The Human Security Factor

in the Southern African Peace and Security Pursuit

Josphat Chivurugwi

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Dedication

This book is dedicated to my father and mother, their footprints continue to inspire many people to work hard and to remain forward-focused.

Acknowledgements

Writing the acknowledgement to the book is an opportunity its author enjoys in recognizing those who helped in making it possible.

My greatest debt is owed to Nedia Chivurugwi my dear wife and mother of our children, Rumbidzai, Ronald and Rutendo who had to contend with my restrictions to the reading room during times they would have needed my attention and fatherly love. Without their constant love and support, I would not have peace of mind to undertake and complete writing this book.

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Abstract

This book gives a critical analysis of human security approach to peace and security in Southern Africa, specifically South Africa. In order to understand the effectiveness of the state to guarantee peace and security of the society and individual peoples, the book examines political and economic variables of human security. It focuses on human security aspects which bring together the human elements of peace and security, rights and development that display characteristics of interdisciplinary concepts such as that of people centred, context-specific, multi-sectoral and prevention oriented. The research was conducted within neo-liberalism and neo-realism theoretical frameworks. Furthermore, this book argues that non-state actors have a role of complimenting government's efforts of providing human security aspects to the individual citizens in developing nations. The book revealed that the colonial legacy of apartheid has a lot of influence crystallised in relation to black segregation on racial and employment spheres. To this end, the book recommends that the NGO/civil society groups should complement government efforts in human security provision to the citizens of South Africa. At the heart of this research are issues concerning the interpretation and development of the South African government's democratic transformation, from the apartheid systems of political and economic injustices to that of empowering all citizens regardless of race, creed or nationality. It concluded that in South African's political and economic developmental activities, the black citizens remained ostracised and deeply bound up with colonial values and precedents. The apartheid systems which were still entrenched in political and economic spheres of the new democratic South Africa often formed the basis of entitlements to all means of production across the country. The book contends that South Africa's narrow focus on the state and top governments elites leaves threats to peace and security issues generating unresolved. It has therefore paid lip service to creating

more inclusive peace and security management processes. South Africa, and largely SADC, has largely failed to pioneer new ways of crafting new policy frameworks that could lead to safer, resilient and prosperous society in the country. This research also seeks to bring out strong human security mechanisms to guarantee and preserve peoples' fears from economic and political threats. The study recommends that the SADC member states, specifically South Africa, need to formulate national policies that address not only traditional security threats, the military and territorial security of the state, but also non-traditional threats such as economic, political, social and environmental degradation.

In typical cases where political and economic variables of human security pose insecurity in South Africa, as discussed above, a new approach to address these aspects seem to provide peace and security to the state, community and individuals.The South African citizens based their hope on further political transformations, which gave citizens the rights to determine their sovereign rights. There was agitation for a better future where individuals' basic needs were provided without racial discriminations. The political party preferred by the citizens to govern the country was the one with the capacity to economically empower people, create employment and provide basic service delivery. The white apartheid rule, which ruled South Africa for decades, subjecting black citizens to poor and brute conditions, made most black citizens to be skeptical of a political party connected to the post-apartheid ideology. The white dominated political parties, lost elections in 1998 because of their political past dominated with racial discrimination. On the other hand, ANC got overwhelming support from the citizens because of the black empowerment development programme which were undertaken, without considering one's race or creed. The country's independence opened new opportunities for black majority to exercise their constitutional rights that included rights to political and economic freedoms, which

was associated with founding principles of the ANC. The citizens' political party affiliations were stemmed mainly on the ethnicity and racism factors of various supporters.   The provision of individual security was measured on the political party's capacity to prevent threats that exposed citizens to the vagaries of poverty and economic deprivation.

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About The Author

Josphat Chivurugwi is a doyen of Intelligence, Defence and Security Studies and is also a counterintelligence security expert. He is a veteran trainer and instructor of intelligence security in Zimbabwe under the auspices of the Zimbabwe President's Department. He is a senior part-time lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe (UZ), Zimbabwe National Defence University (ZNDU) and Bindura University of Science Education (BUSE), respectively. He holds a PhD in International Relations with Human Security Theory, comparative politics and intelligence, defence and security as minimum bodies of knowledge of the study at the University of Zimbabwe. He attained a Masters of International Relations Degree from the University of Zimbabwe. He graduated with the following qualifications: Bachelor of Science Honours in Politics and Administrative Degree, Bachelor of Arts Degree in English and Communication Studies, Diploma in Defence and Security Studies, all attained from the University of Zimbabwe. Dr. Chivurugwi graduated with a certificate in Joint Command and Staff Course at the Zimbabwe Staff College in Harare and holds several certificates in intelligence and security studies attained from the Robert Mugabe School of Intelligence among other regional and international training institutes of intelligence training colleges. He has served as a senior official in most governments departments where he presided over matters of peace and security, peace and conflicts, refugee administration, security sector governance and reform, crisis intervention, human rights, disaster risk management, human behavior investigations and intelligence, defence and security investigations, among other security-related pursuits.

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Chapter 1: Human Security in the Geopolitics of Southern Africa: An Overview

The primacy of a democratic governance systems which could provide human security guarantee to individuals and citizens in Southern African region is the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The appreciation of the human security approach to peace and security in SADC, especially in South Africa, where there is a need to understand the effectiveness of the governance systems if they guarantee peace and security of the society and individual peoples form the foremost trope of this inquiry. The human security aspects that bring together human elements of peace and security, rights and development display characteristics of interdisciplinary concepts such as that of people-centred, context-specific, multi-sectoral and prevention oriented theoretic optics. The effects of human insecurity threats caused by the apartheid regime governance systems that are still entrenched in the political and economic developments of South Africa were the cause of insecurity in SADC particularly in South Africa. The intellectual thrust and cogence of this research output is situated in the field of international relations wherein human security takes into its purview individuals and their communities rather than territory, states or governments, as its point of reference. Moreover, given political and economic challenges in South Africa, the non-state actors' activities were deemed as the main architectures of the friction on policy formulation processes with the state.

The effects of human insecurity in the SADC region, specifically in South Africa, where the apartheid system and its legacy continues to divide the population on ethnic, racial and native lines took a centre stage in the analysis of state's failure to provide adequate human security provisions. Three hundred years of white settlement in South Africa from 1652 to 1993 saw the dispossession of Africans of their land and subsequent enforced conversion into wage labourers. Indeed, the land disputes in South Africa began in 1652, when the Dutch East Indian Company (DEIC) arrived and established the first settlement. The DEIC needed fresh food and meat for its ships' crews and

passengers who were enroute to the Far East. Setai (1998:2) postulates that the motives of the company were therefore economic ones, although it brought few assets to serve as the base for developing an economy. Rather, the DEIC relied on the land and resources of the area that was to become known as the Cape Colony to achieve its goals. But, the land belonged, by birth-right, to the Africans, and their right to it was inalienable. To gain access to the land, the Company needed a land acquisition strategy, and it chose the most expedient one available that was to simple take-over of the desired lands. The take-over strategy set the tone of the relationship between black and white in South Africa for hundreds of years translated to a tone of confrontation.

The Khoi-Khoi or Hottentots, a nomadic group of people, were the first group of Africans to be confronted by the settlers in 1652. The contact was violent, where Khoi-Khoi captured men and children, divided in proportion among the poorest whites as indentured servants while women were freed. The Namas, who were good at raising cattle and other agricultural produces, were another group that the settlers soon encountered. That group was considered more stable than the Khoikhoi by the settlers as it produced commodities they desired. As such, in 1713 the Dutch settlers isolated the nomadic Khoikhoi in favour of the Namas. Later on the Dutch settlers decided to control the land and all other national economic resources (Doxey, 1961:184). These initial interactions, notwithstanding the intrusion of the British into South Africa and subsequent occupation of the Cape Province after 1806, totally changed the political, social and the economic landscape in that country. Initially, the British pretended that they were protecting the Namas against the exploiting Dutch people, but their intentions were soon to be revealed when their expansive motive was extended to other African groups in South Africa that included the Xhosa, Zulu, Swazi, the Sotho and Batswana. The British believed that it was imperative to subjugate these African groups. Britain's desire for global influence and economic development was to be met. A triangular relationship developed involving the Africans, Afrikaners (whites of Dutch origin) and the Britons in 1894 was characterised by friction and uneasy co-existence. The fragile relations between the British and the Boers forced the latter into the interior and along the

coast thereby threatening the existence of many African groups. The country began to be perpetually divided because of the disputes among the Africans and the British rulers (Davis, 1976:231). These challenges were to culminate in the South African Boer War (1899-1902) which set the process for the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910.

However, in accordance with the needs of intensified exploitation and subjugation of the Africans, the South African Supreme Law (the Union Constitution of 1910), laid the basis for the development of political and economic system that was consistently racist. According to Nolutshungu (1988:143), the politics in South Africa was centralised on the Union Constitution on issues that were essentially colonial, particularly in the way they were conceptualised and discussed. During the Second World War, South Africa was a critical component of the war machinery that Britain was committed to. The constitutional ties that were between Britain and South Africa consolidated the relations between the two powers in 1948, during the years of global changing times. In the period after the Second World War, South Africa saw itself as a powerhouse in Africa alongside the colonisers who were still suppressing and manipulating African colonial states. The South African's historical and economic developments were progressive in terms of serving the sacrosanct of white supremacy race during the apartheid era (Greenberg, 1988:13).

The apartheid regime viewed the colonialism aspects differently from the rest of African states. The whites had the steadfast, though erroneous belief that the country was founded by the Boers, so black people were regarded as the marginalised race. Independent African states viewed the apartheid system as an internal colonialism. Their argument was that Bantustans were created to ostracise many black population from the epicentre of all the country's political, social, economic and security developments among other human security needs. The practice of apartheid in South Africa formally came into being in 1948 when Dr Malan defeated Mr. J. Smuts in a general election. But that policy as declared was distinct only in detail and emphasised the policy of segregation as practiced by the previous governments. The new government advocated for what it termed

separate development, a mere euphemism for racial based socio-economic and political organisation.

Three bloody events in the 19th Century helped to define South Africa. Firstly, the Great Trek of the Afrikaners (*voortrekkers*) into remote areas of South Africa intensified the displacement of tribal populations. Secondly, the chieftain Shaka transformed the Zulu minority into an aggressive military power that ruled over two million subjects until their defeat at the hands of the *voortrekkers*. Finally, although the British defeated the Afrikaners in the Boer War at the end of the century, the Afrikaners were able to extend their policy of black exclusion to the whole of South Africa. Rapid urbanization, accompanied by compulsory segregation, further oppressed blacks, while the Land Act of 1913 abolished the tenant and share cropping systems that had supported an emerging stratum of more prosperous black families and prohibited them from owning land (Davis, 1976:245).

The Republic of South Africa is the leading state in Southern Africa. In 1671 the Dutch established Cape Town colony as a staging point for voyages around Africa to Asia, and numerous Dutch farmers, called Boers, came to settle. When Britain seized that strategic colony in 1806, many Boers fled north, but the British eventually conquered all of South Africa and set up the Union of South Africa in 1910.That state was ruled by its white minority. International opposition to the government's policy of strict racial segregation, called apartheid, caused the government to declare itself a republic, a total free of any allegiance to Britain, in 1961. However, although South Africa became a political entity in 1910, she was little more than a figurative expression (Figure 1.1). The term 'South Africa' was current from as early as the 1830s but until the beginning of the twentieth century, it referred principally to a region extending northwards from the Cape Peninsula to the Zambezi. It was during the last quarter of the 19th century that the modern idea of South Africa began to acquire meaning and attract interest (Bergman & Renwick, 2002:197).

Figure 1.1 has been extracted to graphically depict the provinces of South Africa from the time of its transformation stages to the current

situation. The provinces of Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West received the highest numbers of illegal immigrants who entered the country.

Figure 1.1 The Provinces of South Africa (Extracted from www.exploresouthafrica.net, 20 June 2013)

Apartheid has been defined as a historically accumulative and purposeful system of racial containment. Its operational components, each with its own experiential profile and time frame fell into four distinctive yet converging categories. The categories are the racial prejudice and discrimination, racial segregation and separation, economic exploitation of natural and human resources. There was racial discrimination in legal and administrative issues and political terror. Associated with these apartheid operational components was a

set of functions and instruments which consolidated racial discrimination against the black population. Some were viewed as essential mainly to support the appreciation of apartheid. Its proponents supported racial separation of which terror was meant to perfect that end. The terror, whatever the intentions of its white perpetrators, was also true apartheid, perhaps its most indestructible component on which it was dependent for its continuation (Friedman, 1978:34).

While racial prejudice is an attitude and world-view, a sentiment, racial discrimination is an act, a measure taken to the disadvantage of its victims. Both racial prejudice and racial discrimination, in their operational form had as their objectives the creation and sustenance of racial superiority among Europeans and the denigration of the capabilities of Africans, Coloureds and Asians. In addition, they were calculated to protect both status and jobs for the Europeans based on colour. Moreover, the white race wanted to consolidate its integrity and ability to maintain the caste system where they remained on top of other races in South Africa. The maintenance of the caste system was only to reduce life chances and restrict opportunities for the advancement of Africans, Coloureds and Asians and above all, prevent equality (First *et al*., 1972:8).

The whites, who consisted only 20% of the population, controlled and managed all the state apparatus. They controlled the political system, the economy and the instruments of coercion. The constitutional instrument that regulated political activity was the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No 32 of 1961 that had superseded the amended South African Act of 1909. Parliament was reserved exclusively for the whites. The lower house was elected by whites only, the Africans and Coloureds were excluded from the common roles. Africans and Coloureds were also excluded from the Provincial Councils, even where there were homelands where Africans

participated in legislative activities. The economy was firmly controlled by the white minority. For instance, the job reservation system ensured that Africans functioned at the lower scale of the job ladder. The basic laws which regulated job categorisation were the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1967, and the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1969. These racial laws provided the Minister of Bantu Administration with powers to prescribe classes of work in which Africans were to engage and to fix the maximum numbers of Africans allowed to work in certain specific employment areas of the country.

Furthermore, restrictions were imposed on Africans by requiring them to seek employment only through the labour bureau. In addition, Africans were only to retain their employment so long as the labour bureau authorised them to do so. By banning labour orders that affected all races, it was only the blacks who had limited choice of selecting jobs regardless of the new policy (First *et al.*, 1972: 12). The 1948 -1980s era saw the white Afrikaners entrenched themselves in political economy, bureaucracy and other government institutions. All significant political and economic powers became invested in the white Afrikaners' hands. Indeed, in the 1960s Cape Town and Natal, former English provinces were effectively put under the white Afrikaner control. It was in this context that Winston Churchill's speech in Cape Town, in 1960, talked about the 'Wind of Change'. This speech gave birth to the South African government's security document called 'The Total Strategy'. 'The Total Strategy' was a result of the fear by the Afrikaners of being overwhelmed by black hordes from the Northern Cape joining the domestic workers to challenge the apartheid system (Randall, 1973:33; Gifford & Loius, 1988:481).

At the core of South Africa's human security problems was the attempt by white settlers to make a country whose population was 75% African, a white man's country, using force and social engineering as

ideological arsenal to achieve that end of segregation founded on racial lines. White people believed that they were a racial aristocracy or a master race with a mandate to lead Africans they dismissed as the 'subject of race' (Magubane, 1994:2). South Africa's apartheid system was characterised by the conquest, expropriation and the annexation of the richest parts of the country and the confinement of Africans whose labour was not immediately needed by the 'white men's' economy. It was in South Africa that race was fully abused as a principle meant to classify human beings. For the first time 'black' and 'white' were converted into racial types with certain intrinsic qualities that either qualified one to be a member of the 'master race' or the 'inferior race' (Maphai, 1994:2). Black South Africans felt the full impact of settler colonisation following the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1868. From then on, the Boers who had companies which produced the mineral wealth of the region under a regime of terror, colour-bars, pass-laws and closed compounds for indentured African migrant peasant workers, dominated politically. Under these circumstances where the blacks were ostracised, the wisdom of retaining the qualified Cape Province franchise dating back to 1853 became an issue of great importance.

The Afrikaner Bond that was formed in 1879 piloted the Glen Grey Act that geared up the dispossession of African peasants and forced them to the mines to offer cheap labour. The Afrikaner Bond itself was created with the objective of forming what its Boer leaders termed a 'South African nationality', by means of union and cooperation of white settlers as a preparation for the ultimate object of a 'United South Africa' (Maphai, 1994:57). These developments forcibly and radically reshaped the African society during the 19th century. White racial supremacy created political, economic and social institutions that negatively affected all Africans across the social divide in rural and urban settings and the illiterate or educated. In the matrix of this imposed system of white-dominated racial coexistence, new patterns

of African politics began to emerge which reflected a broad spectrum of viewpoints ranging from rejection of a new system to whole-hearted efforts to achieve desired goals through processes and structures (John, 1972:183).

From 1948, there were deliberate moves to promote the policy of separate development in South Africa. On the one hand, there were moves to reduce and eliminate black African political rights in relation to parliament, provincial councils and municipalities. However, there were at least efforts and attempts especially from the period 1997 to 2007 to try and channel black, coloured and Indian political aspirations into separate political institutions. The racial degradation of the black South Africans since 1910 in political, economic and social sectors was considered for the better from 1994. In the case of Africans, these institutions were territorially based and were in the 'homelands'. During the apartheid regime, homelands or reserves constituted the territorial basis of separate development as applied to black South Africans who were demarcated in terms of the Native Land Act of 1913 and the Bantu Land and Trust Act of 1936. In terms of the latter statute, about 7 250 000 hectares of land were to be acquired by the South African Bantu Trust to augment the reserves that were in existence. By the end of 1970, nearly one and a quarter million morgana of land was still to be acquired. When it was acquired, the Bantu areas came to 13.7% of the Republic (Randall, 1994:33). Thus, the Republican Parliament of the apartheid South Africa was a representative of white political interests only. It was of course true to the fact that, provision had been made for the separation of African representation in political institutions that were developing in the homelands (Pampallis, 1991:303; Setai, 1998:49; Franklin, 1981:279).

The attainment of independence in 1994 drew together opposition groupings and initiatives that had been fragmented by the apartheid regime's clampdowns in the 1970s and 1980s, including local non-

governmental organisations and supra non-governmental organisations. South Africa's ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), used to have closest ties with both local and international civil society groups, and during the first three years of South Africa's independence in which harmony or semblance thereof were seemingly glued by a constitutional framework founded on the cherished normative values of equality, humanity dignity and the pursuit of basic freedoms. However, the veneer of peace and harmony gradually deteriorated over the slow pace of social and economic change in the country. Black empowerment policies challenged institutionalised racial segregation amidst resistance from the previously privileged racial classes. The crucial component of the multi-faceted concept of sovereignty in South Africa was basically construed almost entirely in the international law as enshrined in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of states (Hough, 2004:235). To avoid economic and political disruptions by the former apartheid loyalists, the ANC government constructed multi-layered governance systems to protect infrastructure that shielded all the citizens and to fight critical and pervasive threats. The security infrastructure included reconstructed and reinstituted institutions at every level of society such as the police, health care networks, educational and the labour system.

South Africa represented the last bastion of colonialism and an institutionalised racial discrimination in the Southern African region, in which the black majority population had suffered inconceivable human security breaches. The CSOs activities in Southern Africa, particularly South Africa continued to be heterogeneous entities composed of diverse elements that reflected the political cleavages and conflicts of the wider societies in which they were located. There was the political manifestation of economic and political interests in which, for example, white dominated South African town councils were preoccupied with denouncing central government for corruption and

poor service delivery. Such interests were in white dominated societies such as Durban and Port Elizabeth. Interestingly, they were not located in Soweto or the province of KwaZulu Natal, where there was a likelihood of intensified political conflict. While the ANC government may have possessed the legitimate claim to the monopoly of governance and policy formulation, it was not able to claim exclusive dominion over economic and political life of the whole of the South African society. Civil society groups possessed the economic interest and moral values which were key poles around which political activity regularly clustered. These were possible because South Africa was still in the transitional stage where all institutions were either public or private entities under the influence of those who were part to the apartheid regime. The CSOs instigated the citizens to perceive that the ruling elite abuse the power granted to them. There were also individuals from CSOs who launched an oppositional critique that was taken up and popularised in informal social movements. To gain public confidence, the ANC government came up with social and economic policy shifts in the social and economic domains to lure citizens' acceptance especially during the early 2000 period. President Thabo Mbeki faced challenges of legitimacy when corruption allegations were raised in various forums by the white-dominated Democratic Alliance political party. This discourse where the civil society manufactured political consent became the source of the legitimation of state power. The right of the elite to exercise state power was ultimately dependent upon popular acceptance. In this way, the civil society organisations served the 'hegemonic' function of justifying state domination (Hyden, 1992:67).

The new concept of peace and security has brought in new human security aspects such as food security, environmental security and economic security. The nature of the relations between the Southern African states and civil society organisations seemed to suggest that cooperation in the governance system was to an extent desirable but

there was absence of commonality in human security approach to peace and security aspects. According to Synder (2008:81), in the contemporary era the concept of security is shifting away from the state to the individual or sub-state group. This implies that individuals can be threats to the state or a ruling regime while the state can also be a security threat to individuals, especially through abuse of authority in the name of regime preservation or national security. While ultimately retaining the state as the principal referent object for security, Buzan (1991:141) propounded that some of the most problematic aspects that citizens faced included many threats which were emanating either directly or indirectly from the state. However, it was just the security of the individuals that was locked into an unbreakable paradox that was partly dependent on and partly threatened by the state. The state remains the principal actor in national and international politics to provide democratic human security rights.

The Southern African region was confronted with challenges of ensuring and guaranteeing political and economic security to citizens, particularly South Africa during the 1997 to 2007. There was need to assess effects of the apartheid regime in South Africa, especially in the political and economic development landscape. There was very little which were able to be ameliorated on human security provisions to ensure and guarantee political and economic security to citizens in South Africa.

The government of South Africa and SADC region at large need to formulate policies that manage migration in the region. Non-state actors in South Africa had to step in to compliment the efforts of the government to guarantee and ensure political and social-economic development to citizens. There was absence of the written constitution at the height of the apartheid system in South Africa, where the parliament was responsible for the constitutional provisions for

governance purposes a move that made the black peoples' livelihoods miserable. The government of Thabo Mbeki was seen as having a limited civil society participation compared with the previous government of Nelson Mandela. The civil society organisations often have more 'current' information on the peace support environment which is of assistance to the South African Department of Defence (DOD). The absence of cooperation between the state and the CSOs affect peace and security in democratic governance mantra.

There are a variety of enmeshed and interlinked factors which explain why Southern African states, particularly South Africa, continue to face challenges in terms of preserving political security and economic security for the individual citizens. As South Africa emerged from a protracted war and apartheid system of governance in 1994, the challenges to human security for a democratic state appeared unsurmountable (www.tr.undp.org).The ANC government had a two-third majority in parliament but it was a political party of a coalition composed of liberation political movements and labour unions, hence for the interest of maintaining peace and security, the so called 'The Mandela Magic' of creating the Rainbow Nation and deliberately not adopting radical policy options helped the country's democratisation process. The human security approach to peace and security criticizes contemporary relations between non-state actors and the state (Dryzek *et al.*, 2008:370). In South Africa, this is evidenced by the perceptions of the non-state actors which wanted the government to cede some of its human security aspects to civil society groups. The South African government was not prepared to work with the non-state actors in policy formulation processes, fearing that national interests could be negatively manipulated. It seemed that there was a consensus among many writers with the belief that the ANC government should guarantee human security, mostly to the historically poor and marginalized black majority (Michie & Padayachee, 1997:133).

According to Eberly (2000:210), contentious non-state actors which acted against the state instilled civil society virtues in people that could help to sustain democracy and which could also lead people to overthrow democracies, the same way dictatorships were overthrown all over the globe. The ANC government was sceptical with the non-state actors' participation in governance systems. The state and the non-state actors needed each other to equitably address the human security needs of all the citizens, regardless of race or ethnicity. The most important demanding issue by the ANC government was to fulfil the dictates of the human security perspectives so that citizens at large accepted their governance systems. Due to the complexity of governance which was dictating that the state had the legitimacy to address the human security needs of all the citizens in an impartial manner, any other player outside government systems was found isolated. Although, the state had the constitutional rights to preside over state activities, it was impossible to do it alone without non-state actors complimenting its efforts.

When South Africa's political and economic independence was attained after a long and painful armed struggle, every citizen and institution in that country started another political and economic realignment, to be relevant in the changing times (Eberly, 2000:342). The regeneration of every facet of the country had detrimental effects to the new order which came into being after a protracted struggle. Among the critical institutions that brought the apartheid regime to the negotiation table included the armed revolutionary parties, labour movements, civil society groups, students and churches among others that were expected to realign their efforts to assist in the transitional order ranging from political and economic, to one which was all inclusive, regardless of race, tribe and ethnic background. Civil society groups had built social ties and a sense of mutual obligation by weaving together isolated individuals into the fabric of the larger group, tying separate individuals into the fabric of the larger group

and tying separate individuals to purposes beyond their private interest. The relationship that existed between the ANC as a liberation movement and civil society groups aggressively resisted the apartheid regime's rule. Since the concept of peace and security is embodied in the human security aspects, there is need to analyse its effects on SADC and on South Africa in particular (Eberly, 2000:7-13).

When reference is given to SADC, many generalisations are made since this group is heterogeneous. To limit such a weakness, it was important to focus the study on the case of South Africa as a representative of sub-regional countries with its own specific characteristics. In this regard, the potential effects for migration to threats to peace and security of the receiving state. The role and place of South Africa as an emerging economy and the impact on human security and peace and security as a subject of international relations.

The level and magnitude of the political and economic variables of Human Security theory cannot be ignored as they bring out ideological matters which constitute the theoretical framework of the SADC's security as a region. The use of neo-liberal and neo-realist approaches is expected to explain certain behaviours and relations between nations. It is expected that where questions of state relations arise, theories can explain why certain actions are taken in a particular way. The neo-realism and neo-liberalism approaches of how human security concept is supposed to work, assumes that political and economic insecurity is directly proportional to state, community and individuals security threats. According to neo-realism, war is an omnipresent phenomenon induced by the anarchical structure of the international system. The neo-liberalism approach to human security recognizes the state's co-existence with the transnational actors in complex interdependence. The Human Security Theory remains premised on a shift of attention from a state-centred to a people-centred approach to security.

There is a need to conceptualize political and economic developments that are the main variables of the Human Security theory. Thereafter, Peace and Security conceptual variations were explored. The central argument pursued was to draw parallels on SADC member states' peace and security provisions to society and individual peoples. The Human Security theory broadens the understanding of security provisions in the SADC region, specifically South Africa. The theory extrapolated and demonstrated how threats to peace and security can be curtailed in a democratic state. However, the preceding arguments on human security aspects proffered neo-realism and neo-liberalism approaches to provide peace and security to the state, community and individuals (Portia & Keating, 2008:45 Mearsheimer, 2001:214, Keohane & Nye, 1977:81).

The neo-realist approach to Human Security theory has been advocated by structuralists or neo-realists such as Barry Buzan in his seminal work titled, "People, State and Fear" (Booth, 2007:16). Buzan argued that the 'straitjacket' militaristic approach to security that dominated the discourse during the Cold War era was premised on the underdevelopment of the concept (Buzan, 1991:120, Van Aardt, 1997:16). The Human Security theory was broadened to include political, economic, social and environmental threats. Although, Human Security theory is examined from three perspectives of the international system, the state remains the most important and effective provider of security and by this argument it remains as a referent of human security. Buzan's analysis on Human Security theory provides the most extensive contemporary examination where the state's perspective to security is paramount. In a similar form to the classical work of Clausewitz (1897) which puts all weight on the regime in power to arbitrary rule of the country is stymied to safeguard the state's sovereign rights.

The neo-liberalism approach to Human Security theory as reflected in the work of Ken Booth advocates for a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a military determination of threats. Neo-liberal approach to Human Security theory stresses that the state must be dislodged as the primary referent of human security and more emphasis is to be put on non-state actors such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organisations. In Booth (1994) view, states and governments must not be the primary referents of security because governments that are supposed to be the guardians of their people's security have instead become the primary source of insecurity for the nationals who live under their sovereignty. The military forces of the states that used to be the threat, are no longer a threat to the state hence the argument that individuals should be referents of the human security (Buzan, 1991:160; Carim, 1995:125; Tickner, 1995:13). This approach challenges the idea that the state is an effective and adequate provider of security to its people. These arguments render the Human Security theory highly questionable.

Van Aardt (1997) posits that the state remains the primary referent of security, but this does not mean maintaining the state should be the sole or unitary referent of human security. This is the main thrust that points out that the security of the state, particularly weak ones continue to be the regime's domain, although building the capacity to provide and maintain security of the citizens is paramount. This means that the conceptualization of security should make the security of individual peoples its end. In some instances, the state cannot be dislodged as the primary referent, although it is weak. In this regard, the perception is that what constitute a state is the composition of the elements which are the government, people and territory. The state being comprised with all its constituent parts has a reciprocal relationship with the individual parts. This line of reasoning asserts that the state cannot be secure if its constituent parts are insecure or

unstable. It is therefore, that insecurity or weaknesses of a state are extrapolated by constituent parts which are weak or insecure.

Booth (1994) has argued that state security was used by governments that posed as guardians of their people's security to cloak reality and hide what essentially was the security of their regime. It is at this juncture that the regime's supporters should then dislodge the state as a referent of security because it would have failed to ensure security to its people. The neo-realist approach to security places human security alongside state security as a twin referent in the theory and practice of security. Buzan (1992) equates state and human security as 'the fate of human collectivities'. In this conceptual framework, the state becomes the referent of security and the representative of the institution of human collectivities. However, the creation of strong states is a necessary move towards guaranteeing human security but it is not a sufficient condition for improved individual and national security. The existence of the strong states would not by itself be a security guarantee. The identification of weaknesses would be able to make the state activates its governance systems to address any threat to peace and security of citizens (Booth 1994: 189; Buzan 1992: 153).

Gilpin (1987) posits eloquently that the placement of a state in the international division of labour as defined by the modern world system theory lies between the core, semi-periphery and the periphery of which this determines whether a state is hard or soft. Whereas a hard state is capable to resist the potential negative effects of external market forces through channelling the effects to its own advantage while a soft state is pliable at the mercy of external market forces and is usually unable to control its own economic affairs. These notions are very important to this study which argues that Southern African states are on the soft and semi- peripheral side because there are economic structural constraints which preclude them from achieving both economic and political security for their citizens (Gilpin, 1987:161).

To illustrate the above argument and to discredit the political and economic variables of Human Security theory, it takes individual peoples and their communities rather than the territory, state or governments as the main referent of peace and security. Central among these, is the political and economic security provisions to individual peoples and society (Waever, 1995:81; Buzan, 1991:136; UN Commission on Human Rights, 2003:70). The phenomenon of placing people-centred approach to security is meant to measure the effects of the success or failure of actions and policies that promote peace and security. A regime may adopt peace and security mechanisms to counter threats that derail policy and legal formulation agenda. The state's security in respect of threats exposed by non-state actors, the mechanisms is premised on the capacity to provide the peace and security to the citizens. The military threats include among others intra-state war, small arms proliferation, communal based violence, insurgency, rebel activity and civil war. It is the non-military threats that involve serious human rights violations, famine, environmental degradation, violent crime, economic collapse, food insecurity and natural disasters. The Southern African states and South Africa in particular, have gone through a peace and security provisional circle which was implicitly to ensure and preserve human security for all citizens (UN Commission on Human Security, 2003:2).

The Human Security theory is an emerging paradigm for understanding global and local vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. It is premised on that the idea of human security holds a people-centred view of security which is supposed to be or necessary for national, regional and global socio-political stability. The emergence of the human security discourse was the product of a convergence of factors observed at the end of the Cold War era. The factors that

challenged the dominance of the neorealist paradigm focus of states' 'mutually assured destruction' military security and briefly enabled a broader concept of security to emerge. The increasing rapid pace of globalisation and the failure of a liberal state building capacity, reduced threat of nuclear war between the superpowers. The exponential rise in the spread and consolidation of democratization offered a space in which economic development and the concept of security were reconsidered, while placing greater emphasis on the interdependency and transnationalisation of non-state actors.

The paradigm shift in international security responded to the evolution of geopolitical realities. The advent of human security in the 1990s can be seen as the triumph of the South in putting development concerns into the global security discussions. The human security concept has led to the recognition that people can be agents of change themselves. The 1994 United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report can be seen as a continuation of protests the inefficiency and amorality of the security arrangements that once responded to the East/West arms confrontation marginalizing the development concerns of the rest of the world. Although, the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report sought to reconcile post-Cold War belligerents, the Western countries and the Soviet block the later were adamant about being associated with political and civil rights while the other and postcolonial developing states emphasised on economic and development rights (Cilliers, 1996:45; Thompson, 2000:65).

The North-South Report of the Commission which was chaired by Willy Brandt in 1980 argued that the hunger and economic crisis had led to the breakdown of peace as such as military aggression. The 1982 Report of the Commission chaired by Olaf Palme called what was termed 'common security' that was defined as a blueprint for people's survival, and it further elaborated that hunger and poverty were

immediate challenges for survival more than wars and military aggression. Just like the 1994 UNDP Report, the 1992 Boutros-Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace, enunciated the explicit reference of human security as port of international responsibilities towards preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping and post-conflict recovery. It was only at 1995 Copenhagen Summit that the concept of human security was met with scepticism from the developed countries for fear that it was going to lead to violations of state sovereignty (Rugumamu, 1993:45; Mathews, 1994:32; Tickner, 1995:173).

In the late 1990s, human security concept was adopted by then UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan, who postulated that sovereignty does not only protect a state from unwarranted outside interference but also obligated the state to respect the basic rights and interests of its members. Within the UN, the concept of human security stressed the indispensable role of the UN as one of the new requisites in peace and security provision. The adoption of a Human Security Agenda by the UN stemmed from the desire to involve the NGOs to complement more feasible development agenda. To maintain international peace and security, the UN set a broad framework for collective programmes to address new and exacerbated security threats, such as economic and social threats, poverty and deadly infectious disease, inter-state conflict and rivalry, internal violence and other non-traditional threats including genocide, xenophobia and transnational organised crimes. It is therefore, prudent to describe Human Security theory both as an ethical rapture with traditional security paradigms and a methodological one with the idea that by securing individuals first, the security of the state, the region and the international system can be at least guaranteed. The Traditional Security paradigm emphasises human security by making the security of people and community as the goal (Tadjbakhsh, 2005:3; Falk, 1995:147).

Human Security theory brings together the human elements of security, rights and development that display characteristics of inter-

disciplinary concepts such as people-centred, multi-sectoral, context-specific and prevention-oriented. As a people-centred concept, Human Security theory places the individual at the centre of analysis considering a broad range of conditions which threaten survival, livelihood and dignity. Human security theory is also based on a multi-sectoral understanding of insecurities. It entails a broadened understanding of threats which includes cause of insecurity relating to economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.

Although, the various definitions of human security differ as to the relative value to be accorded each element and the strategy to be employed, the understanding of the serious and widespread threats facing human security can be deepened by placing them into seven different components. As Table 1.1 illustrates, the first component is the economic security. Economic threats can follow from a collapse of natural economy or getting into significant department. The issue of unemployment and lack of economic opportunities such as problems related to administration and taxation when starting a business. It was threats related to food security arise from, for example famine and armed conflict which often resulted to the collapse of national food production system. Then the responsibility to distribute food and have food available rests with the international humanitarian and development agencies.

The third component consists of health-related threats such as epidemics, contaminated or polluted food or drinking water and mental traumas. Environmental security on the other hand, consists of problems linked with climate change, decline of biodiversity and illegal exploitation of natural resources among others. Environmental problems are closely connected to health and food security. Cluster bombs left in nature after a war can be seen as an environmental problem, but they also have a significant effect on health. They can also ruin the soil's cultivability decreasing food supply possibilities.

Direct or indirect, physical or mental violence caused by state, community or another person is a threat against personal security. Threats that are part of this component are for example armed conflict, genocide, state torture, human trafficking as well suicides. Personal security threats are very often similar to threats directed to community security. However, UNDP considered it to be important to separate these two components as entire communities can be targets of direct or structural violence. The last component of human security is political security of which human rights violations consist of a party. The greatest threat to political security is that the state does not implement international human rights treaties. Corruption in public administration and impunity of civil servants or politicians can have significant negative effects on political security (United Nations Development Programme: http://www.undp.og/; Alm & Juntunen, 2000:23-26).

Table 1.1: Possible types of Human Security Threats (*Adapted from text in UNDP Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security, pp. 25)*

Type of Security	Description
Economic Security	Economic Security means that people have the possibilities to work and earn their livelihood. People also must have the possibility to have the society's support if for some reason they are not able to earn their living.
Food Security	Food Security refers to people having both physical (food is nearby) and economic opportunity to have food versatile enough for good health.
Health Security	Health Security is having low exposure to different diseases and high access to health services if needed, e.g. Deadly infectious disease, unsafe food, lack of access to basic health care, malnutrition
Environmental security	Environmental Security builds on actions which reduce the impact of natural and

	manmade environmental problems on human life, such as land degradation, resource depletion, natural disaster, pollution
Personal Security	Personal Security means freedom from physical or mental violence exercised by state, community or another individual, for example, physical violence, crime, terrorism, demotic violence, child labour.
Community Security	Community Security arrives from belonging to a small or large community whose identity and values a person can share. Community Security is strengthened if there is no inside or outside threat against it, such as inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions.
Political Security	Political Security means respecting human rights, such as political repression and human rights abuses.

Human Security theory emphasises the interconnectedness of both threats and responses when addressing these individual insecurities. Threats to human security are mutually reinforcing and inter-connected in two ways. Firstly, they are interlinked in domino effects in the sense that each threat feeds on the other. Secondly, violent conflicts usually lead to deprivation and poverty thereby leading to resource depletion, infectious diseases, education defects and food shortages. The other threats which can possibly erupt within a given country such as South Africa or Zambia can spread into a wider regional and international security conflict.

As a context-specific concept, Human Security theory acknowledges that insecurities vary considerably across different settings and as such advances contextualized solutions that are responsive to the particular situations they seek to address. It is therefore, in these contexts that in addressing risks and root causes of insecurities, Human Security theory is prevention-oriented and introduces a dual focus on protection and empowerment. When Human Security theory is operationalised in terms of protection and empowerment, capacities of

the governments or institutions of security require more assistance to identify impending threats. There is a need to enhance the capacities of the institutions or governance structures needed to protect the affected communities against the identified threats. It is also the empowerment strategies that build upon the capacities of the affected communities that should cope with the identified threats and on the same note to strengthen their resilience and choices to act on their own behalf and those of the others.

The thrust of protection and empowerment strategies in Southern Africa are inadequate, hence they cannot resist and respond to the identified threats and vulnerabilities. It demonstrates that since 1997, most of South African citizens have been toiling in poverty due to lack of human security. It posits that an adequate capitalization of human security for Southern African states would link human security with human development. It utilises Rugumamu (1993:15) contention that economic development must be at the top of the institutional agenda since development and security are 'two sides of the same coin'. Non-state actors do not have the capacity to bring about large-scale developments or to resolve the new security threats alone without any state assistance. It is critical to note that it is only academic to conceive of rudimentary security and development without strong and legitimate states (Tickner, 1995:210). Consequently, in the context of Africa's 'soft' states, strengthening the state was a necessary precondition for the institutionalization of peace and security. Southern African states, particularly South Africa, had to remain interventionist to build the institutional capacity to manage the non-traditional security threats that affect the people of the Southern African region. The threats of illegal movements across the borders pose serious threats to the host country which culminate in xenophobic attacks, drug and human trafficking among other illicit deals.

The Human Security theory approach to peace and security in Southern Africa and South Africa in particular, shows that the notion

of constitutional democracy assumed a form of governance where the power of the people is spelled out in a constitution. The conundrum in South Africa was a mismatch or disharmony between the theory and practice of constitutional enshrinement of governance by the South African people (Comfort, 1995:122). South Africa's democratization process had to grapple with the realization of people's expectations and accommodating their perspectives while supporting equally important socio-economic and political reforms. There had been a need for public programmes targeted at the citizens so that they understand that democracy and democratic governance means sovereignty, vested in the people and the need for them to seize the opportunities it presents (Comfort, 1995:156).

The Human Security approach to peace and security cannot be fully examined if the notion of civil society groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is left out. Borrowing from the World Bank's *Operational Directive 14/70 of 1984*, NGOs are private organisations that are characterized primarily by humanitarian or co-operative, rather than commercial objectives. NGOs pursue activities that are meant to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect environment, provide basic social services or undertake community development. NGOs are one group of players who are active in the efforts of international development and increasing the welfare of poor people in both the third world countries and very poor countries. There are other NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that see a gap in state capacity and move in to compliment the effort to improve human security. However, on the African continent, they sometimes emerge as proxy entities serving Western interests and therefore not necessarily complimenting state delivery. In South Africa, however, given the emergence of the COSATU and other democratic inclined bodies during the late 1980s, the NGO community has played a progressive role. There are differences that were noticed among the SANGOs and these were

naturally pacified after independence in 1994 and during the same period saw money and other resources flow in South Africa. This was because of SANGOs ability to levy subscriptions on a currency, the rand that had managed to maintain its strength, even as part in the emerging markets. Accordingly, the wealth management aspect which had allowed political characters such as Cyril Ramaphosa, Ibrahim and Viva Vavi, to remain relevant while enjoying some clear sense of independence in a political and economic environment that was polarised.

NGOs work both independently and alongside bilateral aid agencies from developed countries, private sector infrastructure operators, self-help associations and local governments. For a long time, NGOs have captivated the imagination of some policymakers, activists and analysts. Other observers claimed that NGOs are amid a quiet revolution. NGOs from this perspective are idealized as organisations committed to "doing good" while setting aside the profit or politics. Furthermore, optimists of NGOs' activities ignore the fact that the grassroots connections cannot survive without strong community-based organisations that mobilise local voices and interests. In criticising the "gatekeeper" role of intermediary NGOs, their link with international peace and development have been characterized as the new competitors against government in policy formulation. Although NGOs are proclaimed as a "magic bullet "to target and fix the problems that befall the national developmental process of states, they interfere in governance system which at times render weak governments to lose legitimacy. They are equally seen as instrumental in changing citizens' mind-sets and attitudes in addition to being more efficient providers of goods and services. The role of NGOs, however, may be more focused on extending and deepening individual peoples' participation, particularly if they are able to place the participatory peace into the larger provision of peace and security puzzle (Fisher, 1997; Zivetz, 1991; Edwards & Hume, 1996; Keck & Kikkink, 1998).

While the NGOs are spreading democratic and liberal values, there are other fundamentally distinct institutions that go with the civil society entity in uplifting peace and security of the populace. Civil society refers to uncoerced associational life distinct from the family and institutions of the state (Post & Rosenblum, 2002:54). Contemporary interest in civil society focuses predominately on associational life rather than market economy or exchange relations. Due to the civil society's distinct relationship with the state, current trend rather, is the power and role of associational freedom vis-à-vis the state. The association of the NGOs and civil society groups is on one hand with the state and on the other reflects different understanding of the relations. This has been the case in most SADC member states where the regime seems to be on the receiving end of non-state actors on democratic governance. Various perspectives on civil society/state relations are not mutually exclusive nor do they necessarily compete. The civil society can work apart from or against, in support, in dialogue or in partnership with the state but at the end of it all, the interests of either the civil society or state usually would raise scepticism. South Africa is a good case study for this research because it was burdened with two inherited political distortions. These included the siege mentality of the apartheid state on one hand and the legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle for liberation that sometimes left little room for dissent. Sisulu (2005) argues that the way the human rights issues are dealt with by ANC government should not be the same way it was heavily and callously handled by the apartheid regime.

