where a certain white farmer employed illegal aliens, only to inform or report them to the local police before they received their wages for the services they had offered. The aliens, true to the ruthless attitude of some white commercial farmers, were virtually arrested and deported after having worked for the whole month without receiving their due wages.

In an interview with a Zimbabwean young man called Tendai, who was aged about twenty five years, (interview with Tendai 2000) it became clear that aliens lived with serious threat to their individual security. Tendai migrated to South Africa after his peasant parents in Masvingo Province, were approached by a close relative who offered to take him across the border for employment as a waiter in a fast-food outlet. After about eight months he returned home with all the money he had earned. The parents were given a lump sum of Rands by the gentleman who had taken Tendai to South Africa and this man was well connected to business people and commercial farmers dotted in different provinces. After about a week at home, Tendai later found himself with other five young men returning to South Africa through illegal entry points. For two days they were kept by some other people in a farm house near Pretoria where they were expecting to be employed as waiters.

The hopes of being employed as waiters at local hotels in Pretoria did not materialise, but, they were then temporarily assigned to work at a farm to pick oranges and potatoes. They were forced to work over night without pay and they were only given food and they virtually

treated as slaves. The charge of being turned into forced labour became the new way of life where any resistance resulted in deportation. They were threatened with deportation if they raised alarm. On numerous occasions they were beaten and were forced to work hard under guard. One evening Tendai and other five managed to escape but they were intercepted by the South African immigration officials who arrested them. They were deported after spending two weeks in remand prison where food and health services were scarce. Although, they attempted to explain their circumstance of forced labor after illegally entry into South Africa, their narratives of absence of legal immigration papers made their voices fall on deaf ears. It became clear that organised crime syndicates were operating in the Southern African region and above all human trafficking became rampant in the manner Tendai indicated (Solomon, 1998:35-37; Rothchild, 1998:61).

Thus, the challenge for the policymakers when contextualising circumstances usually ended up leading to where Tendai found himself in. It was the responsibility of the authorities to strike a balance between safeguarding the positive benefits of economic developments and minimising negative consequences for the South African government and individual citizens. On the issue of population movements, it is accepted that the movement of people, like the movement of capital, was part of the new global order and that it was going to be beneficial if properly regulated.

South Africa had a long history of migration. The migration scenario before 1994 was strongly regulated and monitored by migration laws which addressed labour needs, economic and security interests of the white minority government. After 1994, political changes had an impact on immigration flows. Post-independence made South Africa attractive to foreign migrants, including black Africans, Asians, Western and Eastern Europeans. For the first time as propounded by Matlosa (1999: 124), black political refugees from neighbouring

countries entered a post-apartheid South Africa. According to the UNHCR, 260 000 people who moved across the provincial boundaries in 1997, 36% moved to Gauteng and 18% to the Western Cape, the two most industrialized provinces in the country. Events in the late 1990s and early 2000, such as the 1998 DRC conflict and Zimbabwe's 1999 land invasions, suggested that many more thousands of migrants from the neighbouring countries and those internally displaced were going to result to consequences of the numerous sources of insecurity plaguing the country (Solomon, 2003:56; Milanzi, 1998:118).

Of the total number of the migrant workers who entered South Africa between 1997 and 2000, 13 000 migrant workers were reported as coming from other African countries, while 7 000 migrants came from the rest of the world. Among foreign migrant workers, 40% headed to Gauteng province and roughly 10% headed for the Free State, KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga provinces. Not surprisingly, 70% of the Asian migrants went to KwaZulu Natal. However, the human security aspects remained a dilemma in the South African context, especially with the migration policy which sought to establish a balance between national interests and the human rights of immigrants (Williams, 2008:141; UNHCR, 14, 1999).

Human migration is a major international problem, but poor documentation in South Africa among other SADC member states, failed to unmask the extent of how it threatened peace and security of the country's sovereignty despite human migration rising profile in the SADC region. South Africa remained a fertile ground for political and economic migrants who ran away from domestic induced vulnerabilities caused by bad governance systems. The exodus of migrants exhibited the weaknesses of some SADC member states' failure to protect their citizens from the vagaries of human insecurities. South Africa's economic worth to migrants was its economic exchange value, precisely because the "cash nexus" dominated it. It was only

before 1994 that migration was determined solely by considerations of efficiency and the pursuit of profit on the part of recruiting agencies, the inflows from the South African neighbours have been pressured by political, social and economic related causes, or what Amin (1995) refers to as “wage employment for purposes of survival.”

The growth of economic activity in South Africa especially after 1999, including elimination of restrictions on the free movement across the borders, the country experienced increased numbers of migrants running away from growing unemployment, economic stagnation or decrease in earning for those employed, disappearing job security, increasing poverty, tribal conflicts, increasing marginalisation and exclusion of the socially deprived groups (Amin, 1995:236; Barrell, 1999:98; Meintjies, 1999:123). Consequently, more SADC nationals were driven beyond marginalisation to exclusion. A growing number of people were excluded from meaningful participation in the economic and social benefits of the society (Milazi, 1998:45; Vale, 1999:65; Reitzes, 1996:78). These economic and social factors had an impact which ultimately fuelled migration to South Africa.

The strategic response to the question of illegal population who were entering South Africa needed to be SADC oriented and multifaceted in approach, tackling such diverse emigration pressures as poverty, environmental degradation and human rights. It was only by 1995 that SADC proposed a regional migration which continued to be difficult to operationalise. South African migration policy by 2007 was ambiguous because there was a delay by the Department of Home Affairs in implementing 1999 White Paper on migration policy. The lack of clear policy guidelines resulted in adhoc, reactive and uncoordinated responses to illegal immigration and confusion among civil servants on how to deal with migrants. The ambiguity of the immigration policy was seen in the ANC government’s vacillation between measures of accommodating and control measures on SADC citizens.

In fact, the Department of Home Affairs of South African government in 1996 offered permanent residency to SADC citizens who met the following criteria:

- Those who demonstrate or provide evidence of continuous residence in South Africa from 1 July 1991.
- Those who engage in productive economic activity (either formal sector employment or informal sector).
- Those who are in a relationship with a South African partner or spouse (customary marriages included).
- Those who are dependent children born or residing lawfully in South Africa.
- Those that have not committed any criminal offences as cited in Schedules 1 and / or 11 of the Aliens Control Act 1991, (Act 96 of 1991 as Amended).

According to the 1997 South African Department of Home Affairs' official statement, an estimated one million SADC citizens were likely to be qualified for permanent residency under the amnesty (The Citizen, 19, September 1997; The Star, 25 June 1997). By 1 October 1997, however, the day after the 30 September 1997 closing date for applications, only 84 815 applications had been received by the Department of Home Affairs. The low number of aliens who met the conditions listed above was caused by mostly illegal immigrants who regarded that as a ploy by the government to get them to identify themselves for deportation and subsequent repatriation. Another reason for the low turnout was that illegal aliens were not aware of it despite the radio and newspapers blitz undertaken by the Department of Home Affairs through using all major languages including, English and French (Reitzes, 1997:15).

As a result of the failure to register by the illegal aliens, the South African Department had to extend the deadline for the applications

indefinitely. The extension had set a bad precedent to the South African immigration laws because the amnesty became counter-productive to halting illegal immigration, rather it contributed to greater illegal immigration flows as prospective migrants were encountered by the periodic amnesties pronounced by the government.

The challenge caused by the amnesties raised a security dilemma in that the South African government had no stipulated laws to govern the number of migrates entering the country. Although, at the same time the South African government rewarded illegal individuals who flouted the same laws by granting them amnesty and permanent residence permits, the migration regime became compromised. It became very difficult to see how the South African government was going to accommodate the illegal immigrants without threatening the security of the state (Solomon 1998:85).

According to Dugard (1999), Pretoria embarked on “soft” measures such as accommodation of immigrants through amnesties and the granting of permanent residencies while it was on the one hand trying to tighten the immigration laws. The measures which the government attempted to put in place included an increased repatriation and deportation of illegal aliens. Immigrants were sacrificed by the South African citizens who continued to lose their stake in the job opportunities where foreign labour was most preferred by the employers. Most foreigners regardless of their high academic qualifications or expertise, they were accepting lower wages compared to those which were stipulated by the labour unions.

South African black citizens raised their economic deprivation eager against the government by attacking alien related activities. The economic injustices backdated to the apartheid era impacted negatively on their contemporary human insecurity. The apartheid era



deprived them of basic education which should have capacitated them to compete for jobs with foreigners. The South African citizens wanted jobs, food, political and economic space among other things which they were to compete with immigrants (Melander 1997:15).

According to the 1999 Masungulo Project of the Catholic Bishops Conference in South Africa, 6 348 illegal Mozambican households did not have more than three years of formal education and they had no work skills outside those of subsistence agriculture. This assertion was contrary to Reitzes' (1996) view that South Africa had a highly educated illegal immigrant population. While extrapolating the figures of the educated illegal immigrants in South Africa, there was some truth to the broader illegal immigrants' population residing in the country. The Mozambican migrants who flooded South Africa had no immigration documents. The absence of these documents was not a deliberate move by these migrants but back home their governments had no resources and institutional frameworks to provide citizens with these basic documents. In this case, the Mozambican migrants became the prime target of cheap manual labour due to the absence of immigration documents and limited educational background. The migrants from Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia when comparing then with those from Mozambique, their situations were better due to basic education they attained, with some being highly skilled.

The Masungulo Project revealed that illegal immigrants were competing with low-skilled South African citizens in the job market. Similar revelations also came from a study conducted by the National Labor and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), a think tank for the Congress of South African Trade Unions. It documented the presence of illegal aliens in the various sectors of the South African economy and concluded that the presence of illegal foreign workers had a depressing effect on wages. Illegal migrants accepted to work for long hours for low wages compared to citizens wanted labour laws

to be fully adhered to by the employers. The resistance by the illegal immigrants to join labour unions caused them to be manipulated by the employers. By so doing, the immigrants were contributing labour problems to local people to have decreased access to employment. In turn, this gave rise to resentment towards illegal immigrants that was then expressed as xenophobia (MacDonald, 1998:301).

According to the Masungulo Project study, illegal immigrants were generally active in sectors such as agriculture, construction, informal trading and hospitality industries. In the food and agriculture sectors of South Africa, the organisers of the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) noted the presence of the large numbers of illegal aliens working in farms in the Limpopo Province, Mpumalanga and on the sugar plantations of the KwaZulu Natal.

FAWU organisers later claimed that farmers employed aliens because they were cheaper to an extent that some worked for shelter and a plate of food a day. These aliens feared to be exposed to the government officials hence they were resisting joining workers' union activities. On the same note, the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU) officials detected an increased presence of illegal immigrants in the hospitality sector. This was confirmed by officials of the Tea Room and Restaurant Industrial Council, who believed that most of the illegal immigrants were Mozambicans and Zimbabweans. As in the Agricultural Sector, SACCAWU organisers reported that the aliens were prepared to work for low wages.

Due to their vulnerability as illegal aliens, they were wary of embarking on industrial action. SACCAWU argued that it undermined their ability to fight for better wages and conditions. On the other hand, it served to depress the wage levels of South African workers and resulted in a decrease in employment opportunities for South

Africans. The Café Zurich that was in Hillbrow, dismissed 20 South African waiters in 1999, and replaced them with 20 Zairean workers who worked without being paid any meaningful wage; in fact, they were simply surviving on tips (Hilton, 1999:56).

The challenges caused by the immigrants in the South African human security development were immense to the extent that their presence elicited a great deal of concern from many workers unions across the country. The impact of illegal aliens had adverse effects in the country's societal hegemony. The rate of crimes committed ballooned to the extent that South African black citizens were left with no option but resort to xenophobic attacks against aliens regardless of one's innocence in committing crime. Haldenward (1998) noted that, between January and September 1997, 152 aliens were involved in commercial crimes to the value of R517 986 870 that constituted 19.6% of all commercial crimes over the same period. As a result of the crimes committed by aliens, the government of South Africa drafted the National Operational Police document which viewed illegal immigrants as "South Africa's Number One Enemy" (Vale: 1998:163). The presence of illegal migrants across the country's townships during the period 1997 and 2007 exposed the citizens to vagaries of human insecurities. The illicit deals and prostitution were among other ills that weakened social, political and economic facets of the social cohesion of the South African citizens.