In this region there have been settler governments and liberation movements have taken on the mantle of government but have not changed the political construct. South Africa has gone a little further in changing that construct than other countries, but even in South Africa it is a contest.

Regrettably, the lack of public trust has been further accentuated by the gulf between a modern democratic state on the one hand, and an extremely inequitable division of wealth. This has been the case in a strong preference for socio-economic over political change.

The Human Security theory attempts to transform traditional notions of security that are framed in terms of national or regional settings, the stability of political and economic systems and to focus on human beings. Internationally, South Africa's orientation to its external national security has changed from explicitly offensive strategy as characterised by the South African apartheid's Total Strategy approach of the 1970s and 1980s to that of a defensive approach. The White Paper on national defence in 1996 emphasised the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence of the South African state and the promotion of regional security in the SADC region (Hough & Du Plessis, 2000:65). In a document entitled 'Ready to govern: ANC policy guidelines for a democratic South Africa', adopted at its national conference in 1992, the ANC identified lack of security in terms of underdevelopment, poverty, and an absence of democratic values as promoting conflict within and between states. The primary threats to human security to be dealt with were no longer the exclusive domain of the military forces. In some instances, focus is on the primary security threats where internal economic failure, violation of human rights and political discrimination are used as tools of human security provision. The most criticism of national security is no longer found in the military power but in the favourable social, political and economic conditions which promote human rights and protect individual peoples against human insecurity (Hough & Du Plessis, 2000:16-17; Tadjbakhsh, 2005:181).

Although, the definition of Human Security theory remains devoted to international relations and developmental issues, it has also been referred to in various terms as a new conceptual framework that

defines individuals' insecurity. There is consensus among scholars of international relations that the human security conceptual framework should advocate for a paradigm shift of attention from a state approach to a people-centred approach to security. These unintended outcomes should motivate the state to ensure that the national borders are secure against any threats of incursions and invasions so that peace and security are guaranteed (Gasper, 2004:132; Doyle & Nicholas, 2006:232). Although, there was an attempt to leave the state outside the realm of governance by sharing some of its autonomy with non- state actors, the state continues to be the main referent of human security. Apart from Human Security theory as a Peace and Security conceptual framework the "absence of insecurity and threats" is premised in that individual should be free from both fear and want (Buzan, 1992:108). The notion of being secure and safe in any society or community for the individuals should be free from physical and sexual violence, death and persecution threats which might be caused by the state's negation of issues that lead to insecurity. Matlosa (1999:98), in response to the notion of security elaborated that individuals can be free from the threat of want if they are physiologically secured. Human Security theory, therefore, is all about the will and the capacity of the state to identify threats, and where possible counter them from happening. This line of reasoning asserts that the continued entrenchment of apartheid's ideological systems will exacerbate widespread insecurity across ethnic and racial lines in South Africa.

Regrettably, the core elements of Human Security theory do not necessarily reveal that security is a single concept at the heart of every individual. In fact, Human Security theory generates a conceptual framework where security "means the absence of threats" (Booth, 2007:75). This again confirms three variables which categorically assume that there should be a referent object which is supposed to be under threat, the impending or actual danger threatening the referent and a desire to escape harmful possibilities of threats. The question

which arises is mainly to be able to distinguish which one is a referent object between the states or individuals. No matter what insecurity was experienced in South Africa in the 1990s, the blacks did not stop to fight for peace and security. According to Vale (2013), "lives of the whole society can be overturned by an assault on its security" the 9 September 2011 terror attack at the World Trade Centre in United State of America, produced exactly the opposite of what is expected to protect the security of citizens. The citadel of capitalism stir up patriotic reactions and produced absolute rule in the targeted state. The attack caused the new insecurity landscape in the international system.

The outbreak of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict of 1998, also known as a "Third World War" caused the whole of SADC region and beyond to live in fear of refugee movements, food insecurity, political insecurity and ethnic killings (Mandaza, 2005:127). When a state or nation lives in a condition of war or is threatened by war, peoples' survival are normally disregarded and priority consideration would be in all dimensions pointing at nation's survival. In fact, political and social ideals which include public welfare and cultural pursuits are put on hold to give military threats a priority. Additionally, the opportunities of all Human Security theory aspects are usually ought to be forgone when survival at national level is threatened.

In Britain's so called "finest hour" when it stood alone against Nazi Germany in 1940, the Prime Minister Winston Churchill was asked about the country's human security policy. His answer to the British House of Commons was blunt and heroic when he said:

> "It is to wage war by sea, land and air with all our mighty and with all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime. I can answer in one word: Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory,

however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival" (Wohlforth, 2010:231).

Churchill's speech contained one serious misconception when he equated victory and national survival of the country. Survival is an existential condition which relates to the existence of the regime. Survival is not synonymous with living tolerably well and less still with having conditions to pursue cherished and social ambitions. For Churchill, security is required not just for survival but also to be free from life threatening threats and to have space to make choices. Critical security theory appeals to the authority of Thomas Hobbes' articles on "Morals" and "Political Philosophy". Hobbes (1894) declared that 'the safety of the people is the supreme law and opined that by safety, one should understand not merely survival in any condition but a happy life thereafter (Morgenthau, 1978:84). What is true of states and nations is also true of individuals and families. Just a condition of war in any circumstances determines the behaviour of states, so poverty determines the lives of individuals and family.

A major source of military conflict that provided focus for the Western World's perception of threat to human security was removed when the Cold War era came to an end in the late 1980s. The apartheid system's orientation of the then apartheid South Africa was the source of insecurity which was to be eradicated after its effects had compromised peace and security of Southern African states. This showed that the threat of insecurity does not come from military force only. According to Mathews (1994), as early as the 1970s, the United States of America had already expanded its definition of national security to include international economics, when it was clear that the USA economy was no longer the independent force it had once been, but it was affected by economic policies of other countries. There are two main contemporary theoretical frameworks behind the new human security, one approach is based on a neo-realist theoretical framework which maintains a continued emphasis on the primacy of

the state with a broadened conceptualization of Human Security theory (Thompson, 2000:134; Booth, 2007:41). A post-modernist or 'critical human security' approach that is rooted within that pluralist theory of international politics which represents the other end in this security discourse. There is an attempt by proponents of neo-liberalism to dislodge the state as the primary referent of security. The greater emphasis by the neo-realistic theoretical framework is on the interdependency and transnationalisation by the state on the non-state actors.

Davis (2003:65) avers that the Constitution of South Africa provided for the establishment of local government as an important sphere of government. Bound by legislation and policy frameworks to work with the people, local government was strategically positioned to furnish services and amenities to communities, deepen local democracy and uphold governance. In this case, the challenges for South Africa's municipalities were the racial and ethnic divisions created during the apartheid regime. Their task was to harmonize the competing interests and unite all constituencies. There was also a question of harmonizing traditional leadership with modern governance institutions. The scope and functions of traditional institutions versus the local government system remained blurred. The constitutional powers of traditional authorities in South Africa were circumscribed and their roles were reduced to advisory, ceremonial and extra constitutional. The creation of homelands during the apartheid era was the next step in controlling the location of the African population. The apartheid government delineated nine reserves, renamed them black homelands or Bantustans, and developed unilateral plans to populate them with Africans deemed to be unproductive. All unemployed and unemployable Africans were to be resettled in these homelands that according to Setai (1998), were 75 Bantustans in total, across the country. The government's main targets were women, children, the aged and the sick. As well, at the end of

their working life, all Africans in the urban areas were to be removed to the homelands (Setai, 1998:115; Ntsebeza, 2003:27; David, 2003:79; Comfort, 1995: 157).

The homelands, comprising 13.7% of the total land area of South Africa, consisted of about 276 areas spotted throughout the country. The Transkei's homeland was the only one that was almost homogenous. The rest were widely dispersed, pocket-sized reserves, enclosed in white territory. More than 200 unconsolidated reserves of this type were in Natal. To enhance the achievement of the resettlement policy, the government further divided the homelands into ethnic enclaves. This division reflected the poor understanding the apartheid government had of the extent of detribalisation. Through industrialisation the African cultures were converging and moving forward into a more modern world. For example, many Africans who had a Xhosa name might never have learned to speak the Xhosa language or have been exposed to the Xhosa culture. They might, however, be fluent in Sotho or Zulu, and well versed in the traditions and values of these cultures. The ethnic divisions served merely to create more strains for an already besieged people and to move a step backward by reversing cultural progress (Setai, 1998: 115-118). The history of South Africa's political and security strategies showed that the country had managed to maintain to a lesser extent, peace and security for the citizens, although relations with non-state actors remained fragile and continued to gradually deteriorate. However, Human Security theory needs to be situated in relation to state and national security. The motivation behind the Human Security theory strategies is to capture peace dividends so that individual citizens live in peace where they can access basic necessities of life. The nature of the relations between the South African government and non-governmental organisations seem to suggest that cooperation in the governance system is desirable, although there is the absence of commonality in human security approach to peace and security

aspects. This study, therefore, seeks to analyse the nature of non-state actors' operations since 1997, focusing on why peace and security is difficult to attain and how apartheid regime's legacy rendered it difficult for the South African government to ensure and guarantee human security for South Africa's individual citizens and that of Southern Africa at large (Ogata, 2002:35; Ntsebeza, 2005:142; McDonald, 2002:321; Matlosa, 1999: 47).

The human security architecture provides an understanding of Human Security theory or concept, as a starting point of analysis, a political agenda or as a political framework. In fact many studies have rigorously researched on the effectiveness of the Human Security theory on the improvement of peace and security for the community and individuals. The motive was to identify the best conditions under which Human Security theory can achieve the best results for the provision of peace and security of the state, community and individual. A majority of scholars have concluded that human security work in cases where the state is complimented its efforts in providing human security aspects. The inserts that appear throughout in this book, apply the analysis to SADC competence to analyse the effectiveness of the member state's capability to provide peace and security to the individuals and the community.

There is consensus among analysts that Human Security theory can inflict both negative and positive unintentional effects to the state, community and individuals. In the literature devoted to international relations, there should be a shift of attention from states security to security of the people who live within the states borders. Other generalisations of human security aspects include political and economic variables which need to be comprehensively attended to, for the country to enjoy peace and security. In some instances, focus is on the relationship between the state and citizens, that is how the former perceive the human security variables especially the political and

economic developments. However, other scholars question whether human security should be considered as a just means for peace and security provision for the society and individuals.

The most common criticism of human security is that it can be used as a tool in the active campaign of spread or rather imposes liberal democratic values and human rights on other countries. While this may be partly true, it is important to critically analyse in what aspects are human security aspects deemed deleterious to state's sovereignty. Consequently, and most significant to the motivations of some studies, it was identified and analysed that the negative unintentional effects of human insecurity to the society and individuals in South Africa was due to racial historical differences. The unintended outcomes include the amplification of subjective aspects and individual values while reinforcing the economic and political power of the developed countries. The debate around human security as a Western notion was therefore not a simple contestation of Asian or African values based on societal concerns over liberal individual-based values. It was entangled in grievances over conditionalities, and democracy imposition as indicated in the preceding sub-topics.

The discourse on democracy devotes considerable attention to the concept of civil society, but particularly its relationship to the state. Just as the neo-liberal variant of the concept of democracy stresses economic liberalisation as its condition and guarantee, the civil society organisation thrives better if separated from the state (Sachikonye, 1995:140). This perception highlights that the liberation of civil society from the clutches of the state is the major condition for democratisation. Keane (1992:13) posits that civil society can be conceived as an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities such as economic and cultural production, voluntary associations and household life. In this way, civil societies preserve and transform their identity by exerting all

sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions. Civil society includes organisations such as professional associations, student bodies, independent communications media, trade unions, cooperatives and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The concept of civil society spans several centuries. It features significantly in the writings of Hegel, Marx, Max, Weber and Gramsci on the state. Although the concept of civil society was synonymous with the 'commonwealth' or political society in English political thought in the 16th and 17th centuries, it underwent some modification in Hegel's distinction between the state and civil society. Marx transformed Hegel's distinction between the state where it expressed the peculiarities of civil society and its class relations (Wood, 1990:61).

Gramsci appropriated the concept of civil society to define the terrain of a new kind of struggle which extend the contest against capitalism not only to its class economy conditions but to its cultural and ideological roots in everyday life. This speaks directly to South Africa's nature of and culture of NGOs that exhibit ethnic, racial and even sub-regional characteristics for example the teacher's union, the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) and the Eastern Cape history and even roots. In Southern Africa, civil society groups are viewed as playing a critical role against statist of various shades but primarily the statism associated with a prominent role of the state in economic and political activities. In Bangura's article, he posits that the concept of civil society has been utilised in Eastern Europe in the defence of political rights and the restoration of capitalism (Bangura, 1992:75). Although the separation of the state and civil society in the Western countries gave rise to new form of freedom and equality, it created new modes of domination and coercion. The civil society was reconstituted to become a new form of social power in which main coercive functions that once belonged to the state were relocated to it in the private sphere, class exploitation and market imperatives (Gibbon, 1992:76). Other theorists concur when they observe that a

civil society organisation has no natural innocence because repressive power relations also exist in its fold (Kean *et al.*, 1992:211).

It is argued that not all civil society institutions are democratic because they do not exist independently from the state. In fact, there is an inter-penetration and interlocked nexus between the state and civil society. Beckman cogently argues that:

> "for the notion of civil society to make sense, it must involve some structuring of relations that distinguishes it from just being a society. It is the relationship to the state that is this structuring principle. Civil society is situated in rules and transactions which connect states and society" (Beckman, 1992:355).

In South Africa, the Chamber of Commerce organised and represented business interests in any public arena as defined primarily by relations to the state via legislation, tax and license provisions. This culminated in the construction of civil society being considered on rules that regulated relations between competing interests in societies. Thus, the South African government's protection of human security aspects was sought in the pursuit of productive and reproductive life. This enforced separation between the South African government and civil society in the neo-liberal mould to be conceptually untenable.

The density and outlook of civil society institutions have a bearing on the democratisation process. Civil society and the state must become the condition of each other's democratisation process. This can depend on the extent to which the totality of civil society and the state could become the condition of each other's democratization (Keane, 1992:79). This process depends on the extent to which the civil society would temper with the political instinct of a dependent and compradorian post–colonial state. Furthermore, the civil society poses as an opposition when the state has become as weak as to self-propel itself towards the one-party state (Mandaza, 1991:39). Admittedly, the growth of the civil society has been uneven within and between

countries but associations representing workers, occupational groups, students and business interests, have lately become more active, robust and better organised in the pursuit of their interests (Beckman, 1992:65; Sachikonye, 1992:56). They have made it more difficult for states to engage in coercive authoritarianism with impunity and their resistance has been instrumental in broadening the domestic space. In the post-white settler era, civil society organisations which included the bourgeois in manufacturing, mining and agriculture have played a key role in limiting the states control over economic and social civil life.

Authoritarian regimes with a dense civil society tend to be more precarious than those with a 'thin' one (Gibbon, 1992: 166). However, where a dense civil society was composed largely of traditional or neo-traditional elites, these proved amenable to certain forms of state subordination. Although the elements of civil society have been central in the drive for the restoration and consolidation of multi-party politics and structures in such diverse countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. The tendency by the student unions, labour, consumer associations and employers' associations to then represent the only centre of resistance and potential take-over of power of the former liberation state is something that continued to cause further insecurity to the citizens. The tension which was visible between the labour unions under COSATU and the ruling party ANC in South Africa caused blacks to be more vulnerable to the vagaries of economic inequalities. In Zambia where the late Fredrick Chiluba, backed by the labour movements, managed to remove President Kenneth Kaunda's UNIP political party from power using the peoples' power. The ZANU-PF and MDC political dynamics of the 2000 years created animosity among these competing institutions of power. While these forces represented sources of pressure for democratization, they also achieved their development through access to state patronage and resources or legal structures. The state/civil society relations bring

back the earlier argument that the compartmentalization of state from the civil society is more confusing than dealing with the challenges.

In Marx and Engels works, the concept of civil society hinges on the nature of bourgeois society and democracy. There are conceptual challenges presented by analysts who claim to be Marxists yet there is a lack of reflection on the theoretical status of the term in Marxism as a whole. The term is used as if it appeared only in the contemporary period with no root in Marx's works. Tracing the meaning of civil society in the Marxist classics provide the theoretical backdrop against which to assess both the theoretical and political validity of the usage of this concept in contemporary political and economic transitions in South Africa. In Hegel's (1896) article, on the other hand, he uses the term civil society to distinguish between what he called political society, whose consummation was the state and civil society, the sphere of private individuals pursuing their own interests. Hegel (1896) further argues that the state is the rule of reason in society and the incarnation of freedom of which by inclination it includes the rationalisation of the irrational and rabid civil society organisation that try to subvert the state's governance systems (Narsoo, 1991).

Marx postulates that the real threats of history are not the state but civil society itself. Through the political society from the civil society, Marxists argue that the latter was born out of bourgeois revolution as part of the freedom from the capitalist productive forces. In this regard, the perception is that the bourgeois revolution had smashed the feudal order, and it gave birth to civil liberties (Arthur, 1970:165). However, the birth of civil liberties does not constitute human emancipation and full freedom. This was a mechanism where the state is separated from the civil society so that civil society interest groups become autonomous to pursue their own interests without hindrance. The separation of the civil society and the state is an embodiment of human alienation and is reflective of sophisticated forms of

institutionalization of capitalist exploitation throughout the society. This separation serves to mask the true nature and basis of exploitation in modern bourgeois societies. What Marx is pointing at is that the freer bourgeois society seems to be, the more exploitative it becomes. In practice, NGOs do not generally perform well in the early stages of democratic consolidation. The reasons can be found in the dynamics of the democratization process, notably in the deflation of political energies that occur immediately after transition. The new regime may draw civic leaders into leadership positions in government or party institutions, thereby effectively co-opting and silencing them. Among citizens, the intense levels of political engagement that were whipped up during the election campaign cannot be sustained under normal political conditions. Indeed, political elites deliberately seek to defuse and contain the ebullience and unrealistic expectations of citizens. In addition, political factions which united around the common goal of ousting an authoritarian leader rediscover differences of interest that can divide, incapacitate and even destroy NGOs. In addition, in poor countries many of the people who became politically active during the transition choose to withdraw again into the household realm to address pressing and neglected needs of economic survival (IDR Reports, 1994).

The non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are a heterogeneous group. There are many alternative or overlapping terms in use and some of the NGOs include the third sector organisations, non-profit organisations, voluntary organisations, civil society organisation and social movement organisations. An NGO is a legally constituted organisation created by natural or legal people that operate independently from certain forms of governmental control. The term originated from the United Nations (UN) and normally refers to organisations that are not part of a government and are not conventional for-profit businesses. In cases in which NGOs are funded totally or partially by government, they maintain their non-

governmental status by excluding government representatives from its membership in the organisations. The term is usually applied only to organisations that pursue wider social aims that have political aspects but are not political parties. Shivji (2007) posits that NGOs are constituted of an independent voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis for some common purpose other than achieving government office, making money or illegal activities.

NGOs play an important role in any country in the world as they provide an umbrella of services including promotion of equality and human rights, education, economic and political empowerment. Maunden (1998) highlights and brings to the fore the fact that NGOs help citizens to participate and influence on the decision-making process and management of public affairs. Citizens can through civil society organisations make an impact on the decision-making process at both central and local government level. An inordinate amount of attention has been focused on the civil society as the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting and bound by legal order (Lekorwe, 1999). Maunden (2004) argues that the civil society in Botswana is very weak and usually lobbies beaucrats rather than politicians. Maunden (2004) further asserts that the civil society is characterized by complex ways of organising. As Lekorwe (1999) argues despite Botswana having built a successful democracy, the civil society structures remain weak and inactive to fulfil their watchdog role on government's governance systems. These assertions also confirm that the civil society organisations are organisations which are temporary in nature as they address particular issues in the society and then go into decline (Lekorwe, 1999 Maunden, 1998).

Molomo (1996) argues that some of the factors which are contributing to the weaknesses of civil society organisations, are that they are conceptually imported from outside by donor agencies in response to

the African states' donor dependency syndrome. The structure of civil society is an inward looking and less engaging when it comes to policy issues. In most cases, governments in SADC countries such as Zambia and Mozambique receive sympathetic attention from international originations and donor agencies because NGOs' pleas for humanitarian assistance (Molomo, 1996). On the same, Lekorwe (1999) argues that some civil society organisations and interest groups in Botswana continue to be manipulated by the government through state funding which is extended to them for the humanitarian purposes (Molomo, 1996; Lekorwe, 1999).

The major cultural challenge for the new democratic South Africa was to change the public perception of racial discrimination and democracy. The perception of the ethnic heterogeneity which was entrenched over a long period of apartheid system became hard to replace with the perception of multicultural supra-state. This was a by-product of the late 1990s' Immigration and Utilisation Act which targeted guest workers, refugees, economic migrants and human trafficking victims. Many people from all over Africa and beyond trekked to the post–apartheid country to seek human security in its entirety. This movement of people, especially from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia) created a multiculturalism that is qualitatively different from the diversity of lifestyles or cultural differences of historic, territorially based minorities that already characterize the independent post- apartheid state. It is the fears, challenges, dialogues and exclusions that this new multiculturalism has given rise to, and the developments that it intimates for the future (Tariq & Momood, 1997). The collapse of the apartheid regime meant, among other things, the shifting of racial ethic boundaries as new politics had been ushered and new social centres were created. Blacks that had previously been on the economic periphery began to reconstruct and reconceptualise with those white dominated economic epicentres. For centuries, South

Africa was a battle ground and frontier between Christians, Muslims, German nationals, English nationals, black Africans, Arabs, Israelites, coloureds and many other natives of different states (Hall, 1992:253).

Storey (1997) posits that culturalism was born out of a critical dialogue with both Leavisism, mechanistic and economist versions of Marxism. The educational space opened up by the Leavisites was occupied by culturalists in many ways that eventually challenged many of the basic assumptions of Leavisism. Culturalism is an approach that insists that, by analysing the culture of a society, the textual forms and documented practices of a culture, it is possible to reconstitute the patterned behaviour and variety of ideas shared by the men and women who produce and consume the texts and practices of that society (Storey, 1997; 24). It is an approach that stresses human agency, the active production of culture, rather than its passive consumption.

The classical political theory is accorded a very challenging representation to the citizens through the state to also promote human security needs. The modern economic addendum is more to the fact that the state is found in the web of promising a minimal standard of living to the workers. The post-modern cultural guarantee is the access to the technologies of communication. The latter promise derives its force from a sense that political institutions need to relearn what sovereignty is all about in polymorphous sovereign states that are diminishingly homogeneous in demographic terms. Heteroglossic populations complicate the executive government's expectation that its people will be faithful to the state, while claiming their support as the grounds for its grounded governance system (Miller, 2001:189).

There are three zones of citizenship, with partially overlapping but distinct histories. Firstly, there is the political zone with the right to reside and vote. In the South African context, this zone stresses that all races and ethnic groups are equal and must have a political

orientation. Secondly, the economic zone in South Africa stipulates that there are citizens who have the right to work and prosper than the others. Those who do not have the right to participate in the economic zone are being governed by other attributes which include education, racial background and professionalism, among others. Lastly, the cultural zone gives every citizen the right to know and speak. While both conservative critics and culturalist perspective explain cultural citizenship as the one of social movements, it must also be understood on an adjustment to economic transformation. It is in this premise that the right wing's project of deregulation has played a role in creating and sustaining cultural citizenship (Downey & Murdock, 2003:84).

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the 'post- apartheid economy' has been one of the hottest discussion topics in South Africa. South Africans, albeit for varying reasons, were concerned with the issues of economic growth and redistribution. When the apartheid system was dismantled through an election in 1994, the country found itself in a period of transition. The apartheid system had been increasing the degree of distortion in the labour market. Wage rates continued to differ between racial groups performing the same tasks. On another note, non-whites were crowded out of skilled and semi-skilled occupation and the homelands system made it impossible for the unskilled labour market to clear (Porter, 1978:65; Lundahl, 1982:116). Finally, the very creation of the apartheid bureaucracy imposed new costs on the economy, both directly and in the form of rent-seeking by the bureaucrats. The labour issue in South Africa during the first decade of independence witnessed a competitive era where blacks started to compete for political and economic hegemony in the new independent country.

The construction of a mythological discourse of the so called political 'correctness' has been used by the anti-racist forces of both the right and the liberal centre to undermine the validity of positive action

which exuded necessary ingredients of the race relations policy agenda (Dunant, 1994:90; Gordon, 1990:57).This political correctness discourse operated by exaggerating and ridiculing all anti-racist initiatives as authoritarian, illiberal, dogmatic or absurd. Further, it has been used in a broader context to undermine other egalitarian progressive movements, particularly feminism. In the light of apparently intractable problems of minority group exclusion, marginalization and impoverishment, some of those who were opposing abandoned the nationalistic approach for a restatement of the primacy of class interest and the state of the economy.

The end, of the apartheid system in South Africa in 1994, ushered in the new democratic dispensation that required the intelligence service organisation to safeguard the national security. The post- apartheid governance of South Africa was able to wade off and survive the national and international onslaught on its political, economic and social architectures due to the sophisticated intelligence service apparatus. The intelligence service organisations across the world have the duty to boost the capacity of the states to enhance the delivery of core state functions and responding to public expectations. The states' resilience is ensured through the intelligence service organisations' territorial embeddedness of state administration and institutional hegemony.

The intelligence services are shielded by legislation, norms and values which promote secrecy, hence the scrutinisation of their governance arrangements is very difficult if not possible at all. It is therefore, difficult to measure the performance and value addition of intelligence services due to the secrecy that surrounds their operations. Nonetheless, the provision of human security remains their core business as they are mandated to predict likely insecurity threats and other trends in the security landscape. The principle of intelligence gathering   is   shrouded   in   secrecy   and   information

compartmentalisation is the order of the day. Lathrop (2004) postulates that the 'need to know principle' is the guiding rule to be able to live up to states' security defence mechanisms, hence the need for intelligence compartmentalisation. The public cannot readily review the intelligence organisations' outputs, because the dissemination of the intelligence reports and information is strictly circumscribed, and everything is premised based on the "need to know principle." The notion of the "need to know" means that intelligence information should be confined or disseminated to those who by a policy framework should know. Anyone who has no direct access to the intelligence service organisation is expected to trust intelligence judgment. However, this tends to unravel uneasiness when crises arise and intelligence failures come to the fore (Lustgarten & Leigh, 1994:200; Todd & Block, 2003:187; Lathrop, 2004:45).

The transformation of the South African security and intelligence service was one of many consequences of the political transition from white minority rule to a democratic government. The intelligence transformation was a complex and difficult process, integrally linked to the broader political transition which simultaneously impacted upon it. A web of objective and subjective conditions shaped its path and its outcome and only a few of these must be highlighted to ascertain the validity of security information to national security. The South African intelligence organisation, the National Intelligence Services (NIS) remained a key factor in the country's policy formulations. It remained an influential organ of the security sector which provided critical intelligence to the state and guided political decision-making on a tactical and strategic level. This was in line with given volatility of political and security conditions during the transition from the apartheid era.

Although, the South Africa intelligence organisation went through a transitional period when "The White Paper" document was

formulated to direct operational mode of the service, it remained entrenched into the imperatives that governed apartheid intelligence domain, that is, secrecy and manipulation of governance systems for national expedience. The White Paper was a product of the legislative process which recognized that the South African intelligence services should adhere to democratic principle of governance. Secrecy was entrenched in law, when it was considered very necessary to protect the identities of members of the services, the sources of intelligence and the methods of work of the intelligence services (Currie & Klaaren, 2002:119). Although the Bill of Rights guaranteed the people the right of access to all information held by the state institutions, it remains unclear to the public what information it might request from the intelligence services.

In most cases, the public does not know what intelligence information is at hand, hence in most cases the declared information is of no consequence to the inner core of national secret security domain. It is, therefore, upon the intelligence service to release the information to the public which does not strangulate the ethos of state security. The fact that many if not all, senior appointments in the NIS were of ANC aligned members, meant that what was transpiring in the intelligence service take advantage of the ANC as a ruling political party. It meant that the intelligence service was going to work for the consolidation of the ruling ANC elite to remain in power.

 Realists argue that due to the anarchic nature of the international system, states are generally supposed to be sceptical of possibilities of permanent peace, ideas of the world government, disarmaments and concepts such as collective or co-operative security (Garnett, 1987:9). Security was broadly defined to include military threats, not only against states but also the non-states actors, sub-state groups and individuals. Although, Morgenthau (1978) views the international system as anarchic, the critical theorists such as Garnet (1987) view the

international anarchy as a socially constructed structure. Critical security focuses on changing the way people think about security, the role and the very makeup of actors in the international system.

Quincy (1998) assumes that security is always not the primary concern of all states but merely one concern that varied in importance from one historical context to the next. For instance, both military and non-military tools of state craft would be important to national security. The recognition of the security dilemma led to cautious use of military power. There were linkages made between national security and domestic affairs such as the economy, civil liberties and democratic processes (Baldwin, 1995; 22). For example, the United States of America and the Soviet Union were divided after the Second World War, over ideologies in democracy and the so called international best practice. The realistic explanation to the analogue of international best practice became the clash of capitalism and communism, especially during the Cold War period. The USA wanted to establish an international political and economic structure that favoured capitalism, while on the other hand the Soviets were concerned with exporting the workers' revolution and overthrowing capitalism at a global level, thereby exercising unrefuted control over Central and Eastern Europe. The sour and bitter relations led to the political and security antagonism for the world. The political transition in independent South Africa caused similar challenges as clashed with the entrenched apartheid systems that had been defeated. The remnants of the apartheid regime continued to the perpetuation of colonial and apartheid systems by the new government (Kaul, 1995: 87).

At present, the security aspects have shifted away from the state to the individual and non-state actors. This focuses on how individuals can be a threat to the state or the ruling regime or how the state can be a threat to the security of individuals or non-state actors in the name of regime preservation or national security. States are the most important

actors in international politics. Realists like Thucydides (431-404B.C, Machiavelli (1500BC), Morgenthau (1985) and Waltz (1979) focus more on the states and pay less attention to individuals and transnational actors like the corporations and multinational organisations (Mastanduno, 1985:187; Migdal, 1988:90).

It has become commonplace to talk about the all-encompassing role of security, after the most spectacular bombing incident which witnessed the crumbling of the World Trade Centre in New York in the year 2011. The incident brought new security concerns and measures which affected all regions of the world (Lars, 2007:35). The state regulates the security sectors, both private and public security sectors, in terms of budgets, media coverage, powers and influence over all domains of governance, including the management of welfare systems, refugees, migration, money transfers, internet use and many others. The concept of security has undergone changes resulting in the broadening of the concept to include many referents which are not necessarily the states. Unlike the traditional concept of national security, the Human Security Agenda focuses on the safety of people rather than states, and the concept of sovereignty that is conditioned by the state's respect for the rights of its citizens. Duffield (2004) posits that the aspect of sovereignty represented the absolute and unfettered power of the state over its citizens. The state could use unlimited powers against the citizens in the name of preserving and protecting sovereignty of the country thereby violating the rights of the citizens.

Security is the term used in many ways and contexts, but generally it is associated with the perceived threat to the survival of the individuals and the state and with the use of exceptional means of countering these threats. Security is about real questions of safety and violence but it is also a way of representing particular problems in a manner that makes them exceptional and a question of survival. Security is not a pre-given or unproblematic unit of analysis. Waever (1997) postulates

that security is the move that takes political issues beyond the established democratic rules of the game and frame them within a special kind of political framework. Furthermore, the issue security as a concept needs further interrogation so that perceived threats against the state can be tackled in a manner that strengthened democracy (Waever, 1997:20). At independence most African states were faced with the rubric task of designing and implementation of plans, structures and processes that would build a unified nation by addressing the injustices and imbalances that had been brought about over centuries of colonialism.

In the field of international relations, realism has long been a dominant theory and captured in ancient military theories and writings of great thinkers, such as Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli and Rousseau. The realist views anarchy and the absence of a power to regulate the interactions between states as the distinctive characteristic of international politics. Because of anarchy or a constant state of antagonism, the international system differs from the domestic system (Waltz, 1979:241). The concept of security fits well in the realism theory that has a variety of sub-schools of thought based on three core assumptions which fit very well in the Southern African states' peace and security environment. The first assumption is groupism which is very fundamental to the ideals of SADC members which come together to solve security threats through an alliance under the banner of the SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). Secondly, egoistic factors arise on the premise that some SADC member states want to put national interest as a priority to any other regional challenge. Thirdly, power-centrism comes into being due to states which want to take the big brother's position in economic, security and political development especially those which use their economic prowess to dominate others (Wohlforth, 2010:193).

The propagation of peace and security in different ways insinuates that peace is not just to go for war or not engage in conflict. There are other

variables of human security which make peace and security in the Southern African states unattainable. Due to failure to come up with commonly used concept of peace, the contemporary world has witnessed increased armed conflicts than ever. Peace definitions or concepts are the basis on which the regional groupings such as SADC decide on how to make peace. The greater the level of peace and security enjoyed, the more individuals and groups can have an existence beyond instinctual struggle merely to survive. The idea of world peace is synonymous with the freedom of individuals and groups' compatible with the reasonable freedom of others and universal moral equality compatible with fusible pragmatic inequalities (Booth, 2007:361).

The notion of peace contains the element of the world order as echoed by peace and security theorists like Hedley Bulls and Hans Morgenthau. Order among mankind as a whole is something wider than order among states, something more fundamental and primordial than it. The rich world lives in collective denial, believing itself to be too sensible, too rich, too intelligent and too privileged for life not to go on as hoped (Booth, 2007:67). In the 1980s nuclear disarmers used a joke unmasking the illogic of the pro-deterrence argument that because there had been no nuclear war for the previous forty years, the "so far so good" notion in this age of terror does not pay or is not a recipe for world security. The bombing of the World Trade Centre in 2011 in USA showed that no human species is safe from terror. Curiously, Nelson Mandela was denied to "have" control of the 6 Gun Type Nuclear weapons that had been developed under the Total Strategy of apartheid. The USA and allies negatively perceived the relations that Mandela had with the Gadhafi of Libya who was by then actively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Hence, the Pelindaba Treaty dismantling and seeking on nuclear weapons on the African continent adopted by the AU is something that has tended to downplay the realpolitik that was being played out in Pretoria. Vale (2000) posits that

the rationale of "destroying" weapons developed during the apartheid era with the assistance of Israel, the West and other countries was to deny Mandela power to be a focal point at international level. The mechanics of dismantling the weapons infrastructure prior to 1994, had significantly affected nearly hundred thousand workers and businesses that had mushroomed in and around Pretoria under this project (Booth, 2007:86).

The state is a contested concept. Marxist scholars consider it as an institution that stands for the interest of the dominant class (Pierson, 1996:78). Others view the state as the political society constructed through an implicit social contract to provide certain basic functions to its members. The Weberian view portrays the state as an array of administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive institutions that monopolise the legitimate means of violence. Another commonly used definition views the state as an embodiment of people, territory, government and sovereignty. The term 'state' is understood as a territorially embedded set of institutions that perform certain basic functions essential for the existence of a properly functioning political community. The low level of institutionalization in many African states has meant that privately motivated actions could be expressed in its name. The definition of a state employed thereafter, does not exclude the personnel working in the institutions of the state (Pierson, 1996:78-91; Einsiedel, 2005:205-215).

Although, conflict resolution, Peace and Security concept are antonyms and conceptually and analytically distinct, in this thesis the peace and conflict concepts both defined and viewed against the backdrop of security and stability in the SADC region. It is almost impossible to define conflict and peace in isolation of security and stability since both are critical variables in the analyses. For example, security is the term which denotes the absence of conflict, hence the presence of peace. However the usage of these concepts has tended to

be biased towards explaining the political predicaments of states often wrapped up in elegant terms such as "nations".

Lippmann's (2005) conception of security is instructive. For him "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes" to avoid conflict or war with the adversary (Lippmann, 1999:195). Wolfers (1999:97) perceives security as "the absence of threats to acquired values and the absence of fear that such values will be attacked." Bellany (2002: 58) says, "security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will be a consequence of any war that should occur." Presenting people as primary referent as opposed to the state, Buzan (1999) provides a more expansive explanation that encapsulates material things that are basic to human survival but does not fully delink security and therefore peace from "freedom from threats". However, Vale (2007), Riddell (2007) and Motumi (2003) argue that security is central to individual's freedom. Hence, it requires that "more attention should be given to societal security" because processes regionalisation and state sovereignty preservation are undermining the classical order based on nation states while simultaneously leading to fragmentation and national instability.

For Khadiagala (1997:53), security is ultimately the reduction of vulnerability impinging on states. Conceptually, conflict presents even a more serious problem, particularly with the increasingly expressed scepticism about the often-invoked realist definition used to describe it. Some analysts show that conflict often expresses itself in the form of violence, noting that once it assumes this character, "it becomes both undesirable and counter-productive" (Matlosa 1999:166). However, the concept carries no threatening connotations. For instance, Rubin *et al.* (1994:5) explain it as "perceived divergence of interests, or belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously." For them conflict is not inherently violent, dangerous or inimical to

peace and security, even though they concede that it is "capable of wreaking havoc on society", that is if poorly managed. Thus, two types of conflict are discernible from this definition namely harmful and harmless. The former has dogged SADC member states and South Africa in particular, for a long period of time and has prompted the formulation of political and economic policies that address peace and security of individual citizens.

Rubin *et al.* (1994:6) note that people always respond to and attempt to solve conflicts using various strategies. These include imposing their preferred solution on the other party, making concessions, climbing down from earlier positions or negotiating a mutually acceptable deal. Missing in these writings is the possibility of this problem occurring, warning of the danger of conflating the concepts of nation and state and subsuming the interests of the people under those of the state. To resolve this riddle, Locke & Mill (2007) stressed civil control of state institutions (Makoa, 1999:114). In fact, where competition for state power is central to conflict, it is difficult for a complainant to accept government and government-related institutions as arbitrators or mediators. When South Africa attained independence in 1994, the government of African National Congress (ANC) did not provide a tidy and coherent definition of conflict, peace and security.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives on the South African Human Security Drive

The continued renewal of interest in democracy and human rights discourse has projected the concept of civil society into a prominent position in terms of intellectual traction and cogence in both social science theory and development policy. Pressures for political and economic reforms have emanated from two quarters. In the late 1980s, the international political and economic developments took a new dimension where the two superpowers, United State of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), reduced and in some cases withdrew their outright support to client states, thereby undercutting authoritarian regimes. With the end of the Cold War era demands for political change in Southern Africa mainly emanated from within as citizens mobilized to rid of themselves from the then ruling military and single-party states. Civil society organisations emerged as popular human security force which threatened to capture the political initiative from the state elites.

Civil society organisations espoused a political style which provided distance from established channels, thereby questioning the legitimacy and the decisions of the government. The members of the civil society organisations usually adopted a wide range of protest acts which included demonstrations, boycotts and political strikes. Some of these acts were generally illegal according to every state's legal provision but in contrast to criminal behaviour, the actors' motives were political (Hague & Harrop, 2007:154).

To appreciate the character of social movements, it is useful to compare them with parties and interest groups (Hague & Harrop, 2007:168). Social movements are loosely organised institutions and

their origins lie outside the country's legislature. Civil society organisations emerge from the community or an organised group of people to challenge the political and economic establishments among others. Civil society organisations possess both similarities and differences with interest groups that focus on areas such as the nuclear disarmaments, feminism or the environmental. In fact, the civil society organisations do not necessarily seek state power but rather to influence government's policy formulations. They promote the pluralisation of political ideas through advocating for legislative changes which allow a broad interpretation of politics (Hogue & Harrop, 2007:169). The civil society organisations are in most cases described as 'new politics' because before the emergence of the modern state more protests were locally based than national in structure (Fisher, 1998: 187).

Regardless of how the civil society organisations are conceptualised, they played a vital role in providing a space for public voice, for the practice of citizenship and for the building of social cohesion. Castells (2000) points out that civil society organisations are imperative as a space for the building of identity in a world where citizens feel that they have little control over their circumstances and where the nation state becomes too big for its citizens and too small in relation to the global world order. It is within this space of vulnerability that the civil society sector grew. Heinrich (2007) also reiterates this, stating that civil society has always been in existence, but that the current climate of political, social and economic insecurity has facilitated the proliferation of civil society organisations across the globe. Although the civil society as an institution has been often painted in glowing terms, Castells &Heinrich (2007) propound that where cultural identity is threatened, fundamentalist organisations are likely to see a growth as people look to them as space in which to express identity. This has certainly been the case over the last decades and it explains some of the shifts experienced by the civil society organisations in South Africa

and other SADC member states in general (Castells & Heinrich, 2007:37).

Non-State Actors (NSAs) are one group of players who are active in the efforts of national and international development targeting the welfare of the poor people in most poor and developing countries. In Southern Africa, NSAs which specialise in human security provision either working independently or alongside bilateral aid agencies which provide 'private-sector infrastructure operations, self–help associations and local governments (Werker & Ahmed; 2007:3). Mostly, NSAs range in size since some were founded by individuals while some showed a complex organisational outlook with managers who are based in developed countries. The steady rise of NSAs captivated the imagination of some policymakers, political activists and analysts, leading some observers to claim that NSAs are in the midst of a "quiet political" revolution (Edwards & Hume, 1996:260; Fisher, 1997:36). Indeed, NGOs are frequently idealized as organisations that are committed to offering services free of charge while making profit or engaging in politics (Zivetz, 1991:18-19; Fisher, 1993:70). As NSAs became more active on developmental issues where their efforts were concentrated on challenging traditional approaches to peace and security paradigm which placed the state at the centre of both economic and political development processes (Dickson 1997; 155). Recent years have witnessed vigorous global transformations from below as social movements and citizen groups built transnational alliances and coalitions to resist and contest some terms of neoliberal economics by promoting an alternative programme which aimed at bolstering markets to work for the people, and vice-versa (UNDP, 1997: 91). In the realm of international development, NSAs have been characterized as the new "favoured child" of the official development agencies and as well proclaimed as a "magic bullet" to target and fix global problems (Mortinussen, 1997:115-116).

Non-state actors can also be categorised differently as international governmental organisations or public international organisations which have added a platform and a plausible voice to states' foreign policy and diplomacy. NSAs promote common interests as defined by the country they originated from. They fund programmes, activities or personalities that saw interests and objectives implemented according to the design of the state, individual personality or institution (Weiner, 2010:35-40). According to Vale (2004) NSAs were established in great numbers and for many purposes in the second half of the 20th century. Because of their diversity, NSAs presented a confusing sight in the way they handle and engage national governments on issues of human security. In Southern Africa, in general and South Africa in particular, one can easily distinguish between universal, regional and national organisations such as the United National High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). One can also distinguish between the Southern African Development Community and the Organ on Peace, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) which is a special SADC organ which deals with military and security issues of member states in the Southern African region. One can also classify NGOs according to the reasons they were established. As was shown above, COSATU stands for labour related issues while UNHCR stands for social, political and economic refugees and many other related institutions. The most pushing factor for the mushrooming of these civil society organisations has been the wish for closer social and political ties with the ruling institutions and the need for redrawing a new democratization process. Arguably, the driving force for the setting up of most of non-governmental organisations has been the desire to influence the electorate to subvert the state as an institution. The NGOs and CSOs in most instances were established to make sure that objectives and aspirations of the founders of the institutions were fulfilled (Weiner, 2010:285-295).