According to Hussein (2003:105), the South African National Defence Forces confiscated 1000 guns from illegal immigrants of Mozambican and Zimbabwean extraction. During the same period 22 121 kilograms of dagga, 5 422 Mandrax tablets and 110.2 kilograms of cocaine were confiscated from Mozambican, Zimbabwean and Malawian alien syndicates which were working with the locals. Although the syndicates were busted the locals in most cases were the ones arrested and prosecuted after their accomplices jumped the borders to their

countries. The social and economic negative impact of the illicit deals conducted by the immigrants against the South Africans, led to many problems of insecurity.

In 2000, the South African Police's Organised Crime Unit further estimated that illegal immigrants controlled 90% of the local cocaine. The drug trade threatened to ruin the South African's good relations with various countries after it became clear that the country was being turned into a top drug conduit. The drug trade had further threatened peace and security of the country since social and economic developments were greatly retarded (Vale: 1998:170).

According to Solomon (2003), South Africa had become one of the most important conduits for drugs into Western Europe. Illegal immigrants in this drug trafficking were also singled out such that the effects of narco-trafficking at international level indicated that there were serious political, social and economic challenges to South Africa. In fact, narco-trafficking to Western countries caused serious political problems where political favours were bought for movement of the drugs. Economically, there were serious losses of productivity caused by the movement of money outside banking systems. Those who were peddling illicit drugs used the money realised to venture into activities which had nothing with the growth of the economy. There was disruption of family life due separation of families who were moving from one place to the other scouting for customers selling their wares. All these cases affected South African citizens' social stability and safety (Peters, 1999:110).

One Mozambican researcher De Monteclos (1998:203) revealed that about 60% of illegal aliens who were moving from Mozambique to Swaziland in the early 2000, entering borders were armed. It was said that once inside the country, the weapons smuggled were either used in the commission of violent crime by the illegal aliens themselves or

were sold or rented out to South African criminal syndicates. South Africa continued to suffer from crime and political related violence associated incidences. This greatly affected the economy through reduction of investor confidence and state security apparatus needed to be heavily funded, thereby undermining the already stretched state resources. These new political and economic challenges were to be funded to improve the lives of the poor individuals (Lindley-French 2004:110; Crush, 1998:16).

Human insecurity in South Africa was evidenced by a more ominous development where illegal immigrants from Mozambique were hired in 1998 as assassins for various crime syndicates and legitimate businesses. In one case, the South African intelligence (NIA) busted and revealed to the nation that taxi bosses in the province of Mpumalanga had hired 40 Mozambicans as assassins to eliminate rival taxi bosses. The illegal Mozambicans were hired on the basis that it would be difficult to track them down than locally hired assassins. The security agents failed to apprehend most of the alien criminals because they swiftly went into hiding at the same time adopting another identity (Deng *et al.*, 1998:315).

The incident held severe implications for South Africa's domestic security stability. Illegal migration did not impact adversely on employment opportunities only but also had negative implications for the South African government in its provision of adequate education, health, housing and pension fund which were the most critical human security needs for the country's citizens. According to Reitzes (1997:78) it was disturbing that illegal immigrants bring with them diseases with epidemic potential that was attributed to poverty. The vast majority of these illegal immigrants arrived in poor health and was severely malnourished, and thus had little resistance to illness and disease. Aliens were therefore excessively susceptible to diseases such as

yellow fever, cholera, tuberculosis and Aids (Solomon, 1997:1998:65, Reitzes, 1997:80).

On the social front, Minaar (1997:33) illustrated how busloads of Swazi and Basotho children crossed into South Africa to attend schools located close to the borders, and this placed an inordinate burden on South Africa's overstretched education resources. De Monteclos (1998) also noted that this phenomenon of aliens attending schools in South Africa's border regions was even stretched in greater heights in areas like Johannesburg area where an estimated 80 000 children of illegal immigrants burdened the already overcrowded schools.

Another aspect that continued to affect the South African immigration paradigm was that the diseases that were brought by these aliens had an epidemic potential that attributed to health facilities being overstretched. Some illegal immigrants arrived in South Africa in very poor health and greatly malnourished, hence they were susceptible to diseases such as yellow fever, cholera, AIDS/ HIV and tuberculosis. These illegal immigrants burdened the country's healthy services in many ways. When they arrived in the country, they sought medical assistance from local hospitals and clinics. Some spread certain diseases to South African citizens in various ways, thereby taxing overburdened health infrastructure. The illegal immigrants were a burden to the health system because economic costs became unbearable for the already overstretched facilities and medical staff. This health challenge had negative impact on the production sector where workers failed to access medical attention in time. By and large, the security and stability of the country was greatly affected by the human insecurities which were worsened by the influx of the immigrants from neighbours of South Africa and beyond the SADC region (Knayezze, 1998:16; Leiotta, 2002).

One of the first challenges regarding illegal migration was how South Africa should have dealt with its xenophobia. There was growing evidence that South Africans were becoming more xenophobic in the period 1997 to 2003 in their attitudes towards migrants generally and illegal immigrants (Solomon, 1997: 4-15). Matlosa (2001: 85-87) posits that there was the reality of the new South Africa for “foreigners, strangers, those with darker skins or higher foreheads.” These foreigners included such cultural groupings such as Nigerians, Ethiopians, Zimbabweans and Mozambicans. It was the arrest and the detentions of the suspected irregular immigrants among these groupings that had turned up the dark underbelly of the South African psyche.

It was interesting that not only the authorities as illegal aliens targeted foreigners, but also even local people were picked up, harassed, intimidated and at times thrown into transit camps for undocumented migrants. The locals who were victims of these human insecurities were from the minority groupings such as the Venda, Pedi and the Shangaans from the North of the country (Younge, 1999: 6). South Africans were once known as the “bully boys” of Africa by the citizens of its neighbours during the period when jobs in the mines were easily available in that country. Since most immigrants from the SADC region recognised that they had long been manipulated they ended saying that they were “sick and tired” of being labeled as “*amakwerekwere*” meaning foreigners from Zimbabwe, after they had assisted to build the country’s economy (Matlosa, 1999:67).

While there was the need to control the influx of outsiders into South Africa to preserve its own economy and standard of living, it was worrying that the country’s xenophobic tendencies torpedoed the vision of an African Renaissance which was held by people such as President Thabo Mbeki. The human security of the minority tribes was at the mercy of the Police and Home Affairs Department. The

Shangaans of the Northern Province community are dark skinned, and their South African language accent is biased to other languages spoken in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. Due to these, the security agencies found it difficult to be complacent when attending to them in every aspect. They were in most cases arrested and detained after being suspected of being aliens. There was a perception in South Africa that darker people or people without the 'right' South African accent were not citizens. In provinces of Limpopo, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal, some citizens were picked up by the security agencies after they were suspected as aliens, only to be released after their national identity documents were availed. Due to these incidents of wrongly suspected as aliens many citizens had resorted to always travel with their national identities. Because of the cultural interfaces of citizens of SADC member states, especially those from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana and Zambia, the security agents found it difficult to differentiate them from other citizens of the minority tribes.

In most cases, the black people with dark skin and those who were not able to pronounce certain Xhosa or Zulu words or speaking in a non-South African accent were at high risk and this brewed hatred and ignorance about the rights and realities of both refugees and migrants. Human security as a term can be also understood to encompass the concept of conflict prevention. It draws other terms used more broadly in the current global discourse such as the responsibility to protect, human development and xenophobia. Human security aspects as related to the concept of xenophobia can be treated as the 'crisis end' of terms like human rights and human development. The human rights would be at stake at such extreme vulnerability where minority groups such as the Vendas, Pedi and Shangaans continued to be identity suspects. These were suffering extremely from xenophobic tendencies because they were disturbingly picked up, harassed and thrown into the transit camps where undocumented migrants were kept. Security



is viewed as the absence of physical violence hence the minority tribal groups in the South African context remained vulnerable if they were to be threatened of deportation to their country of origin because of being suspected as foreigners. While human development is viewed as material development and improved living standards translating it to the situation of minority tribes in South Africa, showed that human insecurity was rife and in much the same way, human rights were often treated wrongly as civil and political rights of the Pedi, Vendas and Shangaans were at the mercy of the police and immigration officials not the laws of the country (Benita, 2006:278; Leiotta, 2002; Hussein, 1997:93).

Although xenophobia is viewed as a sentiment confined to individuals at the lower end of the socio-economic and the educational spectrum of the society, it should also be closely related to the notion of sustainable peace which must be the goal of conflict prevention. For example, in the initiative by the government of South Africa to incorporate immigrants into citizens in 1997, it was an idea to promote peace and security in the region. The conflict prevention discourse has its origins in a political ethos rooted in civil society, collective action and the public sphere. Conflict prevention attempts to break vicious circles of instability including subsidiary tools of early warning and analysis which were the rapid responses that should have stopped the xenophobic attacks perpetrated against foreigners in the period 2001 and 2004.

Despite the fact that conflict prevention has roots in civil activism, the focus should be on the nation state to help rectify the invulnerability of individual citizens through a state institutional reform in the security sector, judiciary and governance, so that strategic human security proponents can be put in place (Lindley-French, 2004:1-15).

When it came to issues of human security in the South African context, the state failed to uphold the United Nations (UN) principle of the 'responsibility to protect.' According to Bellamy (2008:423), the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chretien announced the creation of an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) at the United Nation's Millennium Summit in 2000. The ICISS was charged with the task of finding a global consensus on humanitarian intervention. In 2001, the ICISS chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Shannon delivered a landmark report entitled "The Responsibility to Protect" which stated that the states have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens. The United Nations principles which deal with the protection of citizens under UN ICISS (2001: xi) was not adhered to by the South African government. Since she is a signatory, the UN principle was supposed to be adhered to by protecting brutality against the Pedi, Shangaans and Vendas.

The UN article on the 'Responsibility to Protect' states that when a state is unable or unwilling to protect the citizens, the international body must intervene to protect the vulnerable people. This involved not only the responsibility to react to humanitarian crises but also the responsibility to prevent crises such as xenophobic attacks (Bellamy, 2009:430; Thomas, 2007:341; Wheeler, 2000:97).

According to Hough & Minaar (1996:127), the xenophobic attacks were perpetrated by the Zulu and Xhosa speakers. It was revealed that the Zulu speakers were more xenophobic than other groups while the Xhosa speakers were considered less xenophobic. This perception was closely related to the fact that Zulu speakers were largely associated with the violent political party Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The IFP hard-line stance towards illegal immigrants was clearly illustrated in October 1998 when the party's youth brigade threatened that, if the ANC government failed to take strong action against illegal aliens, it would do so itself (Solomon, 1998:97). The security of citizens and

individual immigrants became a nightmare due to the condescending stance taken by nearly big tribal groups such as the Zulu, Xhosa and Afrikaans (Potgieter, 1998).

As Table 7.1 indicates, the influx of illegal immigrants was categorised as a bad trend which indicated that South African citizens were extremely unhappy about the country becoming a refugee destination. As indicated, more than 80% of the South Africans felt that the illegal immigrants were either unwelcome or very unwelcome in that country. The findings were reinforced by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) which also indicated that the South Africans wanted a ban on immigrants. Table 7.1 also indicates that the Western Cape Province had more citizens who were saying illegal immigrants were unwelcome. The anti-illegal immigrant sentiments were caused by an increase of those with better educational qualifications who flooded the provinces and eventually they secured good employment opportunities ahead of locals who were less educated. South African citizens were negatively inclined towards any immigration policy that welcomed newcomers into the country. The table below shows the highest level of opposition to immigration recorded by any country in the world where comparable questions were asked. The South African provinces of the Western Cape and Eastern Cape indicated that they were opposed to the illegal immigrants because they were disenfranchising locals in various areas of political, economic and social spheres.