Although, states have far–reaching and comprehensive powers on governance policy formulation processes, the NSA had the autonomy to set up some structures which can compete with the state's institutions or complemented government's efforts to address a Human Security Agenda. Between 1997 and 2007, the Congress of Southern African Trade Unions (COSATU) had the mandate to represent South Africa's workers at any level on labour related issues. In the face of global political and economic trends which dictated negatively against the country's economic growth, COSATU competed and challenged government on various areas of policy formulation (Vale: 2004:210-11). Unlike the state, an NSA has only limited powers which are defined by the organisation's functions not by the national public. Since 1945, the establishment of NSAs has been legitimised by Article 105, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter which mandated them as authorities that are necessary for the independent exercise of its functions. This functional approach to the powers of a NSA was used by the Southern African Human Rights Organisation in its advisory opinion on SADC member states' government systems (Davis, 1997:211; Closson, 2006:97).

To determine and interpret the functions of NSA, one must take recourse to the rules of the organisation. These rules consist of; (as can be argued by analogy of UN Article 2 paragraph 1, letter (j), of Treaties between states and international organisations which primarily are of the constituent instruments, decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance with the NGOs and established practice of the organisation (Kleiner, 2010:284). The interpretation of these instruments shows the limits of international governmental organisations' functions. However, an NSA which operates in a host country that has domesticated the international law has national rights and obligations to venture into other domains of national structure. Thus, the NSA can operate independently without the government's interferences but if activities were politically motivated, logistical barricades are always

visible due to the states' motivated desire to monopolize the sovereign rights of the statehood (Kaufmann, 2008:100).

).

The NSAs in South Africa operate with state sanctioning and linked through individuals to public officials and private institutions. The main areas of focus included the executive branch of government, legislature and the judiciary. The core business of most civil society organisations (CSOs), especially the protective ones, is influencing public policy. Thus, states institutions that shaped and applied policy became the main targets. Their ideal way of influencing policy hinges on direct conversations with the government ministers who formed the political executive. If a NSA engaged the government ministers before the specific policies have been crystallized that would enabled the institution to enter the policy formulation process at an early formative stage. In most developing countries where nearly all SADC member states are found, a regional representative group usually was appointed to a joint advisory through which the concerns or motives of the NGO/CSO were made known to the relevant departments of governments (Curry, 1999:36).

The bureaucracy was undoubtedly the main pressure point by the NGOs/CSOs in any government setup. In fact, these interest groups followed where power was concentrated, and it was in civil servants' offices that detailed decisions were formed. As Matthews (1989:219) comments:

> "The bureaucracy's significance is reinforced by its policy- making and policy- implementing roles. Many routines, technical and less important decisions which are nonetheless of vital concern to interest groups, are made by public servants."

In most cases, shrewd NSAs focus on the hidden agendas which gave the government advantage over its people. They modified the details to suit their operational desires and their financiers' aspirations.

Other civil society organisations usually secured influence through their relationship with the political party that formed government. This has been the case in South Africa since 1994 when the workers' movement, COSATU became the leading partner to the ruling political party ANC to discuss and formulate industrial affairs. This politically fashioned link with the South African government's ministerial component of the executive guaranteed human security to all the citizens of South Africa regardless of race or ethnic background.

Table 2: Channels of Interest Groups Influence (*Jackie Selebi Building Collaborative Security in Southern Africa, 2012) Table 6 (page 67)*

The demise of the apartheid system in South Africa gave birth to a regime with a parliament which was a departure from the erstwhile parliamentary sovereignty regime which had a more reactive rather than proactive approach to different policy issues. This was due to the composition of members of parliament who were suspicious of each other on political and racial grounds. Accordingly governance systems suffered to the extent of derailing revolutionarisation of good democratic transformation. The attainment of a negotiated South African independence in 1994, the white minority remained in control of nearly all governance systems and security operational dynamics. As a result, NSAs treated members of parliament as opinion-leaders rather than decision-makers. Whenever COSATU began to challenge government on labour related issues, the blame was directed towards the bureaucracy. Landes (1995:488) posits that,

"Interest groups have an acute sense of smell when tracking the scent of power. Interaction with the bureaucracy and not with MPs is the goal of most groups and one reason why interest group activity is not highly visible to the untrained eye".

Whenever COSATU was left in the cold in policy-making process, they managed to seek redress through the courts or through lobbying to the executive arm of government. However, in most cases the trade union used to engage in labour boycott or industrial strikes. The donor entities, both domestic and foreign based, provided technical advice which became instrumental to the political and economic transformation in the country. The close links that existed between NSA and the government started in 1994, all democratic transformation were done by bureaucracy consulting other stakeholders. The government became sceptical of NSAs' activities when they interfere in political activities (Brehn, 2004:316).

When it comes to human security aspects in South Africa and SADC at large, the participation of NSA was greatly cherished through the public awareness on policy formulation. During the 1994 to 1999 period when South African government was under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, the formalization of democratic practices moved from participatory to consultative. The NGOs were roped in by the African National Congress government to provide defence, security, economic and social advice on policy formulation (Cawthra *et al.*, 2000: 162). Unlike the Mandela era, President Thabo Mbeki's government (1999-2008) witnessed limited NSA participation. Participation of NSAs became more visible in specialized areas only. Those that was technical in nature utilised outsiders where expertise was not available in South Africa. The NSAs complemented the ANC government on the peace support environments. The South Africa Department of Defence received assistance from NSAs in the early stages of policy formulation. The latter possessed specialized knowledge and

experience from involvement in the peace and society sector in the SADC region (Khanyle, 2003: 116).

In South Africa, interactions between the state and the NSAs were not necessarily solicited by the former but in democratic societies, it is normal practice where the NSA sector complements government in service provision (Motumi, 2003:28). Another function of NSAs in South Africa was to engage with the state with a view to influence state policy on issues that have a national character. According to Jackie Cilliers of the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), the South African government engaged the civil society and NSAs to provide agricultural inputs to legitimize policies and build support for government actions. The aim was to achieve what was called the "social consent" to avoid criticism and antagonism by those resisting the new political dispensation of ANC government. In fact, some people were wishing for the failure of the ANC government in human security aspects (Hough and Du Plessis, 2000: 14). The new government benefitted a lot from the expertise which was provided by the NSA sector. For instance, the NSA sector engaged in various discussions with the South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on a range of policy formulation processes which included the 1998 Whitepaper Policy Document on peacekeeping and many other various aspects related to the New Partnerships for Africa Development (NEPAD) and ultimately the establishment of the African Union (UN) and its various organs. This again evidently showed that human security aspects cannot be left to the state alone, but the NGO needed to complement the service delivery by the government (Cawthra, 2007:31; Jacobeit, 1998:412).

The most remarkable roles of civil society and NGOs in Southern Africa were observed in issues related to defence and security and more broadly foreign affairs (Cawthra *et al.*, 2007.167). The coming in of the ANC government in 1994 also brought in also a new phase of civil society actions in terms of governance systems. Firstly, there was

the adoption of a critical stance regarding government policy by the white South Africa media. Most NGOs were aware of the corrupt deals by ANC politicians and the nature and cost of the defence equipment procured fraudulently and how contracts were granted. The Mbeki government was forced to change defence and security policy after it was heavily criticized by the white media for allowing the then Deputy President Zuma's alleged benefits deriving from the various arms contracts, especially the procurement package. Since a host of NGOs were involved in policy issues in areas of transformation of the military and the nature of a post-apartheid security and defence, the policy formulation processes were often developed without the appropriate oversight by and accountability to parliament and the executive (Pere & Vickers, 2004:113-117). The NSAs which were involved in political clandestine activities were found arm twisting the government to formulate policies favouring their financiers. The agenda was to destroy footprints left by the apartheid era where economic and political manipulations were rampant. Accordingly, the Mandela era saw a vibrancy of civil society activity formalized to participate on the formulation of policy and the development of legislation. The 'White Paper Document' on defence and peacekeeping operations was compressively "workshopped", as was the defence policy review. In the post 1999 period, the Defence Act of 2001 was drawn up not only by the military and justice and legal experts, but experts from the NSA sector. The policy formulation in defence and security of South Africa was dominated by the white racial supremacy bias due to the nature of political, social and economic dictates which contributed as inputs for document formulation and crafting. The experts from the NSA side had interests making sure that the defence and security policy was in favour of their capitalistic aspirations which had a bias towards the post-apartheid systems (Khanyle, 2003:68).

During the period 1997 to 2007, NSA activity in South Africa was increasingly confined to the services of research provisions to government's development programmes. NSAs provided the

government with various policy framework proposals because they had stronger research capacity. Jackie Cilliers of the Institute of Security Studies posits that:

> "We can look at every sector of South African society including the areas that engage in security, where government has been weak and has been so mistrustful that government of its own people and particularly the old guard that government almost laid its self-bare to policy influence on anything from the land reform to security issues" (quoted in LePere & Vickers 2001: 68).

The Mbeki government faced challenges and competition of policy implementation and service delivery from the NSAs much more than in the Mandela era. During the latter's reign, NSAs were more concerned with peace and security issues particularly what was going to face those who benefitted politically, economically and socially during the apartheid era (Motumi, 2003: 91). Their participation was to a very large measure supportive of government policy and was aimed at contributing to the building of a democratic South Africa. NSAs provided necessary capacity skills and knowledge for the country to realize its domestic and international objectives. The fact that the South African Department of Defence solicited civil society organisations' input through various boards, among them the Equal Opportunity Board, Military Veterans Board and Military Arbitration Board, confirmed that there was a force to reckon with in terms of providing expertise in policy formulation system of government (Motumi, 2003:168; Vale, 2007:215; Riddell, 2007:18). The range and influence of the modern civil society organisations raised awkward questions about the distribution of power in liberal democracies like that of South Africa. Despite only representing a small minority and interest groups of white race of Boer origin in South Africa, the civil society groups were deeply entrenched in the formulation of a policy that directed government functions in support of their interests. Since such CSOs possessed power to influence the changes without accountability they took advantages of having access to the centre of policy making

process simply because of their historical alignment to the ruling elite of the apartheid era (Mutua, 2009:15).

The crises that erupted in some Southern African states in the 1990s illustrated that human security threats were beyond the control of any individual government or governments. These human security threats such as political, social and economic highlighted the need for greater collaboration among SADC member states, international and regional organisations, civil society organisations and community-based actors. The human security of the regional framework involves various entities of the society to provide the requisite peace and security provisions. Thomas (2000) argues that:

> "People's practice of collective action has existed throughout history, political, socio-cultural and socio-economic changes over the last decades, however, have provided a uniquely fertile ground for the emergence of new forms of civic engagement on an unprecedented scale." (Henrich, 2007:xxi)

Forms of collective action that existed outside of the family, state and market have increased and taken on new forms over the last half century and particularly in the 1990s. These structures form a very powerful space for social cohesion and solidarity, service delivery and a voice of critique and expression. The civil society organisations were, therefore, a key partner in a democratic and free society, especially in the third world countries. This is particularly pertinent in South Africa, where they played a fundamental role in the transition to democracy. Under the apartheid regime, civil society organisations had been defined by their relationship to the state. It was either they were serving the white interests and aligned to the state, or in opposition to the state. Considering the ANC government's failure in delivering on its promises, the non-state actors decided to focus on serving poor communities in most cases, without government's assistance or interest (Thomas, 2000:118).

The National Development Agency (NDA) that was established in South Africa in 1998 through the Act of Parliament is "aimed to

promote an appropriate and sustainable partnership between the state and the civil society organisations to eradicate poverty and its causes" (NDA Act, 1998). It was established primarily to develop partnership between government and NSAs for service delivery and poverty alleviation. It carried out projects or programmes that met and developed needs of the poor black South Africans who had for a long time been under racial degradation. Although the establishment of the NDA was viewed as a milestone for a partnership between government and NSAs, it paradoxically remained clear that the ANC government was skeptical of the roles the non-state actors were to undertake. NDA was one NSA which took the initiative to ensure that economic power was passed on to the blacks who were both economic and politically vulnerable. In fact, the NSAs presented an opportunity for government to develop effective and efficient partnerships that provided human security aspects to the citizen of the country (Valentine, 2010:4-7; Webner, 1999:210).

Non-State actors that were close to and familiar with the realities on the ground were important in building responses that were proactive, preventive and sustainable. Civil society organisations played a critical role in mobilizing support and advancing collective action. With the knowledge of the threats that deprived their countries of peace and security, these non-state actors were crucial partners of government in promoting human security (Mutua, 2009: 285).

The Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) was instrumental in the application of human security in South Africa during and after apartheid era. In the 1980s and early 1990s, IDASA effectively participated in the struggle to end apartheid and the ushering in of the new society in 1994. It decided to focus on democracy with the aim of generating discussions and engagement across the highly polarized South African society. In a nutshell, IDASA was founded on the ideological premises to work for political

advocacy to end racial discrimination (Gupta & Kellman, 2009:284). It was instrumental in the initiation of a process theory which insinuated that change was to occur if white South Africans resistance to change was undertaken and addressed. It was IDASA that stressed the strategic importance of involving the white community in the struggle for non-racial democracy out of their self–interest in change, not mainly by moral exhortation (Gupta & Kellman, 2009:285). While in the period 1997 to 2007 each NSA had its own individual political, economic and social circumstances, IDASA's social developmental thrust suggested that its institutional policy shifts were moulded into general methodologies for organisations that hoped to facilitate transition and consolidate democracy in South Africa and SADC region. The roles of the NGOs in national policy formulation during and after conflict were huge in that, some regimes such as the apartheid system needed to be recreated and realigned to be adoptable to the new regime's dictates (Roitberg, 2004: 30-36).

In 2008, IDASA went into an institutional reconciliatory approach that was based on the government's democratic approach on fundamental issues of human security in South Africa. The first step which was embarked on was to understand the fundamental issues South Africa were facing considering that a new democratic government was in power. IDASA then committed itself to constantly analyse the socio-economic and political situation of the country. During the early months of 2008, IDASA in partnership with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation of Germany hosted conferences to discuss the South African economy, political developments, human rights abuse and security sector reforms. This was an attempt to bring together political organisations, labour and business to analyse and understand the country's political developmental realignment and to force an economic policy that addressed the inequalities left by the apartheid system. Through discussions and an engagement with the ANC delegates in government it concluded that "a non–racial democratic

political system would be meaningless without economic restructuring" (Valentine, 2010:18; Dodson 1990: 1-2). The participation of IDASA in the South African democratic transition in the period 1994 to 2007 brought political, social and economic advantages that uplifted human security aspects of the citizens (Smouts, 1999:312).

The changing political face of South Africa in the late 1990s saw the role of NGOs such as IDASA, taking the leading role in the transition process to democracy. The NGOs continued with the role of facilitating governance systems where human security breakdowns occurred during mediations between groups, institutions and individuals (Boraine, 1994:6-7). It became apparent that NGOs in South Africa became committed to work in the field of political and economic development where greater understanding of democracy and human rights was needed to be conscientised. In their effort of conscientising the citizens about human security perspectives, NSAs became active agencies of change (Boraine, 1994:8-1) In the 1999 xenophobic attacks which erupted in South Africa, they called for a concerted effort of all human security stakeholders to take part in support of a process to pacify the political situation. The civil society groups such as IDASA, COSATU and South African Human Rights Organisation came on board to compliment ANC government's efforts to agitate for peace between foreigners and the South African citizens. The NSAs set up institutions such as the Johannesburg-based Training Centre for Democracy (TCD) where workshops, seminars and conferences offering in–depth training on the philosophy of democracy (Curry, 1999:33-34). They complimented government's effort to create a conducive environment for foreigners. However, the government was castigated for failing to preserve peace and security of South Africans who pitted foreigners in the habit of accepting an upper class in society. This came about due to better standards of living which foreigners were enjoying compared to South African citizens. In fact, foreigners were more acceptable than locals by the employment sector

which was dominated by post-apartheid elements. Equally intriguing, foreign unskilled labour was the most favoured because it was cheaper to pay and manipulate (UNDP, 1997; Vale, 2003:48).

In the quest of upholding of the human security aspects, NGOs such as IDASA and TCD facilitated cooperation with government of ANC in 1997 through the establishment of the Public Information Centre (PIC) with the mission to collect, collate, analyse and provide information on public policy. The main purpose of the PIC was to enhance the ANC government's transparency, accountability and effectiveness. The NGOs became monitoring agencies to make sure that the government followed certain policy framework that were in tandem with their dictates. Through using institutions such as PIC, the NGOs managed to provide key information for good governance and to facilitate the election and appointment to public offices at all levels of government people who were acceptable to NGOs dictates to serve the society in an open manner (Mutua, 2009: 295). The initiatives of the South African NGOs in the early years of that country's independence were extensively to maintain peace and security in that country and the region at large. Venturing into the community security policing, NGOs wanted to guide the methodology of policing which was already an existing framework in the security field (Davies, 1997:613-620).

The NGOs' argument on spearheading a government's sacrosanct area was based on the assumption that the objective of policing which was the provision and maintenance of safety and security for all individuals and communities became the regulatory tool to restrain ANC government from making arbitrary policy formulation processes without the involvement of all so-called stakeholders. NGOs believed that the ANC government during the period under review was going to face challenges in society that included high levels of crime and violence, increasing unemployment, poverty and the perceived inability of the government to make things happen. All these

machinations by the NGOs were meant to empower the society so that the government of South Africa became tamed in such a way that the policymaking process was thoroughly exhausted for popular support where policy development and implementation remained the domain of all and not the government alone (Thomas, 2000:418; IDASA, 1999).

When NGOs or non-state actors operate within the context of a donor-recipient relationship, it remained clear that the relationships contribute very little to strengthening constituency bases. The relationship between the NGOs and their donors operating in South Africa in particular, were neither to enhance horizontal linkages between autonomous actors nor vertical relations of independence (Brehm, 2004:11-15). In South Africa, NGOs were administered by the agents of political and economic transformation which were donor countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Japan, among other developed countries. Both international and domestic donor institutions became, to a larger extent, victims of donor dictated projects and programmes (Davis, 1997:299). It was difficult for NGOs to remain independent of government's control which funded the strategic direction and development of the humanitarian aid. Government or individual institutions which usually funded NGO activities have in most of cases determined to have their national or individual interests successfully implemented. In South Africa and other SADC member states, it was the discretion of the western developed states which pumped in humanitarian assistance to influence democratic transitions (Davis, 1997:23).

For any NGO to preserve a high level of independence, it had to create an overall mission of what it wanted to achieve without reference to donors. The strategic direction, according to Mutua (2009), was to collectively decide its mission, search for ways to achieve the mission objectives and then sought funding opportunities. Most NGOs which largely depended on donor intervention suffered lack of resources

because whenever the objectives of the donors were not properly observed and religiously followed, it became obviously clear in South Africa that the funding for the recipients would dry up. It became fundamentally clear for the NGOs to maintain their objectives despite donor intervention because IDASA, one of the South African civil society groups, remained autonomous of donor influences due to its reputation as a productive organisation of high-quality work with results–oriented projects and commitment to change. However, in 2009 the institution was hard hit by the lack of donor funding hence, it closed its doors. Its buildings were inherited by other independent peace and security agencies (Mutua: 2009).

COSATU received the trade agreement between South Africa and the European Union on condition that they were going to be significant effects in shaping the country's future trade relations especially developments in domestic industrial structure and employment levels. Although COSATU's relationship with the ruling party African National Congress was very cordial before relationship turned sour over political and economic fundamental issues, the labour union had a bigger role to play in shaping the future of the country. The government had no absolute autonomy to independently rule the country without criticism from the NGOs or civil society groups. In the late 1990s, COSATU felt that in the long-term, it was appropriate for South Africa to cultivate strong relationships with the developing countries, especially those she shared with the same world outlook (SAIIA, 2000:109-111). COSATU remained a cornerstone to partner government in trade negotiations with the European Union since its opposition to the trade agreement was going to derail the policy formulation and implementation. By courting COSATU in 1999, the ANC government realized that South Africa's productive capacity was going to be locked into a particular mode by the labour unions. COSATU's had a change of mind after realizing that the agreement with European Union was going to transform colonial trading

relationships and moved up the value–adding chain. The government receive support from different quotas because the move was meant to transform the economic development for the citizens (Kaufmann, 2009:60-62).

The crisis that was created by job losses in South Africa in the early 2000 made COSATU reconsider its stance on employment. While it was critical for COSATU to represent the interest of workers in matters of tariff liberalisation, export orientation and employment, the government was not allowed to enter into an agreement without consultations with the labour body. COSATU asserted that job creation and the prevention of job losses in South Africa were their primary criteria in evaluating and informing policy. Although the trade pact between the EU and South Africa was concluded, COSATU influenced the government to make sure that the interests of workers and employers were considered in the policy formulation. This is what made the agreement possible. NGOs have become an increasingly common phenomenon of social life for the people in South Africa and SADC (Gupta & Kellman, 2009:101).

Accordingly, proliferations of both international, regional and national non- governmental institutions (Shanks *et al.*, 1996:125), the growth in treaty arrangement among states (Goldstein *et al.*, 2000:160-170) and the deepening of regional integration efforts in SADC all represent the extent to which regional and national politics have become more institutionalized (Carlsnaes *et al.*, 2007;192-193). Between the 1990s and 2000, NGOs were viewed as actors providing regional and national collective and redistributive goods (Gregg, 1995:206). However, they also came to regulate many of the social, political and economic problems traditionally within nation states' purview (Smouts, 1995:441-450). Through the development of specific competencies for both regional and national policy formulation processes, SADC member states managed to transform the agendas and goals that they

were grappling with, in an effort to come up with a roadmap for peoples' human security provision. NSA had a lot of influence in South Africa's policy formulation policies, especially in the 1997 to 1999 period when the country was reorganising and aligning her policies to suit the new political dispensation a few years after the apartheid system's demise. These institutions had an agenda which was to influence and socialize influences that were very critical for the white minority to remain relevant in the new democratic system (Kingsbury, 1998:345; Olsen, 1997:157).

After independence, the South African government, went through a process of coming up with a political and economic system to accommodate the ostracised black majority. On the other hand, to dislodge the apartheid system the ANC had to tread with caution because random and aggressive actions against the whites would result in economic and political confrontations. The major sustained effort at bringing together the analysis of non- actors particularly NSAs, have been Keck & Sikkinks (1998). They found out that different NSAs were able to work with institutions which promoted respect for human rights norms and those which were able to change state behaviour in many profound ways. Haas (1992) posits that epistemic communities in different states interacted with non-governmental organisations to change national outcomes. Jacobeit (1998) postulated that "debt-for-nature swaps" found that NSAs were dominant actors in organising and implementing policies that supported their agenda. The most fundamental issue on this argument was that non-state actors were able to use the South African government institutions as leverage to promote their political and economic agenda. Where states fear that the benefits of cooperation with NSAs were disproportionately militating against them, the NSAs were able to provide influence to the states about their fears to realize that cooperation was going to bring more political and economic benefits to

improve human security for the individual citizens (Kaufman, 2008:38).

The proliferation of the security sector in the SADC member states, emanated from how some rulers of weak states contributed to change of traditional role of the state to protect and safeguard the citizens within the national borders. The military and police services were traditionally the domain of the state. The privatisation of the security sector neglected issues of "comprador states'. The weak states in Southern Africa remained not as an innocent political formation that required humanitarian rehabilitation. From a security perspective, it was a dangerous phenomenon for the state to invite the private security entity to execute peace and security roles beyond the realm of legal accountability and public oversight. The weak SADC state rulers engaged in all sorts of complex survival techniques including inviting into their countries NGOs and international outlook NSAs that were able to sell military and state food resources. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique transformed into what Rodney (1982:12-18) termed comprador regimes that were regimes that do not care about the welfare of their citizens but the economic interests and foreign economic interests of the business moguls. Closson (2006:1) conceptualizes weak states in security terms as an arena for the operations of trans-territorial networks locked in a struggle for resources. Thus, the weak state became vulnerable because its sovereignty was highly contested by both local and global non-state actors. According to Doyle (2003:8-12) during the DRC conflict (1998-2001), the South African government covertly invited a private military company, the Executive Outcomes, to help the rebels to thwart President Laurent Kabila's efforts to nationalize the economy. This private military company assisted the rebel groups to repel the government forces and other rival forces to install imperialism of manipulation (Gumedze, 2007:18). The traditional argument concerning weak states is that they are dominated by protectionist

policies of developed countries that weaken them due to their state of failure to provide human security. This approach is sympathetic to weak states as it presents them as victims of external manipulation by the NGOs and other foreign entities. Rotberg (2002: 341) notes that;

> "Failure and weakness can flow from nation's geographical physical, historical   and political circumstances, such as colonial errors and Cold War policy mistakes. More than structural or institutional weaknesses, human agency is also capable usually in a fate of war."

The importance of Ruberg's (2006) observation is that it captures the often-ignored human security agency and the role of leaders in the weakening of their states. The role of Mobutu Sese Seko in the weakening led to the most notable DRC crisis of 1998-2001 which was largely blamed on his weak leadership. Mobutu was responsible for the instrumentalisation of disorder that opened the gates for several private military groups and pseudo militant NGOs to intervene in the political conflict. According to Weber (1998:336), the problems of weak states emanate from allowing powerful forces to proffer their interests in every domain of states systems.

The interest in democracy and human rights issues had really brought into the limelight the Peace and Security paradigm. This interest was led by civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations that came to dominate sacrosanct areas of influences formerly exclusive to the state. The importance accorded to the non-state actors in the international relations compromised the state's legitimate power to rule independently. The state continued to receive a barrage of attacks from the non-state actors especially in the political, economic and security sectors that were regarded as centres of manipulation by illegitimate power systems of governance.

The non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations were supposed to complement the government efforts in human security aspects such as food security, health security, personal

security and political security. However, they tended to be critical symbols of governance systems. They wrestled power from the state especially in areas of policymaking and policy formulation processes. Non-governmental organisations have an added platform to state's foreign policy and diplomacy. Thus, they were to take care of the state's common interests at international forums and other global settings where due to donor funding structure the civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations voices were heard. Although states had far-reaching and comprehensive powers on governance policy formulation processes, there were many areas the non-state actors had structures which were able to compete with states institutions to address the Human Security Agenda.

The human security principles and aspects have been interlocked into the states' primary roles for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of populations. The human security threats such as political, food and economic developments have highlighted the need for greater collaboration among regional and international structures including civil society organisations where they were accorded the right to address issues at other international forums. Although the civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations were driven by the interests of those who fund them to compliment states' effort to address human security, the influences were usually targeted to specific competencies for both regional and national policy formulation processes which had a gender-setting and socializing influence for the governance systems.

Regardless of major concern of civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations had to pursue policy makers to consider their views and then to act on upon them. This involved inducing policy makers either to adopt a course of action that they had not initially intended to embark upon or to abandon a measure which they had originally decided to introduce. As a result, these included

participating in the formulation of policy to achieve the objectives that complement government efforts to provide human security aspects.

Chapter 3: The Evolution of Peace and Security Notions in Southern Africa

A brief history of the concept of Collective Security was dealt with in the preceding chapters, followed by an analysis of the SADC's citizens' security prospects, regional security mechanisms, peace and security developments in South Africa, peace and security impact on business in the region and role of state's security intelligence organisation in ensuring human security. This approach enabled an assessment of the effects of the concept of Collective Security on SADC countries in general and South Africa in particular. Collective Security concept is viewed as a method of controlling war in a world of sovereign states. To ensure peace and security in the region, SADC member states agreed to cooperate to dissuade incipient aggressor from their inclinations towards breaches of regional peace and security. According to this chapter, Southern Africa can hardly be termed a viable integrated regional political, economic or a regional security regime. There is a notable absence of common policy formulation process to uphold human security aspects for both individual citizens and the community at large. The Southern African Development Community is faced with a range of security challenges, all of which require a long-term capacity-building approach to instability and insecurity in SADC and the African Union should champion itself to make sure that the sub-regional body commits itself to the global reforms and initiatives required for an improvement in the current situation.

 SADC is one of the few regional economic and political bodies internationally regarded as having the potential to become a success. The current SADC was initiated as a rather loose, regional functional cooperation approach through which important political,

administrative and infrastructural links were created. In 1992 SADC adopted an "integrationist model" that was further strengthened through the joining of South Africa and Mauritius in 1994. These, then, two newcomers added a considerable economic strength in SADC due to more developed economic base than the others. In particular, South Africa's membership significantly strengthened the idea of integrating SADC through intensified intra-regional trade and by creating a Free Trade Area (FTA).

Regional interests in security and economic integration continue to spawn new regional initiatives especially in SADC. Thus, the creation of a strong sub-regional institution to deal with an array of political and security challenges was necessary. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was not able to simply rely on summitry and relations between Heads of State and Government and their ministries to resolve conflicts and promote democratic governance and eventually democratisation. As Baregu & Landsberg (eds) (2002:2-15) argue that;

> "… Southern Africa is going through a very turbulent time when its mechanisms for dealing with problems are in a state of flux".

The political, economic and individual security challenges which were faced by some SADC countries in the 1990s called for improvement on the democratic scale. During the late 1990s and early 2000, the most urgent issues which caused scepticism among SADC member states included economic, political and social instability. Refugee movements, food insecurity, employment crisis and inter/intra-state war, especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), remained a threat to human security in the SADC region.

The other peace and security challenges which were faced by the Southern African region included a virtual coup d'état in the Lesotho political crisis of 1998, a stubborn civil war of Angola in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a clash between democratisation and social justice in

Zimbabwe over the land reform programme in 1999, a revision of Namibia's decade–old constitution to give President Sam Nujoma a third presidential term, with Malawi's President Bakili Muluzi seeking to do the same in search of a third term and the highly contested elections in Zimbabwe and Zambia (Isakem & Tjonneland, 2001:6-20). The political contestations triggered by the intent to extend the term of office of the leaders was contrary to the aspirations of NGOs which saw a lot of corruption by the incumbent heads of state and government. The DRC went through a turbulent political and security phase which derailed democratic governance and the institutionalisation of centres of power of which such a political and security policy remained a complicating undertaking. In Malawi poverty, HIV&AIDS and under-development continued to coincide, posing significant threats to an already struggling democratisation project.

These security challenges hindered establishment of a strong security community in Southern Africa had political, economic, social and environmental dimensions. The absurdity of colonially inherited frontiers in DRC, South Africa and Namibia, the lack of access to food and the abuse of human rights were regarded as the most serious threat to peace and security of the individual people. This was because they invariably gave rise to security threats between communities and states in SADC, thereby endangering the security of the regional member states (Nathan, 1992:6; Thomas, 1987:35). The implosion of the Zimbabwe's economy in the early 2000s was a serious human security threat to both its citizens and neighbours. There was a severe shortage of foreign exchange reserves in Zimbabwe that was coupled with capital flight and a brain drain to South Africa, Britain and United States of America. Even in countries that have made significant strides in bringing about democratic governance such as Botswana and South Africa, poverty and inequality continued to increase causing more human insecurity (Ngoma, 2005:115-119; Nkiwane, 2000:193).

On the democratic front, most SADC states were caught between semi-authoritarianism and democracy as evidenced by the number of

disputed elections, including those held in Zambia in 2001 and Zimbabwe in 2000. Even in cases of democratic breakthrough such as the 2002 elections in Lesotho, democracy remained highly fragile and under immense security threat. In Swaziland, peace and security of both individuals and community at large was threatened by an increasingly hostile and intolerant monarchy with revolts and industrial actions by workers and opposition movements becoming the daily scenario. Apart from these human security inadequacies, the SADC sub-region continued to face the double-edged sword of weak states that were simultaneously undemocratic and had poor governance records (Ngoma, 2005:119-121).

Although there was wrangling between some SADC leaders as witnessed in the Malawi Summit in 2002 between Presidents Mandela and Mugabe, South Africa never sought to operate outside SADC on matters of security and economy. However, Southern African Customs Union (SACU) arrangement inherited from the apartheid system was never tempered with. In fact, Zambia is now a new member of the grouping. The post-conflict rehabilitation conducted in Angola in the 1990s, prevented the on and off peace process in the DRC from reverting to an all-out war. The search for political stability in Zimbabwe, while trying to address the imperatives of social injustice across the region became a tall order for SADC member states. The land question which also caused political and economic instability in Zimbabwe and the Lesotho constitutional crisis of 1998 worsened the SADC's dilemma to maintain peace and security in the region. It was not only Zimbabwe that was affected by the land question, but there were also signs simmering in Namibia and South Africa where the land question fallouts were very visible. These challenges continued to threaten not only peace, security and stability in many SADC countries, but it eroded some of the democratic gains made at independence (Meyns, 1999:13-19).

HIV&AIDS and the land question in almost all white settler societies along with devastating food insecurity emerged as major threats to human security in the SADC region. It was estimated that 22% of SADC's population was HIV positive in 2001. The HIV&AIDS epidemic was treated as a major governance issue in nearly all SADC member states. It had a massive impact in increasing poverty and inequality in most affected member countries. Furthermore, the improvement of families' social status became very difficult once there was a loss of human capital and a drop in productivity. There were increased health-care costs and a decline in savings. It became clear that reduced spending on education alone was a major threat to human security in SADC (Landsberg, 2002:194).

After the ANC Congress at Polokwane in 2007 and change of leadership, President Jacob Zuma's policies on Public Health have been lauded as remarkable after providing free access to "all those in South Africa" whose immune levels were very low. According to Dinkelman (2004) one medical doctor, Aaron Motswaledi, had done wonders in the opinion of civil society groups when he attended to the new infectious diseases. SADC member states needed political and security structures that went beyond simply managing old-styles of state-centric peace and security challenges. Instead, the challenge was also that of addressing issues of trade, democratic governance, land reform, growing poverty and inequality and eventual HIV&AIDS pandemic. It was not surprising that as early as in 1999, the SADC member states set up a task force to bring about "a SADC society with reduced HIV&AIDS prevalence" (Landsberg, 2002:197). In this case, indications were that the effects of the disease in SADC were rising and was estimated that no less than 48% of people in SADC member states lived below the poverty datum line. This was apart from other human security complexities such as crippling food insecurity. According to the April 2003 food assessment index by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), an estimated 13 million people in

SADC needed food assistance (Kornegay & Chesterman, 2000:56; Baregu, 2002:68; Bekoe, 2002:135). Thus, genuine enduring peace and security was consequently one which was all-encompassing.

The concept of Collective Security was first introduced by the League of Nations under the Treaty of Versailles to "promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security" (Chan, 1984:119; Bennett, 1991:130). Although, the founders of the League of Nations wanted world's member states to fight against any aggressive states that disturbed peace and security in the international system, the agitation was to maintain human security. Bennett (1984) propounded that Collective Security was viewed as a method of controlling war in a world of sovereign states but the capability to maintain peace and security for the individual citizens remained a global challenge. The idea of Collective Security was meant to provide the bridge between the crumbling world of past centuries and the kind of an ideal world which provided the most empowerment thrust in human security.

The theory of Collective Security as it was applied in Southern Africa in the late 1990s rested on the assumption that all nations in the region shared a primary interest in maintaining peace and security of the individuals. Bennett (1984:154) propounded that for collective security to operate, "peace must be viewed as indivisible and threats to peace anywhere must be treated as the concern of all members of the international system". The question of human security provision in a nation or state depended mainly on the effective reaction against threats to peace and security of the citizens and individuals within the state or society. Instead of concentrating on defeating the aggressor nation or individuals in line with the notion of the collective security, the human security aspects became more inclined to issues which undermined the individuals politically, socially and economically. In fact, the use of international peace to dissuade incipient aggressors from breaching peace of nations, individuals or society became less

prevalent in the late 1990s. In situations where the aggressor nation faced an overwhelming opposition from all the other members of the collective security system until peace was restored, the new human security concept demanded that peace and security started with the individual not the state. The state on the other hand was found to be the perpetrator of insecurity (Nolutshungu 1994:310; Punungwe, 1999:116; Mohammed, 2002:38).

SADC member states failed to make any significant improvements on the human security front, due to their failure to create lasting solutions to their political, social and economic insecurities (Nathan, 1992:6). There was a fundamental departure from the very narrow militaristic conception of "security" of the early 1990s to a more inclusive one after 2000. The Peace and Security concept now included individuals and societies as the subjects of security (Chenoy, 2007:348). This break emanated from the realisation that there were more security threats to the individual than previously assumed.

In the SADC region, the threats that undermined peace and security came from political conflicts. From a narrow perspective only the threats to physical safety such as armed conflict and physical torture were more acceptable as the threats to people's security. The Lesotho military crisis of 1998 was viewed as a security problem which needed military intervention by the SADC member states but possible interrelations between threats to food, political, health and economic security and their impact on the other sectors including different levels of vulnerabilities they had caused were not taken into consideration. The Lesotho crisis should have been dealt with after the identification of the most critical and pervasive threats, vulnerabilities and insecurities of the affected state sectors or community and assessing the actors and sectors involved. The deployment of military personnel worsened the community and personal security of many individuals in that country (Mandaza, 1999:81; Changara, 2000:89; Baregu, 1999:149).

The Human Security Agenda also appeared during the time of increased global interest in regional organisations, such as SADC that appreciated that the underlying cause of both inter-state and intra-state conflicts which were afflicting the region were not blamed only on political exclusion, but also on deep-seated social exclusion, relative deprivation and societal disintegration (Walsh, 2015:86). The security element of the SADC has always been crucial and central to the regional political and economic development. Meyns (1999) postulates that the development of SADC's political and security wing originated from the Southern African Development Coordination Conference era of 1980 to 1992. The major change was witnessed with the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, which is one of the SADC's Organisational units, to which all fourteen members belong. The SADC's OPDSC is a security mechanism for conflict prevention management and resolution. It is also responsible for ensuring peace and security in the Southern African region. The OPDSC can be described as an attempt to reach a collective security arrangement designed principally to promote peace and security within member states of the regional body.

The collective security system in SADC member states would have worked well if power was widely dispersed in the period 1997 and 2007. Although, the theory of Collective Security requires that the possible application of preponderant force against an aggressor reduces the odd effective action of that aggressor, the political and economic developments of member state took the centre stage on the thrust to bring peace and security in Lesotho crisis of 1998 and DRC civil war of 1999. Chan (1994:231) argues that the ideal collective security system requires a membership approaching universality. However, this was not possible in SADC due to different levels of democratisation from country to country. The South African government was not interested to intervene in the DRC conflict that erupted in 1998. The ANC government was then dominated by the

remnants of the apartheid system and the DRC conflict was viewed as the internal conflict which did not need SADC's intervention. The economic downturn that was wreaking havoc in Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia led to these countries to offer moral support to the intervention force comprised of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. The intervention of the SADC force was in line with the DRC government's appeal that the country was being invaded by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi (Baregu, 1999:36; Mandaza, 1999:65).

The theoretical models for the security community that have been provided by Deutsch, Adler and Barnett, Kupchan and Ngoma, give flesh to the human security aspects for the Southern African regional security community. Deutsch (1957) describes a security community as a "real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes in some other way". The DRC conflict which erupted in 1998 displaced women and children who left the country under harsh conditions. The larger part of the DRC population was poised to all vagaries of human rights abuses which included rape, body mutilation and torture under the hands of the rebel movements (Baregu, 1999:206).

According to Baregu (1999), challenges in the development of a security structure for the Southern African region come from the public attention given to SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) by the former colonialist states. Thus, state-centrism concept in the presence of the SADC's Organ lacked the dimensional view to uphold individual peoples' human security. Deutsch's focus on security community was not only preoccupied with matters of state survival as an important consideration for security but also as the creation of viable economic infrastructures that sustain developmental agendas. In the 1997 to 2007 period, like South Africa and Zimbabwe in 1997 to 2007 needed protective mechanisms and entitlement programmes that had an impact on communities' human security.

Ngoma (2005) argues that among such theories as "realism or neo-realism, neo-liberalism, society of states, the Kantian perspective and constructivism, it is the last one that best explains the development of security community". Constructivism is characterised by its views on global politics, the nature of the state and power. Constructivism also concentrates more on the aspect of security community paradigm that concerns itself with protecting the state rather than the individual. Ngoma insists that international relations methods should acknowledge the social identities and the source of state interests. Kupchan (2001) describes a security community as "a zone within which states have stable explanations of peaceful change and those that continue to play more traditional rules of geopolitics. Ngoma (2005), on the other hand, emphasises that states in such relationship may sometimes have differences without resorting to fighting with one another. He further reiterates that regional security communities exist in Africa and elsewhere because their members see themselves as "part of such geographical security arrangement". Thus, more emphasis on traditional rules of geopolitics defeated the essence of human security. Security cooperation is not an obvious element of regional economic integration. Moller (2009:99) argues that a region's members can progress economically without necessarily trusting each other. Despite this, the SADC leaders assumed that countries were supposed to cooperate in the security arena to improve the prospects of economic integration. At times it was unclear to some SADC member states whether or how the region was able to provide human security to the community and individual. Instead, the positions of SADC member states on the key regional challenges such as trade, growth and development, security and stability were driven by national interests rather than regional interest. Realists, such as Vale (2000) argue that national interests are hard and measurable, regional cooperation is hard to measure.

Deutsch's (year) community security theoretical framework conforms to the major tenets of constructivism where a combination of national interest and a cooperative relationship based on shared identities are unfolded. Against the backdrop of Deutsch's security community, remains a vacuum where there are no efforts to promote comprehensive and people-centred solutions that empower the individuals politically and economically. Deutsch (1987) builds upon his ideas on security communities as a group with shared identities, values and meanings with complex sustained interpersonal encounters. Deutsch (1987) regards a security community as groups of countries which "consist of people who have learned to communicate with each other and understand each other". It is critical to note that beyond the mere interchange of goods and services in regional alliances, the protection against food insecurity requires action. Although SADC member states had the primary responsibility of ensuring food security, political security, health security and economic security for their citizens, the responsibility for protection mechanisms also falls upon the international community. For a full peace and security package to protect the individual there is a need to work in close partnership to minimise the negative consequences of international policies related to food security and political security (Deutsch, 1957:145-160; Ngoma 2005:44).

In response to Ngoma (2005), Deutsch (1987) maintains that a model of security community at regional level develops a cohesive entity. Ngoma's (2005) view of Deutsch's (1987) contribution towards the SADC's integration is important for key reasons. It challenges Deutsch's   position on regional transformation and integration. Deutsch (1987) was acting against the realisation that community security has strategic interests of the masses of the people not only of an individual state but of all SADC member countries. Regardless that SADC member states maintained that there was the fundamental and structural need to have a regional integrative system managing key

functions in areas such as the economy, defence and foreign policy, the ultimate objective of peace and co-existence remained more important.

Ngoma (2005) critically fleshes out in detail factors that have been identified as conducive to the development of the Deutschean model are mutual compatibility values, strong economic links and expectation of multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions, growing number of institutionalised relationships, mutual responsiveness, and greater mobility of people and mutual predictability of behaviour. The SADC region, to some extent met the criteria of commodity of values in large movements of people amongst member states especially during the 2008 political problems in Zimbabwe, 1998 DRC civil war and the Lesotho crisis of 1998. Many economic refugees moved out of Zimbabwe, DRC and Malawi to South Africa where economic opportunities were perceived to be better. There were efforts by SADC member states to achieve peace and security in the region, by rationalising migration laws at border posts so that movement across the region was manageable. It was critical that DRC nationals who were running away from the civil war, needed protection by setting up systems that shielded asylum seekers from menaces of the war. Protection of asylum-seekers in SADC means that people who run away from political, social and economic threats need to be provided with secure environment. SADC member states were challenged by threats that were beyond their control because of the rebel fighters who were attacking certain tribes, ethnic groups, women and children. It then transcended that human security aspects needed to be applied to protect people in a systematic, comprehensive and preventive way. Each member state needed laws to accommodate people affected by security threats (Meyns, 1999:10; Vale, 1997: 29-31).

Ngoma (2005), however, argues that the prevalence of a mutual security threat and homogeneity at the cultural, political, social and ideological levels was necessary for a security community, to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhanced human freedoms and human fulfilment. It meant that the people in the SADC

region were protected from severe and pervasive threats and situations caused by various vagaries of political conflicts. On the other hand, Adler and Barnett (1998:138) stipulate that the role of the powerful states or a coalition of states should be designed in a way that provided leadership roles. That notion was to be conceptualised in security fundamentalities where protection became centralised on the state.

The argument which has been advanced by Ngoma (2005) that political and economic integration will only be reached in SADC if and when all SADC members accede to the ideal by way of consensus on good governance systems. For practical reasons, this 100% unanimity is utopian as some SADC member states are under the hegemony of apartheid or imperialism or will never be allowed by their former colonial masters to accede to regional political integration. Such states should not be allowed to hold progress of other SADC member states. While holding a firm belief that a regional security community is the only guarantee of the long-term security, Booth and Vale (1995:290) argue that "the litmus test for the existence of a security community is whether the state's target involves each other militarily". The Lesotho political instability in 1994 and 1998 and the 1998 DRC crisis showed that SADC needed a new human security paradigm to respond to the complexities and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats which ranged from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism and sudden economic and financial downturns. Such security threats tended to acquire transnational dimensions and moved beyond traditional notions of security that focused on a nation's external military aggression alone.

Ideally, human security should have brought together the human security elements conducive for economic development. Human security might have promoted a new integrated, coordinated and people-centred approach to advance peace, security and development in SADC member states. The regional efforts to stop and prevent human insecurities in the region hit a brick wall because threats to human security are mentally reinforcing and interconnected and interlinked in a domino effect way. Violence witnessed in DRC in 1998

bred vicious ethnicity violence across the Great Lakes Region and conflict spill-over effects were felt in Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The movement of refugees from DRC caused conflict spill-over effects in areas of employment, health, ethnic clashes and food insecurity on the countries that accommodated the DRC refugees who feared persecution from their home country. The DRC violent conflict worsened resource depletion, spread of infectious diseases, education deficits and unemployment in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa.

During the period from 1997 to 2007, Southern Africa was characterised by political, economic, social and environmental insecurities and risks which were overshadowed by the post-apartheid South African structural systems. The attempts to address the SADC's human security ills were founded on sensible public policy. The decay and misery remained visible in nearly every community of the SADC member states. Reflecting on what choices the region had to elevate itself out of the economic, political, social and environmental quagmire; it became clear that each SADC member state was expected to view the regional human security viewpoint in an entangled political and economic policy. Despite the diverse views of the contributions, the ranges of disagreements in the SADC region were relatively limited. While this consensus held considerable promise for the future of SADC, it was the political will that determined the way forward for the people in the region. Although, politics in SADC was all about competing interests, ideas and controversy became inevitable due to other human security threats which militated against peace and security in the Southern African region (Alden, 1993:312-320; Nolutshungu, 1993:54-60).

In the late 1990s, the SADC region was militarily volatile. The dangerous by-product of South Africa's era of destabilisation was that the region was awash with arms of war that had come to be treated as commodities. This trade was plied largely by many demobilised conventional soldiers and guerrilla fighters who became socially marginalised and who were also a dangerous and a destabilising legacy during that era. The demobilisation of military personnel by the

newly independent states was meant to cut expenditure costs which had turned out to be national security threats (Dayton, 2002:174-175).

The transformation of Southern African states to democracies was through armed struggles and negotiations. It was not a smooth transfer of power due to the colonial powers' interests in the region. In fact, the governments' political and economic transformations were complex. So serious were the interferences by the former colonial powers remnants to control means of production. The most critical and probable urgent provision of peace and security demanded the restructuring of the government. The ordinary human rights were supposed to be uplifted to enable them to influence the choices they made about their lives and their future (Taylor *et al.*, 1993:9-11).

The idea of societal security remained the cornerstone for understanding the contemporary security agenda. Waever, *et al.* (1993) propound that societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under evolving conditions and possible or actual threat. There was a need for sustainability in areas of culture, association, religion and national identity. Migration remained the SADC's problematic phenomenon where movements of peoples to new homes pose a threat to the societal security of the recipient group due to the capacity limitations. In turn, the resistance to integrate large numbers of migrating nationals caused the stability of society and therefore the ability of the receiving governments to govern (Hesler & Layton, 1993:162).

The SADC region is a product of the geographical proximity of the fourteen member states. Geographical proximity is one factor that aids in determining whether people living within would be protected and empowered against various threats that undermine development. However, the lack of proximity of the members to conform to a neat recognisable geographic area could make it difficult to exclude other states or agencies or organisations from consideration in matters that concern the regional system. Zimbabwe, for example, remained a member of several other organisations that claim regional status that include African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP), Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA) and SADC.

Although some ACP and COMESA member states do not conform to any natural geographic region of SADC, total integration to fully implement human security complexities can be a great challenge (Punungwe, 1997:67-89).

Examining the nature of human security aspects in the SADC, one cannot fail to see the imprint of the regional body's economic and political colonial history. Figure 3:1 shows fourteen members of the SADC, a rather loose regional functional cooperation through which important political, economic and infrastructural links were created. Peace and security in the SADC region has had a direct influence in the change of the spatial outlook of the member states.

Figure 3.1 The SADC members' states *(Extracted from www.afrol.comsadc, 2014)*

Adler & Barnett (1998) propound that the first regional integration tier is synonymous with the emergence of collective security that interlink

national security and political policies. The second tier is the one which identifies the factors that are conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity. The third tier identifies the development of trust and collective identity formation precipitated by a dynamic positive and reciprocal relationship between the variables of trust (Barnett, 1991:215; Adler & Barnett, 1998:17).

In the first tier, Adler & Barnett (1998) identify a range of factors that pull states in each other's direction, thereby making it imperative that they synchronise their policies. These factors which could be either exogenous or endogenous tend to encourage states to form alliances with the desire to reduce mutual fear through security coordination. A case in point was the 2000 period when South Africa signed economic agreement with the European Union excluding other SADC member states. This was designed to enforce other member states to follow a certain policy making process which adhered to democratisation systems (Matlosa, 2001:56). In SADC, the pull factors between 1997 and 2007, included changes in technology, demography, economics and politics which entailed that the integration process was going to have some simmering inadequacies. The inadequacies were going to be taken advantage of by the European Union which sought to influence SADC states to adhere to the interests which made economic and political fortunes for the European States. The industrial development of SADC was brought in the spotlight, not only in demographic problems in the form of both intra and inter-state migration, but also in areas of environmental degradation on a scale demanding concerted effort by all members of SADC. According to Cawthra *et al.* (2001:23-35) a sub-region like SADC can be defined in many different ways through geographic propinquity or intensity of interactions such as trade and formal declaration in political, historical and cultural developments. As such, SADC in this aspect, represented instances of first resort as far as the peaceful resolution of conflicts were concerned.

According to Isakem (2002), the SADC member states are expected to cooperate according to the regional defence and security pact. In the event of conflict breakup, the use of force or imposition of sanctions and the mandate to intervene rested upon the SADC's Organ. During the late 1990s collaboration on human security in SADC took different forms. These deviated from the traditional analyses of SADC, hence many protestations about how the regional body was going to promote peace and security and to defend democratic governance and democratisation without focusing on the crucial issues to its institutional governance and mechanism for peace, security, governance and democracy. Traditional analyses of the SADC tended to focus on the nature of conflicts in the sub-region, the security landscape, and proposed remedies such as preventive diplomacy, mediation and intervention (Bekoe, 2002:116; Isakem, 2002:103). It was therefore questionable whether SADC had the institutional capabilities and security mechanisms in place adequate or workable enough to provide peace and security of the people in the region.

Although many analysts have taken for granted that SADC region could promote peace, security, governance and democracy, the economic turbulences which erupted caused a lot of political and economic insecurity. There were unprecedented political upheavals which were caused by the land reform programme in Zimbabwe in 1999 and 2000 which triggered a tough period against economic sanctions instigated by the western countries such as Britain and France. The 2002 xenophobic attacks against foreigners in South Africa were caused by competition over employment opportunities. South African employers were in favour of employing cheap labour, especially from Zimbabwe and DRC, then their citizens who wanted wages which were commensurate with the poverty datum line. The DRC conflict of 1998 and the political disturbances in Zimbabwe during the same period caused an exodus of people to South Africa where employers manipulated them in various ways.

Unfortunately, South Africa remained a violent place particularly for women, children and other "disempowered victims," such as refugees. South Africa had one of the highest rates of rape in the world that gave extraordinary urgency to the cause of women's rights. Ballard *et al.* (2005) postulated that 25% of South African children were malnourished and by then whites were still earning ten times as much as blacks in that country. Despite improvements in housing, sanitation and education comparison of South Africa to a double-decker bus remained accurate (Sparks, 2003: 98). The top deck was comprised, of Coloureds, Blacks and Indians and whites. The bottom deck however dwarfed the upper deck that remained poor and black. Organised crimes that were ignored by the apartheid regime during its struggle with the African National Congress, planted deep roots in South African society in the 1990s. Drugs, prostitution and money laundering, among other ills continued unabated (Ballard *et al.*, 2005:142).

In this context, business moguls of South Africa took advantage of human insecurity of other SADC member states' citizens to maximise profits by employing them as cheap labour. The hope for SADC was that an integrated regional body would deal with deep-seated political, economic and military challenges that were simmering in the region. The fulfilment of human security aspects in their variant dimensions became a tall order for the regional body to fulfil. Problems such as epidemics, economic crises, environmental problems and intra-state conflicts became the concern of the entire region. The SADC body needed to protect its member states and their people from the pernicious and inequitable effects of globalisation which continued to militate against the improvement of human security which provided the foundation for achieving sustainable development, peace and security (Campbell, 2009:214).

Nolutshungu (1994:36) stipulates that a collective security structure that the Southern African region witnessed a reaction to severe

security problems for which there is "a requirement for a better solution and which in essence demands a comprehensive dimension". Such an approach includes politics, economics and military security considering the linkages between national levels. The hindrance to military security considering the linkages between national levels. It was also conceived as a special forum for sub-regional political, defence and security cooperation with a focus on conflict management. Although the protocol to govern and guide the work of the OPDS was finalised in 2001, the SADC member states were committed to collective security, collective defence, democratic governance and the protection of human rights, the development of common foreign policy approaches in international fora and the building of joint capacities in areas such as peacekeeping, disaster management and co-ordination of humanitarian assistance. The SADC protocol on defence and security's operationalization fulfilled the human security aspects especially, intervention in the political conflicts of DRC and Lesotho. Member states' poverty, political conflicts, economic downturn and ethnic hatred were going to be extensively worsened in the absence of such security architecture capable of managing issues of security threats (Mandaza, 1999:199; Baregu, 1999:56; Changara, 2000:29-36).

The history of security cooperation in relation to the provision of human security was characterised by multi-dimensionalism or multi-functionalism which combined economic, political, social, cultural and security aspects. It was also to be driven by a combination of economic or security imperatives and ecological and other regional developmental objectives that were going to place the individual security at the safe and protective levels (Honsohm, 2002:157).

Although, there was no consensus on institutions and mechanisms created to promote peace and security in Southern African region, the establishment of the OPDS and the Mutual Defence Pact have promoted and sustained human security in the sub-region. The end of apartheid in South Africa, the settlement of the Lesotho constitutional

crisis of 1998, the DRC conflict of 1998 and the Zimbabwe's 2000-2009 political and economic disturbances were some of the cases the SADC region intervened. According to Ngoma (1999:140), the involvement in the resolution of conflicts in the region was of great relevance.

The DRC conflict erupted at a time when the SADC region had been working towards what Vale (1999) describes as "a community of states in SADC". The Angolan conflict which prompted the OPDS' Committee of Ministers to meet in Luanda, Angola, from 17-18 December 2000 came up with a recommendation commending the Angolan government for holding a sustainable dialogue with the leadership of civil society, political parties and religious denominations in a spirit of national reconciliation (Ngoma, 1999:154-190). The SADC intervention in the Angolan political talks made the region to realise that they were able to resolve the problems thereby providing sustainable human security aspects.

The other relevance of the SADC body in the aspect of upholding human security was the way the Lesotho crisis was handled by the regional body. The fact that Lesotho was geographically inconsequential, poor and imbedded in South Africa, provided an important lesson to which human security aspects of political and economic in nature could be pacified and resolved. Three countries of Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa threatened to restore the constitutionally elected Lesotho government by force. The 1998 SADC involvement in the renewed Lesotho conflict was at the request of that country's government following a re-run of the Monarch's collusion with the opposition parties and some members of the military. Operation Boleas which involved a "Rapid Deployment Force" from Botswana and South Africa engaged the mutinous Lesotho Military (Baregu 1999:36; Mandaza, 1999:62; Meyns, 1999:136; Tsie, 1998:152). But unlike the 1994 intervention, the SADC force did not limit itself to mere threatening postures. Of particular interest in the Lesotho

political debacle of 1998, was the prevention of violence actions by the military against the civilians which came to end after the SADC force intervened (Sabina, 2003:315, http//www.crise-ox.ac.uk).

The question of SADC participation in resolving the crisis in Lesotho was critical in that it showed that the sub-regional body acted as a unified force to uphold human security aspects. The Operation Boleas which the SADC force undertook in Lesotho in 1998 fulfilled the human security aspirations to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhanced human freedom and human fulfilment, (Kofi, 2005:30, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org). According to the Mauritius SADC Communiqué of 13 September 1999, the commission of inquiry established in May 1999, was tasked to interrogate the electoral crisis in Lesotho as a way by SADC to seek a peaceful solution for the country to enjoy peace and security without the use of force. Although Baregu (1999) claims that the Lesotho controversy exposed varying agendas for the collective security community, but the peace and security was restored and the political security was provided for by the regional political initiatives (Baregu, 1999).

Another dimension which sprang from the SADC action in Lesotho was the corrosiveness of its decision to intervene militarily rather than using negotiation methods to pacify the political crisis. In 1999, a newspaper, *The Guardian*, quoted one opposition leader, Evaristis Sekhonyane commenting that the South African military intervention in Lesotho was to secure certain individuals 'interests against those of national interests which the ANC government was supposed to guarantee. This suggested that the members of SADC intervened in conflict infested areas when national interests were visible and unpopular governments were maintained in power against the will of the people (Vale, 1999:65; Nkiwane, 2000:13-28). This view was further interrogated by Baregu (1999) when he says that the South African involvement in the crisis was not "launched out of sheer altruism" but

was driven by self-interests. This meant that peace and security was maintained in Lesotho under conditions which benefited the intervention forces' national interests.

Referring to the rationale for military intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho Crisis of 1998, Zuern (2011) concludes that the SADC force saved lives and protected people from flagrant abuses. There was a constitutional crisis which had gripped the nation due to the leadership wrangle between the King and the Prime Minister. It was widely reported that the Operation Boleas was done to protect certain South African interests, such as the Katse Dam Water Scheme. The dam was of economic interest to the South African hydro-electricity generation. What made the South African intervention controversial was the fact that hardly a month earlier the South African government had refused to intervene militarily in DRC, opting for peaceful negotiation among the warring factions. This was largely because South African was pursuing her national interests outside SADC's collective security pact. Despite controversies over the Lesotho military intervention, South African and Botswana forces managed to effectively deal with the Lesotho conflict where peace and security was finally restored (Zuern, 2011:167).

The decision to intervene in the DRC in 1998 was reached in Harare after the verification committee comprised of Foreign Ministers of Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia, submitted its report reaffirming that Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi troops were invading the DRC. It was at this juncture that countries of the Southern Africa region agreed that those states which were able to send troops to defend the government of Laurent Kabila could do so (Mandaza, 2002:201).

Initially, there were doubts on whether such an intervention by the SADC Allied Force was a SADC initiative. The DRC war erupted at a time when relations between the then chairperson of SADC, President

Nelson Mandela and the then chairperson of the SADC's OPDS President Robert Gabriel Mugabe, were very tense. In fact, President Mugabe wanted the OPDS to work independent of the SADC Summit, but according to Baregu (1999) the then South African President Mandela wanted the OPDS to fall under the SADC Summit.

These differences were compounded by the DRC conflict. In fact, there were differences in the DRC crisis resolution, with Nelson Mandela advocating for peaceful negotiations among the warring factions while Robert Mugabe was advocating for military intervention. The SADC Allied Forces intervention was under a SADC undertaking under OPDS, in the sense that there was a consensus among SADC member states that President Laurent Kabila, who had taken power in 1997, was the rightful authority in the DRC and was able to demand respect and assistance for his country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Having received a request for assistance from DRC that was a member of SADC, Zimbabwe which was still chairing the SADC OPDS at the time, called for a meeting of the Inter-State, Defence and Security Community (ISDSC), comprising defence and foreign ministers that was held in Victoria Falls on 7 and 8 August 1998 which set up a Verification Committee to assess the situation in the DRC. It was on the Verification Committee's recommendation that "those countries able to do so could give assistance to President Laurent Kabila" (SADC, MDP 1999; Baregu, 1999:200). It was on this basis that Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent military contingents to the DRC in support of Kabila regime. The ISDSC did not commit itself as a body, but it left it to individual countries to decide. To a certain extent, it was clear that this was a SADC undertaking in which the SADC chair of the OPDS, President Robert Mugabe participated. According to Changara (2000), the intervention could claim legitimacy on the strength of Article 51 of the UN Charter which allows for individual or collective self-defence in cases of violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity (SADC MDP, 1999; Changara, 2000:29-36).

It is important to note that the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee did not have the final authority to make final decision. This was the mandate of the OPDS or the SADC Summit. Even though the SADCs OPDS or Summit had been convened, no decision was going to be upheld. A communiqué on the OPDS' resolution of 23 July 1996 communicated that the SADC Summit and OPDS meeting had called for the conclusion of a Mutual Defence Pact. The significance of the signing of the pacts was to pave way for the region's rules of engagement in times of aggression against peace and security of SADC. The SADC Allied Forces concluded a Mutual Defence Pact in April 1999 which was later signed meaning that all SADC member states began to perceive threats to peace and security to be common to all members and a step forward to a strong and integrated collective security community (Changara, 2000:180; Hanson, 2002:105).

Furthermore, since time was running out for the Kabila government to survive the rebels' onslaught, the OPDSC saw military intervention as a realistic move to save situations. The ISDSC was justified in the military intervention because the war was likely to cause a human security catastrophe for some SADC member states. The SADC member states' military intervention in the DRC conflict managed to prevent the escalation of the civil war that had a potential to cause serious human insecurity. Subsequently, Nelson Mandela accepted the intervention of the SADC Allied Forces on the grounds that Uganda and Rwanda forces had violated DRC's territorial integrity. Hanson *et al.* (2002:136), President Mandela further justified the SADC Allied Forces' intervention on the grounds that President Laurent Kabila had requested their support (Mandaza, 1999:290-300).

Given the dynamics of the DRC Conflict, efforts to resolve the conflict were made by various stakeholders but brutal activities continued against women and children. The region was prone to armed conflicts due to foreign interferences by the industrialised countries that

advocated for democracy. The ISDC and OPDSC's main initiative was the Lusaka peace process which was mainly to avoid the collapse of the DRC government. Zambia was threatened by the movement of refugees who were either resettled in the country or transiting to South Africa. However, the OPDS reacted effectively in the DRC conflict where the rebels were driven out of the capital, Kinshasa. Later, peaceful negotiations took place in Lusaka which finally brought relative human security provisions to the country's citizens.

The enhancement of the human security project requires cooperative, and often multilateral, responses and approaches that emphasised preventive action and engage new partnerships. Human security was advanced through the protection of human rights, respect for the rule of law, democratic governance, sustainable human development and the peaceful resolution of conflict (Cawthra *et al.*, 2001:21-23). Vale (1992:65) argues that in the post-Cold War era security in the Southern African region should have moved away from "the traditional state-centric approach to a people centric one which is guided by collective interest in regional settings". This view gained currency in the region as shown repeatedly by various political statements by SADC leaders and the ultimate creation of the SADC's OPDS in 1996. The vision to have a people-centric approach was, however, more easily articulated in words than in deeds.

Since regional integration in SADC took place in a volatile and unstable environment political and economic crisis sowed seeds of disagreements among political leaders. The first disagreements among the SADC leaders emanated from the Council of Ministers in Windhoek meeting in 1994, where the idea of a creation of the conflict resolution and political cooperation mechanism was proposed as a "sector" of SADC (Nkiwane, 2000:16). The idea of a "sector" was opposed by Angola, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe that argued that peace and security issues were very sensitive to the extent that the

SADC secretariat was not institutionally strong enough to perform the duties required by such an arrangement. However, the idea of a sector was supported by South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and the SADC Secretariat which also argued that the arrangement was consistent with the provisions of the SADC Treaty. After the SADC Council of Ministers failed to reconcile the opposing proposals, the SADC Summit which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August 1995, decided that the security sector on defence and security be allocated to any member state. The idea was again disapproved by South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland and Zambia, on the grounds that there was a possibility that the SADC Chairmanship was going to be concentrated with too much power and influence, a move which was likely to have compromised human security aspects in the region (Mandaza, 1996:66; Breytenbach, 1999:104; SADC Ministerial Meeting, 1998).

South Africa was reluctant to accept Zimbabwe's proposal that the OPDSC operate at SADC Summit level and that its own separate chairmanship should rotate on a troika basis. The OPDS marked a significant turn in Southern Africa although differences of views persisted with respect to the status and its place in the existing SADC structures and institutions. The SADC Ministerial Meeting held in Maputo, Mozambique, on 8 May 1998, broke the political impasse over the OPDS' creation when it was agreed that the "most ideal structure for the Organ's creation was to have a small committee of Heads of State which should have five members only", (Report on the Ministerial Meeting Maputo, 1998). SADC and its OPDS were seriously divided by the war that had started in the DRC on 2 August 1998. Differing views between Zimbabwe and South Africa over the necessity of a SADC military intervention in support of the DRC government widened. It was only after the military intervention in Lesotho by Botswana and South Africa that a common position over the DRC conflict that the military intervention was necessary was

reached. However, the acknowledgement by the SADC members that military intervention in the DRC was necessary incensed Rwanda and Uganda which considered it as a SADC declaration of war against them (Baregu, 1999:7-16; SADC Strategic Indicative Plan, 1999:1-18; Deconing, 1999:4).

The DRC conflict featured the multiplicity of interests of SADC member states, East African Community (EAC), Britain, USA and France. What became of the DRC conflict on the human security concept were the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats such as chronic and persistent poverty, ethnic violence, human trafficking, health pandemics, refugee movements, torture and human rights abuse, rape and arbitrary civilian killings by armed gangs. The Kabila government argued that foreign countries such as Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi had invaded sovereign territory (Baregu, 1999:15). On the one hand, the DRC rebels argued that President Kabila was corrupt and despotic. Uganda argued that it was in the DRC to create a buffer zone against dissidents of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) which were infiltrating into their country from the DRC (Baregu, 1999:6).

Rwanda's position was that President Laurent Kabila had failed to control the Hutu militants and the ex-Forces Armies' Rwanda (FAR) who had encamped in Eastern Congo to launch their attacks on Rwandan territory. The Angolan government's concern included cutting off supply lines to UNITA forces which were passing through the DRC, thereby pre-empting any political alliance between the DRC rebels and the UNITA. Although, the SADC Allied Forces were in DRC to restore regional peace and security, the element of adhering to non-aggression pact took precedence to maintain peace and security in the region (Baregu, 1999:7). The SADC Allied Forces called for consistency and coherence in solidarity interventions, South Africa differed with the other SADC Allied Forces in a regional power

struggle. South Africa was still under apartheid influence such that she was an unacceptable hegemony in the SADC. The South African Defence Forces (SANDF) had not really changed from their apartheid structures and the South African government was not ready to sacrifice their money and men for any regional cause. There was no willingness by the South African government to uphold the required principles of human security (Baregu, 1999:9).

The United States of America, Britain and France, among other Western powers, who had interests in the DRC, argued that Laurent Kabila was "despotic and that he had terminated their mining concessions, while at the same time propagated the 'buffoon theory" (Baregu, 1999:19). Although they supported the rebels who were against Laurent Kabila, their interests were to create an environment in the DRC which was receptive. The human security aspects such as the context-specific where insecurities vary across different settings were not observed. In fact, peaceful advances were proposed contextually to respond to the DRC conflict without resorting to war. Finally, the USA, Britain and France failed to observe and address risks and root causes of insecurities that were threatening the DRC as a country (Baregu, 1999:80; Cilliers, 1999:314).

To have a proper understanding of national peace and security challenges of South Africa, one needs to understand the concept of security and its dynamics. During the early years of the dismantlement of the apartheid system, the concept of security was so weakly developed that it became inadequate for the task of providing peace and security to the South African citizens. The question of peace and security whether for individual, national or international citizens ranked prominently high among the problems that faced humanity in the country (Buzan, 2007: 26-28; Jarvis, 1989:281-2). National security was particularly centralised to dominate conditions that determined security at all South African government's institutions. In this case, it

was important for peace and security to prevail with other Southern African states. Although throughout the history of states, each had been made insecure by the existence of others, the military and economic actions of each in pursuit of own natural security had combined with those of others to produce economic dislocations and at times military confrontational wars. An understanding of national security that was inadequately aware of the contradictions latent with the Peace and Security concept involved high levels of interdependence among the actors trying to make themselves secure (Burk, 2002:7-20; Jenkins, 2002:79).

The South African security, like any other security concept of SADC member state, was not the only concept through which the national security problems were to be approached. In fact, the literature on the security concept mostly analysed concept to power and peace. Walt (1991: 212) has this to say:

> "Security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use and control of military force. It explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects states and societies and the specific policies that states adopt to prepare for, prevent or engage in war."

This definition is based on the traditional understanding of security. Traditionally, security was merely the security of the state which was predominately threatened by the military of other states and was supposed to be defended by the military power of the state itself. While it is true that Walt refers to the effects of the use of force on individuals, states and societies, on the other hand, strategic studies is concerned only with the security of the state, as an institution which claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The effects of the use of force on individuals and societies is well captured in the term from techno-strategic language that gained notoriety during the Marikana Massacre of 2012, where about forty-five (45) mine workers were shot by the South African police. The damage caused by the massacre of these mine workers to individuals and to the society in which the workers lived was termed as "collateral damage" to the main study of strategy. The mine owners were interested in

maximizing profits and the deaths of those who made them to have access to minerals were not regarded as important.

Although, the Marikana Massacre which took the lives of miners had come and gone, the successes of the mining sector in South Africa would continue to be dominated by the pro-apartheid ideological fanatics. The pro-apartheid ideologically group continued to undermine the crude deterministic theories of Marxist dependency theory that saw the white South Africans deliberately seeking to impoverish the blacks. The continuing structural inhibitions against fully "changing up" with the whites remained powerful (Hall & Zhao, 1996:135; Dannreuther, 2008:22). It was salutary to note that since 1994 in South Africa, very few black businesspeople managed to expand their businesses in white dominated areas although, most of the citizens were suffering in the domains of abject poverty. The inherent moral injustice of extreme disparities of wealth was difficult to deny and was intermittently recognised by the white South Africans who continued to own economic resources such as farms, industry and the mining sector in conjunction with international business conglomerates. This was observed, for instance, in the 2000 Millennium Development Goals agreed upon by the United Nations that included the numbers of those in extreme poverty by the year 2015 (Annan, 2000:64). But whether such moral indignation and the responses, they continued to generate specific concern in South Africa since this represented inequalities against the black citizens. The argument for the security implications of such poverty and inequalities had certainly gained in strength since the end of the apartheid system in South Africa (Dannreuther, 2008:33).

Even though this argument qualifies an unqualified direct causal connection between poverty and conflict, it does not take away many more subtle and indirect ways in which poverty and inequality contribute to conditions of South African national security threat. There were three ways in which this can be seen to be the case in the South African situation in the popularity of the concept of human security. The first is related to the actual conditions of absolute poverty in which over 20 million of South Africa's population lived. For these citizens, life was inherently insecure since they lacked the necessary

protection against internal economic shock perpetuated by the apartheid legacy and suffered multiple vulnerabilities originated from the race structure. In the South African context, the period between 1997 and 2007 saw minor changes in the environmental degradation which inhibited citizen's access to clean water or primary energy resources (Mattes, 1999:154). South Africans who lived in the Bantustan environments during apartheid system, their major causes of poverty and insecurity was the prevalence of endemic societal violence, racism and xenophobic attacks. Refugees from the Great Lakes region, especially the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Ethiopia were the national symbols of such chronic insecurity (Dowthy & Fleischer, 1996:81). The return of refugees to their countries of origin remained a challenge in the South African context, because most of the refugees were mainly economic refugees who wanted to find jobs and work in that country. As long as the source of insecurities still remained in their home, their return was impossible. Refugees who had flooded South Africa in search of economic, political or religious security provisions later realised that prospects to get the same was not easy due to challenges the country was going through. National security and development are in these ways inextricably linked such that South African economic prosperity and security remained doomed by the increasing numbers of foreigners who continued to claim normal life and the alleviation of their poverty (Swelling *et al.*, 2004:95).

The second dimension related to the processes and trajectories leading from poverty to prosperity. Although security was seen as an essential vehicle for development, it became clear that development did not necessarily lead to national security. Indeed, as depicted in Polanyi's (1944) seminal work on European industrialisation, development remained a wrenching, disruptive and socially destabilising force that brings with it significant increases in inequality, personal alienation and societal conflict.

The security and stability that brought development to South Africa were prizes which were yet to be gained after the end of apartheid system that had dominated governance structures (Stieglitz, 2002:25;

Mazower, 1999:54). The South African government faced challenges of intermediate security that could dismantle post-apartheid systems while, on the other hand, seeking to contain the multiple conflicts generated by this very process (Huntington, 1968:234).

The third dimension emphasises on the security implications of the subjective rather than the strictly objective perceptions of poverty and inequality. One of the major insights in conflict theory is that it is relative deprivation, rather than absolute deprivation that is the most significant determinant of conflict in countries such as those of SADC (Finkel & Rue, 1986:314). The path taken by the South African government to empower the once marginalised blacks to embark on the path of development, faced challenges of injustices in national distribution of wealth and political power motives. The fears and resentments which were generated by the erstwhile protagonists, blacks and the apartheid system, brought into play perceived exclusionary anathema whose purpose was to place obstacles to job creation and peace environment in the country. South Africans viewed their SADC neighbours as the principal sources of criminality, illegal migration and ethnic conflict. Such fears and mutual concerns, driven by a mix of substantial inequalities, caused by a broader national insecurity in South Africa (Madlala, 2005).

The socio-political legacies of South Africa's colonial and apartheid past has rendered human security processes at national level extremely complex. This was because the legacies of apartheid (poverty, marginalisation and unequally distributed resources) persisted in the country. The apartheid system used to emphasise the significance of racial and cultural identity above other identities, although identities as a whole were supposed to be dynamic and continuously contracted. It was in the apartheid setting that identity was imposed and treated as a fixed, primordial and assigned at birth. This view of ethnicity persisted in the post-apartheid setting or at times being reinstituted

after the ANC government observed distinct advantages to emphasise ethnic purity to give blacks a political space Author, (2011). South Africa was viewed through skewed lenses which contributed to racial segregation in social and economic life (Sharp, 1986:16-36; Muthien *et al*., 2000:134).

The ideologies of apartheid system were difficult and continued to be difficult to dissolve in South Africa. There were problems which emanated from the racial inequalities of outcomes which prompted to have a look on the past inequalities of opportunity and to focus on the sheer inequalities of outcomes. One other important reason why South Africa needed to address inequalities of outcomes was the extreme spectrum of wealth in that country that meant the very poor citizens in the townships simply did not have sufficient means to lead a dignified and humane life. There was a need to keep pace with peace and security of South Africa through providing a minimum standard of life to individual citizens of that country. Furthermore, there was need to identify the unjust acts under apartheid and colonialism. Inequalities of outcomes had not arisen as per chance but it was specifically engineered through repression and robbery of black people in the South Africa farms, townships and industries. This again raised difficult questions of blaming others as guilt and how practical was restitution in the face of intergenerational injustice. These two questions of basic standards of living and restitution whether land or money was rigorously debated to provide peace and security to South Africa citizens. The most nuanced reason that demanded consideration was that inequalities of outcomes in South Africa fundamentally obscured the conception of what it meant to have an equal opportunity and thus hindered the ability to deliver to a society which had existed in maximised nation of inequalities of opportunity (Herald, 2013; Klandermans, 2001:43; Kihato, 2001:107).

The extreme inequality of outcomes meant that South African politicians did not appreciate what the barriers to opportunities were. Indeed, there was an extreme ignorance from those who were supposed to help the people, to extricate from racial and economic impoverished systems that had remained starkly segregated. As such, the way the private power, economic class, culture, geography and race were viewed, continued to divide the people. Segregation ensured that the white middle class South Africans were able to live their lives in isolation from poor black South Africans. Thus, the white professionals such as professors, business leaders did not understand the extent and nature of inequalities of opportunities (Buijs, 1998:661-682). It was in fact that without structures to ensure a proliferation of views of what the conception of equal opportunity was, it was difficult to even know what needed to be done to ensure it. Alexis de Tocqueville, a French philosopher, is said to have remarked when he arrived in America that he had never seen a country which was free and equally led. Tocqueville was not being amazed or surprised by the fact that everyone in America was earning the same but that the equality meant that the leaders were governing in full cognisant of the circumstances of their fellow citizens. It was along this vein, that the South African leadership was expected to balance axiom of political system to remove disparities along ethnic lines. In fact, inequality of both outcomes and opportunities was so problematic in South Africa that opportunities remained suppressed such that the poor, corporate and government leadership continued to be out of touch with the realities (Campbell, 2009:52-58).

During the period from 1997 to 2007, South Africa's trade with and investment in Africa precipitated a plethora of changes in the SADC region and beyond. The ANC government propelled the growth of the private sector as a way of providing the civil society sector roles in addressing the development challenges facing their societies. It was in this vein that the growth of South African investment and trade with

the SADC members and others in the continent was viewed as a benevolent to promote peace and security in South Africa and the region. This was a way of doing business since the demise of the apartheid system. In fact, there was a processing of crowding out formerly protected monopolies which had close links with the governing elites, thereby invoking a wave of criticism from both citizens and foreigners. Although there was a high critique on the South African way of approaching trade and investment in the late 1990s and early 2000, the SADC region and beyond welcomed the two tier approach of investment and trade as a tool to pacify labour practices and racial discrepancies (Karume, 2003:176; Kihato, 2001:65).

According to Waltz (1998) the combined capability of a state (military, economic and political) shapes the behaviour of actors in the anarchic international system, when they fear the wrath of a more powerful state. South Africa's defence spending by 1997 was more than the annual gross national product (GDP) of most SADC member states. South Africa was therefore, capable of playing a hegemonic role in SADC region. South Africa was committed to entrench a power-sharing and reconciliation policy model that brought democracy in 1994. Under President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa interpreted the policy model to mean that "South Africa cannot impose its will on others but it can help to deal with instability by offering its resources and leadership to maintain peace and security". While it has been argued that international relations in the 21st Century are devoid of power politics, the extension of democracy has rendered them obsolete, it is also reasonable to argue that most SADC states are yet to experience this trend. South Africa is surrounded by many states whose internal instability and commitment to democracy were in doubt. Because of political and economic uncertainty in most SADC member states in the late 1990s, South Africa's challenges to expansion became within the context of power politics and relations between states. South Africa's dominance was able to influence the regional's

economic development, although in areas of security cooperation, she continued to be viewed with proposed suspicion (Brogden, 2004:623-626; Bratton, 2004:16; Waltz, 1998:112-113; Hills, 2000:421-431).

South Africa remained an economic giant dwarfing other SADC member states' economies. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1998 was $169 billion (R945 billion) (The World Group, Total GDP 2003, Quick Reference Tables' online at http://www.worldbank.org/data, quickreference/quickref.html). Its economy was 82 times larger than the GDP of the average state in Africa as a whole. Since 1998, it reasserted its economic dominance in the bilateral trade with the SADC member states and others beyond, and expanding this relationship into a significant investment (Grobbelaar, 2004:200-203). Since 1994, the priority of the South African government was to search for peace and security of the nation which was battered during the apartheid period. Trade and investments became prominent to build good relations with the neighbouring, countries, especially those of SADC. South Africa's total trade in 1997 with SADC had grown by just under 400% and these exports had increased from R8.6 billion in 1997 to R38.8 billion in 2008. Although, there was an apparent increase in the importation of goods from other SADC member states, there was also an export growth in South Africa which was fuelled by the growth of investment especially, in the food, retail, tourism and construction sectors. This investment growth indicated that the opening of opportunities for other nationalities to come to South Africa for jobs and trading. The movement of other nationalities to South Africa meant that there was a growth challenge to the country's human security, especially, in the areas of politics, economy and environment. The political and economic gaps which were occupied by the foreigners in South Africa agitated the South African citizens to wage xenophobic attacks in 2001 and 2005 as a way of out flanking foreigners they accused of taking their jobs (www.thedti.gov.za, 2014).

The South African political and economic sectors became the pace setters of social stability, thereby providing peace and security to the country's citizens. Although the South African investment into the SADC region and Africa grew significantly during the 1997 to 2007 period, this was due to the country's end of economic isolation by the international community over the apartheid system. The economic growth had limited effect on the black population because they were not involved in the development programmes. According to the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) estimates, the investment into SADC grew from R10 billion in 1998 to just over R29 billion in 2005 (SARB Quarterly Bulletin, September 2005: 86-9). Although this figure represented about 5% of total South African investment of R819 billion abroad in 2004, the impact of this investment on SADC and African societies far outweighed its modest value (Media Monitoring Project 2014; Ntsebeza, 2005:23).

Table 3.1: South African Foreign Assets by Region, 2005 *(SARB, SARB Quarterly Bulletin, 2004)*

Region	Value (Rand millions)	%
Africa	31.8	4.3
Asia	13.0	3.2
Europe	600.0	70.1
International Organisations	55.4	6.2
North & South America	158.9	15.1
Oceania	8.5	1.1
Total	**867.6**	**100**

South African investors distinguished themselves well from the traditional investors in SADC and Africa by their willingness to invest in risky sectors. A 2004 study by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) indicated that 86% of the investment in Africa was resource-based predominately in the extractive industries and low-technology sectors. Although most South

African investors had moved aggressively beyond investment in mining, (a leading sector in terms of value and employment generation) other sectors such as banking, retail, tourism, manufacturing, construction and telecommunications remained contentious sectors against foreigners who competed against South African nationals. This became a peace and security threat to the South African societies because segregation became rife (SADC Paper 19, 2004).

The investment and trade drive in South Africa was supposed to manifest more on the thrust to promote peace and security in the country but due to challenges militated against the government individual security of citizens remained static. Black empowerment became a challenge up to 2007, the ANC government's institutional framework did not do enough to dismantle perpetuated colonial economic legacy. The black owned businesses in South Africa were rooted in resentment, foreign businesses were capitalising on poorly managed and undercapitalised businesses. The economic sector was conditioned in such a way that black owned businesses were finding it difficult to compete with the white owned businesses. However, foreign owned businesspeople capitalised on the weaknesses of the local business sector. The government failed to create institutions and frameworks within which all resource-based organisations operated efficiently due to the entrenched apartheid systems which entangled all economic facets of the country's production sector (Muthien, 2003: 16-19; Pottie & Shireen, 2003:15; Sparks, 1995:45).

The South African government had to play its economic development thrust accurately to be able to penetrate foreign markets, and to be responsive to the dominant trends in the global trading system. The globalisation process had a great effect on the South Africa's global economic strategy needs which in turn have a lot of human security effects to the generality of the populace (Ismail, 2001:231-236). The

government of South Africa set up a policy document in 2001 which rolled out the global economic strategy which was sponsored by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The document responding to challenges ranging from participation in the multilateral trading system under the umbrella of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to select key strategic partners for investment and market access (Ismail, 2001:301-310). South Africa needed to join with other SADC member states economically, notwithstanding the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the European Union and the Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur) which promoted trading at regional level as one other means of integration into the global economy. In this global economic strategy, South Africa considered peace and security of its people as most important thing in the measurement of all fundamental human rights and freedoms (Karume, 2003:154).

To give citizens a belief of new spectrum of human security, it was important for the South African government to identify key strategic partners within the global trading environment to give citizens a new lease of human security. The so called "butterfly" strategy in the South African context was in line with the country's relations with the South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Besides dealing with the ASEAN grouping SADC and Africa were viewed as the starting point of the body of the butterfly in developing trade relations. Trading with Latin America constituted the west wing and Asia the east wing of the butterfly, thereby positioning South Africa economically advantageous because of rapid growth in trade and a high proportion of value-added exports. Although in this case, government to government interactions created various political and security windows which promoted human security in South Africa, the black people in that country remained marginalised due to entrenched post-apartheid system in nearly all government systems (Matshego, 2003:19; Frazer, 2004:39, http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/mbeko31012.html.).

Although, the butterfly strategy had visible trade benefits to the private sector, the black communities remained marginalised. In this case, the visibly consummated and glaring positive trade results remained out of reach for once black marginalised societies. South Africa's trade deficit with Asia which increased to R15.7 billion in 2001, from R2 billion in 1995, was caused by the strong growth in imports. Asian countries invested in the South African economy, thereby creating opportunities for the working class in that country (Matshego, 2003:160; Fraser, 2004:91; Snow, 1996:1-6). A sharp increase in the imports from the Asian region into South African economy meant that Asian nationals flocked to manipulate the opening up of the economic sector. Asian businesses occupied and dominated most sectors of the economy thereby displacing black citizens who were excavating to start new businesses. The Asian investors who had access to capital start businesses further displaced the poorly capitalised black South African citizens from the business sector. Lack of capital injection into the black owned economic business ventures failed the black empowerment consolidation in that country. The Asian member states which exported to South Africa in 2003 increased their total shares to 7.3% from 1.2% recorded in 1994. This increase in imports from the Asian countries into South Africa meant that the South African citizens' human security was at stake. In fact, there was need for the ANC government to come up with an economic policy which would boost the country's exports to the Asian region especially to China. Although the Asian market presented South Africa with immense opportunities in the metals, automotive components and the agro-processing sectors, this opportunity went on to revolve over those South Africans who were on the business advantage during the apartheid era (Aglionby, 2003, http://www.daf.gov.za/docs/ mbek031012.htm). Although, the South African government had proposed and cemented economic partnerships with the Asian countries, the effort did not impact on the life style of the blacks, who

continued to suffer from marginalisation due to the failure of the empowerment drive (White, 2003).

The multilateral coalitions of South Africa and the Asian countries were supposed to be based on the principles of respect for international law, especially on the eradication of poverty, diseases and social injustice to improve peace and security of the individual peoples. This initiative made Brazil, India and other economically sound economies to strategically translate into lofty ideals that improved the individual security. South African leadership during the period between 1997 and 2007 became an instrument used to dominate the economies of SADC, thereby making the process of empowering the economically marginalised vulnerable societies' fate economically vulnerable. Lack of pragmatic or constructive objectives had resulted in little direction and poor participation from many other South African alternative interest groups such as labour unions and human rights advocacy groups. These groups were supposed to play a critical role in developing a more realistic strategy of engagement and offering incentives that added substance to the ambitious agenda. The inclusion of the civil society groups as wished was not acceptable to the ANC government because there was still a lot of scepticism between the two. Civil societies groups were accused of manipulating the political system to return the colonial hegemony to the forum (Snow, 1996:35-40). The "butterfly" approach to economic development in South Africa during the period 1997 to 2004 was meant to shift the trade and investment thrust from the traditional business connections of the Western European countries to that of the Asian states. The apartheid system which was dismantled by the first South Africa democratic elections of 1994 had been trading with the Western European countries for more than a century hence the black citizens of that country had no economic opportunities to open new corridors to sustain their economic opportunities. The opening of the Asian economic corridor for trade and investment indicated a new paradigm

shift for a new economic order where all races in South Africa were to be involved in economic emancipation. However, that thrust failed to create a conducive environment for peace and security in that country (Snow, 1996:48-52).