**Table 7.1:** Whether the Influx of Illegal Immigrants is Good or Bad, Analysed by Province in % (Solomon, *Illegal Immigration into South Africa, 2003, Table 11, p. 95*)

PROVINCE	GOOD	BAD	NEITHER	UNCERTAIN	TOTAL
Northern Cape	3	78	8	11	100
Western Cape	3	81	14	2	100
Mpumalanga	8	60	26	6	100
Eastern Cape	10	79	6	5	100

KwaZulu-Natal	14	64	15	7	100
Free State	16	70	11	3	100
Gauteng	18	56	16	10	100
North West	30	56	12	2	100
Limpopo Province	37	56	3	4	100

According to the IDASA survey of 1998, most of South Africans were resoundingly negative towards any immigration policy that might welcome newcomers into the country. The table shows that there was the highest level of opposition to immigration recorded by any country in the world where comparable questions were asked (Matters *et al.*, 1999:365).

The preceding survey on Table 7.2 asked the citizens if illegal immigrants that came to South Africa from other countries were very welcome, welcome, neither, unwelcome, very unwelcome and uncertain. It indicated that foreigners were very unwelcome in South Africa and xenophobic attacks were eminent if were to go by results produced. The responses were very uncompromising on refusing the immigrants to enter the country. As indicated 73.6% of the South Africans felt that illegal immigrants were either unwelcome or very unwelcome in the country. Most of South Africans were resoundingly negative towards any immigration policy that was going to welcome new immigrants because their economic and social lives were going to be threatened. Although, 15.9% of the South Africans indicated that they either very welcome or welcome illegal immigrants, this was due to the transnational ethnic consciousness with provinces sharing borders with the country's regional neighbours and whose host populations share a common cultural heritage. It was provinces such as the Eastern, Western and Northern Cape that share borders with Swaziland and Zimbabwe that provided transnational ethnic consciousness that saw illegal immigrants more as kinsfolk than aliens.

**Table 7.2:** What is your view in general on the so-called illegal immigrants that come to South Africa from other countries? (*Solomon, Illegal Immigration into South Africa, (2003:20), Table 12.*)

RESPONSE	PERCENTAGE %
Very welcome	3,2
Welcome	12,6
Neither	7,0
Unwelcome	35,8
Very unwelcome	37,8
Don't know	3,6
Total	100

This was an indication that the South Africans felt that immigration laws were not strict enough to protect them from labor, food security and many other human security facets that were poised to compete with aliens (Business Day, 27 December 2001:1; IDASA, 1999:31; Magardie, 2000:4).

While the concept of human security was then defined as useful and was embedded in the state policy discourse on security in nearly all SADC countries, in South Africa it remained a contested issue because of xenophobic attacks against the immigrants in the period 1998 to 2005. The contemporary tendency by several scholars to focus on the state in the belief that the traditional security task of the maintenance of sovereignty and territorial integrity had security for citizens were taken for granted (Baker, 1999:248; UNCHS, 2003). For the SADC region and South Africa, in particular to provide human security to the citizens, there is a need to define human security as the absence of threat to human life, lifestyle and culture, through the fulfilment of basic needs. Although this definition was greatly guided by the feminist agitators contributing to the new security thinking, it did not take cognisance of the individual security. This definition seeks to place the security concerns of ordinary man and woman on the street

at the very core of any security strategy (Booth, 1994:58; Buzan, 1991:68; Omari, 1995:365; Krause, 1996:13).

While addressing United Nations Summit in 1997, the then South African President Nelson Mandela stated that;

“It is true that hundreds of millions of politically empowered masses are caught in the deathly trap of poverty, unable to live life in its fullness. Out of this, are born social conflicts which produce insecurity and instability, civil and other wars that claim many lives and millions of desperate refugees. Out of this cauldron are also born tyrants, dictators and demagogues.”

This widening thinking of security made great strides in sustainable economic development which enabled to achieve political, economic and social well-being for all the people of Southern Africa, especially those of South Africa. The security and peace perception was based on people-centred approach because the human security transcended to the individual security levels. On the same note, poverty was also considered as a structural problem in Southern Africa. In the period between 1997 and 2007 about 45% to 50% of the total population lived in abject poverty (World Bank, 2000).

About three quarters of all poverty was concentrated in rural areas characterised by unfavourable climatic conditions, for example, little and irregular rain, poor infrastructure, in fertile soils and prone to erosion (IFRRI / WUR / IFAD, 2002). Poor communities in most SADC states had limited access to education and social services. They were also vulnerable to HIV and AIDS and an unbalanced family structure with proportionally more women and young children (FAO, 2000). In this case, the evolution of the concept of security transcends the narrow and military-centred aspect to a wider holistic approach providing security to the individual peoples. In fact, a traditional perspective on state sovereignty that suggests that the regime has

ultimate, rights needs recast because there are other players who provide peace and stability in societies (Magardie, 2004:116).

Southern Africa continues to be a region of migrants of various sorts. The economic history of Southern Africa, therefore, remains predicated in extricable story of migration (Vale & Matlosa, 1995:37). The movement of people from other Southern African states remains a historic fact that South Africa is the economic attractive destination. Despite the criss-cross of citizens in the entire region which spanned from the colonial period, people ignored political boundaries imposed by the colonial administrations. The SADC region experienced different types of migration in the period 1997 to 2007 that included contract migration, refugees, undocumented migration, brain drain and asylum-seekers (Knayedza, 1998:312; Sachikonye, 1998:212; Jauch, 1997:35).

While the Southern African economies have been tied together in an interdependent fashion by, among other things cross-border migration, they also exhibited considerable imbalances and inequalities. The uneven development in the SADC had implications for labor markets and migration. Despite the political boundaries bequeathed from the colonial rule, the regional cross boarder migration had become ingrained in the socio-fabric of the SADC as a whole. Due to the regional economic and social links created by the inter-state migration, the basis of regional politics and anthropology remain anchored on the single regional economy (Vale & Matlosa, 1995:97).

Although migration had helped to weave the economies of the SADC region together in a relatively integrated whole, it caused on the other hand, unequal development and exploitative relations that existed in the period 1997 to 2007. Regional cross-border migration had caused human insecurity of individual citizens in other SADC member states while at the same time benefiting the South African economic sector. In

fact, South Africa remains more industrialised than any other regional state in SADC (Lundahl & Peterson, 1995:60; Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999:311; Jauch, 1997:30).

It was imperative to identify the various types of migrants and to understand the relationships between the different categories which caused the cross-border movements in the SADC region. Population displacements at either intra-state or inter-state caused a lot of human insecurity to the citizens. SADC member states are economically and politically different. The citizens migrate to environments where peace and security is guaranteed. The end of colonialism which was marked by the independence of South Africa in 1994 opened a floodgate to that country's job market. The topology of migrants who flooded that country had different interests but most of them wanted to secure employment. It was the economic factors that made health staff, teachers, agriculturists and land surveyors' migrants among other professionals settled in South Africa (Prah, 1999:41).

Migration is a concept commonly used to describe human movements either from one region of a country to another (internal migration) or from one country to another (external migration). Migration may either be permanent, as in a case where a migrant settles permanently in a host region or country, or oscillatory, as in a case where a migrant moves back and forth between the region or country of origin and the host region/country. Migration is, thus, a permanent or semi-permanent change of one's residence or site of labour. As a process, it involves an origin, destination and intervening factors. These factors that either facilitate or inhibit migration, are generally categorised into four as follow:

- factors associated with the areas of the region;
- factors associated with the areas of destination;
- intervening factors that either inhibit or facilitate the movement, and



- personal factors that drive individual migrants (Setai, 1998:78).

These factors have combined together to propel the migration process in Southern Africa. These have related mainly to economic and political causes and environmental factors which either push or pull labour to seek wage employment elsewhere for purposes of survival (Amin, 1995:90; Milanzi, 1998:201). However, the causes of migration cannot be divorced from its consequences. Migration is not only the consequence of an unequal development that could be the result of natural causes, such as the different natural potential of different regions. Migration is also a part of the unequal development, as it serves to reproduce its conditions and aggravates them (Amin, 1995:45).

Contract migration remained one of the most glaring features of the political economy of the SADC region that was traceable to the pre-colonial period (Matlosa, 1992:35; Crush *et al.*, 1991:89). Rapid economic development that was brought by the political independence of 1994, made South Africa a key locus of capital accumulation in the region while other SADC member states became labour reservoirs. According to Prah (1989:6), the fundamental law of capitalism is that “capital attracts labour, skilled or unskilled but the need for labour depends on the extent of capital concentration and the differentiation of production.” This assertion by Prah (1989) indicated that other SADC member states were just labour reserves that served as South Africa’s pool of extra-cheap labour and a captive market for the country’s manufactured goods. Contract migration in the SADC region suggested that an agreement was supposed to be drawn up between a migrant job seeker and the employer. This contract/agreement was supposed to state the agreed position where the employer paid foreign workers remuneration and on the other hand, the contract labourers were to undertake to work for the employers for a fixed period after

which they were supposed to return to their country of origin (Pule & Matlosa, 1997:116; Matlosa, 1996:25; Crush, 1997:91).

Contract migration, especially to the South African mines and farms, had been dominated by mostly rural male folk from mainly SADC states with minimal educational achievements and coming from very poor backgrounds. The contract did not emphasise remuneration for the foreign migrant labourer. Rather, contract migrants were concerned with getting some money to support the family back in their countries. There were less or relatively low involvement of female folk in labour migration in the period between 1997 and 2007. Male folk dominated in all employment on the mines and in the agricultural sector. These movements of migrants to South Africa from most of the SADC states caused a lot of insecurity in terms of food security, the health security, social security, political security and economic security. The migration of male folk to South Africa left agricultural activities in the hands of women and children and the result was relatively food insecurity, political insecurity, economic insecurity and disruption of families.

On the health insecurity aspect, these male migrants brought and spread various diseases due to the circumstances of livelihood they adopted in the foreign environments. In terms of human security of the individuals, there was a catastrophe for all the citizens of the region because even the South African citizens were to endure ostracisation from the employers. However, South African employers were in favour of cheap foreign labour they manipulated by paying them poor wages (McDonald, 2002:78).

Many communities in Southern Africa share a common history, cultural heritage, language, religion and other social bonds that transcended colonial boundaries. In most instances, these communities struggle for daily survival. This made clandestine migration in the

period 1997 to 2007 very easy although risky at times where individuals crossed crocodile infested rivers such as Zambezi and Limpopo rivers. These borders were crossed under stringent state security and military surveillance of boundaries (Solomon, 1996:38; Crush, 1997:315; Crush, 1998:99-111). Asylum seekers and refugees remained a potential threat to the security of the SADC region. It was often that the country from which the asylum seekers and refugees fled also had suspicions about the activities of the migrants within their host country. Asylum literally means a sanctuary or place of refuge. Asylum-seeking refers to a quasi-legal process where one state grants protection to a national or nationals of another state.

A refugee is described as a person who is outside of his or her country of origin or habitual residence because they have suffered or feared persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or because they are a member of a persecuted “social group” or sometimes they are fleeing from war. Such a person may be called an asylum seeker until recognised by the state where they make a claim. The concept of peace and security in the SADC region remained a very contentious issue because nearly all members in one way or the other, once housed both refugees and asylum seekers from one or two regional states. Mandaza (1998) argues that the SADC region had the highest number of refugees and asylum seekers compared to other African sub-regional groupings. There was an exodus of asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the early 2000 due to the war which nearly drove the international community into an “African World War,” (Mutero, et al 1998:67). The primary difference between refugees and asylum seekers is that the rights of asylum belong to states and not to individuals although the United Nations Article 14 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 does give individuals a right to asylum. But as the declaration took the form of the United Nations General Assembly, it is not legally binding on states (Booth, 1994:201). The number of asylum seekers

who entered South Africa in the period 1997 to 2007 was not able to be determined because nearly all SADC member states have their citizens' flight to that country as political refugees but Matlosa (1999) who propounded that most of the migrants were squarely economic refugees.