The previous sub-topics that touched on the intelligence security mantra have situated many national and regional studies in the context of a wider understanding of security, both human security and state security. These discussions have been grounded in an understanding of collective security dimension as being context –specific, relational and situated within regional and global imperatives. This role of intelligence security locates the role of the national security intelligence institutions in the context of wider security national transformation and security governance that hinges on the growth of a political culture that rejects violence in politics and on positive economic growth. This returns us to the wider themes of state, individual and community and their role in security. However, SADC member states located the role of intelligence organisations in wider security and societal context but expresses reservations about whether the South African experience can be replicated or generalised again stressing the importance of historical and societal context. The Southern African region puts some faith, in the emergence of a SADC wide intelligence cooperation organisation that she felt was going to be a vehicle for spreading good governance practices within the regional members' intelligence community. From the notion of peace and security stratagem, there were spatial hubs of dense political and economic webs that spanned across SADC member states' national boundaries. The role and significance of the national security intelligence institution is discussed to buttress the concept of peace and security which consolidates the provision of human security aspects. In this topic, the South African and Zimbabwean national security intelligence organisations' experiences were taken as a point of departure to examine the wider implications for SADC.

In the SADC region, the intelligence agencies continued to be created without input from interest groups or members of the national congresses. The absence of the civil societies in matters of peace and security also continued to hamper the growth of democratic systems. According to George & Kline, (2006), intelligence is described as the only area of high complex government activity where overall management across departmental and agency lines is seriously attempted. The role of the intelligence agency in a national security framework continued to be balanced between the need for central direction and imperative to preserve national intelligence organisations in SADC member states. The secret service institutions must provide policy makers with the best possible information and to coordinate clandestine operations for the benefit of the state. In fact, the intelligence agency remained largely supportive of the government enthusiasm for covertly countering the worldwide influence of those states which might want to threaten peace and security of the citizens (Rishikof, 2003:486-487). The secret agencies in any state remain a loose association of individual fortresses that seldom give up information about their clandestine activities. To benefit maximum benefits from the intelligence sector, governments must keep the names of its secret agents concealed especially all those deployed in different parts of the world. The government must also keep the people better informed about the activities of its security agencies that can be made public, especially events that took many years back before total liberation of the member states (Johnson, 1996:83-86).

Since intelligence services exist in national government system to promote national formulation policy, it also provides peace and security to the individual citizen. The main thrust lies in the responsibility to monitor the entire domestic and foreign environment to explain the full scope of the nature of events and threats including the impact on national security and stability (Global Investment and Business Centre 2007). Intelligence is simply a relevant information

policy that has been collected from all available sources of information, evaluated and analysed for a specific decision-maker. The intelligence needs to be relevant, accurate and should have timeliness for it to be relied upon for decision-making purposes. Furthermore, a society which is anchored on democratic values, social justice and fundamental upholds the human security aspects (Hutton, 2009:13). Fundamentally, intelligence to be relevant and accurate for policy-makers to formulate policies which provide peace and security national security, it should be collected by covert means. The need for secret information in the intelligence sector propels the state leadership to fully understand and appreciate threats which might befall the nation.

Once intelligence business is defined, it becomes apparent that as a concept, intelligence is as elusive as the daring fictional agents who have cemented it in the popular imagination. Since intelligence is greatly associated with security, secrecy is a means to its end. The end is the security and the prosperity of the entity that provides for the collection and subsequent analysis of intelligence. Since the states are the principal customers of intelligence and the key organisers of collection and analysis, their overall mission is to provide peace and security of the state. According to the Global Investment and Business Centre (2007), the national intelligence service is responsible for domestic and counterintelligence to enhance national security and defend the constitution and to conduct intelligence in relation to external threats and opportunities. External intelligence is that security information gathered from outside the borders of the state and if analysed by counterintelligence experts other issues that affect and pose threats to the wellbeing of nationals can be prevented and contained without harm to security interests of the country and its citizens. The intelligence organisations of SADC member states are responsible for peace and security of their respective member states through providing intelligence information for the strategic

management of the economic, political and national security of the states. It is upon individual SADC government, to consider the intelligence as the most reliable source of information on political, economic and social developments and other events that impact positively or negatively on national interests' abroad (Smith, 1990: 30-45; Miller, 1998:15).

According to Probst (2006), General Carl von Clausewitz, the great theorist on war, defined intelligence as "every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis, in short of our own plans and operations." The author branded the intelligence business as unreliable and transient of which he asserted that flimsy plans and operations were the cause of failure for the state to sustain peace and security for the citizens. In 2007, the Minister of Intelligence services in South Africa, Ronnie Kasrils, defined the internal environment of the secret sector in a country;

> "The role of the public in stimulating debate on the way intelligence services should function in an open and democratic society is essential … we welcome the public's involvement that can only strengthen our intelligence services and build the necessary trust and confidence required in democracy."

The main thrust for the intelligence organisation was to provide peace and security for the national citizens. In most cases' whenever intelligence information was provided, the nation's human security aspects were at least attended to. Democracy that is another yardstick for measuring peace and security in a state, remained a contested issue to citizens in SADC member states. Why it continued to be a contested issue rested, on the SADC member states' failure to arm the intelligence services to spearhead security ethos to address the citizens' peace and security exuberance.

The South African intelligence service established a special unit in 1996 that was mandated with the objective of providing evaluated

intelligence information on every sector of state system to compliment human security complexities (South Africa Intelligence, Security Activities and Operations Handbook, 2007; Hutton, 2009:14-15). The intelligence services in South Africa, just like any other SADC member states, set out their noble security purpose by providing national security that reflected the resolve of the South Africans, individuals and the nation at large. This mandate is premised on promoting citizens to live as equals, in peace and harmony with each other and to be free from fear and want which is among other human insecurities. Accordingly, the work of intelligence remains surrounded with too much scepticism and secrecy hence the generality of the citizens suspects that intelligence services abuse, manipulate and coerce people hence they are taken as tools of oppression and control Lathrop (215-217).

To be able to manage all human security aspects and its complexities, the intelligence services should be viewed by citizens as an indispensable adjunct to statecraft. Given the security threats in the unpredictable global world that know no borders, intelligence services sector cannot be discarded since it continued to provide peace and stability for both the community and individuals. Intelligence services are associated with spies who provide intelligence advice to the state's principal on impending national threats to the state's vital interests and institutions. Lathrop (2004:11) has this to say about the significance of intelligence information for the benefit of the state:

> "From time immemorial the Byzantines had maintained many agents who used to travel among our enemies … they would make detailed inquiries of all that was afoot and were able to report on …. The enemy's secret plans to government, who, forewarned."

Procopius (1971) as cited in Lathrop's (2004) work cautions against the neglect of the intelligence. In fact intelligence has been employed by every SADC member state in pursuit of different objectives depending on the character and nature of the state. Above all, peace and security

remained the goal to be achieved through intelligence information. The South African National Intelligence Agency (NIA) continued to provide the government with intelligence on domestic threats or potential threats to national stability. This allowed the government to implement policies to deal with potential threats and thus improve their policies. Besides dealing with domestic threats, NIA is mandated to fulfil the national counterintelligence responsibility that is on one hand, defensive and offensive on the other. This includes identifying, monitoring and neutralising foreign or hostile intelligence services that might seek to gain access to the classified information. The intelligence sector in any state needs to know and identify the manifestation of threats to security before it happens. The potential threats need to be known so that corrective measures could be taken before they cause catastrophic disastrous damage to the society. The outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa in 2000, opened the debate on the role and function of the intelligence service (NIA) and the debate gained considerable significance because the conflict could have been prevented if the intelligence organisation had known the simmering tension among different nationals from other African states against South African citizens.

The failure to detect the security threats implied that many social problems in South Africa's poorer communities became susceptible to the downstream ills such as sexual abuse and drug abuse among others. The manifestation of human insecurity issues in societies emerge in environments where individual peoples were exposed to threats of want and safety from vagaries organised crimes. Gang-related activities and trafficking in illegal goods and people often offered fertile ground for insecurity. The NIA should have identified the tension build-up over economic space which was dominated by the foreigners, where black indigenous nationals were on the economic periphery. The impoverished nature of black communities in South Africa, especially during the period 1997 to 2007, offered real potential

by the communities to commit crime en masse while protesting against ostracisation of blacks from the economic activity. The intelligence units should have picked up and reported timeously that the occupation by foreigners in the economic environment in South Africa was going to start xenophobic attacks (Johwa, 2008:49). The human security of South African citizens was put at risk by both the intelligence sector and the government policy-makers due to their failed pre-emptive attacks against foreigners in their midst. This conflict could have been prevented by correcting the economic insecurity which had simmered in the country. If the intelligence units had reported timeously the blame was going to be directed to government for failing to take sufficient precautionary action on intelligence reports.

In fact, the blame was going to be heavily ascribed to the ANC government's lack of understanding or prioritisation of the role of the intelligence service and the problems of integrating the state intelligence structures in the larger body politic (Hutton, 2007:346). The South African government should have aptly prevented the xenophobic attacks if it was quick to respond to intelligence reports that highlighted the simmering tensions between foreign businesspeople and impoverished communities of South African citizens. Indeed, the Special Browse Mole Report of 2007, indicated that the government departments that were supposed to have addressed the economic problems were reluctant to make use of intelligence services reports. The impact of the economic insecurity had caused a lot of suffering among both the South African communities and foreigners in areas of job losses, damage to property, deaths to foreigners and the whole episode which threatened the investment opportunities for the country's economic development.

It is important to interrogate the nature and the prioritization of the role of intelligence service in South Africa, hence deductions as to

whether NIA was able to gather intelligence information and advise the government timeously. Equally, some security intelligence practitioners have alluded to the fact that the South African government was suffering from the so-called 'eternal dilemma' that was incumbent upon the political leaders to act upon intelligence reports. Just like any other African intelligence organisation, NIA has its own challenges ascribed to the lack of understanding of the political dynamics affecting the society and the individuals (Research Interview with Joshie, former NIA Officer based in Pretoria, 2014).

According to Johwa (2008:28) the greatest problem for South Africa in 2000 was that the intelligence services were deflected from their collective role as protector of the nation to being the handmaiden of the ruling party and its government. The intelligence services should have been the protector of the nation in terms of human security so that peace and security would have been guaranteed in the country where post-apartheid system was still entrenched. The case of Project Avani and the allegations of spying on businessman Saki Macozoma were perfect examples of the sacrifice of the open society to service of the party. The intelligence services were dragged into self-serving manipulative deals at the expense of the peace and stability of the whole populace (Johwa, 2008:83).

An interview with one senior NIA official, who joined the intelligence service in 1984 revealed that, the ANC government and those served in the apartheid regime were suspicious against each other on security matters. He clearly stated that;

> "The ANC government's top leadership in the security sector treats us as spies for the defunct Botha government. If I bring intelligence information which indicates that there is simmering conflict between whites and blacks, there is no action taken until they verify with the political activists who are ANC members. In most cases the whites are blamed for provoking the blacks thereby disregarding our reports which give the true picture on the ground. We are forced to see no evil committed by blacks in the economic and political fronts. To write a report denigrating a member of ANC

involved in corruption or any illegal activity is a dismissible offence. For me to be safe, I just keep a distance from political and economic intelligence information associated with these ANC guys. There is no way I could survive if I report the ills of the ANC guys to the government. My friends whom I have joined this service with, were either frustrated or segregated after they indicated impartiality at work."

The problem of intelligence services deviating from the realm of upholding national human security aspects was not only peculiar to South Africa but extended to most of SADC member states as well. The Zimbabwean economic environment should not have gone wayward if the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) had managed to advise the government against upholding national policies in the period 1998 to 2010 which scared away the investors to come to do business in the country (Mandaza, 2004:210). The economic downturn which was witnessed in Zimbabwe led to a massive movement of people to search for economic opportunities to South Africa and other European countries. The exodus of the Zimbabwean working age and professionals led to wanton human resources deficit in the country hence, many sectors of the economy collapsed. According to UNDP Report of 2008, about a million of Zimbabweans migrated to other countries for job opportunities. This exodus of the productive age was disastrous since it exposed the country to the vigor of human insecurity, where food and medical shortages became the order of the day and many lives were lost due to lack of peace and security for the Zimbabwean individuals (Botha, 2008:23).

By 2003, the macro-economic policies of Zimbabwe, especially the liberalisation, had not created better conditions for the development of agricultural sector (Integrated Framework 2003:129). However, the continued operational problems in the agricultural sector due to land invasions by the landless blacks of white owned farms drove away investors. The land invasions by the landless blacks worsened the

country's economic downturn while on the other hand, lack of rule of law caused the economy to suffocate.

The collapse of the agricultural sector that was supposed to be a source of economic diversification and investment worsened the circumstances of the country's poor. Had the policy been successful some 8,1 million Zimbabweans should have lived on more than one US dollar per day and more people would not have migrated to other countries in search of a better livelihood (Christie & Crompton 2003:321; World Bank 2008,2). The economic problem that bedevilled Zimbabwe in the late 1990s to 2007 caused a lot of human insecurity in the country and security of the individual citizens and the societies at large. The insecurity which was felt by most of Zimbabweans in the country was equally felt by citizens of Botswana and South Africa because their economies were greatly undermined by Zimbabwean refugees. Ironically, the exodus of Zimbabweans to South Africa and Botswana provided surplus cheap labour for the receiving countries (Webner, 1998:209).

The intelligence sector in any country should issue guidelines that regulate and expedite the provision of the government intelligence interests. The main thrust of the intelligence sector remained anchored on providing peace and security of the citizens of the country. They were three major problems with the South African National Intelligence Agency's (NIA) mandate in the period running up to the 2000. The mandate was too broad and opens to various interpretations. The National Strategic Intelligence Act required NIA to focus on threats and potential threats to the security of the Republic and its people, internal activities, threats and potential threats to the constitutional order of the people of South Africa (Hutton, 2009:96).

NIA had interpreted the mandate in so broad a fashion as to encompass the thematic focus of virtually every state department. This

was impractical and unnecessary, and it detracted it from focusing on serious criminal threats and the potential for violence which elements were causing insecurity to individual citizens. The terms "security of the Republic and its people", 'national stability' and "threats to the constitutional order" were imprecise and open to interpretation. NIA's mandate was in fact interpreted three times since 1994 but the results of the process were never subjected to open and vigorous parliamentary and public debate. The broad mandate of the secret agency's political intelligence function might have been too politicized to the extent that it gave rise to an inappropriate focus on political activities. The political intelligence function had entailed monitoring and reporting on transformation within the ANC government institutions, on competition within and between political parties and on the impact of political policy decisions.

However, the working environment of the secret agency remained torrid, given that operational powers acceded to NIA infringed constitutional rights of the South African citizens. In fact, the intelligence agency was supposed not to violate the rights of the people who were behaving lawfully although that was a threat to national security. The intelligence sector is all about secrecy for it to do the actual work and function properly and feed the government with good policy making intelligence. Intelligence work goes hand in glove with spying. Spying in the intelligence sector is like policing, prosecuting and even journalism of which it should be professionally handled to gain legitimacy. But to what extent are good intentions matched by positive outcomes? To gather intelligence of value, which is usable in statecraft, the process of acquiring it needs to be highly covert and discreet to avoid bias and opinion of the one who is acquiring it.

To this end, the intelligence sector cannot be divulged of their covert operations. One can never be informed on where intelligence

organisation gets its work, what can only be heard of by the generality of the people in a national set up is when it goes wrong in its operations. Secrecy in government systems generally reduces accountability, and it promotes abuse of power and hides incompetence. The secrecy that surrounded the intelligence work in a democratic state like South Africa, has negative effects to the security of individual citizens. In the analysis of intelligence governance in South Africa, Hutton (2007:345) makes the point that;

> "The intelligence sector is possibly the most difficult one for civil society to engage in, and yet it holds civil liberties and the rights and freedoms of citizens. The challenge for intelligence services is to overcome the tendency to formalise the bureaucracy of secrecy that has resulted in an obsession with secrecy."

Taking the South African intelligence sector into consideration, to provide peace and security of the individuals, the essence of democracy was just merely the potential for self-correction. The more operational clandestine NIA became, the more it was likely to affect the system in ways that reduced the security of the people. This was especially important when it came to intelligence. By the early years of 2000, the intelligence information was supposed to be particularly powerful in nature to prevent xenophobic attacks against foreigners.

Since intelligence information was secretly provided and supplied by spies from sources with supposedly privileged access, it carried with it a weight, an aura and an incontestability that placed it above others, perhaps countervailing information (Hutton, 2009:56; Galison & Moss, 2008:281; Sole, 2007:56; Early, 1997:64). Because intelligence was supplied in secrecy, it became obvious that it was not open to credibility checks or to peer review in the marketplace of ideas. Furthermore, the special nature of intelligence information made it open to abuse, with the potential to influence policy outcomes that had been rejected by the policy makers. The special credibility which was given to intelligence information in South Africa ignored the historical

fact that apartheid was behind the events curve, not in front. To be considered for example, was the killing of socially disadvantaged people, especially those who lost their lives during the xenophobic attacks which erupted in 1998 in many places in South Africa.

Despite the above assertions contributing to exacerbating absence of constructive contribution by the intelligence services in ensuring the political and economic stability of democracy in SADC, particularly South Africa, the promotion of accountability and operational effectiveness upholds the national constitutional principles. A lot of issues were brought into limelight among them failure to arm the intelligence services to spear heard national peace and security ethos. The intelligence services need to be able to identify the manifestation of threats to national security before anything interrupts government business. In a nutshell, failure to detect security threats against the state, society and the individuals cause downstream ills that can affect the whole region. Usually, intelligence gathering by security intelligence services should, therefore be permissible if only is within strictly defined parameters, with intelligence oversight acting as the bridging activity connecting the seemingly divergent worlds of secrecy and transparency within such democratic framework.

The ANC government had a clear distinction between the domestic and the external levels of national security. In fact, the domestic approach to security meant that domestic security was the responsibility of the South African police service while the external security was mainly the task of the South African defence forces. Although South Africa's orientation to external national threat had changed from an explicit offensive strategy, the objectives of the then current set up included the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the South African estate and the promotion of regional security in Southern Africa (Hough & Du Plessis 2000:65). According to Hough & Du Plessis (2000), lack of

security in terms of underdevelopment, poverty and absence of democratic values promote conflicts within and between states. For peace and security to prevail it should not be restricted to the military, police and intelligence organs of the state but in critical areas such as political, economic, social and environmental insecurities that need to be holistically safeguarded (Hough & Du Plessis, 2000:16–17).

The human security matters were worsened in South Africa by the upsurge of regional insecurity (Hough & Du Plessis, 2000:69). The South African National Intelligence Agency can be blamed for failing to recognise and foresee many threats that were related to the economic, political and societal dimensions emanating from the regional grouping. The South African government was heavily overwhelmed by security problems brought on by foreigners running away from military conflicts, economic downturn and chronic underdevelopment of their countries (Ngoma, 2003:201). The South African government faced the transnational threats such as the spread of disease, the burden of refugees, DRC civil war (1998-2000) and the proliferation of weapons. Zimbabwe's chaotic land reform programme from 1999 to 2005 made South Africa a safe haven and more insecure in terms of institutional framework and capacity-building. The National Intelligence Agencies of South Africa was supposed to create a clear link between democracy and the type of security paradigm in which the country was to operate internally and regionally. In 1998, there was a paradigm shift within the security sector's roles where peace processes were improved to provide the human security to every citizen in the country.

Human security development in a country determines peace and security provisions for the citizens. The Zimbabwean human security index went down in 1998 after the National Security Council (NSC) decided that the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) should intervene in the Democratic Republic of Congo war. The Zimbabwe government

through ZNA intervened to protect the DRC sovereignty and legitimacy although the intervention was viewed by many as a selfish move with the ZNA top brass allegedly accused of personally benefitting from their military intervention. The Zimbabwe Central Intelligence Organisation should have identified both the economic and political threats which were going to affect Zimbabwe by intervening in the Congo before the war erupted (EDC News, 200). The major criticism was all about the amount of money that the government was spending in DRC in 1998 to 2001. Zimbabwe's economy was not able to sustain the needs of the citizens (The Financial Gazette, 1999). The Zimbabwe's security organisation (CIO) made their assessment in terms of Peace and Security concepts, where national security aspects were followed, but the human factor was not considered.

The rebels who were fighting the DRC government also intended to remove the ruling party ZANU-PF from power using opposition elements (Shire, 2003:149; Financial Gazette, Harare, 1999; Bond & Manyanya, 2002:56-61). The scheme according to George Shire, the SADC region was perceived as a dangerous and insecure region in terms of lack of democratisation. All liberation movements which were ruling, especially, Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF, Namibia's SWAPO, Angola's MPLA and Mozambique's FRELIMO, were all perceived as resistant to democratisation. The political developments in Zimbabwe where the rule of law was perceived as having been thrown away by the ZANU-PF government, triggered the international community and civil society organisations to demonise the government of autocratic rule. All revolutionary political parties which were ruling in the period 1997 to 2007 were accused of being resistant to democracy (Cilliers, 1997:50). On the same, the relations that emerged between DRC and Zimbabwe were criticised, as it was alleged that the links benefited individuals and not the country. These accusations of plundering resources by the former revolutionary freedom fighters extended to governments in Mozambique, Namibia and Angola. The quest for

peace and security for the region was put in limbo because the whole region was plunged into economic insecurity, the movement of refugees intensified, poverty became the order of the day in societies and unemployment and atrocities among tribal groups was rampant in SADC in the years 1997 to 2007.

Linnington, (2004) a lawyer and lecturer in the Department of Politics and Administration, at the University of Zimbabwe, stated that Zimbabwe was in economic and political problems because the government was not addressing the issues of peace and security which were negatively affecting the citizens. The ZANU-PF government was under siege after it failed to formulate and implement its national security policy. The emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), an opposition political party in Zimbabwe presented problems for the government internally because the political arena changed. The ZANU-PF government was not used to facing a challenge such as that presented by the MDC. The country was plunged into political violence during the 2000 electoral campaign period. Internal security was threatened as both ZANU-PF and MDC exchanged accusations as to who was initiating the violence. This violence affected the regional security as refugees left Zimbabwe for Botswana and South Africa. Most of the migrants fleeing the alleged political violence between ZANU-PF and MDC supporters found themselves roaming around commercial towns of South Africa for employment. There was no red-carpet reception for the refugees from Zimbabwe from either the governments or the ordinary people of Botswana and South Africa. The government of Botswana and South Africa on the other hand accused the Zimbabwean refugees of criminal activities including providing cheap labour against the interests of the citizens' demands of fair labour wages (Shire, 2003:314; Baker, 1990:36; Mandaza & Nabudere, 2002:163).

Although, Zimbabwe became a focal point during the 2000 period where human insecurity was at its worst ebb, the problems of

instability emanated from the colonial past. The political violence that was witnessed in Zimbabwe had a bearing of the colonial history which a minority group had overseen all economic resources. The economic revolution which saw the white owned farms being invaded were meant to correct the injustices plunged the country into political and economic chaos. The ZANU-PF government was being led by those who participated in the liberation war and most of the leaders were still in power since independence hence this contributed to the way the country's problems were perceived by the European countries whose natives were economically disempowered (Shire, 2003:300).

Those who were accusing the ZANU-PF of plunging the country into human insecurity, especially the Western countries, hardly knew that problems which were in Zimbabwe existed until the land invasions of 2000. Shire (2003:317), a Zimbabwe government sympathiser had accused the British government of fuelling the Zimbabwean political, economic, and social and security insecurity while blaming lack of democracy. The political and economic insecurities witnessed during peak of the land reform programme were a contestation between the majority blacks and the minority whites. The chaotic "land grab" in 2000 land reform triggered food insecurity across the country. The human security threats which affected Zimbabwe in 2000 and beyond had ripple effects on South Africa's economic development. The intelligence sector in South Africa failed to identify threats which were caused by the Zimbabwean political turmoil to that country's economic threats. However, SADC member states need to ensure and guarantee political and economic security to the citizens through practicing democratic governance systems (Mandaza & Nabudere, 2002:125).

As one interviewee from the South African Embassy in Harare avers;
> "The security challenges of armed robberies, prostitution, smuggling, drug abuse and high rate of unemployment are caused by foreigners running away from their countries to seek refuge in South Africa. Surely, our neighbours are not doing justice to my country because they allow their people to flood South Africa without proper immigration papers. Political instability in some SADC member states is a cause of great concern because most of those people affected by such conflicts end up in South Africa seeking both political and economic refugee status. Our country is home to

political and economic asylum seekers, who continue to strain social and economic services."

South Africa and her neighbours need to put consented efforts to stabilize the uncoordinated movements of undocumented immigrants. Evidently, both the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2002 in Zimbabwe were flawed because of too much conflict. The main issues rendered these elections not free and fair were the allegations of vote buying, violence against opposition political parties among many others raised by the National Constitutional Assembly of Zimbabwe. South Africa's social and economic services were severely constrained by the ever-populated movement of immigrates into the country (Wole, 2005:37; Raflopoulous & Mlambo, 2009:123).

The examination of the concept of a community security is largely conceptual in manner. The Human Security paradigm responds to the complexities and the interrelatedness of new and old security threats that affected SADC region during the period 1994 and 2008. Such threats that included political insecurity, food insecurity and health insecurity, were leading for derailing the process of political integration in the SADC region. Apparently, the need to broaden and deepen the understanding of a community security was supposed to have been tackled through regional conventional mechanisms that address peace and security threats. The SADC integration thrust assisted the member states to acknowledge the linkages and the interdependences between development, human rights and national security, especially in Lesotho, DRC and Zimbabwe's land reform programme. These countries' economies were deprived of the much-needed balance of payments from the international financial institutions which feared to invest in unstable environments.

The Southern African region went through a very turbulent period between 1997 and 2007 when its security and political mechanisms for dealing with the regional problems in terms of human insecurities were in a state of flux. The agreement by SADC member states to establish the SADC's OPDS was a great stride towards addressing political and security threats which traditionally had relegated the

regional citizens to chronic poverty, food insecurity, unemployment, displacement and refugee movement.

The interface of security threats at national and regional levels existence of peace and stability become the panacea to provision of human security aspects for citizens. The assumption that security and stability in a state are inextricably intertwined and mutually reinforcing underpins all the SADC member states' peace and security aspects. This chapter has demonstrated that much progress has been registered in respect of the human security aspects in the region where the intelligence sector is called upon to entrench values that promote peace and security of the individual citizens. Although, the slow democratisation process has caused human insecurity in the region, meddling by the Western countries in SADC politics continues to be a serious threat to human security (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995:13).

The debate on the security architecture in the SADC region was seen as robust as the democracy and governance discourse. Although, this debate revolves around different conceptions of security, there was a distinction between narrow security which concerns the security sector and the so-called widened security with issues such as economics, the environment, food and society were regarded as having security threat dimensions.

As Cawthra (2009) concludes, regional security cooperation in the developing regions like SADC is clearly aimed at stability and regime security rather than human security. In this scheme of things, the state tends to be the only agent of security to the exclusion of other critical actors in society such as the civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations. Zacharias (1999) posits that;

> "The state is not and it should not be the only agent of security, it has limited initiative and resources. It does not constitute the totality of social life. There are other agents equally important for securities that complement the activities of the state, and it's their empowerment that is likely to make a

difference in security. These include societal organisations such as civic, charity and various interest groups."

It must be noted, however, that civil society in itself is not a panacea to problems of individuals or citizens in human security. For human security to be adequately addressed to enjoy peace and stability the state, non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations need to complement each other's effort to provide peace and security to the people (Zacharias, 1999:154-156).

Chapter 4: Civil Society and the Changing Political Landscape of South Africa

When exploring theoretical paradigms and their relevance in understanding non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations' critical roles in consolidating democracy in state policymaking framework, appreciation of the human security dynamics is paramount in the new approach to Peace and Security concept. After a brief discussion of human security, multi-sectorality and externalities framework which was a necessary tool for developing a platform to human security idealism. South African non-state actors grew out of the anti-apartheid movement and were autonomous and influential with strong ties with the community-based organisations (CBO). Ironically, within the African National Congress (ANC) coalition, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) sometimes acted like an opposition political party. Non-state actors played a critical role in consolidating democracy and state policymaking framework in the new approach to peace and security paradigm in South Africa. The political space accorded the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) by the SADC member states was directed to develop a platform to work towards human security multi-sectorality and externalities framework. The good working relationship between the state and NGO/CSO provided the necessary tool for developing policy and programme coherence among the state's relevant sectors which were involved in programmes critical to human security idealism. The SADC's integration thrust was also persuaded by the critical activities carried out by the non-state actors to improve citizens' lives threatened by the vagaries of political and economic developments.

The human security components such as economic security, food security, healthy security, political security and personal security

remained the cornerstone of every non-governmental organisation and civil society organisation that desired to register and penetrate the sacrosanct areas of statehood domination. The non-state actors come into the states' domain of power through complimentary roles of providing humanitarian needs to the less privileged people, who needed mostly peace and security in their environments. This chapter approaches the human security efficacies through assessment of vulnerabilities and capacities of the affected communities and nationalities to help prevent and mitigate the recurrence of insecurities. On the other hand, because poverty and inequality were front and centre in the South African public debate and discussions about the democratic processes. Whites in South Africa by 1994 exhibited lukewarm support for the democratic processes due to their scepticism towards the new democratic regime (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995:45).

The Human Security conceptual framework examines the exigencies of peace and security of both the community and the individual person. In the late 1990s, the South African government was blamed for failing to provide security to both foreigners and citizens after an episode of xenophobic attacks in the country. South Africans were craving for the desire to participate in policymaking framework that was suspected to catapult them into positions to be able to secure jobs, food and health facilities. Issues of human security have attracted modest attraction both by the leading state and regional structures especially with experts of international relations. Although, there were difficulties in researching sensitive issues like food security and personal security in their complex forms and the institutional set ups, there was a lot the political leadership of South Africa was expected to uphold to improve the lives of the citizens. This was partly a heritage which derived from the former apartheid South African government and had entrenched in the African National Congress regime which had also a lot to protect against the Non-Governmental Organisations and the Civil Society Organisations (Sparks, 2003:104; Ballard *et al.*, 2005:153).

South Africa was generally widely known for its history of a popular struggle against apartheid system that spanned decades of restive struggles against inequality treatment of the blacks. The ill-treatment of blacks by the apartheid regime captured world attention. With some of the media focus on Mandela who was incarcerated for 27 years, this became the rallying point for the international focus. The popular struggles against post-apartheid systems in public institutions were understood as part of a broad but singular struggle led by the ANC (Baines, 2007; 284). Among the many organisations that developed anti-apartheid options against the apartheid system in South Africa, the civic groups stood out to challenge the local government structures. Rather than defining themselves as representatives of a particular segment of the population such as workers, women, youths, civic groups claimed to represent all people living in a particular geographical area but marginalised by the state in terms of race, class and ethnicity. By presenting themselves as the "true" representatives of a township or set of townships, they directly challenged the legitimacy of local governments which were non-racial but divisive authorities. In some parts of South Africa such as Soweto, the civil society organisations offered a unique view into the processes by which ordinary people worked to challenge structures of power. The civil society organisations' experiences also provided key insights into the interactions between various local government authorities and national opposition movements, mainly the ANC.

The early civil society organisations in South Africa included, in their ranks, political activists and by the late 1990s the majority endorsed a non-racial approach. Many civil society organisations folded after the ANC was unbanned in 1990 as part of CODESA negotiations and normalisation by the apartheid regime. They emerged into a larger organisation allied to the reinvigorated ANC in 1995 (Zuern, 2011:22). The ANC sought to appropriate the history of the civil society organisations though suggesting that they be under its direction and

guidance. Indeed, many civil society organisations which were formed prior to 1995 and beyond included ANC members and supporters in their ranks. The formation of civil society organisations in the new democratic South Africa such as the Diepkloof Civil Association, the Soweto Civil Association (SCA) and the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) were noteworthy for their determined resolve to fight for greater rights for the communities. The fundamental reason which bound the non-state actors was the call for political and personal security for all the people. The apartheid regime was determined to make sure that the apartheid legacy was maintained through suppressing the black individuals' voices in matters of governance. The historical fact of the struggle for independence in South Africa was premised on a range of civil society organisations' strategies to rope into political enlightenment to effectively attract workers and students (Thompson, 2000: 225). There were civil society organisations which made different choices regarding mobilisation to advocate for residents' welfare (Collinge, 1986:253). The political and personal security remained a thorny issue in the South African political development because prior and after 1995 general elections in that country, civil society groups continued to support the ANC political party.

Since the late 1990s, South Africa had seen political mobilisation in many poor communities as new organisations grew out of past experiences of civic society organisations' efforts of complimenting government's activities. The following names of several of the movements underlined their focus included the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC), the Landless People's Movement (LPM), the Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) and the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF). Zuern (2011) argues that participants in these civil society organisations in South Africa repeatedly defined themselves as both poor and in need of a greater say in the public sphere. It was in this way that they worked to connect their material struggles to demand

for more political and security space in democratic governance. The demands by the civil society organisations in the quest for human security in South Africa had made the root cause of power struggle. In this case, threats to peace and security are rampant because the once racially degraded blacks have not yet economically and politically been empowered. The citizens in South Africa allege that the fight against apartheid was to destroy the injustices so that everyone could have access to basic needs such as food, healthy, peace and freedom of movement among other necessities that needed important attention (Ake, 1996:161).

After the 1994 South African democratic elections conflict emanated from a process of empowerment. By challenging existing understandings and widely accepted forms of discrimination, civil society movements worked to expand debates which involved the applications of basic rights that provided the "alternative blueprints for democracy" (Alvarez & Escoba 1998:136). The civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations of South Africa in their deep-rooted desire to participatory democratic experiences of ordinary people encouraged demands for the ANC government to incorporate some of the more successful democratic practices of local organisations (Mamdani, 1996:350). Although these processes were by no means immediate or necessary, they produced long-term institutional effects by providing a basis for the construction of democratic processes which provided the basics of human security which included political security, food security and social participation in all areas of governance. Through their efforts to counteract threats to peace and security of the individual citizens of South Africa, civil society groups helped to bring about regime transformation and encouraged the continued development of a democratic ANC government.

The year 1994 remains a historic one where a new political dispensation in South Africa ushered an end to over decades of

apartheid rule and violent conflicts. However, as efforts to consolidate the hard-won democracy, stability and democratic governance continued to be undermined by the forces of the apartheid legacy which remained vividly visible during the period 1997 to 2007. In the early 2000, areas such as Soweto, Diepkloof and Johannesburg continued to witness persistent violent crimes, high homicide rates, xenophobic attacks and a ready supply of firearms which sustained a culture of fear and intimidation (Atkinson, 2000:97). Lessons learnt from these manifested experiences of political and personal insecurity suggested that an integrated approach which included multiple sectors, various government agencies and the civil society participation were imperative to effectively improve the human security of the country. Meanwhile, given the seriousness of political and personal insecurity, gender inequality and human rights abuses also required special considerations as human security was going to be unachievable without the active participation of women among other stakeholders (Ogata, 2002:6).

With emphasis given to special needs of vulnerable groups, communities and attention to advancing inter-governmental partnerships, the human security approach was viewed as the most suitable mechanism for fostering co-existence and civic security in urban and rural areas of South Africa. The peaceful coexistence and improved citizen security was only achievable after the government of ANC comprehensively developed strong public institutions and civil society engagements to augment human security. This was meant to provide the foundation for achieving sustainable development where threats of political violence and personal insecurity were to be eliminated. Peace and security in South Africa and the SADC region needed to benefit from the peace processes created through advancing the protection of workers from labour malpractices and the prevention of armed violence among other ills which plagued South Africa.

According to Seekings (2000:162) the dual goals of South African liberation and democracy were matched by two complementary projects meant to strengthen peace and security of the citizens. Firstly,

it was tearing down of the old structures and secondly, the construction of democratic structures. In the period 1997 to 2007, non-governmental organisations and the South African government laid the groundwork for new democratic institutions that promoted political, economic, social and personal security to all the citizens. It was the tearing down of the old institutional structures which was white dominates. It was the same whites, who participated largely on spontaneous acts of uprising, violence and the destruction of human security artifacts while on the other hand, building up viable mass-participatory institutions that strengthened human security aspects.

Leaders at various levels in South Africa and even among the civic structures had argued that grassroots civic groups were the key to both the development of democracy and the revolutionary liberation process. While recognising the importance of the civil society organisations as a link between national level organisations and grassroots participants, the ANC government tended to emphasise the importance of sovereignty over democratic practices (Cherry 2000:89; UDF 1998). Cherry (2000) argues that surveys in township residents in the Eastern Cape of South Africa demonstrated that the level of coercion to support civil society organisations' activities was generally low and certainly much lower than state actors. When violence and other human rights abuses against the individual citizens broke, state actors were complicit. The areas of intervention in the promotion of human security included consolidation of harmony between the state and non-state actors and promoting public awareness on civic culture coexistence norms.

In orthodox international relations, it is often suggested that small states must learn to live within their international environments (Petersson, 1996:145). In contrast, more powerful nations can shape external settings more directly to their liking. Thus, Thucydides, in his famous work titled "The Peloponnesian War", has argued that international relations, is but the aggressive pursuit of national interests by all means possible and those that are unable to wield similar capacity become victims. The efforts of the external environment for the safety of the people especially food and personal security, remained at the epicentre of the citizens' rights to human

security. From the traditional realist perspective of human security, the focus was on military aspects of nation-states goals (Block & Berkowits, 1990:122-134).

However, little in the realist perspective on human security remained focused on the important developmental processes within Southern African States. The strategic conception of security policy was concerned with the preservation of the independence and sovereignty of nation states thereby leaving human security aspects which civil society organisations and non-governmental organisation found more accommodative to challenge the role of the stated (Krause & Nye, 1997:135). The strategic conception of security policy conceived human security in terms of abstract values and the preservation of the independence and the creation of proper conditions, favourable to the protection of values that provide peace and security to the citizens of the SADC region.

Transformation was essentially a political function driven by political pressures and agendas in South Africa and SADC region with a trajectory strongly influenced by human rights based civil society groups. It was seen in some respects as a means whereby the "levels of power" which were to a great extent represented by the public service were able to be controlled. Control over the South African public service, especially during the late 1990s, was often mooted by the government as being essential to address economic imbalances and social injustices that was entrenched in every sector of the country. Central to the vision of transformation was affirmative action whose mission was "facilitating the transformation and reform of the public service into a high performance, democratic, accountable, effective and professional organisation that was representative and affirming of the disadvantaged in culture (SAIIA, 1997:75). In line with the pro-poor policy reforms enunciated by the ANC government in 1998, an increase in spending became part of a long-term economic plan to consolidate peace and security in the country.

The functions of the South African government's administrative matters were drawn parallel to any other structure of SADC member states governance system. There was a distinction between the interventionist state and the non-interventionist state composed of non-state actors (Vale, 1997:96-113). The state in this context referred to newly established government of South Africa composed of all races and the entire public administrative apparatus of the country. In this context, interventionist and non-interventionist denoted the degree to which the state intervened in the society that was part of its sphere of influence. The nature and type of state intervention were relevant in so far as some states were not permitting full democratic freedom by means of thwarting non-state actors in areas undermined government's authority.

According to Venter (1998:121);

> "All state interventions can be arranged into four primary categories or collective functions, namely power functions, security and protection functions, economic functions and redistribution functions. These functions are not limited to the national level of government but can also manifest themselves at provincial and local government levels. They are evident in the form of public goods and services that are provided by the state to provide a suitable enabling environment in which individuals and society can strive to maintain or improve the quality of their lives."

With regards to South Africa, prior to independence the state and its policies tended to be interventionist in nature on both the political and economic fronts. There were political interventions in the form of non-state actors' activities on political freedoms and economic intervention in the form of regulation of the economy and other various sectors of production. There was less intervention by the state in the early 2000, specifically in the political and economic freedoms where the ANC government embarked on a national plan to improve health services and food security. Labour laws were formulated and access to basic services became mandatory for every citizen.

A simplified view was that individuals were able to achieve on their own in terms of political, economic and personal security after they formed groups to enhance their chances of survival. It started with the formation of small groups such as the Diepkloof Civic in Soweto, Alexandra Action Committee and the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) which converged and formed a strong force to complement the government efforts in human security provision. The role the civil society organisations included issues related to defence and more broadly affairs. The civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations' actions are generally visible whenever the security of the individual and the society comes under human insecurity. It was under President Mbeki that challenges became visible around policy implementation and service delivery. The CSOs/NGOs developed a lot of interest in areas of policy formulation, to the extent that some policies were often developed without the appropriate oversight by and accountability to parliament and the executive. The government of Mbeki came up with the national programme, the Integrated Governance and Planning Framework for Government which was adopted by the cabinet of July 2001 and January 2002. The government established five clusters comprised of heads of government departments to provide strategic policy direction and monitoring performance in all areas of governance. The clusters were given the mandate to identify gaps and critical challenges, including pulling together of cross-cutting issues. Furthermore, the new policy formulation process was necessary to reflect the character of post-apartheid South Africa at a period where CSOs/NGOs had indicated that they wanted to critique the country's formulation process (Motumi, 2003:130).

As the ANC government became a more formal democracy, most civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations in South Africa became less participatory and less democratic. This contradiction was due to the process of institutional disciplining that

was occurring at three levels. The first level was premised on the state-based discourse of neo-liberalism and good governance which was proved by the second democratic elections conducted in 1999 which ushered President Thabo Mbeki's reign. The other level was that of political party leaders' actions to reduce perceived sources of challenges. The ANC government was being challenged by the enormous and voluminous calls by the citizens to deliver both economic and security freedoms which were still under the neoliberal policies under the tutelage of the remnants of the apartheid die-hards. The last level was that of the leadership-driven reorganisation of the non-state actors which was meant to increase efficiency and political influence. This was important to realign the complementary efforts of non-state actors to newly established ANC government (Zuern: 2011:118-119; Venter 1998:233; Baines, 2007:283-302; Bratton & Mattes, 2001:45). The South African political and economic expedition in the period 1997 to 2007 did not proceed in any fixed order with participants including the government and non-state actors moving in the same direction in closed columns.

According to Mclean (1996:370), there is no politics without policy. Public policy considers both the processes and contents of government and governance practices. Taking the general usage of the most buzzword, 'policy' means the behaviour of an actor or actors such as officials, government agencies or a legislature in an area of activity such as the economy and social sectors. Anderson (1997:8) postulated that the political decision-making and public policy-making in South Africa were overlapping and closely intertwined in such processes that decision-making continued to be a subdivision of public policy-making. In one of the most succinct conceptualisations of policy formulation in South Africa, Anderson (1997) further describes it as the involving of the development of "pertinent and acceptable proposed courses of action for dealing with public problems". The meaningful implementation of government policy systems suffices when the

wishes of the stakeholders, the non-state actors, state and the citizens are fulfilled.

In South Africa, the policy-making process involved many consecutive and interconnected steps. There was an effort by the government to decide the form of health care for the citizens who were once ostracised during the apartheid regime. There was to be restriction on the same health policy issue, in terms of abortion for example. The general alignment of health issues dispelled ripple effects which had negative effects which required attention. Once the health issues were resolved through a policy making framework, then draft legislation and administrative rules were promulgated. However, the adoption of principles of health care issues by the ANC government meant that implementation by the responsible government department. Non-state actors offered cover in instances where there were gaps in the state's financial and capacity to provide health care to the whole society. The state was easily able to lose legitimacy of the society if it failed to provide services which non-state actors were able to provide through donor funds.