According to United Nations Charter, Article 1A of the Geneva Convention of 1951, not all migrants seeking protection or shelter in another country fall under the definition of "refugees". One of the fundamental criticisms of the 1951 Refugee Convention is that it is unclear about what constitutes persecution. Furthermore, emphasis on the individual negates the concept of group persecution. This criticism is unfair because there is no internationally acceptable criterion for determining whether a person has a "well-founded fear of persecution" (Melander, 1987:274-284). Melander (1987) observes that there is a growing tendency to refer to basic human rights "that is the criterion for persecution may be fulfilled if the applicant fears exposure to human rights violations". In this respect, it is civil and political rights in particular that are relevant to the field of human rights which deals with the relations between the individual and the state. The criterion may also be fulfilled when economic, social and cultural rights are violated if the applicant fears discriminatory measures (UNHCR Handbook, 2009).

However, every person who has been or will be faced with a human rights violation in his or her country of origin cannot be considered a refugee. There is an important prerequisite which stipulates that the violation must reach a certain degree of severity before it is classified as persecution. The human rights violation must also be motivated by one or more of the five causes of persecution referred to in the UN 1951 Convention which includes race, religion, nationality, and membership of a particular social and political opinion (Matters, 1999: 16).

In 1999 to 2007 there was the mass movement of Zimbabweans to South Africa and Botswana to a lesser extent. This movement blurred the distinction between what is a refugee and an economic migrant. Economic migrants fit neither in the category of refugees or asylum-seekers because they fall outside the specific mandate of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). According to the report (Zimbabweans migrating into Southern Africa), the lack of protection in migrants in the SADC region was based on a “false distinction” between a forced and an economic migrant rather than focusing on the real and urgent needs of some of the migrants. The report suggests that there was a need to have a better term which was to be called “forced humanitarian migrants” to emphasise the exodus of Zimbabweans to South Africa who were moving for the purposes of their basic survival. To emphasise that the movements of Zimbabweans into South Africa and Botswana were properly for economic opportunities, the Regional Office for Southern Africa of the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coined the term “migrants of humanitarian concern” in 2007. This put Zimbabwe into the international spotlight as a failing state while other critics called for even military intervention to rescue the people from what was defined as an induced political and economic mismanagement of affairs by the sitting government (UNHCR, 2003:116).

Although, general responses to Zimbabweans migration in Botswana and South Africa in the early 2000 was premised on the original definition from the 1951 Convention and it was said that Zimbabwe was failing to protect her citizens by providing them with economic security aspects. Those who were crossing into South Africa from Zimbabwe were neither refugees. Most of them did not apply for refugee status but given the extent of economic collapse back home they were not even considered as “voluntary economic migrants” because there is no statutory instrument of the UN Charter which

supports economic migrants (Mandaza, 1998:311). Many Zimbabweans suffered insecurity challenges because there were no legal instruments to protect them neither did they receive humanitarian support from UN agencies as they fell outside the mandates of the support structures offered by government and non-government institutions. In fact, the Zimbabwean refugees or asylum seekers were rejected into mainstream of the political, economic and social structures because they were considered economic migrants.

The movements of Zimbabweans into Botswana and South Africa caused a lot of insecurity to the country because people left their jobs unmanned, without even a replacement. Zimbabwe was plunged into both economic and political challenges which brought human security provisions for individual citizens questioned. South Africa, on the other hand was on the receiving end, due to increased population demanding food and health services. The most basic needs for the exploded population were hard to come by, hence scarcity of services led South African citizens to question the influx of foreigners. As indicated by the 1999 IDASA survey on the immigrants who flooded South Africa;

“Most of South Africans are resoundingly negative towards any immigration policy that might welcome newcomers. 25% of the South Africans want a total ban on immigrants and 45% support strict limits on the numbers of immigrants allowed in. Only 17% would support a more flexible policy tied to the availability of jobs and only 6% support a total open policy of immigrants. This is the highest level of opposition to immigration recorded by any country in the world comparable questions have been asked”, (IDASA, 1999).

On the question of immigrants’ influx in South Africa, Minaar & Hough (1998:106) illustrate that almost 75% of South Africans believed immigration laws were not strict enough to curb the influx of foreigners. There were political costs that were related to domestic political stability and foreign policy considerations. The need for an effective immigration policy that clearly distinguished between alien

and citizen, and between legal and illegal immigrant was needed to control irregular movement of people into the country. The influx of immigrants contributed to South Africa's severe political risks, both domestic and international, posed by a failure in an effective immigration policy (Business Day, 27 December 2001; Magardie, 2000).

In November 1999, the South African police reported that they were investigating the murder of a police officer who had been investigating the involvement of a contract immigrant in insurance business. Subsequently, about 60 contract foreign employees from Zimbabwe were put on trial in Pretoria. The murder of the police officer led to authorities in South Africa to increasingly adopt a more coercive approach regarding foreigners engaged in sectors reserved for locals especially the insurance, retail and manufacturing sectors. To ameliorate locals, the South African government engaged in mass deportation of immigrants, especially Zimbabweans suspected to have committed any sort of offence (KOPOBb EB, 24 June 1999; <[www.search.nando.net](http://www.search.nando.net)>).

Meanwhile, Botswana's traditional welcome to Zimbabwean economic migrants was quickly replaced with suspicion and fear after it had been discovered that large numbers of the immigrants were engaged in smuggling diamonds. These suspicions exacerbated tensions between the Botswana and Zimbabweans, because of the dwindling price of diamonds at the international market. The tensions were caused by the sale on the black market of smuggled Zimbabwean diamonds in Botswana for a very low price. Botswana being a country depending largely on diamond mining, was threatened by the illicit dealing of diamonds.