With the transition to democracy, far-reaching changes in South Africa were instituted in the domains of political decision-making and public policy-making. The political decision-making and public policy-making processes and the substantive policy objectives changed with political actors driving the process of policy-making, the structuring of the processes through which ANC's political decisions were taken and the priorities and goals of the policy-making processes. There was a great reordering of the organisations and individuals that wielded power over the policy-making processes. Although there were no definitive changes in the early years of planning, decision-making and coordination continued to be reorganised to improve policy implementation. The government of Mbeki was preoccupied with the restructuring policy-making processes. It was argued that only

legitimate and considered processes would achieve to produce a restructured society reflective of the ideals of the independent citizens of South Africa (Anderson 1997:9; Ham & Hill, 193:97; Heymans, 1996:28-50). To this end, the most powerful policy-generating clusters in South African politics centred on top government officials, in particular, the ANC cabinet ministers and President Mbeki and the structures of the governing political party the ANC. In South Africa, as elsewhere in SADC member states, the political leaders interpreted needs that they had identified based on community contact, opinion polls, interpretation of international trends and the influences of the non-state actors. The process did not necessarily follow the stereotypical linear progression from the articulation of a need to the eventual adoption of the policy. The process was mainly aimed at addressing the injustices which were perpetrated and were entrenched in economic and social systems.

The South African government embarked on political and economic security drive in 1996 that provided for a successful democratic society with governing institutions and civil society working together to improve human security of all the inhabitants of the state. It was at this conjuncture that transformation and affirmative action were additional important dilemmas and processes affecting the public service in South Africa. In essence, transformation was essentially a political function driven by political agendas. It was observed in most aspects as a means whereby the 'levers of power' that to a greater extent was represented by the public service, was able to be controlled.

The first South African democratic government had to control the public service as a way of providing political and social security to the South African citizens who over the years of apartheid rule were riled by segregation and injustices. In fact, central to the vision of black empowerment in South Africa, an economic affirmative strategy which had its mission on facilitating the transformation and reform of the

public service. It has been difficult to establish high performance, democratic, accountable, effective and professional organisations functioning in an environment where post-apartheid systems existed (South Africa, 1996:20; Webner, 1998:105). The primary goal of transformation was, therefore, to make the public service more representative and comparable to the demographic composition of the country. According to Barger, (1999:52) the composition of the public service in South Africa as of 30 September 1996 was as follows:

Table 4.1: Race Ratio in Public Service as of 1996 (*Barger, 1999:52) Table 12*

Race	Percentage
Black	65%
White	23%
Coloured	9%
Asian	3%
Total	**100**

These figures indicate that in comparison with the demographic figures, black people were greatly under-represented in the public service as they comprised 76% of the population yet only 65% were in the public service. This compared with an over-representation of whites, who were 13% of the population but made up 23% of the public service. The percentage of Asians and coloureds in the public service compared favorably with their percentage of the overall population (South Africa, 1996b:17-19). The transformation process was necessary to reduce the dominance of whites, specifically white males who were in the higher management echelons of the public service.

South Africa government was sensitive to the people's call to address the human security aspects especially transformation in the service delivery, human resources development and training and

democratisation at workplace. These areas were dominated by elements of the post-apartheid regime while blacks remained in confinement of the economic and political periphery. Proper assessment of promotion of professional services, institutional capacity-building and public service management at all levels of government systems. In this case, critical areas which needed address included democratisation processes. Vale (2004: 24) argues that political leverage of black people, especially uplifting standards of the once disadvantaged blacks were necessary to give attention. The uplifting of living standards in all aspects and provision of economic space to formerly exploited groups was considered critical.

In general usage, "policy" means the behaviour of actors such as officials, government agencies or a legislature in an area of activity such as the economy in general, land reform or education (Anderson, 1997:81). In one of the most succinct conceptualisations of policy formulation, Anderson (1997:13) describes it as involving the development of "pertinent and acceptable proposed course of action for dealing with public problems". The political culture of loyalty to the ANC as the major liberation force nevertheless continued to contribute to an overriding sense of loyalty and legitimacy which other opposition political parties found it difficult to conquer. According to Charney (1995:4-28), after democracy the South African population expected fewer benefits under the new policy formulation of the ANC government. People were disappointed that the rate of political and economic change was too slow. People expected that the democratic government was going to speedily transform the economic sector which was still being controlled by racially biased elements of Afrikaans and English extraction. Although, there was a deep-seated belief that the new democratic government required time to effect transition, the time frame of up to 2007 became too long for the ordinary peoples who were suffering from poverty to apprehend. It was on this notion that the human security provision became a

complex issue for the citizens who expected the government to take grand stances to create environment that empower citizens (May, 2000:213; Meier, 1989:34-39).

The search for comprehensive human security strategies need national policies which are guided by governance systems that include measures designed to provide safety nets for the population. Such measures were supposed to restructure the economy and to implement empowerment policies which serve people during both crises and peace (Venter, 2000:248-250). Such policies should be people driven and multi-dimensional as threats to human security were multiple and interconnected. Given the multiplicity of democratic challenges which South Africa was exposed to, an interdisciplinary approach combining economic, political and sociological strategies was needed. Like, other SADC members, South Africa was flexible and capable of responding to rapidly changing scenarios where human security was a tool to furnish a framework for preventive policies based on an understanding of root causes of peace and security threats against citizens or individual people.

When adopting a human security approach, there is need to reorient development and security programmes and plans to emerging challenges. Firstly, in South Africa it would mean correlating programmes in areas that were interconnected although handled by separate initiatives that acted at cross-purposes. Secondly, recognising the potential threats through systematic human security assessments, early warning signs and building capacity for dialogue among communities. The guiding principle to the achievement of human security in South Africa viewed policy making approach in the spectrum of that country's interactive process assisted that country to address racial discriminatory and political differences. In 1997, there was a range of policy actors which formed policy communities and policy networks to initiate direct or influence policy-making. The

cumulative stream of actions that combine to deliver policies and directives for their implementation is shown in the Table 4.2 that follows:

Table 4.2: South Africa's National Policy Formulation Process *(Crush, 2005:271) Table 12 and DTI (www.thedti.gvt.za)*

Streams of Policy Actions

Policy Phase	Problem Identification	Agenda-Setting	Policy Deliberation	Policy Adoption	Policy Implementation
POLICY ACTORS	Community leaders, members of parliament, political party leaders	Political partners, interest groups, cabinet, cabinet committees, PCAS	Cabinet members, cabinet committees	MPs, cabinet provincial government	Public servants and government ministers
AND	Communities speaking out, social movement action, government awareness	Party conferences, delegations to government	Public hearings community forums, commissions		Feedback from communities
PARTICIPATING INFLUENCES					
POLICY CLEARING HOUSES		Departmental task groups, ruling party, NWC / NEC	Parliament, parliament committees	Cabinet, national assembly, NCOP, Constitutional court	State department, provincial and local governments
DOCUMENTARY	Memoranda, Informal communication	Petitions, commissioned research reports	Green Papers	White papers, Bills, Legislation	Secondary legislations, departmental directives

STREAM OF POLICY ACTIONS

In human security aspects, the policy-making process became the most fundamental tool to receive systematic theoretical attention by the ANC government. The South African constitution of 1996 came up with the notion of cooperative governance to guide cooperation between the three spheres of government. The new models of policy-making formulations were pivotal in stratification of strong policy variations. This enabled the citizens to improve their lives in various fields such as politics, economy, food and health among others. Although the ANC government interpreted the inclusion of the wider community need, the policy-making processes included various stakeholders of different societal groups. In some instances, there were

relatively small groups of participants with an interest in a specific set of issues that concern governments, (Mentzel & Fick, 1996:96-149). Policy-making in South Africa integrated the arms of government, the civil society groups and opposition political parties to deliver the most desired peace and security aspects (Mboweni, 1997:51; Mclean, 1996:68; Moyo & De Coning, 1996:78-95).

The notion of constitutional democracy assured a form of governance where the power of the people was spelled out in a constitution. The conundrum in South Africa though, was that there was disharmony between the theory and practice of constitutional enshrinement of governance by the people. South Africa's democratisation process had to grapple with the realisation of people's expectations and accommodation of their perspectives while supporting equally important socio-economic and political reforms. There was a need for public programmes so that they understood that democracy and democratic governance meant sovereignty vested in the people and the need for the people to seize that opportunity (Comfort 1995:214-216).

The other critical lesson drawn from the South Africa's democratic transformation in the period 1997 to 2007 was the country's commitment to the human security concept. This represented a qualitative change in the conduct of foreign and security policy. The notion of change was particularly relevant for the ANC government to manifest in the constitutional provisions for decentralisation and establishment of the local authorities. Although, the ANC government had been able to create a legal environment conducive for development at the local level, it grappled with challenges from the local government authorities which were dominated by the whites. The decentralisation of governance, policy formulation and service delivery to the people provided the litmus test to deal with many challenges caused by those apartheid remnants in public service systems (Davids, 2003:119).

One of the challenges for South Africa's municipalities under the apartheid regime was division along racial and ethnic lines. The main task for ANC government during early years of independence was to harmonise the competing interests and constituencies which included civil society groups, businesspeople and non-governmental organisations. The scope and functions of traditional institutions in South Africa against that for the local government system was blurred by the year 2001. The constitutional powers of traditional authorities in South Africa were circumscribed and their role was reduced to that of advisory, ceremonial and extra-constitutional (Ntsebeza, 2003:15; Cilliers, 1996:13-25; Ally, 1997:86-91; Barber, 1997:58).

The domestic and international context in which the South African government operated shaped that country's foreign policy towards the advancement of the citizen's human security. As the apartheid regime gave way to democratic governance, the political situation was transformed. South Africa's domestic political changes had a dramatic impact on its international status since the apartheid state had largely been isolated. Initially, at independence the term human security was synonymous with the absence of the protracted armed struggle, but this changed after 2000 when the South Africans began to understand the concepts of conflict prevention, crisis management and the civil-military coordination to achieve peace and security of the citizens.

Just after the downfall of the apartheid, race and racism continued to form the core of the identity and experiences of South Africans in general. The structural and ideological manifestations of a radicalized order persisted in South Africa thereby threatening peace and security. The South African liberation struggle, like any other in the SADC region, was about the simultaneous institutionalisation of democratic rule and deracialisation of the societies.

Chapter 5: Locating the Land Issue in the Peace and Security Drive in South Africa

The agricultural sector in South Africa and Zimbabwe as anywhere in the world is a unique instrument for economic, social and political development as it enhances economic growth at national level, livelihood and food security at the local and family levels. In most SADC member states, human insecurity was exacerbated by the attempt to readdress the land issue years after colonial rule. Zimbabwe was greatly affected by its venture into land reform programme which even caused threats to peace and security in South Africa. Most important were similarities and parallels drawn between the two neighbours which were threatened by human insecurity after the respective governments delayed addressing the colonial land imbalances. South Africa and Zimbabwe were under analysis because they shared one thing in common, that of land disputes that most blacks were dispossessed of, during the white colonialist and apartheid regimes. Furthermore, this chapter critically analysed the role of the former colonial power, Britain, in her attempt to protect the interest of the white race that were on farms acquired during the colonial period. Land redistribution became a political and economic security issue in Zimbabwe and South Africa due to migration of people for various reasons ranging from food shortages, unemployment and xenophobic threats among others. In a similar vein, most black South African and Zimbabwean citizens believed that the land was taken unfairly by the white settlers, and this was regarded as a human right abuse since they had no right to the land they had occupied.

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Furthermore, the land issue is analysed as a political tool during election time in both countries. Some similarities and differences were drawn between South Africa and Zimbabwe on the impact of political

and economic insecurity caused by politicking the land issue to win the hearts and minds of the electorate for votes. However, the two neighbours faced similar challenges as far as the land redistribution was concerned. Zimbabwe and South Africa found it even more challenging to support the new landowners to succeed in land utilisation. This became a recipe for disaster in Zimbabwe where peace and security were threatened by exodus of people to other countries, particularly South Africa. On the other hand, South Africa was faced with an agitated land hungry people. Unemployment crisis caused by white commercial farmers who preferred to employ foreigners at the expense of citizens exacerbated xenophobic sentiments among the South African community. The two countries went through political and economic insecurity characterised by poor health delivery services, food shortages, unemployment and xenophobic attacks among a plethora of problems.

Land reform is a prickly issue in South Africa and Zimbabwe. For some, it conjured up images of land which was stolen from black people during the apartheid and colonial rule. For others in South Africa particularly, whites, it incited fear of being evicted from the farms, echoing the Zimbabwe's Fast-track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) which caused human insecurity in the country. Reclaiming land was an important rallying cry for liberation movements in both South Africa and Zimbabwe but in the years after white minority rule ended, it became difficulty to acquire and redistribute the land fairly and efficiently. The FTLRP which left nearly all white commercial farmers dispossessed of their farms led to Zimbabwe's agricultural sector's demise, while many observers were asking if South Africa was going to be next. Walker (1998) observes that, when Nelson Mandela took power in South Africa in 1994, about 87 percent of the country's land was owned by whites and these represented less than ten percent of the population. The African National Congress (ANC) government wanted to redistribute 30% of the land from whites to blacks in the first five years of the democracy. It then took 16 years of independence for

the ANC government to reallocate only 8% of the land to the land hungry black citizens. Indeed, the land remained a hot issue in both countries because it touched on economic and political nerve centres of individual citizens (Walker, 1998:432-436; Thompson & Leysens, 2000:321).

In failing to redistribute land, the South African government undermined a crucial aspect of the negotiated settlement to end apartheid causing black economic insecurity. According to Section 25 of the new South African Constitution, promulgated in 1994, the white property owners received valid legal title to property, which was acquired under the apartheid regime, despite dubious circumstances of its acquisition. Although black citizens, including people of mixed racial descent and Indians were expecting a fast land reform but still whites continued to keep their property. In fact, political apartheid system had ended in South Africa, but economic apartheid system continued to live on. On the other hand, successful implementation and execution of the Fast-track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe required the intertwining of a host of factors. Chigora & Dewa (2003) argue that the FTLRP could have made significant progress in human security provisions in Zimbabwe if the beneficiaries of the land reform programme had been equipped with the requisite farming knowledge and skills. However, there was an attempt to move beyond the land reform programme in the context of the nexus between land reform and food security in the two countries. Assessing the effectiveness of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe, the move was made taking into consideration its impact on the security of individual peoples and migration of citizens to South Africa. The agricultural sector in Zimbabwe as anywhere else in the world was a unique instrument for economic, social and political development as it enhanced economic growth at national level, livelihood and food security at the local and family levels. The potential for national economic growth in Zimbabwe was rooted in its agricultural

foundation, of which it was not the same scenario for the South African land issue (Kanyenze, 2006:65; Moyo, 2000:45-55; Vale *et al.*, 2001:401-413; Thomas, 1996:120).

In this topic, the land question in Zimbabwe is examined as the core of the country's political, economic and social development. From the occupation of Matabeleland and Mashonaland in the 1890s until today, the land question remains the root of political tension within Zimbabwe and with Britain, the former colonial power. It was Cecil John Rhodes, a British business tycoon who championed the colonisation of Zimbabwe in 1890 and a process of systematic dispossession of land began which belonged to the indigenous black people. The Ndebele War of 1893 saw the local people being driven to the newly created Gwaai and Shangani reserves. The 1896 Ndebele and Shona uprisings took place partly because of the land question. African resistance crumbled under the settler's superior firepower. According to the British Government's Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1898, additional Native Reserves were established based on the policy of racial segregation and the same Order further provided that;

> "The Company (BSAC) shall from time to time assign to Natives inhibiting Southern Rhodesia, land sufficient for their occupation and suitable for their agricultural or pastoral requirements."

Various legislative enactments coupled with the use of violence enabled the British South African Company (BSAC) to demarcate land in a racially skewed manner. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which provided for restricted rights of the African to land ownership to designated Native Purchase Areas was enacted and implemented. According to the Act of 1930, land was apportioned as Table 5.2 below indicates:

Table 5; 2 Land-Ownership Patterns after Land Apportionment Act of 1930   Source Mutondi 2001: Table 3:1

CATEGORY	ACRES	% OF COUNTRY
European area	49,149,174	51
Native reserves	21,127,040	22
Unassigned area	17,793,300	18,5
Forest area	590,500	0,6
Undetermined area	88,540	0,1
Total	96,213,120	100

Africans were supposed to have used 28,391,606 acres or 29,8% of land. The African population was estimated to be 1 081 000 in 1930 (Utete, 2003:14). The land /was located in marginal, inhospitable and at times tsetse fly ridden areas. The European settler population was about 50,000 and yet was allocated 49,149,174 acres or 51 percent of the best land in the country. After the Second World War, new settlers escaping the economic hardships in Europe were allocated more land at the expense of blacks. Massive evictions to accommodate the new white settlers took place. The Native Land Husbandry Act was enacted in 1995 to enforce the de-stocking and conservation practices on the African held land (Tindall, 1968:221). The then outspoken Catholic Bishop of Umtali, Donald Lamont, rhetorically asked in 1959;

> "Can you in conscience blame the African, if eking out a tenuous existence from the poor soil in an overcrowded reserve, he is swayed by subversive propaganda, while close besides him there lie hundreds of thousands of hectares of fertile soil which he may not cultivate, not occupy, not graze, because although it lies unused and unattended, it belongs to some individual or group of individuals who perhaps do not use the land in the hope of profit from speculation" (Presidential Land Review Committee Report 2003: 14-23).

As overcrowding in the reserves increased, the colonial regime of Ian Douglas Smith pursued segregationist policies with vigour and

abandoned any pretence at accommodating the majority blacks. Against this background, the nationalist struggle, with its many causes, chief of which was the land grievance was launched mainly from Zambia. According to the late Chairman of the Zimbabwe African National Union, (ZANU) Herbert Chitepo, land was the real issue of the armed struggle being waged;

> "I could go into the whole theories of discrimination, in legislation, in residency, in economic opportunities, in education. I could go into that, but I will restrict myself to the question of land because I think this is basic. To us the essence of exploitation, the essence of white domination, is domination over land. That is the real issue" (Presidential Land Review Committee Report 2003:15).

All conferences and negotiations over Rhodesia could not solve the crisis because of failure in resolving mainly the land issue. Thus, the Geneva talks of 1976, Malta in 1978 and the Anglo American Proposals known as Detente all revolved on issues of the land reform and compensation to white farmers. The Lancaster House talks of 1979 almost collapsed because of disagreements over the land issue. The Patriotic Front (PF) wanted the recognition that the main reason for the armed struggle was the recovery of the land which was forcibly taken from the black people. The Patriotic Front was composed of two liberation movements ZANU and ZAPU for the purpose of peace negotiations with the Smith regime. Attempts by the British to retain privileges in property and land rights were thwarted by the PF until the British and US governments agreed to the setting up of a fund to finance land reform in a new Zimbabwe. As the final agreement was reached the PF announced;

> "We have now obtained assurances that… Britain, the United States of America and other countries will participate in a multinational donor effort to assist in land, agricultural and economic development programmes. These assurances go a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question arising from the great need our people have for land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in Government (Presidential Land Review Committee Report 2003:16) (*Ibid*).

The chairman of the Lancaster House Conference, Lord Carrington on the land issue on 11 October 1979, had this to say;

> "We recognise that the future of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership. The costs would be very substantial indeed, well beyond the capacity, in our judgement, of any individual donor country, and the British Government cannot commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them. We should, however, be ready to support the efforts to the Governments of Independent Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for these purposes" (Presidential Land Review Committee Report 2003:17) (*Ibid*).

The centrality of the land issue was, therefore, acknowledged but the British inserted Section 16 of the Draft Constitution which formed part of the Declaration of Rights which sought to prohibit compulsory acquisition of property of any description expect under the authority of law. The property could be acquired under certain conditions such as in the interests of the public health, public morality, defence, public safety, and town and country planning. The acquiring authority was required to give reasonable notice of its intention to acquire the property in question and to pay prompt and adequate compensation. Section 16, as part of the Declaration of Rights would be entrenched for ten years from the date of independence. In the meantime the constitution obligated Government to acquire land on a willing seller-willing buyer basis during the first ten years of independence. Not much was achieved as the land was very expensive and the international community gave limited financial support. As a result, only 71,000 families were resettled on a paltry 3, 5 million hectares of land acquired by Government between 1980 and 1990. As pressure mounted on government to speed up the land redistribution exercise, there developed growing impatience on the part of the land hungry (Tizora, 2013:241-243; Utete, 2003:14-18; Presidential Land Review Committee Report, 2003:13-45).

Land reform in Zimbabwe officially began in 1980, while in South Africa it began in 2014, twenty years after the end of apartheid. It remained a contentious issue although a very insignificant number of black people were reallocated pieces of land in South Africa. In this case, the land reform was an effort by the two neighbours to equitably distribute land to the black subsistence farmers. Addressing a meeting of the Central Committee of the ZANU (PF) party on 26 November 1990, in Harare, President Mugabe dubbed the new land reform drive as the 'Third Chimurenga', the last phase of the liberation of Zimbabwe, after the armed liberation struggle of the 1970s and the early uprisings against colonial settlers in the 1890s. Mugabe's pronouncement led to the national desire to seriously revisit the land question in Zimbabwe. Therefore, beginning in 2000, the Government of Zimbabwe adopted a fast-track land resettlement programme which was followed by series of spontaneous farm occupations of white commercial farms by the landless black people. The land reform was received by the populace in different ways because of its political polarisation and racial discrimination. The targeted farms belonged to white commercial farmers, a precedent viewed by the opposition political party elements as a political gimmick by the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF) to consolidate a political powerbase using the land issue (www.voanews.com; Setai,1998:115-120).

Immediately after independence, most Southern African countries faced the challenge of reversing the colonial and apartheid legacies of neglect and underdevelopment. In this case, Zimbabwe began to play a key role in the process of compulsory land acquisition after landless peasants and war veterans had invaded white owned farms. This process led to a deliberate statist development strategy that manifested itself through nationalisation programmes and the expansion of the public sector. For the better part of the 1990s and 2000s, post-colonial states in SADC, particularly Zimbabwe, focused their development

strategies towards addressing the basic needs such as education, health, food and employment. In fact, the social policy occupied centre-stage in statecraft. To this end, development strategy aimed at improving basic social services in Zimbabwe came under the grip of local authorities but agriculture and industry were placed under strong state control in what Mandaza (1996) argues as the emergence of state capitalism. Explaining the predatory nature of most SADC post-colonial states, Mandaza (1996) further posits that one of its main objectives had been to "try to ensure that those who became rich, particularly outside state, do not become prospective contenders for state power." Indeed, the land issue took a political dimension of which anyone that went against the ruling elites' decisions was left out of the land redistribution equation. State control in agriculture in Zimbabwe took a new dimension after chaotic land invasions across the country. The white commercial farmers who were booted out from the farms became vindictive to the extent that they sabotaged the agricultural sector and even relocated to other countries, including South Africa. The relocation of white commercial farmers did not only plunge Zimbabwe into human insecurity mode but caused pressure on South Africa's land demand. The effects of the chaotic land reform programme had caused a lot of Zimbabweans migrating to South Africa running away from political and economic insecurities. The motivation to relocate to South Africa by Zimbabweans had a direct and indirect impact on labour market and migration patterns (Blumfeld, 1991: 1991; Lundahl & Petersson, 1995:243; Smith, 2001:75; Mamdani, 1996:36).

The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 which gave birth to Zimbabwe's independence sought to provide for equitable redistribution of land to the landless peasants and war veterans without damaging white farmers' vital contribution to the economy and food security. In this case, on a similar vein South Africa's Land Restitution Commission, an agency which was pivotal to the land reform efforts in 1999, placed a moratorium on buying land claimed

under the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Bill. Inequalities in land ownership in both countries were worsened by a land hungry growing population, depletion of tracts of arable land and escalating poverty in subsistence farming areas over the preceding decades. There was a sharp underutilisation of land in some white commercial farms in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The land reform programme made the Zimbabwean regime popular among its own people and it attracted a lot of media attention on the international scene. Chigora & Dewa (2003:92) postulate that "there was fatal politicization and internationalisation of the land conflict that led to the imposition of sanctions". The land grab in Zimbabwe presented President Robert Mugabe great victories against the Western countries and the opposition political parties which were critical of misrule. Mugabe regime capitalised on the popularity and influence of black empowerment to consolidate power, but this exacerbated political and economic turbulences in the country and across the borders. South Africa affected economically because many people trekked there to secure employment and health services (Chigora & Dewa, 2003: 92-98; LEDRIZ, 2011:485-495).

Although, the pressure to redistribute land emanated from nationalist liberation movements, the impetus for land reform was deep-rooted within civil society and opposition political parties. In spite of this, unlike in Zimbabwe, not everyone in South Africa expected instability to actually materialise in the farming sector because land issue inequality in that country was not affecting livelihoods as it did in Zimbabwe. For instance, about three percent of South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was based on agriculture whereas before the 2000 land grab in Zimbabwe, agriculture contributed about 20 percent of the country's GDP. The Fast-track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 2000 followed political posturing by Britain, the former colonial power that expressed dissatisfaction that democratic tenets were not being followed in acquiring land during the Phase I (1980-1997) of the land resettlement programme. The land occupation then turned more political to the extent that the internationally acclaimed respect for private property rights was negated. Furthermore, the land occupations responded to the social and political pressures for faster implementation of land reforms. The Western countries led by Britain

labelled Mugabe a villain after land grabbing but in SADC and beyond he became a hero for readdressing the colonial ills. Mugabe became more popular even after the British government had indicated that pressure was needed to remove him from power. In a nutshell, despite threats against Mugabe's regime over the alleged land grabbing, Zimbabweans continued to support him regardless of severe food shortages and job dismissals across the country (Madhuku, 2004:213; Boyle, 2001:665-669).

The British government denied that Britain had committed itself to a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. The ZANU-PF grabbed the opportunity to politicise the land issue where Britain was portrayed as a villain intending to fight back the land reform exercise. At every ZANU-PF rally held thereafter, it was Britain and opposition political parties which were accused of intending to reverse the land ownership to the white minority group. The issue of land took an ugly face that plunged the whole country into food insecurity. The turning point of the land reform programme to a political gimmick which caused people to move to South Africa in search of peace and security (Matondi, 2008: 62; www.foreignaffairs.com).

Given the above, Zimbabwe government grabbed the opportunity to blame the British Government for reneging on the promise made during the political settlement at Lancaster House. Unlike South Africa, Zimbabwe received several interpretations and analyses across the globe on issues of land reform. Leaders of SADC member states were generally supportive of the programme, although the population of the region were sceptical of political and economic challenge that was inevitably simmering. For example, former Mozambican President Joachim Chissano said that the reforms had given the opportunity to millions of previously landless Zimbabweans to possess land and to produce their own food (Speech to Corporate Council on Africa, 2003). In this case, Mugabe was viewed as a hero fighting for the poor peasant black farmers who for the first time had reclaimed their land. Although, Mugabe remained popular after the grabbing of white owned farms, the food insecurity in the country reached the lowest levels. Most rural people witnessed another worst drought seasons of

which the only survival opportunity was to go trek to South Africa for jobs. The large-scale commercial farms which were not invaded, the white farm owners continued to take agricultural sector as "business as usual'. The white farmers, ironically, left the political business to blacks while they concentrated on economic business. The whites did not help the economic recovery after the land invasions, in fact the human insecurity worsened. However, critics of the land reform programme blamed the ZANU-PF government for consolidating its political power using the land reform as a strategy, compromising peace and security of the country (http://www.saflii.org; Davenport, 2003:201).

While the aim behind land redistribution in Zimbabwe was to correct the existing imbalances in land ownership, the government's goal was to enhance food security for the country. The World Food Conference report (1996) defined food security as the availability at all times of adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices. In this case, the notion of food security underscored that all peoples always have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (Napoli, 2011:512; Setai, 1998:78).

Although agriculture was not contributing significantly to the South Africa's GDP, about 35 to 40% of the nation's population resides in rural areas, so access to land was necessary for the survival of many poor families. Unlike other complex social issues in South Africa such as unemployment and inadequate health care, the land issue that remained contentious had roots in most of the citizens. Indeed, the ZANU-PF government was viewed by the landless peasants as politically gallivanting with the land issue. This came about after a long pause without land being acquired for resettlement due to the direction of government policy on land reform. The government ring-fenced the large-scale commercial farming sector (LSCF) as the anchor for the economy. This was acknowledged by the late Julius Nyerere who recognised the vitality of the agriculture-based economy of Zimbabwe, describing it as 'the jewel of Africa'. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe's large-scale agriculture was an enclave developed based

on ruthless land dispossession of blacks by whites for a period of over ninety years, stretching from 1890. The indigenous African populace was condemned to below subsistence farming in neglected, marginalized and overcrowded 'Tribal Trust Lands' which were not able to provide a decent livelihood, thereby forcing many black Zimbabweans into low wage employment. To make matters worse, the large-scale agricultural economy was heavily based on exporting cash crops to the detriment of providing food to the general populace. However, the political and economic insecurity created by the failure to provide land led many Zimbabweans to trek down to South Africa for employment and human rights provisions (Zikhali, 2008:416; Kanyenze, 2006:305; Rukuni, 2006:89).

While the wind of democratic change had been blowing across Africa for over decades now, the land issue remained the contentious problem in many societies. Some Southern African countries were at a stage of change and flux as they struggled to democratize and readdress the land injustices created during the colonial and apartheid era. To curb political, economic and social polarisation in readdressing the land issue, support was needed to be scaled up to strengthen mechanisms for security and protection of the individual peoples, including through formulation and implementation of supporting legislations. Civil society organisations in Zimbabwe and South Africa understood that the land issue could not be separated from good governance. It can be argued that democracy, as a political practice requires an effective state and appropriate legal political institutions to secure people's rights, safeguard their human security and make their own laws. The understanding is that, despite the frequent holding of multi-party elections in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the absence of addressing the land issue remained a serious human insecurity factor (Nathan & Honwana, 1999:212; Nkiwane, 1999:112).

Food insecurity in Zimbabwe had various complexities that emanated from the manner in which the land resettlement exercise was handled. It was the issue of food scarcity which led most of citizens to accuse the government for not being sincere in addressing the concerns of the peasants. The food insecurity became a poor governance issue after the country had suffered food shortages. Zimbabwe faced food deficits

since 1997 and ZANU-PF was blamed for coming up with poor governance policies. Many civil society activists argued that there was no positive development brought about by restructuring the agricultural sector after the white commercial farmers were forced to surrender parts of their land. Households expected to have sufficient food to meet their requirements always had gone through the worst periods of hunger. The food insecurity had been a permanent feature of Zimbabwe from 1990 resulting in perennial food deficits driven by low production and productivity (FAO and WFP, 2009).

One major negative effect of the FTLRP was the loss of land bankability. This completely paralyzed high crop and animal production compromising food security. People who had occupied white commercial farms found their way to South Africa after the agricultural sector was unattainable to farmers who had no capital to do business. As a result, all the land issue problems identified went uncorrected and human insecurity affected the already disadvantaged landless people. South Africa, due to its proximity to Zimbabwe became the only alternative rendezvous for escaping poverty and other related social ills. Although, once became fashionable to some peasant farmers to invade white owned farms across the country, it turned out later that capital injection and government assistance were needed for new farmers to start agricultural production. There was no assistance which came by for the newly resettled farmers to start any production on the farms. The only alternative that came into the minds of most resettled farmers, was to go to South Africa to secure jobs among other business menial activities (Marongwe, 2008:116; Moyo, 2000:582).

Zimbabwe achieved its independence relatively later than the other African countries. Mhone (2000) argues that it was hoped Zimbabwe was going to draw lessons from the mistakes of African countries which plunged into political and economic crises after independence. The ZANU-PF government adopted three policy frameworks which affected the agricultural sector among other economic sectors. Although, the first decade of independence, 1980 to 1990, started promisingly with government pursuing the policy titled 'Growth with Equity' in 1981, it failed to address the colonial legacy in favour of the black majority communal farmers and the war veterans. As a result,

the government latched on to the diametrically opposite programme of 'Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which also impacted negatively on the agricultural sector. Kapoor (1995) says that empirical evidence pointed to the fact that most of the gains made during the first decade of independence was eroded by ESAP and the economic crisis came thereafter. The land resettlement programme which was expected to have addressed the agricultural sector by decongesting the black majority peasants to new arable areas did not succeed due the complexities of the Land Act as per the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979. In fact, the 'willing buyer willing seller' concept which was agreed at Lancaster House made it impossible for the government to confiscate the land from white commercial farmers. The land became the cornerstone of black economic emancipation after the failure by government to achieve a robust economic growth to sustain investment levels. In this case, efforts to rectify land injustices through a 'willing seller, willing buyer' system had been viewed as largely ineffective. The failure by government to provide overcrowded rural farmers with proper agricultural knowledge exposed them to food shortages (Mhone, 2000:214; Kapoor, 1995:4-6).

The productive sector in Zimbabwe faced a litany of problems that included the lack of secure and predictable property rights, a rapidly worsening shortage of manpower skills, uncertain agricultural land rights and land-tenure insecurity. Zimbabwe further experienced worst economic crisis between 1996 and 2009. Average annual inflation had been on an upward trend since 2000 and it recorded its peak in November 2003 at 619.5 %. It dipped slightly to 448% in June 2004. Unemployment reached extremely high levels of 70% while on the other hand, food assessment was predicted to be able to feed about twelve million people. Two million tonnes of grain was supposed to feed the hungry for the period 2004 to 2005 (www.news24.com.). Industrial production was 60% below capacity owing to shortages in fuel, power and foreign exchange which made it impossible for companies to buy essential materials. According to Cornish (2004) Zimbabwe was the front-runner for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Southern African states. It was receiving as much as US$444.3

million in investment by 1998 but this amount dwindled to US$5.4 in 2006. The challenge for ZANU-PF government to avoid migration of people to South Africa was to effect real transformation without undermining its commercial farming sector (Archbishop Ncube, 2004; Nkiwane, 1999: 70-76).

Since 1997, South Africa became a major political player in attempting to resolve conflicts in Africa. However, the political crisis which dogged the country remained unresolved. South Africa on the other hand was accused of not adopting a strong position against Zimbabwe to stop political persecution against opposition political elements. Although, South Africa maintained that it was in constant dialogue with the Zimbabwean leadership in both ZANU-PF and opposition political parties, peace and security provision for the larger part of the population was threatened. Pretoria claimed that it was using discussion and persuasion in its effort to restore law and order in Zimbabwe. During all these developments, the political and economic insecurity became invincible that the migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa became rampant being exacerbated by those who wanted to find employment. Many in South Africa and NGO elements were of the view that South Africa was the strongest and most influential country in SADC to influence Zimbabwe to address the human rights abuse issues. However, it meant that Pretoria was expected to come up with a drastic foreign policy measure that was going to persuade Zimbabwe to democratise. South Africa became a focal point for those countries whose nationals were dispossessed of their land. Pretoria was pressured by the British and United States of America among others, to persuade Mugabe regime to reverse the land reform programme (Rutherford, 2001:89; Stolten, 2007:312).

The Zimbabwe's human insecurity became a regular centre of discussion at various public forums. South Africa's alleged soft approach against Zimbabwe's alleged undemocratic tendencies gave

pressure to Mbeki regime to take drastic measures. Mbeki did not accept to be forced to take any action against Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's dependency on South Africa for electricity and other imports were the necessary options which the Mbeki regime might have utilised to persuade Mugabe regime to accommodate opposition elements. However, the SADC region developed mixed political perception after Zimbabwe was alleged to have perpetrated violence against the people leading to the exodus of people to South Africa (Manyeruke, 2007: 214; Rugube, 2004:98; Moyo, 1999:48).

However, approximately two million Zimbabweans had already entered South Africa illegally by 2000, fleeing the harsh economic conditions and political repression in the country (Madhuku, 2004:450). If Pretoria were to force the ZANU-PF government into submission, consequently fewer refugees were going to cross the borders. South Africa had no economic capacity to absorb Zimbabweans, especially given the high levels of her domestic unemployment. Zimbabweans among other migrants sparked more internal fissures considering xenophobic attitudes that many South African citizens had (Stolten, 2007:35).
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South Africa was unwilling to intervene in Zimbabwe's political and economic problems beyond diplomatic persuasions. President Thabo Mbeki had once stated that the solution to the Zimbabwe's political and economic debacles lay in the hands of Zimbabweans themselves. He feared that further political and economic chaos in Zimbabwe was going to affect South African citizens. Sadomba (2008: 89) says that the obvious consequence of Pretoria's making a strong move against Harare without the support of other African states was going to have negative effects on both South Africa and Zimbabwe economies and political dispensations. Pretoria continued to assert a policy of limited engagement with Zimbabwe, where it encouraged the leaders of ZANU-PF and the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change, to come together and seek reconciliation. The migration of

Zimbabweans into South Africa revealed that SADC had no strong capability to maintain peace, security, good governance and democracy in the region. SADC as institutions should have committed itself to maintain peace and security and promote democratic governance and economic growth in the region. The organisation's lack of strategic policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe had shown weaknesses that threatened human security in the region (Maylam, 2001: 418).

ZANU-PF's political message at the height of the land reform and during elections of 2000 was 'Land is the Economy and the Economy is Land' (Sadomba, 2008). This political rhetoric paid dividends to the party because it gave ZANU-PF party advantage to win the elections against the opposition political parties which were heavily supported by various stakeholders who were opposed to the land reform programme. According to Madhuku (2004), the Zimbabwe government dealt with the land occupations while on the other hand effecting some constitutional changes to give legality to the land occupations. The government parcelled out large tracts of land to the people basing their arguments on the constitutional amendments which allowed the state to acquire land compulsorily without compensation except for the improvements on the farm. Capacitating poor people with physical assets such as farm equipment, tools, irrigation and market infrastructure, transport, processing facilities and other types of inputs needed to support production for sustainable empowerment (Madhuku, 2004:211).

The rejection of the draft constitution of 2000 by the electorate exposed the former colonial power Britain because it became clear that it wanted a regime change in Zimbabwe. According to Rugube (2004), the British government supported the opposition political parties and civil society organisations to mobilize the electorates to vote against the draft constitution to stop the invasion of white owned commercial farms. The British government cited many other things to oppose the

Fast-track Land Reform Programme. Britain picked up that the FTLRP was characterized by double standards and irregularities which were coupled with issues such as government's poor planning and unfair allocation of land to politicians and war veterans of the ruling ZANU (PF) party (LEDRIZ, 2011). The land reform programme became too politicised, and the population at large was divided on political party affiliation. The political polarisation of citizens divided the communities to the extent that even government aid was distributed along political party lines. The nation was exposed to political and economic insecurity, hence the desire to cross to South Africa for job opportunities and humanitarian assistance (Carey & Pope, 2000:68-70; Bujra, 2002:49).

Indeed, the ZANU-PF government managed to resettle some peasant farmers on farms vacated by white commercial farmers. However, the country suffered food shortages due to uncoordinated agricultural activities which saw some farmers grew crops in areas suitable for animal husbandry. The basic agricultural rules, regulations, administrative mechanisms, and issues of resource mobilization were ignored by government in the resettlement process. They were viewed as a hindrance to achieve the objectives of the land reform programme. Constitutional and legal imperatives were also suspended in favour of a free for all scenarios in the agricultural sector. The existing legal frameworks that white commercial farmers attempted to challenge government actions with, were quickly amended to suit the intentions of resettling peasant farmers. In a short space of time, white commercial farmers lost hope, confidence and a sense of ownership in the Zimbabwean body politic and started to vacate the farms en masse (Bond: 2000:235; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011:349-355).

The government of Zimbabwe as a measure to revive the agricultural sector invited the European development partners for a land conference in Harare in September 1998. The conference brought together key domestic and foreign agricultural stakeholders such as

farmers and civil society organisations, international donors and multilateral institutions. Although, the conference agreed on fundamental principles which were supposed to give direction to a democratic way of land resettlement, issues of lack of transparency in land allocation, rule of law, and politicisation of land caused donors to withdraw their assistance to the land reform programme. Furthermore, the Commercial Farmers Union, a white farmers' organisation, tried to negotiate with government by offering land for resettlement where about a Z$15 billion aid package was offered through the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (Commercial Farmers' Union Policy Documents, 2006). The initiative did not materialize because the ZANU-PF regime had taken the position that the British government and white commercial farmers were against the land reform programme. Indeed, the land became a battle ground for political expedience for all stakeholders. This caused food insecurity in both towns and rural areas across the country (LEDRIZ, 2011; Napoli, 2011: 98).

The need to address the land question in South Africa and Zimbabwe arose from racially discriminatory laws and practices which were in place for the largest part of the twentieth century, especially related to land ownership. According to Kloppers & Pienaar (2014) postulate that the formation of a stronger, richer and unified settler states in 1910- the Union of South Africa- ushered in a policy environment which suppressed and isolated African farmers from mainstream agriculture to facilitate their transformation into rural and urban labourers. The whites in both Zimbabwe and South Africa during the colonial and apartheid era respectively segregated blacks in the land ownership and usage to the extent that they remained viable as cheap labour. The advents of political independence, the ruling political parties were forced by circumstances to review the land issues. Vale (2003:34) argues that addressing the land inequalities in Zimbabwe and South Africa was the most important issue for waging the armed struggles

which saw many lives lost (Kloppers & Pienaar, 2004:412; www.saflii.org.za).

The land reform in South Africa was different from the way it was carried out in Zimbabwe. This was due to economic repercussions it was going to cause in the economic sector. Zimbabwe's economy is agro-based, as such without land being given back to the people there was no black empowerment. South Africa had the mining, manufacturing and hospitality industries which augmented agriculture in human security provisions. The apartheid regime land law, the Native Lands Act of 1913, prohibited the establishment of the new farming operations, sharecropping or cash rentals by blacks outside of their reserves, where they were forced to live. During the armed struggle for independence, ANC promised the masses that it was to come up with the 'Land Restitution' to address the land inequalities at independence. The black land ownership was important to economically empower overcrowded peasant farmers in reserves. Indeed, it was also important to reduce inequality between black and white (Vale, 2003:145-157).

The land reform process in South Africa focused on restitution, land tenure reform and land redistribution. Restitution was all about government compensating individuals in monetary terms, the farms they were forcefully removed. According to Makhado (2012), redistribution of land was the most important component of the land reform in South Africa. The concept of redistributing land through buying land from its owners (willing buyer) by the government (willing seller) did not produce dividends in South Africa because the owners were not involved when the land were purchased. The government reviewed the land redistribution and tenure process in 2000, to a more decentralised based planning process. In this case, more community participation approach was adopted at district levels

where land redistribution was undertaken (Vale, 2003:90; Cilliers, 1996:65; Crush, 1999:134).

There were various concerns and challenges that emerged during the land redistribution at district levels. Although, the government appointed agricultural extension officers to work with the community leadership to distribute land take away from the white commercial farmers, the political elites corruptly gave themselves farms to the detriment of the peasants. Unlike in Zimbabwe where farms expropriated were not compensated due to lack of funds while those of South Africa were timeously compensated. South Africa's land reform programme remained hugely unequal with blacks still dispossessed of land and homeless. The ANC government faced challenges to improve the various bureaucratic processes and to give citizens secure land tenure (Crush, 1999:160-170).

According to Hall (2004) the main model of land reform implemented in South Africa was based on the Market- led Agrarian Reform (MLAR). The MLAR model faced various challenges. Hall and the South Africa Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (2008) came up with the following challenges of MLAR:

Willing seller-willing buyer principle: It took a long time to negotiate land price with the landowners. The whites who used to own the land did not want to part away with their farms. It took a long time for government to persuade whites with access land they were not utilising to sell it for resettlement purposes.