The South Africans were threatened politically and economically by the invasion of sectors preserved for citizens by immigrants. A similar situation existed in the domestic sector in 2004, where the South

African Domestic Workers Union (SADWU) reported that there was an increase in the number of Zimbabweans and Malawians in this sector. The SADWU organisers also reported that, Zimbabweans and Malawians were prepared to work for very low wages and were not interested in joining the workers' unions while on the other hand, employers preferred to employ them as opposed to South Africans. The presence of Zimbabweans and Malawians in most informal sectors elicited a great deal of concern from even the African Chamber of Hawkers and Informal Business (ACHIB) which was based in Johannesburg.

According to Lawrence Mavundla, ACHIB's president, an estimated 500 000 foreigners were plying their trade in the informal sector which represented 40% of the total number of informal traders in South Africa. Mavundla's claims were substantiated by the number of Zimbabweans and Malawians arrested in a single raid in September 1999. On this occasion, the Northern Transvaal police arrested 2000 Zimbabwean traders and contract workers in and around the former Venda capital of Thohoyandou. ACHIB argued that because of Zimbabweans and Malawians' failure to join labour unions they were not paying duty while others who were vendors were not paying import duties on their goods, hence they were able to sell these goods at far cheaper prices. In this way, South African local hawkers were losing their only source of livelihood to foreigners. (Solomon, 2003:113). The human insecurity of Zimbabweans and Malawians remained unstable and insecure due to lack of economic opportunities in their respective countries.

The human migration in the SADC region continued to unmask the extent of threats to peace and security of migrants who opted to leave their countries to seek refuge. The movement even threatened peace and security of the host countries. In the SADC region South Africa and Botswana to a lesser extent remained the fertile grounds for both



political and economic migrants. The migrants from Zimbabwe capitalised on the vulnerabilities created by unemployment, food insecurity, lack of democracy and political intolerance, to seek refuge in South Africa and Botswana. The push factors of immigrants to South Africa were the result of the growth of economic activity which was witnessed in 1994 that saw the elimination of restrictions on the free movement of people across the borders of its neighbours. These immigrants flooding South Africa were taking advantage of regional security lapses caused by civil wars of Mozambique and general elections euphoria that hit Zimbabwe. It was mainly marginalisation and exclusion of the social groups of people in many SADC countries which fuelled migration to South Africa and Botswana.

Although there was a need to control the influx of immigrants into South Africa as a way of preserving its economy and security of the citizens, the measures instigated the xenophobic tendencies where the vision of pan-Africanism observation was ignored. South African citizens felt disadvantaged by the foreigners who encroached into many economic domains which were reserved for them. The xenophobic attacks forced the government to intervene by creating laws that gave citizens first preferences in the economic sector. Many foreigners lost not only lives but even property. The xenophobic attacks which erupted in South Africa in the early 2000 demonstrated their frustration that the government was not doing enough to economically protect them from the foreigners. The xenophobic attacks were mainly confined to the individual citizens who were occupying the lower end of the socio-economic and educational spectrum of the society in South Africa. In this case, xenophobic attacks are viewed in relation to peace and security provisions where citizens were exposed to vulnerabilities exacerbated by poverty and lack of job security.

The peace and security perception in Southern Africa remains premised on security of the state. Although, the global trend on human

security has shifted to the security of the individual people, levels of poverty in SADC shows that the state sovereignty takes precedence. Individual peoples remain characterised by limited access to education and social services, vulnerability to HIV and AIDS among other security threats.

Due to the regional traditional economic and social links which were created by the inter-state migration, the basis of the SADC's political and anthropology continued to be anchored on the single regional economy. The migration of people to South Africa and Botswana in the Southern African region consequently caused unequal development and exploitative relations. The contract migration trends which were unanimous with the South African labour laws were dismantled just after the apartheid system. The post-apartheid elements were part to problems which bedevilled mine and manufacturing industries in South Africa. The inequalities at workplaces led foreigners to be vulnerable in hands of the employers. The human security of foreigners became unbearable because locals corroborated with employers and property owners for their deportation.

There was a need to control the influx of immigrants into South Africa, the measures instigated the xenophobic tendencies ignoring the vision of Pan-Africanism. Many foreigners lost not only lives but also even property in the hands of the South African citizens who felt economically losing out to immigrants. The xenophobic attacks were generally confined to the individual citizens who were occupying the lower end of the socio-economic and educational spectrum of the South African society. Nevertheless, as immigrant populations rose, South African citizens were beginning to recognize immigrants' contributions and to lower barriers at least to immigrants with skills. The count of 120 000 self-employed immigrants in South Africa in 2000 revealed that many immigrants were professionals or business owners. Many South African citizens began to accept the idea of multicultural

when most industries and factories were operating under the tutelage of immigrants after many whites were closing shop to sabotage the industrial sector (Bergman & Renwick, 2002:202).

In terms of skilled immigrants, the analysis found out that these people were also, by and large, happy to be living and working in South Africa. Most have strong transnational links back home, they were sending remittances to family and friends, visited home on a regular basis and were proud to call themselves citizens of their home country. There was another aspect of this research worth highlighting that here was the challenge of stereotyping the skilled immigrants in South Africa. Popular myth in South Africa had it that skilled foreigners of African extraction were taking over their job opportunities. The xenophobic attacks against skilled immigrants in some instances became the only alternative for the locals to get rid of foreigners to retain their chances of occupying skilled jobs (McDonald & Crush, 2002:7-9).

The South African government ought to come up with a revised national White Paper blueprint on immigration matters that includes refugee management concepts, compatible border control and entry policies, efficient readmission and return policies and then the labour agreements as an alternative. The African National Congress (ANC) as a political party, needed to consult extensively with other SADC member states to revisit the June 1995 Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the members states. However, the host countries of asylum seekers and refugees should adhere to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and African Union Protocol on Refugees and Asylum seekers, when they provide human security protection.