Capacity: There was lack of institutional capacity for community legal entities. The communal people who were overcrowded were not able to legally challenge their positions due to the rules of the Land Appropriation Act of 1848 which gave land rights of occupation to the white race.

Claim disputes: There was a long process to mediate and resolve claim disputes among those who would have been resettled. The land disputes took years to pacify because of resources which were needed to be availed to the one who was selling the farm. Most of whites who hesitated to sell their farms had to go through several legal processes to protect their interests at the farms. On the other hand, the blacks who wanted to be resettled had to satisfy the legal statutes of the country laws for them to occupy land under the custody the white farmers.

Beneficiary selection: It was a lengthy and time-consuming process to select the rightful beneficiaries for land redistribution. The government had limited capacities to be able to select the beneficiaries of those pieces of land which might have been submitted for resettling blacks by whites on a willing seller-willing buyer principle. The government took time to select the rightful beneficiaries for land allocation as mitigatory measure to curb corruption by the political elites who used to manipulate the process.

Resettlement support: The agrarian reform in South Africa during 1997 to 2007 period required enough resources and time to effectively facilitate post-resettlement support to new land owners. The country needed to a big financial budget to be able to move people to new places where land had been acquired. The white commercial farmers who had sold their farms wanted cash upfront which made the ANC government failed to meet within the limited timeframes.

Monitoring and evaluation: There was lack of reliable monitoring systems and evaluation by the South Africa Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. South Africa was still young in terms of democratic transformation by 1997. There were no proper land resettlement systems in place to monitor and evaluate the whole agricultural processes which were supposed to be undertaken across

the provinces. The evaluation of farms remained a problem for the government to be able to give conclusive evaluations of the land.

Policy: There were gaps in the policies that governed the land reform processes that were compromising effective implementation of land reform programme. The land acquisition policy in South Africa was in favour of the white race because of historical land acquisition processes of 1848. The land policy was possible to be changed if the legislature, judiciary and the executive arms of government were to unite in the formulation of policies which were to correct the land resettlement processes in relation to ownership imbalances.

Different political views: There was lack of common consensus among political parties on land reform debate. The Government of South Africa in the period 1997 to 2007 was composed of political parties with political ideological diversity. The whites who were in parliament were in favour of whites to remain on farms while most of blacks wanted land ownership to be revisited.

The ANC government was criticised for not taking keen interest to fund the land reform programme. In this case, it was to address and implement Section 25(6) of the Constitution which reinforces equalities between races and assist the beneficiaries of the land reform to obtain the capital and skills necessary to use the newly acquired land productively. The MLAR approach was different to the FTLRP which was hawkish and disastrous to the agricultural sector. Although, the MLAR managed to maintain agricultural sector productive but blacks remained dispossessed of their land while the Zimbabwe scenario, most of the peasant landless were able to be resettled in farms which once belonged to white commercial farms (Vale, 2003:90; Cilliers, 1996:65; Makhado, 2012:312).

The land reform interventions in post- apartheid South Africa focused on the reduction of asset poverty amongst the rural poor and utilising their expertise to mitigate food insecurity, poor incomes and unemployment through creating conditions for diverse forms of commodity production. Such a restructuring process focused on providing the rural poor with assets needed for livelihoods and developing diversified agriculture while creating conditions for accumulation from below. The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP), the South African government land and agrarian project was meant to improve the food security situation of poverty-stricken rural communities through land reform.

The Zimbabwe land reform required a lot of resources, to identify land which was to be allocated to individuals. In this case most of the beneficiaries had no knowledge and financial capacity to fully utilise the acquired farms. The government of Zimbabwe faced resistance to unlock militating challenges which included economic sanctions imposed by the Western countries, poor economic investment environment and poor foreign direct capital injection. Under the FTLRP, the land acquisition process was compulsory in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 20:10) as amended. The following categories of land were targeted for acquisition:
- Derelict and under-utilised land
- Land under multiple ownership
- Foreign owned land
- Land contiguous to communal areas.

The four categories of land which were supposed to be identified for resettlement were shrouded with scepticism. To identify derelict and under-utilised land in a country with no foreign capital injection made the government fail to fulfil social needs of the people. Few white commercial farmers who survived the land invasions failed to produce good harvest due to natural phenomenon of weather. Land that was under multiple ownership, was targeted but it was difficult to identify

it, some peasants were hiding information pertaining to white commercial farmers' ownership of multiple farms. It was even difficult for the government to know which farms were still under foreign ownership and those lands near communal areas. The hurdles derived from the government systems resourced to venture on the ground to concretise the land reform programme (Bond: 2000:213; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011:39-55).

The government spared other pieces of land from acquisition due legal challenges and other fundamental intricacies of government-to-government bilateral agreements. These were the farms which created more economic damages to Zimbabwe after they were acquired. The following special categories of land were excluded for acquisition:

- Agro-industrial properties involved in the large-scale production of tea, coffee, timber, citrus fruit, etc.;
- Properties with Export Processing Zone (EPZ) permits and those with Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC) certificates,
- Farms belonging to church or mission organisations; and
- Farms subject to Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPA).

The government of Zimbabwe had put the land acquisition procedures under Statutory Instrument 419 of 1999. This statutory device set out the maximum permissible land sizes per natural region, considering climate and the surrounding ecological system. Zimbabwe has a total area of 39, 6 million hectares of land, of which 33 million hectares are suitable for agriculture while the rest is reserved for national parks, forests and urban settlements. The country has a variable rainfall pattern, occurring mainly between October and March, and the total rainfall and its distribution are the over-riding factors limiting agricultural production. Average annual rainfall varies from below 300mm in low-lying areas of the country to over 1000mm on the central watershed. It is generally, a small area in the eastern border mountains which receives over 1500mm annually. The reliability of

rainfall increases with altitude and only 37% of the country receives more than the 700mm annual average considered necessary for semi-intensive farming, with less than a third of the area being arable (Muir-Leresche, 2006:84).

Initially, the FTLRP was intended to de-congest communal lands, but was further extended to incorporate the creation of indigenous commercial farming sector. The Model A1 farming scheme was to decongest communal lands and to empower peasant farmers to produce enough food for both cash and consumption purposes. The Model A2 farming scheme was to create a cadre of black commercial farmers based on the concept of full cost recovery from the beneficiary. The Model A2 farmers were expected to be self-sufficient of government support, although the land was unbankable, the difference between the two models could not be easily depicted in many respects. In terms of food production, the Model A1 performed far much better than the Model A2. Model A2 agricultural overheads in terms of infrastructure development and maintenance proved too expensive. Zimbabwe was going through the worst economic situation ever (Rugube, 2004:98; Moyo, 1999: 48).

The Model A1 resettlement scheme managed to settle 145 775 farmers. These farmers received minimum support from government. It was structured in a villagised manner where residential areas, separate fields and common grazing areas were demarcated. On the other hand, the Model A2 scheme that the government saw as providing opportunities for the development of black commercial farmers, accommodated about 16 386 farmers. The A2 resettlement model beneficiaries were provided with medium to large-sized landholdings and were expected to provide their own resources (Sadomba, 2008). Model A2 scheme beneficiaries were allocated land by the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement through the offices of the Minister for Provincial Affairs. Table 5.1 shows the results of land distribution by

2008 where the coordination of land-allocation activities met several challenges, and accordingly figures for the total number of people allocated land by province showed wide variations. There were several institutions at district and provincial level that had different figures of people who were on the list waiting to be allocated land. Given that the government had very few resources to assist resettled farmers, the beneficiaries were supposed to oversee the construction of their own residencies. The land reform, therefore assumed a political dimension, with politicians taking advantage of the reality that most of the blacks favoured land repossession based upon grievances over historical injustices. It also turned out to be a major political issue as it entailed a deep-seated challenge to the property rights of a powerful propertied class,

Table 5.1 Land Distributed to A1 and A2 Farmers by 2008 by Province (*Beyond the Enclave, Towards a Pro-Poor and Inclusive Development Strategy for Zimbabwe (2011:97), Table 3.7.)*

Province	A1 Resettlement (subsistence)		A2 resettlement (commercial)	
	Area (ha)	Beneficiaries	Area (ha)	Beneficiaries
Manicaland	215 427	12 309	102 215	1 232
Mashonaland Central	568 197	16 853	259 489	2 434
Mashonaland East	437 269	17 731	314 233	4 703
Mashonaland West	811 033	28 435	873 111	4 460
Masvingo	750 563	33 197	341 000	1 351
Matabeleland North	520 214	9 394	259 659	421
Matabeleland South	383 140	10 812	288 324	765
Midlands	451 242	17 044	243 611	1 019
Total	**4 137 085**	**145 775**	**2 681 642**	**16 386**

The fast-track land reform programme adversely affected the Zimbabwean economy due to challenges faced by the country's agricultural sector. Arable land was largely underutilised because the

beneficiaries of the FTLRP lacked resources to prepare land while the high cost of inputs became detrimental to achieve set targets. As a result, production suffered across the whole range of agricultural commodities. During the 2000-2009 periods, land utilisation in any farming season was around 40% in the new resettlement areas as compared to the production levels before the FTLRP, a rapid decrease in agricultural production. Consequently, the country faced serious food shortages. At the same time the unemployment of farm workers rose significantly, the loss of seed production increased, and the industrial production related to irrigation dropped (LEDRIZ, 2011; Napoli, 2011:98).

Essentially, food security can be described as a phenomenon related to availability of food and the individual's access to it. For a variety of reasons, food security in Zimbabwe has been a perennial problem since the Fast-track Land Reform Programme started. During the land reform programme, remunerations failed to keep pace with inflation and the ordinary person's access to food was negatively affected, worsened by unsuitable pricing policies that created shortages of basic commodities and policies that restricted the movement of grain. For example, restrictions placed on the movement of maize grain in 2003 resulted in acute shortages of food across the country (Muchena, 2006). Because of price controls on basic commodities, most commodities vanished from the formal markets, although they were widely available on the black market at much higher prices.

Zimbabwe experienced food deficits since the year 2000 which marked the beginning of the FTRLP. This led to a humanitarian crisis as indicated by the fact that over two million Zimbabweans were food insecure, especially in 2008. Table 5.2 shows that crop production decreased due to the FTRLP. Although, maize, sorghum and millet were grown during the period 2006/9, the food security in the country decreased due to the challenges farmers faced to revive the agricultural

sector which had suffered due the land invasions. The area under maize crop that is the country's staple food, decreased between 2006 and 2007, while from 2007 to 2008 the total yield decreased significantly, only to increase in the 2008/9 agricultural season. On the same note, the acreage under sorghum in the period 2007 and 2008 was low compared to that of 2006/7. The acreage under sorghum was comparable to that in the 1980s, but the area under millets continued to decrease to the levels which caused severe food shortages in low lying areas of the country. Production of maize, millet and sorghum decreased in the period 2008/9 compared to the yields of 2006/7 season.

Table 5.2 National Crop Productivity Trends 2006/9 (*Beyond the Enclave, Towards a Pro- Poor and Inclusive* **Development Strategy for Zimbabwe (2011:305), Table 3.10.)**

	Production (1000 t/ha)		
Crop	2006/7	2007/8	2008/9
Maize	1,446	496	1 140
Sorghum	225	75	156
Millet	194	37	74
Wheat	-	31	12
All cereals	-	639	1 382

Crop production was a key livelihood strategy in the livelihood zone where food security availability was assessed and analysed. The livelihood zones covered vast area composed of districts which fell in the same or similar natural regions. The area shared an average annual rainfall which varied across the zones. As noted above, the FTLRP led to a general underutilisation of land by most of the resettled farmers, particularly the A2 farmers. Significantly, crop production of maize, sorghum, millet and sweet potatoes contributed to three quarters of very poor household food consumption in the reference period of 2000

to 2009. The level of crop production in livelihood zones across the country during the FTLRP was very poor due to various reasons included poor rains. It is important to note that poverty which befell the country caused people to go to South Africa among other countries to secure employment and other trading businesses (Muchena, 2006:286).

It should be appreciated that Zimbabwe's agricultural sector to be productive, required a favourable socio-political climate, adequate governance and macro-economic fundamentals underpinned by robust and responsive institutions. The negative impact of the fast-track land reform programme in terms of food shortages had been much wider than the architects of the programme envisaged. The wider speculative thinking by government officials and peasant farmers that the restructuring of the agricultural sector was going to affect the white commercial farmers proved to be wrong. The assumption was based on various baseless presumptions proffered by some top government officials who argued that smallholder farmers were the ones who were producing the bulk of maize, cotton and wheat and therefore deserved to be given first preference on land allocation. The smallholder farmers used to produce the bulk of cotton and maize before 1998 but the functional commercial sector was there to balance out food production such that poverty did not reach levels of the period 2000 up to 2009. It was perceived that white commercial farmers had abandoned maize production in the 1990s for political reasons and were engaging in livestock production which was commercially viable. That departure from producing staple food exposed the country to extreme vagaries of food insufficiency and exploitation by the foreign food merchants (Rugube, 2004:135).

In general, the situation in Zimbabwe became complex under the FTLRP because, as food production continued to decline substantially, even those with entitlements to the land were failing to access food on

the markets. The prime movers of agriculture had been decimated, including research and development services; equipment wasted while dams and irrigation infrastructure were either underutilised or rarely serviced. The agricultural sector had become a victim of entrenched difficulties.

Everything pertaining to food insecurity in Zimbabwe from 2000 pointed to the multi-dimensional impact of the fast-track land reform programme and the politics surrounding it. Although, new settlers felt empowered in the early years of the land reform period up to 2004, expectations for high food production waned when there was no funding from government. The hardships associated with minimum support to the agricultural sector affected the ability of the producers to feed the nation. It also emerged that not all the Model A1 and Model A2 resettled farmers had the agricultural expertise to use the land productively. There was a need for government to have retained renowned white farmers who were going to extend their knowledge of farming to newly settled farmers.

After the commencement of the FTLRP in 2000, commercial farming areas became target areas for acquiring assets by the elite rather than for competing in food production and effective use of land. To reverse this process and make the agricultural sector function like business for the country to have adequate food security, there was need for farmer education, training and extension on efficient land utilisation. The government should have subsidised inputs to boost productivity rather than the continued programme of giving resettled farmers government free inputs. The government was supposed to have pre-planned land allocation. For example, it should have prioritised land allocation to agricultural professionals so that the land was used as collateral security to attract investors.

Although, the land reform programme remained a noble and appreciated idea, it lacked proper planning and prioritization in land allocations. There was no financial training and extension support to ensure that the goal of human security for the citizens was achieved. In fact, the exodus of young and professional Zimbabweans to South Africa was triggered by the failure of the land reform programme which also paralysed other economic sectors that depended on the agricultural sector. However, Zimbabweans who resettled in South Africa from 1997 to 2010 were self-declared economic refugees who caused citizens to lose out economically. Stolten (2007) postulated that the arrival of Zimbabweans in that country displaced the citizens to the economically peripheral sources. In places where South African black citizens used to sale their wares, they were taken over by foreigners, including Zimbabweans. It was places such as Soweto where even vegetables and onions were sold along the roads by Zimbabweans among other nations.

Chapter 6: Governance and Participation in South Africa: Issues and Transition

The advancement of progressive, democratic political governance, respect for human rights and rule of law and enhancement of transparency and accountability are issues regarded by individuals of different and antagonistic political, ideological and economic positions. The issue of political participation offers South Africans a platform to express their opinions and related experiences on political and economic issues. These issues were critically important to the citizenry as South Africa continued with its political and economic transitional processes. There was evidence of the country being pulled in all directions in the period 1997 to 2001. South Africans citizens were scared in the party political wars, slow black economic empowerment and electoral challenges witnessed in 1999. In fact, South Africa has the National Assembly of Parliament and the National Councils of Provinces. These two institutions control all the national business of the country. The winning political party controlled the state functions. In this case, the African National Congress (ANC) that won the 1994 plebiscite, had the white dominated New National Party (NNP) as the election serious contender in 1999 second democratic elections.

ANC, however, had the total strategy to circumvent its own electoral defeat by the New National Party that was headed by the former apartheid regime President Fredrick de Klerk. This study revealed that the South African citizens were not sure about what to believe and how to relate to political and economic circumstances during the period 1997 and 2001. They veered between praises for political conditions that had improved and condemnations of the failure to formulate policies that empowered blacks who were racially discriminated before 1994. They leaped from great anticipation that the next 1999 elections were going to bring more change that would

change the lives of the people. South African citizens proclaimed that holding of elections in 1999 and black empowerment were the most important issues that was to bring peace and security in the country.

Undoubtedly, the reasons why South Africans were under pressure to increase economic growth and reduce poverty, became some of the critical issues to address to achieve peace and security. This chapter further explores the 1999 national mood in the country to assess how the economic and political threats changed over time. The series of human security aspects that linked to voting and political party preference were also assessed. The New National Party and the African National Congress Party gave the outlook of expectations and experiences in this analysis of how peace and security was transformed during the 1997 to 2001 period. Assessing the role of the administration of William Jefferson Clinton in Africa's so called "second liberation," particularly in terms of its involvement on issues of democracy and human rights, Korwa Gombe Adar, begins his article in 1998:

> There is nothing more fundamental to Africans who are concerned with the future of the continent than the issues of democracy, human liberties, among other concerns, constitute the central driving force behind what is often referred to as Africa's "second liberation".

According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (1992), "second liberation" was developed by the ordinary people who maintain that political independence has failed to improve material conditions and rights and those of their children. Instead of qualitatively improving them, post-colonial leaders have used violent and arbitrary measures against the masses of the people. The South African black people in their opposition to the neo-colonial state, have served as inspiration for the achievement of a genuine political and economic independence.

A substantial and persisting mood of optimism, hope and idealism characterized many of the responses by South African citizens. South

African citizens had not given up on hoping that the moment of turnaround was going to be realized during election time. Since the new political dispensation in 1994 brought hopes of peace and security in the country, South African citizens revealed cynicism and doubt about the African National Congress leadership, the government and public institutions.

South Africans had no complete consensus as to what direction the country was moving towards in the political and economic areas. Mixed feelings prevailed, largely on whether there was economic improvement that could make South African citizens realise the good direction the country was going after decades of colonial and apartheid rule. This was reflected in the citizens' perceptions of their personal economic conditions that by 1997 was still unbearable. In 1998, South Africans were split down in the middle as to the general direction in which the country was moving. There were different views from the citizens because they were not yet sure of the ANC's capability of transforming their human security.

Table 6.1 below indicates the sentiments of South African voters on whether the economy was improving or not, considering political parties ANC and NNP supporters as indicators. Accordingly, 51% of the citizens in 1996 thought that the ANC government was moving towards the right political and economic direction while 26% castigated it. By 1997, the proportion of supporters that was happy with the ANC government's governance had remained on the upper side of 56%. Two factors point to continued overwhelming ANC dominance. One was the ANC's dual character as a liberation movement and political party. It was not merely a party that happened to win the elections, it was a longstanding opponent of white dominated minority party and a key actor in the founding of a legitimate state. A total of 15% was spotted in the two-year period

where ANC voters were sceptical whether the economy was moving on the right or wrong direction. South Africans' motivation for the positive assessment of economic movement direction was overwhelmingly in the domain of political emancipation. The apartheid system had been politically removed and on the same note, racial discrimination against blacks was reduced.

The main reasons cited in 1996 for the verdict of "right direction the country was going" was in ascending order that the economy was in a good condition. By then commodities were available, food was affordable and that there was political stability. As the most frequently stated reasons, the citizens noted that the economy was in an improved condition (5%), commodities were available, and food was available. Political stability and peace were the next most frequently cited reasons which was the totality of all reasons cited, plus the 'bit of both' and so forth votes that add up to 100% of ANC voters who were interested in the political and economic development.

It was not surprising that, in 1996 the ANC supporters were more likely than New National Party supporters to believe that the country was heading in a right political and economic direction. According to the Table 6.1, about 51 % of ANC supporters compared to 26% of NNP supporters felt that the country was moving towards economic downturn. By 1997, the ANC supporters were more of the opinion that the economy of the country was moving in the right direction. The New National Party supporters' sentiments remained roughly on the same direction where they felt that the ANC was pushing them on the economic periphery due to their association with the apartheid regime. There was quite an increase in the view that there was too much encroachment of black citizens into the white dominated economic sectors.

Table 6.1: Direction South Africa was moving as judged by Party Supporters 1996 and 1997 *(Adapted from Etherington (1996:216), Table 2.4.)*

Direction	POLITICAL PARTY % My vote is my secret			
	ANC		NNP	
	1996	1997	1996	1997
Right direction	51	56	34	35
Wrong direction	26	20	24	25
Bit of both	15	15	28	24
Not moving at all	1	6	8	14
Don't know / Refuse	7	3	6	2

The structural conditions of democratic consolidation commonly identified in literature on the human security aspects can be divided into those of a socio-economic kind and those to do with political culture. Socio-economic conditions conducive to democratisation included higher inherited levels of economic development. South Africa's prognosis on democratic consolidation judged against them was mixed because the country inherited democratic tradition of sorts. The NNP supporters believed that white domination of the economy provided a secure framework in which the ANC government was going to be drawn into the political and bureaucratic structures of state without that leading to a fundamental change in the character of the state (Etherington, 1996:215 -220; Glaser, 2001:232-235).

South Africans linked their hope for further change and a better future to four unfolding phenomena and processes that were going to greatly improve human security aspects. First, there was the practice of the inclusive government in which the labour body, Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the former liberation movement, African National Congress (ANC) became the ruling elite, the processes of policy-formulation, the expected elections of 1998 and

the economic empowerment for the blacks. In this case, the South Africans were very agitated to see political and economic development that was going to consolidate the livelihoods of the blacks who lived under brute racial discrimination during the apartheid era.

The ANC ruling arrangement, policy formulation processes and the 1998 expected elections gave close to 50% of South Africans hope for a better future. With the addition of the 'neither hope nor doubt' responses, these percentages rose to 57, 60 and 59% on the three processes respectively. The same trend, just much stronger emerged on South Africans' hope associated with the pending elections. A total of 62% believed that the next election was going to be conducted in an improved political and economic environment, rising to 74% with the inclusion of the neither hope nor doubt category.

It was simultaneously clear that a substantial amount of cynicism continued, especially around the ANC relations, but also on the policy-formulation processes and the results of the elections. South Africans remained divided, especially on whether ANC Unity was going to lead the country to a better future of which 47% voted yes while 34% voted no citing governance inexperience. Cynicism about the round of elections was far smaller because there were varied opinions in the labor sectors. Workers' unions across the country were not happy with their working conditions; hence, government was expected to address the racial discrimination activities. The 47% of the voters reckoned that the ANC Unity gave them some level of hope and they contrasted with the substantial chunk of 34% that had doubted that peace and security provisions were going to be attained in the country. Table 6.2 below indicates various sentiments of South African citizens on whether human security provisions were going to be delivered during the period 1997 to 2001.

Table 6.2: Hope or Doubt leading to a better future in South Africa (*Adapted from article by Glaser (2001) titled "Politics and Society in South Africa". Table 6.1 drawn by the author.*)

Level of hope or doubt	Four Processes (%)			
	ANC Government	Policy-making processes	Elections expectations	Economic empowerment
Strong hope	14	17	15	30
Some hope	33	33	33	31
Neither hope or doubt	8	10	11	12
Some doubt	15	12	10	8
Serious doubt	19	9	8	9
Undecided	11	19	23	10
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

This research revealed that South Africans were optimistic that the ANC was going to recapture the popular imagination as the agent for change. The historical injustices that were perpetrated by the apartheid regime, made the majority blacks to continue supporting the revolutionary party. It was therefore, that the ANC had with small margin lost the confidence of some of its supporters who crossed over to support the New National Party (NNP). Table 6.3 indicated the swinging of votes due to political and economic circumstances that were taking place in the country.

The consistent and substantial block of non-declarers that was composed of those who chose not to reveal which party they were supporting in an election was also big enough at 47% to change the relative standings of the main political parties, ANC and NNP. South Africans of mixed race refused to disclose which party they anticipated to support, on the event of a next plebiscite. As Table 6.3 shows, the percentage of the people who refused to disclose their political allegiances rose significantly during the period 1998 to 2001. The joint percentages of undeclared and 'will not vote' rose from 31% to 41%

then to 47%. In the same premises, 41% of the people preferred not to disclose which party to support in an election and 40% followed the same trend by declaring their support to a party that agitate for economic development. The other people responded by saying that they did not know or were not sure which party they would support during election time. They were not sure because the political trajectory in the country was still not clear due to the post-apartheid system that was still visible in all sectors of the economy.

Table 6.3: Trends in Party Support 1998 – 2001 (*Adapted from an article by Glaser, (2001) titled Politics and Society in South Africa, Table 7.4 (2001: 616)*

Party	1998 Political Support %	1999 Political Support %	2000 Political Support %	2001 Political Support %
ANC	55	38	19	20
NP	12	17	31	31
Other	2	4	3	2
Undeclared	25	33	40	41
Will not vote	6	8	7	6
Total	100	100	100	100

In terms of the declared support, the ANC unity appeared to have suffered substantial decline levels of support. The decline was witnessed towards the 1998 South African elections where the support base fell from 38% to 20%. On the other hand, the NNP seemed to have experienced a growth in popular support, moving from 17% to 31% in the same period. It was not surprising that smaller political parties had virtually become extinct. In fact, the electioneering campaigns were based on the capacity of the political party to be able to convince the voters that human security aspects were going to be provided for come election. The main political propaganda was supposed to denounce the pathological effects of the entrenched post-apartheid systems or moving with the new unpredictable system. Most of people preferred

to be associated with the new unpredictable dispensation anticipating that new things were going to be achieved.

It was necessary to emphasise the fact of 'declared support' of voters. The undeclared vote was on a very high level, even though higher than that of 1999. The results showed the tendencies of how people voted in an election, and it depended on the circumstances whether one was educated about the plebiscite. If elections were to be held the following day after the voters had been advised, the results of the votes were going to be different from those done after one has been given time to consider preferences to vote for. The findings pointed to the political party's power base and what it stood for in terms of service delivery and in this case though conditions and motivations remained, people made their choices undeterred. The political and economic environment in South Africa between 1998 and 2001 was fluid and experiences and impressions continued to change. People's preferences in an election were determined by the political party's determination to provide peace and security to the South African citizens.

The basic thrust of declared party support was generally borne out through measures such as trust in the political party to economically empower the citizens. Table 6.4 shows how the pattern of voting preferences transcended. Whereas 52% of the people indicated that they trusted the ANC regime, or the trust was lost, the corresponding percentage for the New National Party only reached 16% that was sparingly insignificant. The trust vote that was measured, indicated that there was substance to the party vote determinations in the research. In this research the NNP did not only suffer a notable decline in support, its level of popular support trust had also spun downward, from 16 % to a mere 11% in a roughly 18 month's period.

The drop in declared support for the NNP, compared with the previous election was a vexing issue. The dips in NNP support were illuminated when the perceptions in the ranks of the NNP supporters

themselves reflected the negative activities of the post-apartheid systems that were treacherous on some sections of the population. The NNP was associated with the apartheid systems due to the majority white supporters who wanted to continue dominating in the political and economic sectors of the country. In this case, the NNP exhibited the racial and political discrepancies detrimental to the peace and security of South Africa.

Table 6.4: Changing Levels of Trust in Two Main Political Parties, 1998 – 2000 (*Adapted from Etherington title "Peace, Politics and Violence in New South Africa, (1996:314:4).* Table 7.2.)

Extent of trust	ANC (%)		NNP (%)	
	1998	2000	1998	2000
A lot	52	50	16	11
Somewhat	38	30	15	20
Just a little	10	12	55	56
Not at all	10	8	19	18

It is important to note that the NNP did not have an ingrained type of support, when compared to a historical legitimated liberation movement standing that of ANC component had. The NNP's popular standing was more reliant on shortcomings of the ANC but the revolutionary party's support was based on their revolutionary struggle gains that liberated the country. The latter used to invoke the inhabitable and severe historical injustices to veil the scope of its own shortcomings, especially on the economic front that the apartheid systems were still dominating.

It was noted that peace and security was important to improve the standards of living of South African citizens. The policy making process was a tall order for the ANC regime due to the post-apartheid systems which continued to exist in public institutions. There were differences of opinion between the supporters of the ANC and the NNP. A total of 59% of those who had declared that they were going to

vote for NNP if elections were to be held the following day, the research reckoned that NNP was going to improve its electoral standing and win elections. This was due to its capacity to be able to convince the electorate that it had the capacity to come up with policy making frameworks basing on their past colonial experiences in government.

The ANC supporters responded differently, of which the biggest block of 65% preferred ANC to win the elections. The NNP was poised to lose the plebiscite and most of its supporters had to join the ANC element so that they were to assist in the policy-making process. The main undeclared category, that of 'my vote is my secret' predominantly remained undeclared, with 40% saying they did not know and a further 20% refusing to respond to the research questions. The third biggest response category of 9%, went along with the predominant New National Party category and 6% with one of the main ANC component categories, the New Party was expected that it was going to improve since it had experts who were able to address peace and security issues of South African citizens.

It was just a few popular reasons for party choice in South Africa that showed clear differences between the two main political parties' supporters. The question of economic emancipation, policy-making processes, land and winning elections differentiated the two political parties. The ANC had crafted itself in many effective election and party choice platforms. The NNP largely relied on its emphasis on change and sometimes on its experiences in governance. The discussion that follows highlights the South African citizens' choice of a political party that was poised to transform individual human security as illustrated in Table 6.5. There were some variables where there were those in South Africa, who denied any normative character to party-political life in the state. It was at this juncture that there was a need to create a democratic society and a commitment to tackle the pressing problems related to political, social and economic injustices.

The NNP favoured constitutional solution which demanded that the various ethnic groups be represented in a way to ensure that no single ethnic group dominated in the South African government. A completely different approach to the political representation and a nation-building was expressed by the various political parties in South Africa, ranging from the ANC to the Pan African Congress and from the Black Consciousness Movement through to Inkatha. This did not start with the concept of the group of the tribe, but with the individual who was political active. All South African political party supporters believed that political representation should have occurred on an individual and non-ethnic basis.

The rest of the party political platforms indicated by the Table 6.5 indicates that whereas the level of support differed between NNP and ANC and undeclared, they differentiate less definitively. There was a high level of consensus between the supporters of these two political parties that the way the parties governed was an important reason for both parties to gain the support of the voters. In this case, the party whose power was more traditionally entrenched such as that of the NNP associated with apartheid regime was less received due to yesteryear repression and racism against the black majority.

Table 6.5: South Africans' choice of political party: issues that shape the minds of supporters (*Own compilation, based on Klitgaard (1988:110-120) and Glaser (2001:165-190)*)

	Denominator	Strongly support	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Choose a party that is not corrupt and spends public money accountably	All	58	32	4	4	2
	ANC	60	30	5	2	3
	NNP	59	32	5	2	2
	Undeclared	56	33	2	6	3
Look for a	All	58	28	9	13	8

political party that supports economic reform to SA	ANC	60	25	11	7	4
	NNP	40	15	10	26	4
	Undeclared	38	30	9	10	9
Support a political party that can bring change	All	53	29	9	5	2
	ANC	73	22	3	3	0
	NNP	47	29	8	18	5
	Undeclared	49	34	7	5	1
Go with a political party that supports indigenization in South Africa	All	38	28	10	9	7
	ANC	75	28	12	18	12
	NNP	22	20	55	4	2
	Undeclared	33	29	11	10	7
Choose a party that shows it can deliver services on local level	All	59	33	5	2	1
	ANC	62	32	3	1	2
	NNP	62	31	11	2	1
	Undeclared	54	36	3	2	1
Choose a party that is committed to civil & political freedoms	All	59	30	5	2	2
	ANC	73	32	3	2	1
	NNP	58	29	5	2	2
	Undeclared	54	34	5	2	1
Support a party that defends South Africa against foreigners	All	50	30	4	10	6
	ANC	80	10	5	3	2
	NNP	50	33	6	4	3
	Undeclared	70	20	2	1	7
Look at who it is that liberated South Africa from apartheid	All	27	18	12	14	12
	ANC	70	21	2	2	6
	NNP	32	22	40	7	5
	Undeclared	17	19	14	17	22

When the South African citizens were exposed to a process where they were expected to indicate the ideal political party that they thought was able to represent their political and economic interests, the issue of race and ethnicity took the centre stage. Most whites were found supporting NNP because they believed that it was going to protect them from being disenfranchised by the ANC government in the economic sector. Those who were for ANC, believed strongly that it was only a revolutionary and ruling party which was able to support the economic reform, commit to civil and political freedoms and supported indigenization in the country. The ANC party topped as the favourite political party because many people viewed it as the best embodiment of both political and economic transformation for all South Africans regardless of race or creed.

Life for South Africans was that of optimism and less survival-oriented in the time when new economic changes were greatly accepted. In fact, the citizens reckoned that economic conditions could improve, and they had good hopes that poverty was going to be the thing of the past. The only other thing that worried South African citizens at national level, was the employment. On the local level, the unemployment was roughly equalled by poor services where most of about two-thirds South Africans were formally unemployed (Vale, 2003:114).

Despite that many improvements in the lives of South Africans changed since independence in 1994, citizens consistently rated unemployment as one of the most pervasive problems. The good shortages and other human security shortcomings affected even the political landscape between ANC and NNP. Table 6.6 below shows the changing hierarchies of problems experienced in the country. The most prevalent problems the South African citizens faced during 1996 up to 1998 included unemployment, shortage of foreign currency and food shortages. All these problems were really affecting peace and security

of the country through various ways to the extent that even foreigners found themselves being victims of xenophobic attacks.

Table 6.6: Changing Hierarchical of Problems Experienced in the Community (1996-1998) and in the Community of Residence (Own compilation based on Rose-Ackerman (1999, pp.159-160) and Setai (2006:117-127))

Hierarchy of most important problems	Country 1996	%	Community 1997	%	Country 1998	%
1st problem	Unemployment	26	Poor services	20	Unemployment	23
2nd problem	Foreign currency	15	Unemployment	26	Foreign currency	12
3rd problem	Food shortages	22	Food shortages	18	Food shortages	17
4th problem	Poor services	15	Poverty	17	Poor services	23
5th problem	Bad governance	5	Bad governance	3	Bad governance	7
6th problem	Political instability	4	Education	10	Poverty	16
7th problem	Poor services	10	Health	2	Education	22

In this case, exploration of the conditions of South Africa indicated that the most problematic areas that threatened peace and security in the country, included unemployment, poor service delivery, shortages of goods and foreign currency. Primarily the black people who were once ostracised by the apartheid regime faced all these challenges. The political preference of the majority was on the political party which was going to address the economic problems faced by the country. Most of the South Africans in this research were not emphasising political instability but bad governance or other related issues as they were concentrating on issues that made them economically empowered. The ANC and NNP stated that they could provide the economic security to the people all this was meant to win the popular vote.

In typical cases where political and economic variables of human security pose insecurity in South Africa, as discussed above, a new approach to address these aspects seem to provide peace and security to the state, community and individuals. The South African citizens based their hope on further political transformations that gave citizens the rights to determine their sovereign rights. There was agitation for a better future where individuals' basic needs were provided without racial discriminations. The political party preferred by the citizens to govern the country was the one with the capacity to economically empower people, create employment and provide basic service delivery. The white apartheid rule that ruled South Africa for decades, subjecting black citizens to poor and brute conditions, made most blacks citizens to be skeptical of a political party connected to the post-apartheid ideology. The NNP, a white dominated political party, lost elections in 1998 because of its political past. On the other hand, ANC got overwhelming support from the citizens because of the black empowerment development programme which were undertaken, without considering one's race or creed. The country's independence opened new opportunities for black majority to exercise their constitutional rights that included rights to political and economic freedoms that was associated with founding principles of the ANC. The citizens' political party affiliations were stemmed mainly on the ethnicity and racism factors of various supporters. The provision of individual security was measured on the political party's capacity to prevent threats that exposed citizens to the vagaries of poverty and economic deprivation.

Chapter 7: Xenophobia: Elephant in the Room in the South African Human Insecurity Environment

History does not repeat itself. It does not deal with whatever might have happened has happened and what has not happened has not happened. This reality does not prevent South African citizens and

immigrants from raising questions as to what should have happened if xenophobic attacks did not take place. To borrow from Dani Wadada Nabudere, a distinguished African scholar of Uganda with a high academic and scholarly transdisciplinary reputation, Europe and America's violence abroad is a key reason why people are forced to run away from places where they were born and raised but which have become uninhabitable. It became apparent that the overall human insecurity of citizens and immigrants in SADC member states, particularly South Africa were exacerbated. The previous chapters concentrated on political party activities and governance oversights which have impacts on peace and security of the countries' citizens. The movement of people across the borders in the SADC region was discussed to complement previous discussions where political and economic overtones were analysed as the agents of human insecurity. Political leaders declared emigrants unpatriotic and self, while the media made wild and unsubstantiated statements about the extent of emigration and the motivation for it. Southern Africa is no different in this respect where emigration of both skilled and unskilled nationals has generated considerable public attention in South Africa.

South Africa exhibited another human insecurity turning point after afro-phobia or xenophobia sentiments became rampant within the citizens disgruntled by influx of foreigners into their country. Foreigners competed with the citizens in nearly every sector of the economy, consequently South Africa's citizens became vulnerable due among others, poor education background and unemployment. Political parties' activities discussed in the previous chapter continued to epitomize the political transitional process that dove tails into the country's human security dynamics. The migration issues in South Africa affected political participation of citizens because they were scarred of party political wars which erupted after every plebiscite held since 1994. The traditional state-centric security conceptions have been changed to concentrate on the safety of the individuals. The xenophobic violence that occurred in South Africa after the country attained independence in 1994 led to a consensus among scholars of

international relations that human security conceptual framework should shift attention from the state to the people-centred approach to security.

The approaches towards human security aspects through the assessment and vulnerabilities of the rising tide of xenophobia in South Africa address key issues in South African political and economic challenges. The xenophobic attacks had direct impact on illegal and legal immigrants because their stay in South Africa was viewed by some sectors of the communities as a threat to their economic, political and social securities.

The most notable xenophobic attack in South Africa occurred in March 1990, in Hlaphekani, near Giyani the capital of the former Gazankulu homeland. The locals burnt almost 300 huts belonging to Mozambicans (Booth, 1991:36; Carim, 1990:49; Adepoju, 1995:65). In October 1994 fighting erupted in one of South Africa's squatter camps, ImizamoYethu Squatter Camp in Hout Bay between Xhosa fishermen and illegal immigrants of the Ovambos from Namibia. In late December 1994 and January 1995 a campaign dubbed Operation Buyelekhaya (Go back home) began in Alexandra Township. This campaign of intimidation and terror was aimed at ridding off the township of illegal aliens (Minaar and Hough, 1996:44; Reitzes, 1997:44). In another incident in 2000, three foreign traders, a Mozambican and two Senegalese, were chased through the carriages of a train by a mob of locals shouting xenophobic slogans. They were hounded onto the roof of the train where one fell off and was hit by another train and the other two were electrocuted by the overhead cables (Business Day, 2001).

However, xenophobia did not always take the form of popular violence in South Africa. In fact, criminal elements viewed illegal immigrants as 'soft' targets. Knowing that illegal aliens were unwilling to report their attackers for fear of deportation if they reported, there was increasing evidence that they became the victims of choice for certain criminal gangs (Solomon, 1996:12). The security of the illegal aliens was exploited in different ways. For instance, Minaar & Hough

(1996) noted that in one of South Africa's towns, Kangwane in Johannesburg, aliens were killed for *muti* (magic portion to ward off evil spirits). Since these illegal aliens had no identification and no ready family members in South Africa to report them missing, such killings were difficult to resolve.

Minaar & Hough (1996) further report cases where a certain white farmer employed illegal aliens, only to inform or report them to the local police before they received their wages for the services they had offered. The aliens, true to the ruthless attitude of some white commercial farmers, were virtually arrested and deported after having worked for the whole month without receiving their due wages.

In an interview with a Zimbabwean young man called Tendai, who was aged about twenty five years, (interview with Tendai 2000) it became clear that aliens lived with serious threat to their individual security. Tendai migrated to South Africa after his peasant parents in Masvingo Province, were approached by a close relative who offered to take him across the border for employment as a waiter in a fast-food outlet. After about eight months he returned home with all the money he had earned. The parents were given a lump sum of Rands by the gentleman who had taken Tendai to South Africa and this man was well connected to business people and commercial farmers dotted in different provinces. After about a week at home, Tendai later found himself with other five young men returning to South Africa through illegal entry points. For two days they were kept by some other people in a farm house near Pretoria where they were expecting to be employed as waiters.

The hopes of being employed as waiters at local hotels in Pretoria did not materialise, but, they were then temporarily assigned to work at a farm to pick oranges and potatoes. They were forced to work over night without pay and they were only given food and they virtually

treated as slaves. The charge of being turned into forced labour became the new way of life where any resistance resulted in deportation. They were threatened with deportation if they raised alarm. On numerous occasions they were beaten and were forced to work hard under guard. One evening Tendai and other five managed to escape but they were intercepted by the South African immigration officials who arrested them. They were deported after spending two weeks in remand prison where food and health services were scarce. Although, they attempted to explain their circumstance of forced labor after illegally entry into South Africa, their narratives of absence of legal immigration papers made their voices fall on deaf ears. It became clear that organised crime syndicates were operating in the Southern African region and above all human trafficking became rampant in the manner Tendai indicated (Solomon, 1998:35-37; Rothchild, 1998:61).

Thus, the challenge for the policymakers when contextualising circumstances usually ended up leading to where Tendai found himself in. It was the responsibility of the authorities to strike a balance between safeguarding the positive benefits of economic developments and minimising negative consequences for the South African government and individual citizens. On the issue of population movements, it is accepted that the movement of people, like the movement of capital, was part of the new global order and that it was going to be beneficial if properly regulated.

South Africa had a long history of migration. The migration scenario before 1994 was strongly regulated and monitored by migration laws which addressed labour needs, economic and security interests of the white minority government. After 1994, political changes had an impact on immigration flows. Post-independence made South Africa attractive to foreign migrants, including black Africans, Asians, Western and Eastern Europeans. For the first time as propounded by Matlosa (1999: 124), black political refugees from neighbouring

countries entered a post-apartheid South Africa. According to the UNHCR, 260 000 people who moved across the provincial boundaries in 1997, 36% moved to Gauteng and 18% to the Western Cape, the two most industrialized provinces in the country. Events in the late 1990s and early 2000, such as the 1998 DRC conflict and Zimbabwe's 1999 land invasions, suggested that many more thousands of migrants from the neighbouring countries and those internally displaced were going to result to consequences of the numerous sources of insecurity plaguing the country (Solomon, 2003:56; Milanzi, 1998:118).

Of the total number of the migrant workers who entered South Africa between 1997 and 2000, 13 000 migrant workers were reported as coming from other African countries, while 7 000 migrants came from the rest of the world. Among foreign migrant workers, 40% headed to Gauteng province and roughly 10% headed for the Free State, KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga provinces. Not surprisingly, 70% of the Asian migrants went to KwaZulu Natal. However, the human security aspects remained a dilemma in the South African context, especially with the migration policy which sought to establish a balance between national interests and the human rights of immigrants (Williams, 2008:141; UNHCR, 14, 1999).

Human migration is a major international problem, but poor documentation in South Africa among other SADC member states, failed to unmask the extent of how it threatened peace and security of the country's sovereignty despite human migration rising profile in the SADC region. South Africa remained a fertile ground for political and economic migrants who ran away from domestic induced vulnerabilities caused by bad governance systems. The exodus of migrants exhibited the weaknesses of some SADC member states' failure to protect their citizens from the vagaries of human insecurities. South Africa's economic worth to migrants was its economic exchange value, precisely because the "cash nexus" dominated it. It was only

before 1994 that migration was determined solely by considerations of efficiency and the pursuit of profit on the part of recruiting agencies, the inflows from the South African neighbours have been pressured by political, social and economic related causes, or what Amin (1995) refers to as "wage employment for purposes of survival."

The growth of economic activity in South Africa especially after 1999, including elimination of restrictions on the free movement across the borders, the country experienced increased numbers of migrants running away from growing unemployment, economic stagnation or decrease in earning for those employed, disappearing job security, increasing poverty, tribal conflicts, increasing marginalisation and exclusion of the socially deprived groups (Amin, 1995:236; Barrell, 1999:98; Meintjies, 1999:123). Consequently, more SADC nationals were driven beyond marginalisation to exclusion. A growing number of people were excluded from meaningful participation in the economic and social benefits of the society (Milazi, 1998:45; Vale, 1999:65; Reitzes, 1996:78). These economic and social factors had an impact which ultimately fuelled migration to South Africa.

The strategic response to the question of illegal population who were entering South Africa needed to be SADC oriented and multifaceted in approach, tackling such diverse emigration pressures as poverty, environmental degradation and human rights. It was only by 1995 that SADC proposed a regional migration which continued to be difficult to operationalise. South African migration policy by 2007 was ambiguous because there was a delay by the Department of Home Affairs in implementing 1999 White Paper on migration policy. The lack of clear policy guidelines resulted in adhoc, reactive and uncoordinated responses to illegal immigration and confusion among civil servants on how to deal with migrants. The ambiguity of the immigration policy was seen in the ANC government's vacillation between measures of accommodating and control measures on SADC citizens.

In fact, the Department of Home Affairs of South African government in 1996 offered permanent residency to SADC citizens who met the following criteria:

- Those who demonstrate or provide evidence of continuous residence in South Africa from 1 July 1991.
- Those who engage in productive economic activity (either formal sector employment or informal sector).
- Those who are in a relationship with a South African partner or spouse (customary marriages included).
- Those who are dependent children born or residing lawfully in South Africa.
- Those that have not committed any criminal offences as cited in Schedules 1 and / or 11 of the Aliens Control Act 1991, (Act 96 of 1991 as Amended).

According to the 1997 South African Department of Home Affairs' official statement, an estimated one million SADC citizens were likely to be qualified for permanent residency under the amnesty (The Citizen, 19, September 1997; The Star, 25 June 1997). By 1 October 1997, however, the day after the 30 September 1997 closing date for applications, only 84 815 applications had been received by the Department of Home Affairs. The low number of aliens who met the conditions listed above was caused by mostly illegal immigrants who regarded that as a ploy by the government to get them to identify themselves for deportation and subsequent repatriation. Another reason for the low turnout was that illegal aliens were not aware of it despite the radio and newspapers blitz undertaken by the Department of Home Affairs through using all major languages including, English and French (Reitzes, 1997:15).

As a result of the failure to register by the illegal aliens, the South African Department had to extend the deadline for the applications

indefinitely. The extension had set a bad precedent to the South African immigration laws because the amnesty became counter-productive to halting illegal immigration, rather it contributed to greater illegal immigration flows as prospective migrants were encountered by the periodic amnesties pronounced by the government.

The challenge caused by the amnesties raised a security dilemma in that the South African government had no stipulated laws to govern the number of migrates entering the country. Although, at the same time the South African government rewarded illegal individuals who flouted the same laws by granting them amnesty and permanent residence permits, the migration regime became compromised. It became very difficult to see how the South African government was going to accommodate the illegal immigrants without threatening the security of the state (Solomon 1998:85).

According to Dugard (1999), Pretoria embarked on "soft" measures such as accommodation of immigrants through amnesties and the granting of permanent residencies while it was on the one hand trying to tighten the immigration laws. The measures which the government attempted to put in place included an increased repatriation and deportation of illegal aliens. Immigrants were sacrificed by the South African citizens who continued to lose their stake in the job opportunities where foreign labour was most preferred by the employers. Most foreigners regardless of their high academic qualifications or expertise, they were accepting lower wages compared to those which were stipulated by the labour unions.

South African black citizens raised their economic deprivation eager against the government by attacking alien related activities. The economic injustices backdated to the apartheid era impacted negatively on their contemporary human insecurity. The apartheid era

deprived them of basic education which should have capacitated them to compete for jobs with foreigners. The South African citizens wanted jobs, food, political and economic space among other things which they were to compete with immigrants (Melander 1997:15).

According to the 1999 Masungulo Project of the Catholic Bishops Conference in South Africa, 6 348 illegal Mozambican households did not have more than three years of formal education and they had no work skills outside those of subsistence agriculture. This assertion was contrary to Reitzes' (1996) view that South Africa had a highly educated illegal immigrant population. While extrapolating the figures of the educated illegal immigrants in South Africa, there was some truth to the broader illegal immigrants' population residing in the country. The Mozambican migrants who flooded South Africa had no immigration documents. The absence of these documents was not a deliberate move by these migrants but back home their governments had no resources and institutional frameworks to provide citizens with these basic documents. In this case, the Mozambican migrants became the prime target of cheap manual labour due to the absence of immigration documents and limited educational background. The migrants from Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia when comparing then with those from Mozambique, their situations were better due to basic education they attained, with some being highly skilled.

The Masungulo Project revealed that illegal immigrants were competing with low-skilled South African citizens in the job market. Similar revelations also came from a study conducted by the National Labor and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), a think tank for the Congress of South African Trade Unions. It documented the presence of illegal aliens in the various sectors of the South African economy and concluded that the presence of illegal foreign workers had a depressing effect on wages. Illegal migrants accepted to work for long hours for low wages compared to citizens wanted labour laws

to be fully adhered to by the employers. The resistance by the illegal immigrants to join labour unions caused them to be manipulated by the employers. By so doing, the immigrants were contributing labour problems to local people to have decreased access to employment. In turn, this gave rise to resentment towards illegal immigrants that was then expressed as xenophobia (MacDonald, 1998:301).

According to the Masungulo Project study, illegal immigrants were generally active in sectors such as agriculture, construction, informal trading and hospitality industries. In the food and agriculture sectors of South Africa, the organisers of the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) noted the presence of the large numbers of illegal aliens working in farms in the Limpopo Province, Mpumalanga and on the sugar plantations of the KwaZulu Natal.

FAWU organisers later claimed that farmers employed aliens because they were cheaper to an extent that some worked for shelter and a plate of food a day. These aliens feared to be exposed to the government officials hence they were resisting joining workers' union activities. On the same note, the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU) officials detected an increased presence of illegal immigrants in the hospitality sector. This was confirmed by officials of the Tea Room and Restaurant Industrial Council, who believed that most of the illegal immigrants were Mozambicans and Zimbabweans. As in the Agricultural Sector, SACCAWU organisers reported that the aliens were prepared to work for low wages.

Due to their vulnerability as illegal aliens, they were wary of embarking on industrial action. SACCAWU argued that it undermined their ability to fight for better wages and conditions. On the other hand, it served to depress the wage levels of South African workers and resulted in a decrease in employment opportunities for South

Africans. The Café Zurich that was in Hillbrow, dismissed 20 South African waiters in 1999, and replaced them with 20 Zairean workers who worked without being paid any meaningful wage; in fact, they were simply surviving on tips (Hilton, 1999:56).

The challenges caused by the immigrants in the South African human security development were immense to the extent that their presence elicited a great deal of concern from many workers unions across the country. The impact of illegal aliens had adverse effects in the country's societal hegemony. The rate of crimes committed ballooned to the extent that South African black citizens were left with no option but resort to xenophobic attacks against aliens regardless of one's innocence in committing crime. Haldenward (1998) noted that, between January and September 1997, 152 aliens were involved in commercial crimes to the value of R517 986 870 that constituted 19.6% of all commercial crimes over the same period. As a result of the crimes committed by aliens, the government of South Africa drafted the National Operational Police document which viewed illegal immigrants as "South Africa's Number One Enemy" (Vale: 1998:163). The presence of illegal migrants across the country's townships during the period 1997 and 2007 exposed the citizens to vagaries of human insecurities. The illicit deals and prostitution were among other ills that weakened social, political and economic facets of the social cohesion of the South African citizens.

According to Hussein (2003:105), the South African National Defence Forces confiscated 1000 guns from illegal immigrants of Mozambican and Zimbabwean extraction. During the same period 22 121 kilograms of dagga, 5 422 Mandrax tablets and 110.2 kilograms of cocaine were confiscated from Mozambican, Zimbabwean and Malawian alien syndicates which were working with the locals. Although the syndicates were busted the locals in most cases were the ones arrested and prosecuted after their accomplices jumped the borders to their

countries. The social and economic negative impact of the elicit deals conducted by the immigrants against the South Africans, led to many problems of insecurity.

In 2000, the South African Police's Organised Crime Unit further estimated that illegal immigrants controlled 90% of the local cocaine. The drug trade threatened to ruin the South African's good relations with various countries after it became clear that the country was being turned into a top drug conduit. The drug trade had further threatened peace and security of the country since social and economic developments were greatly retarded (Vale: 1998:170).

According to Solomon (2003), South Africa had become one of the most important conduits for drugs into Western Europe. Illegal immigrants in this drug trafficking were also singled out such that the effects of narco-trafficking at international level indicated that there were serious political, social and economic challenges to South Africa. In fact, narco-trafficking to Western countries caused serious political problems where political favours were bought for movement of the drugs. Economically, there were serious losses of productivity caused by the movement of money outside banking systems. Those who were peddling illicit drugs used the money realised to venture into activities which had nothing with the growth of the economy. There was disruption of family life due separation of families who were moving from one place to the other scouting for customers selling their wares. All these cases affected South African citizens' social stability and safety (Peters, 1999:110).

One Mozambican researcher De Monteclos (1998:203) revealed that about 60% of illegal aliens who were moving from Mozambique to Swaziland in the early 2000, entering borders were armed. It was said that once inside the country, the weapons smuggled were either used in the commission of violent crime by the illegal aliens themselves or

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were sold or rented out to South African criminal syndicates. South Africa continued to suffer from crime and political related violence associated incidences. This greatly affected the economy through reduction of investor confidence and state security apparatus needed to be heavily funded, thereby undermining the already stretched state resources. These new political and economic challenges were to be funded to improve the lives of the poor individuals (Lindley-French 2004:110; Crush, 1998:16).

Human insecurity in South Africa was evidenced by a more ominous development where illegal immigrants from Mozambique were hired in 1998 as assassins for various crime syndicates and legitimate businesses. In one case, the South African intelligence (NIA) busted and revealed to the nation that taxi bosses in the province of Mpumalanga had hired 40 Mozambicans as assassins to eliminate rival taxi bosses. The illegal Mozambicans were hired on the basis that it would be difficult to track them down than locally hired assassins. The security agents failed to apprehend most of the alien criminals because they swiftly went into hiding at the same time adopting another identity (Deng *et al.*, 1998:315).

The incident held severe implications for South Africa's domestic security stability. Illegal migration did not impact adversely on employment opportunities only but also had negative implications for the South African government in its provision of adequate education, health, housing and pension fund which were the most critical human security needs for the country's citizens. According to Reitzes (1997:78) it was disturbing that illegal immigrants bring with them diseases with epidemic potential that was attributed to poverty. The vast majority of these illegal immigrants arrived in poor health and was severely malnourished, and thus had little resistance to illness and disease. Aliens were therefore excessively susceptible to diseases such as

yellow fever, cholera, tuberculosis and Aids (Solomon, 1997:1998:65, Reitzes, 1997:80).

On the social front, Minaar (1997:33) illustrated how busloads of Swazi and Basotho children crossed into South Africa to attend schools located close to the borders, and this placed an inordinate burden on South Africa's overstretched education resources. De Monteclos (1998) also noted that this phenomenon of aliens attending schools in South Africa's border regions was even stretched in greater heights in areas like Johannesburg area where an estimated 80 000 children of illegal immigrants burdened the already overcrowded schools.

Another aspect that continued to affect the South African immigration paradigm was that the diseases that were brought by these aliens had an epidemic potential that attributed to health facilities being overstretched. Some illegal immigrants arrived in South Africa in very poor health and greatly malnourished, hence they were susceptible to diseases such as yellow fever, cholera, AIDS/ HIV and tuberculosis. These illegal immigrants burdened the country's healthy services in many ways. When they arrived in the country, they sought medical assistance from local hospitals and clinics. Some spread certain diseases to South African citizens in various ways, thereby taxing overburdened health infrastructure. The illegal immigrants were a burden to the health system because economic costs became unbearable for the already overstretched facilities and medical staff. This health challenge had negative impact on the production sector where workers failed to access medical attention in time. By and large, the security and stability of the country was greatly affected by the human insecurities which were worsened by the influx of the immigrants from neighbours of South Africa and beyond the SADC region (Knayezze, 1998:16; Leiotta, 2002).

One of the first challenges regarding illegal migration was how South Africa should have dealt with is xenophobia. There was growing evidence that South Africans were becoming more xenophobic in the period 1997 to 2003 in their attitudes towards migrants generally and illegal immigrants (Solomon, 1997: 4-15). Matlosa (2001: 85-87) posits that there was the reality of the new South Africa for "foreigners, strangers, those with darker skins or higher foreheads." These foreigners included such cultural groupings such as Nigerians, Ethiopians, Zimbabweans and Mozambicans. It was the arrest and the detentions of the suspected irregular immigrants among these groupings that had turned up the dark underbelly of the South African psyche.

It was interesting that not only the authorities as illegal aliens targeted foreigners, but also even local people were picked up, harassed, intimidated and at times thrown into transit camps for undocumented migrants. The locals who were victims of these human insecurities were from the minority groupings such as the Venda, Pedi and the Shangaans from the North of the country (Younge, 1999: 6). South Africans were once known as the "bully boys" of Africa by the citizens of its neighbours during the period when jobs in the mines were easily available in that country. Since most immigrants from the SADC region recognised that they had long been manipulated they ended saying that they were "sick and tired" of being labeled as "*amakwerekwere*" meaning foreigners from Zimbabwe, after they had assisted to build the country's economy (Matlosa, 1999:67).

While there was the need to control the influx of outsiders into South Africa to preserve its own economy and standard of living, it was worrying that the country's xenophobic tendencies torpedoed the vision of an African Renaissance which was held by people such as President Thabo Mbeki. The human security of the minority tribes was at the mercy of the Police and Home Affairs Department. The

Shangaans of the Northern Province community are dark skinned, and their South African language accent is biased to other languages spoken in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. Due to these, the security agencies found it difficult to be complacent when attending to them in every aspect. They were in most cases arrested and detained after being suspected of being aliens. There was a perception in South Africa that darker people or people without the 'right' South African accent were not citizens. In provinces of Limpopo, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal, some citizens were picked up by the security agencies after they were suspected as aliens, only to be released after their national identity documents were availed. Due to these incidents of wrongly suspected as aliens many citizens had resorted to always travel with their national identities. Because of the cultural interfaces of citizens of SADC member states, especially those from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana and Zambia, the security agents found it difficult to differentiate them from other citizens of the minority tribes.

In most cases, the black people with dark skin and those who were not able to pronounce certain Xhosa or Zulu words or speaking in a non-South African accent were at high risk and this brewed hatred and ignorance about the rights and realities of both refugees and migrants. Human security as a term can be also understood to encompass the concept of conflict prevention. It draws other terms used more broadly in the current global discourse such as the responsibility to protect, human development and xenophobia. Human security aspects as related to the concept of xenophobia can be treated as the 'crisis end' of terms like human rights and human development. The human rights would be at stake at such extreme vulnerability where minority groups such as the Vendas, Pedi and Shangaans continued to be identity suspects. These were suffering extremely from xenophobic tendencies because they were disturbingly picked up, harassed and thrown into the transit camps where undocumented migrants were kept. Security

is viewed as the absence of physical violence hence the minority tribal groups in the South African context remained vulnerable if they were to be threatened of deportation to their country of origin because of being suspected as foreigners. While human development is viewed as material development and improved living standards translating it to the situation of minority tribes in South Africa, showed that human insecurity was rife and in much the same way, human rights were often treated wrongly as civil and political rights of the Pedi, Vendas and Shangaans were at the mercy of the police and immigration officials not the laws of the country (Benita, 2006:278; Leiotta, 2002; Hussein, 1997:93).

Although xenophobia is viewed as a sentiment confined to individuals at the lower end of the socio-economic and the educational spectrum of the society, it should also be closely related to the notion of sustainable peace which must be the goal of conflict prevention. For example, in the initiative by the government of South Africa to incorporate immigrants into citizens in 1997, it was an idea to promote peace and security in the region. The conflict prevention discourse has its origins in a political ethos rooted in civil society, collective action and the public sphere. Conflict prevention attempts to break vicious circles of instability including subsidiary tools of early warning and analysis which were the rapid responses that should have stopped the xenophobic attacks perpetrated against foreigners in the period 2001 and 2004.

Despite the fact that conflict prevention has roots in civil activism, the focus should be on the nation state to help rectify the invulnerability of individual citizens through a state institutional reform in the security sector, judiciary and governance, so that strategic human security proponents can be put in place (Lindley-French, 2004:1-15).

When it came to issues of human security in the South African context, the state failed to uphold the United Nations (UN) principle of the 'responsibility to protect.' According to Bellamy (2008:423), the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chretien announced the creation of an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) at the United Nation's Millennium Summit in 2000. The ICISS was charged with the task of finding a global consensus on humanitarian intervention. In 2001, the ICISS chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Shannon delivered a landmark report entitled "The Responsibility to Protect' which stated that the states have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens. The United Nations principles which deal with the protection of citizens under UN ICISS (2001: xi) was not adhered to by the South African government. Since she is a signatory, the UN principle was supposed to be adhered to by protecting brutality against the Pedi, Shangaans and Vendas.

The UN article on the 'Responsibility to Protect' states that when a state is unable or unwilling to protect the citizens, the international body must intervene to protect the vulnerable people. This involved not only the responsibility to react to humanitarian crises but also the responsibility to prevent crises such as xenophobic attacks (Bellamy, 2009:430; Thomas, 2007:341; Wheeler, 2000:97).

According to Hough & Minaar (1996:127), the xenophobic attacks were perpetrated by the Zulu and Xhosa speakers. It was revealed that the Zulu speakers were more xenophobic than other groups while the Xhosa speakers were considered less xenophobic. This perception was closely related to the fact that Zulu speakers were largely associated with the violent political party Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The IFP hard-line stance towards illegal immigrants was clearly illustrated in October 1998 when the party's youth brigade threatened that, if the ANC government failed to take strong action against illegal aliens, it would do so itself (Solomon, 1998:97). The security of citizens and

individual immigrants became a nightmare due to the condescending stance taken by nearly big tribal groups such as the Zulu, Xhosa and Afrikaans (Potgieter, 1998).

As Table 7.1 indicates, the influx of illegal immigrants was categorised as a bad trend which indicated that South African citizens were extremely unhappy about the country becoming a refugee destination. As indicated, more than 80% of the South Africans felt that the illegal immigrants were either unwelcome or very unwelcome in that country. The findings were reinforced by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) which also indicated that the South Africans wanted a ban on immigrants. Table 7.1 also indicates that the Western Cape Province had more citizens who were saying illegal immigrants were unwelcome. The anti-illegal immigrant sentiments were caused by an increase of those with better educational qualifications who flooded the provinces and eventually they secured good employment opportunities ahead of locals who were less educated. South African citizens were negatively inclined towards any immigration policy that welcomed newcomers into the country. The table below shows the highest level of opposition to immigration recorded by any country in the world where comparable questions were asked. The South African provinces of the Western Cape and Eastern Cape indicated that they were opposed to the illegal immigrants because they were disenfranchising locals in various areas of political, economic and social spheres.

Table 7.1: Whether the Influx of Illegal Immigrants is Good or Bad, Analysed by Province in % (*Solomon, Illegal Immigration into South Africa, 2003, Table 11, p. 95*)

PROVINCE	GOOD	BAD	NEITHER	UNCERTAIN	TOTAL
Northern Cape	3	78	8	11	100
Western Cape	3	81	14	2	100
Mpumalanga	8	60	26	6	100
Eastern Cape	10	79	6	5	100

KwaZulu-Natal	14	64	15	7	100
Free State	16	70	11	3	100
Gauteng	18	56	16	10	100
North West	30	56	12	2	100
Limpopo Province	37	56	3	4	100

According to the IDASA survey of 1998, most of South Africans were resoundingly negative towards any immigration policy that might welcome newcomers into the country. The table shows that there was the highest level of opposition to immigration recorded by any country in the world where comparable questions were asked (Matters *et al.*, 1999:365).

The preceding survey on Table7.2 asked the citizens if illegal immigrants that came to South Africa from other countries were very welcome, welcome, neither, unwelcome, very unwelcome and uncertain. It indicated that foreigners were very unwelcome in South Africa and xenophobic attacks were eminent if were to go by results produced. The responses were very uncompromising on refusing the immigrants to enter the country. As indicated 73.6% of the South Africans felt that illegal immigrants were either unwelcome or very unwelcome in the country. Most of South Africans were resoundingly negative towards any immigration policy that was going to welcome new immigrants because their economic and social lives were going to be threatened. Although, 15.9% of the South Africans indicated that they either very welcome or welcome illegal immigrants, this was due to the transnational ethnic consciousness with provinces sharing borders with the country's regional neighbours and whose host populations share a common cultural heritage. It was provinces such as the Eastern, Western and Northern Cape that share borders with Swaziland and Zimbabwe that provided transnational ethnic consciousness that saw illegal immigrants more as kinsfolk than aliens.

Table 7.2: What is your view in general on the so-called illegal immigrants that come to South Africa from other countries? (*Solomon, Illegal Immigration into South Africa, (2003:20), Table 12.)*

RESPONSE	PERCENTAGE %
Very welcome	3,2
Welcome	12,6
Neither	7,0
Unwelcome	35,8
Very unwelcome	37,8
Don't know	3,6
Total	*100*

This was an indication that the South Africans felt that immigration laws were not strict enough to protect them from labor, food security and many other human security facets that were poised to compete with aliens (Business Day, 27 December 2001:1; IDASA, 1999:31; Magardie, 2000:4).

While the concept of human security was then defined as useful and was embedded in the state policy discourse on security in nearly all SADC countries, in South Africa it remained a contested issue because of xenophobic attacks against the immigrants in the period 1998 to 2005. The contemporary tendency by several scholars to focus on the state in the belief that the traditional security task of the maintenance of sovereignty and territorial integrity had security for citizens were taken for granted (Baker, 1999:248; UNCHS, 2003). For the SADC region and South Africa, in particular to provide human security to the citizens, there is a need to define human security as the absence of threat to human life, lifestyle and culture, through the fulfilment of basic needs. Although this definition was greatly guided by the feminist agitators contributing to the new security thinking, it did not take cognisance of the individual security. This definition seeks to place the security concerns of ordinary man and woman on the street

at the very core or any security strategy (Booth, 1994:58; Buzan, 1991:68; Omari, 1995:365; Krause, 1996:13).

While addressing United Nations Summit in 1997, the then South African President Nelson Mandela stated that;

> "It is true that hundreds of millions of politically empowered masses are caught in the deathly trap of poverty, unable to live life in its fullness. Out of this, are born social conflicts which produce insecurity and instability, civil and other wars that claim many lives and millions of desperate refugees. Out of this cauldron are also born tyrants, dictators and demagogues."

This widening thinking of security made great strides in sustainable economic development which enabled to achieve political, economic and social well-being for all the people of Southern Africa, especially those of South Africa. The security and peace perception was based on people-centred approach because the human security transcended to the individual security levels. On the same note, poverty was also considered as a structural problem in Southern Africa. In the period between 1997 and 2007 about 45% to 50% of the total population lived in abject poverty (World Bank, 2000).

About three quarters of all poverty was concentrated in rural areas characterised by unfavourable climatic conditions, for example, little and irregular rain, poor infrastructure, in fertile soils and prone to erosion (IFRRI / WUR / IFAD, 2002). Poor communities in most SADC states had limited access to education and social services. They were also vulnerable to HIV and AIDS and an unbalanced family structure with proportionally more women and young children (FAO, 2000). In this case, the evolution of the concept of security transcends the narrow and military-centred aspect to a wider holistic approach providing security to the individual peoples. In fact, a traditional perspective on state sovereignty that suggests that the regime has

ultimate, rights needs recast because there are other players who provide peace and stability in societies (Magardie, 2004:116).

Southern Africa continues to be a region of migrants of various sorts. The economic history of Southern Africa, therefore, remains predicated in extricable story of migration (Vale & Matlosa, 1995:37). The movement of people from other Southern African states remains a historic fact that South Africa is the economic attractive destination. Despite the criss-cross of citizens in the entire region which spanned from the colonial period, people ignored political boundaries imposed by the colonial administrations. The SADC region experienced different types of migration in the period 1997 to 2007 that included contract migration, refugees, undocumented migration, brain drain and asylum-seekers (Knayedza, 1998:312; Sachikonye, 1998:212; Jauch, 1997:35).

While the Southern African economies have been tied together in an interdependent fashion by, among other things cross-border migration, they also exhibited considerable imbalances and inequalities. The uneven development in the SADC had implications for labor markets and migration. Despite the political boundaries bequeathed from the colonial rule, the regional cross boarder migration had become ingrained in the socio-fabric of the SADC as a whole. Due to the regional economic and social links created by the inter-state migration, the basis of regional politics and anthropology remain anchored on the single regional economy (Vale & Matlosa, 1995:97).

Although migration had helped to weave the economies of the SADC region together in a relatively integrated whole, it caused on the other hand, unequal development and exploitative relations that existed in the period 1997 to 2007. Regional cross-border migration had caused human insecurity of individual citizens in other SADC member states while at the same time benefiting the South African economic sector. In

fact, South Africa remains more industrialised than any other regional state in SADC (Lundahl & Peterson, 1995:60; Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999:311; Jauch, 1997:30).

It was imperative to identify the various types of migrants and to understand the relationships between the different categories which caused the cross-border movements in the SADC region. Population displacements at either intra-state or inter-state caused a lot of human insecurity to the citizens. SADC member states are economically and politically different. The citizens migrate to environments where peace and security is guaranteed. The end of colonialism which was marked by the independence of South Africa in 1994 opened a floodgate to that country's job market. The topology of migrants who flooded that country had different interests but most of them wanted to secure employment. It was the economic factors that made health staff, teachers, agriculturists and land surveyors' migrants among other professionals settled in South Africa (Prah, 1999:41).

Migration is a concept commonly used to describe human movements either from one region of a country to another (internal migration) or from one country to another (external migration). Migration may either be permanent, as in a case where a migrant settles permanently in a host region or country, or oscillatory, as in a case where a migrant moves back and forth between the region or country of origin and the host region/country. Migration is, thus, a permanent or semi-permanent change of one's residence or site of labour. As a process, it involves an origin, destination and intervening factors. These factors that either facilitate or inhibit migration, are generally categorised into four as follow:

- factors associated with the areas of the region;
- factors associated with the areas of destination;
- intervening factors that either inhibit or facilitate the movement, and

- personal factors that drive individual migrants (Setai, 1998:78).

These factors have combined together to propel the migration process in Southern Africa. These have related mainly to economic and political causes and environmental factors which either push or pull labour to seek wage employment elsewhere for purposes of survival (Amin, 1995:90; Milanzi, 1998:201). However, the causes of migration cannot be divorced from its consequences. Migration is not only the consequence of an unequal development that could be the result of natural causes, such as the different natural potential of different regions. Migration is also a part of the unequal development, as it serves to reproduce its conditions and aggravates them (Amin, 1995:45).

Contract migration remained one of the most glaring features of the political economy of the SADC region that was traceable to the pre-colonial period (Matlosa, 1992:35; Crush *et al.*, 1991:89). Rapid economic development that was brought by the political independence of 1994, made South Africa a key locus of capital accumulation in the region while other SADC member states became labour reservoirs. According to Prah (1989:6), the fundamental law of capitalism is that "capital attracts labour, skilled or unskilled but the need for labour depends on the extent of capital concentration and the differentiation of production." This assertion by Prah (1989) indicated that other SADC member states were just labour reserves that served as South Africa's pool of extra-cheap labour and a captive market for the country's manufactured goods. Contract migration in the SADC region suggested that an agreement was supposed to be drawn up between a migrant job seeker and the employer. This contract/agreement was supposed to state the agreed position where the employer paid foreign workers remuneration and on the other hand, the contract labourers were to undertake to work for the employers for a fixed period after

which they were supposed to return to their country of origin (Pule & Matlosa, 1997:116; Matlosa, 1996:25; Crush, 1997:91).

Contract migration, especially to the South African mines and farms, had been dominated by mostly rural male folk from mainly SADC states with minimal educational achievements and coming from very poor backgrounds. The contract did not emphasise remuneration for the foreign migrant labourer. Rather, contract migrants were concerned with getting some money to support the family back in their countries. There were less or relatively low involvement of female folk in labour migration in the period between 1997 and 2007. Male folk dominated in all employment on the mines and in the agricultural sector. These movements of migrants to South Africa from most of the SADC states caused a lot of insecurity in terms of food security, the health security, social security, political security and economic security. The migration of male folk to South Africa left agricultural activities in the hands of women and children and the result was relatively food insecurity, political insecurity, economic insecurity and disruption of families.

On the health insecurity aspect, these male migrants brought and spread various diseases due to the circumstances of livelihood they adopted in the foreign environments. In terms of human security of the individuals, there was a catastrophe for all the citizens of the region because even the South African citizens were to endure ostracisation from the employers. However, South African employers were in favour of cheap foreign labour they manipulated by paying them poor wages (McDonald, 2002:78).

Many communities in Southern Africa share a common history, cultural heritage, language, religion and other social bonds that transcended colonial boundaries. In most instances, these communities struggle for daily survival. This made clandestine migration in the

period 1997 to 2007 very easy although risky at times where individuals crossed crocodile infested rivers such as Zambezi and Limpopo rivers. These borders were crossed under stringent state security and military surveillance of boundaries (Solomon, 1996:38; Crush, 1997:315; Crush, 1998:99-111). Asylum seekers and refugees remained a potential threat to the security of the SADC region. It was often that the country from which the asylum seekers and refugees fled also had suspicions about the activities of the migrants within their host country. Asylum literally means a sanctuary or place of refuge. Asylum-seeking refers to a quasi-legal process where one state grants protection to a national or nationals of another state.

A refugee is described as a person who is outside of his or her country of origin or habitual residence because they have suffered or feared persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or because they are a member of a persecuted "social group" or sometimes they are fleeing from war. Such a person may be called an asylum seeker until recognised by the state where they make a claim. The concept of peace and security in the SADC region remained a very contentious issue because nearly all members in one way or the other, once housed both refugees and asylum seekers from one or two regional states. Mandaza (1998) argues that the SADC region had the highest number of refugees and asylum seekers compared to other African sub-regional groupings. There was an exodus of asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the early 2000 due to the war which nearly drove the international community into an "African World War," (Mutero, et al 1998:67). The primary difference between refugees and asylum seekers is that the rights of asylum belong to states and not to individuals although the United Nations Article 14 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 does give individuals a right to asylum. But as the declaration took the form of the United Nations General Assembly, it is not legally binding on states (Booth, 1994:201). The number of asylum seekers

who entered South Africa in the period 1997 to 2007 was not able to be determined because nearly all SADC member states have their citizens' flight to that country as political refugees but Matlosa (1999) who propounded that most of the migrants were squarely economic refugees.

According to United Nations Charter, Article 1A of the Geneva Convention of 1951, not all migrants seeking protection or shelter in another country fall under the definition of "refugees". One of the fundamental criticisms of the 1951 Refugee Convention is that it is unclear about what constitutes persecution. Furthermore, emphasis on the individual negates the concept of group persecution. This criticism is unfair because there is no internationally acceptable criterion for determining whether a person has a "well-founded fear of persecution" (Melander, 1987:274-284). Melander (1987) observes that there is a growing tendency to refer to basic human rights "that is the criterion for persecution may be fulfilled if the applicant fears exposure to human rights violations". In this respect, it is civil and political rights in particular that are relevant to the field of human rights which deals with the relations between the individual and the state. The criterion may also be fulfilled when economic, social and cultural rights are violated if the applicant fears discriminatory measures (UNHCR Handbook, 2009).

However, every person who has been or will be faced with a human rights violation in his or her country of origin cannot be considered a refugee. There is an important prerequisite which stipulates that the violation must reach a certain degree of severity before it is classified as persecution. The human rights violation must also be motivated by one or more of the five causes of persecution referred to in the UN 1951 Convention which includes race, religion, nationality, and membership of a particular social and political opinion (Matters, 1999: 16).

In 1999 to 2007 there was the mass movement of Zimbabweans to South Africa and Botswana to a lesser extent. This movement blurred the distinction between what is a refugee and an economic migrant. Economic migrants fit neither in the category of refugees or asylum-seekers because they fall outside the specific mandate of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). According to the report (Zimbabweans migrating into Southern Africa), the lack of protection in migrants in the SADC region was based on a "false distinction" between a forced and an economic migrant rather than focusing on the real and urgent needs of some of the migrants. The report suggests that there was a need to have a better term which was to be called "forced humanitarian migrants" to emphasise the exodus of Zimbabweans to South Africa who were moving for the purposes of their basic survival. To emphasise that the movements of Zimbabweans into South Africa and Botswana were properly for economic opportunities, the Regional Office for Southern Africa of the United Nations' Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coined the term "migrants of humanitarian concern" in 2007. This put Zimbabwe into the international spotlight as a failing state while other critics called for even military intervention to rescue the people from what was defined as an induced political and economic mismanagement of affairs by the sitting government (UNHCR, 2003:116).

Although, general responses to Zimbabweans migration in Botswana and South Africa in the early 2000 was premised on the original definition from the 1951 Convention and it was said that Zimbabwe was failing to protect her citizens by providing them with economic security aspects. Those who were crossing into South Africa from Zimbabwe were neither refugees. Most of them did not apply for refugee status but given the extent of economic collapse back home they were not even considered as "voluntary economic migrants" because there is no statutory instrument of the UN Charter which

supports economic migrants (Mandaza, 1998:311). Many Zimbabweans suffered insecurity challenges because there were no legal instruments to protect them neither did they receive humanitarian support from UN agencies as they fell outside the mandates of the support structures offered by government and non-government institutions. In fact, the Zimbabwean refugees or asylum seekers were rejected into mainstream of the political, economic and social structures because they were considered economic migrants.

The movements of Zimbabweans into Botswana and South Africa caused a lot of insecurity to the country because people left their jobs unmanned, without even a replacement. Zimbabwe was plunged into both economic and political challenges which brought human security provisions for individual citizens questioned. South Africa, on the other hand was on the receiving end, due to increased population demanding food and health services. The most basic needs for the exploded population were hard to come by, hence scarcity of services led South African citizens to question the influx of foreigners. As indicated by the 1999 IDASA survey on the immigrants who flooded South Africa;

> "Most of South Africans are resoundingly negative towards any immigration policy that might welcome newcomers. 25% of the South Africans want a total ban on immigrants and 45% support strict limits on the numbers of immigrants allowed in. Only 17% would support a more flexible policy tied to the availability of jobs and only 6% support a total open policy of immigrants. This is the highest level of opposition to immigration recorded by any country in the world comparable questions have been asked", (IDASA, 1999).

On the question of immigrants' influx in South Africa, Minaar & Hough (1998:106) illustrate that almost 75% of South Africans believed immigration laws were not strict enough to curb the influx of foreigners. There were political costs that were related to domestic political stability and foreign policy considerations. The need for an effective immigration policy that clearly distinguished between alien

and citizen, and between legal and illegal immigrant was needed to control irregular movement of people into the country. The influx of immigrants contributed to South Africa's severe political risks, both domestic and international, posed by a failure in an effective immigration policy (Business Day, 27 December 2001; Magardie, 2000).

In November 1999, the South African police reported that they were investigating the murder of a police officer who had been investigating the involvement of a contract immigrant in insurance business. Subsequently, about 60 contract foreign employees from Zimbabwe were put on trial in Pretoria. The murder of the police officer led to authorities in South Africa to increasingly adopt a more coercive approach regarding foreigners engaged in sectors reserved for locals especially the insurance, retail and manufacturing sectors. To ameliorate locals, the South African government engaged in mass deportation of immigrants, especially Zimbabweans suspected to have committed any sort of offence (KOPOBb EB, 24 June 1999; <www.search.nando.net).

Meanwhile, Botswana's traditional welcome to Zimbabwean economic migrants was quickly replaced with suspicion and fear after it had been discovered that large numbers of the immigrants were engaged in smuggling diamonds. These suspicions exacerbated tensions between the Batswana and Zimbabweans, because of the dwindling price of diamonds at the international market. The tensions were caused by the sale on the black market of smuggled Zimbabwean diamonds in Botswana for a very low price. Botswana being a country depending largely on diamond mining, was threatened by the elicit dealing of diamonds.

The South Africans were threatened politically and economically by the invasion of sectors preserved for citizens by immigrants. A similar situation existed in the domestic sector in 2004, where the South

African Domestic Workers Union (SADWU) reported that there was an increase in the number of Zimbabweans and Malawians in this sector. The SADWU organisers also reported that, Zimbabweans and Malawians were prepared to work for very low wages and were not interested in joining the workers' unions while on the other hand, employers preferred to employ them as opposed to South Africans. The presence of Zimbabweans and Malawians in most informal sectors elicited a great deal of concern from even the African Chamber of Hawkers and Informal Business (ACHIB) which was based in Johannesburg.

According to Lawrence Mavundla, ACHIB's president, an estimated 500 000 foreigners were plying their trade in the informal sector which represented 40% of the total number of informal traders in South Africa. Mavundla's claims were substantiated by the number of Zimbabweans and Malawians arrested in a single raid in September 1999. On this occasion, the Northern Transvaal police arrested 2000 Zimbabwean traders and contract workers in and around the former Venda capital of Thohoyandou. ACHIB argued that because of Zimbabweans and Malawians' failure to join labour unions they were not paying duty while others who were vendors were not paying import duties on their goods, hence they were able to sell these goods at far cheaper prices. In this way, South African local hawkers were losing their only source of livelihood to foreigners. (Solomon, 2003:113). The human insecurity of Zimbabweans and Malawians remained unstable and insecure due to lack of economic opportunities in their respective countries.

The human migration in the SADC region continued to unmask the extent of threats to peace and security of migrants who opted to leave their countries to seek refuge. The movement even threatened peace and security of the host countries. In the SADC region South Africa and Botswana to a lesser extent remained the fertile grounds for both

political and economic migrants. The migrants from Zimbabwe capitalised on the vulnerabilities created by unemployment, food insecurity, lack of democracy and political intolerance, to seek refuge in South Africa and Botswana. The push factors of immigrants to South Africa were the result of the growth of economic activity which was witnessed in 1994 that saw the elimination of restrictions on the free movement of people across the borders of its neighbours. These immigrants flooding South Africa were taking advantage of regional security lapses caused by civil wars of Mozambique and general elections euphoria that hit Zimbabwe. It was mainly marginalisation and exclusion of the social groups of people in many SADC countries which fuelled migration to South Africa and Botswana.

Although there was a need to control the influx of immigrants into South Africa as a way of preserving its economy and security of the citizens, the measures instigated the xenophobic tendencies where the vision of pan-Africanism observation was ignored. South African citizens felt disadvantaged by the foreigners who encroached into many economic domains which were reserved for them. The xenophobic attacks forced the government to intervene by creating laws that gave citizens first preferences in the economic sector. Many foreigners lost not only lives but even property. The xenophobic attacks which erupted in South Africa in the early 2000 demonstrated their frustration that the government was not doing enough to economically protect them from the foreigners. The xenophobic attacks were mainly confined to the individual citizens who were occupying the lower end of the socio-economic and educational spectrum of the society in South Africa. In this case, xenophobic attacks are viewed in relation to peace and security provisions where citizens were exposed to vulnerabilities exacerbated by poverty and lack of job security.

The peace and security perception in Southern Africa remains premised on security of the state. Although, the global trend on human

security has shifted to the security of the individual people, levels of poverty in SADC shows that the state sovereignty takes precedence. Individual peoples remain characterised by limited access to education and social services, vulnerability to HIV and AIDS among other security threats.

Due to the regional traditional economic and social links which were created by the inter-state migration, the basis of the SADC's political and anthropology continued to be anchored on the single regional economy. The migration of people to South Africa and Botswana in the Southern African region consequently caused unequal development and exploitative relations. The contract migration trends which were unanimous with the South African labour laws were dismantled just after the apartheid system. The post-apartheid elements were part to problems which bedevilled mine and manufacturing industries in South Africa. The inequalities at workplaces led foreigners to be vulnerable in hands of the employers. The human security of foreigners became unbearable because locals corroborated with employers and property owners for their deportation.

There was a need to control the influx of immigrants into South Africa, the measures instigated the xenophobic tendencies ignoring the vision of Pan-Africanism. Many foreigners lost not only lives but also even property in the hands of the South African citizens who felt economically losing out to immigrants. The xenophobic attacks were generally confined to the individual citizens who were occupying the lower end of the socio-economic and educational spectrum of the South African society. Nevertheless, as immigrant populations rose, South African citizens were beginning to recognize immigrants' contributions and to lower barriers at least to immigrants with skills. The count of 120 000 self-employed immigrants in South Africa in 2000 revealed that many immigrants were professionals or business owners. Many South African citizens began to accept the idea of multicultural

when most industries and factories were operating under the tutelage of immigrants after many whites were closing shop to sabotage the industrial sector (Bergman & Renwick, 2002:202).

In terms of skilled immigrants, the analysis found out that these people were also, by and large, happy to be living and working in South Africa. Most have strong transnational links back home, they were sending remittances to family and friends, visited home on a regular basis and were proud to call themselves citizens of their home country. There was another aspect of this research worth highlighting that here was the challenge of stereotyping the skilled immigrants in South Africa. Popular myth in South Africa had it that skilled foreigners of African extraction were taking over their job opportunities. The xenophobic attacks against skilled immigrants in some instances became the only alternative for the locals to get rid of foreigners to retain their chances of occupying skilled jobs (McDonald & Crush, 2002:7-9).

The South African government ought to come up with a revised national White Paper blueprint on immigration matters that includes refugee management concepts, compatible border control and entry policies, efficient readmission and return policies and then the labour agreements as an alternative. The African National Congress (ANC) as a political party, needed to consult extensively with other SADC member states to revisit the June 1995 Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the members states. However, the host countries of asylum seekers and refugees should adhere to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and African Union Protocol on Refugees and Asylum seekers, when they provide human security protection.

Chapter 8: The Future of Peace and Security in the Human Security Agenda of the SADC

Our vigilance means the rigorous selection of friends, a constant watch and struggle against enemies (both internal and internal) and the neutralization or elimination of all factors opposing progress. - Amilcar Cabral

This book advances the argument that peace and security mechanisms adopted by any regional member grouping or a state guaranteeing and preserving people's fears from economic, political and social threats. The analysis reveals that SADC member states' political, economic and security transformations have a relationship to socio-political legacies of colonial and apartheid past. This gives an understanding as to why the democratic governments of the SADC region fail to guarantee human security to their citizens. The research findings suggest that there were no strong human security mechanisms in the SADC region, particularly in South Africa between 1997 and 2007 due to poverty, human rights abuse, racial discrimination, xenophobic attacks and workers' arbitrary dismissal, among a plethora of other ills which militated heavily against most of the citizens. This study concludes that the SADC region and South Africa in particular, should take cognisance of non-state actors' complementary roles to the state's effort to guarantee and preserve human security of the individuals and the community.

The SADC member states need to formulate national policies that address not only traditional security threats, the military and territorial security of the state, but also non-traditional threats such as economic, political, social and environmental degradation. These non-traditional security threats respond to the evolution of geopolitical realities.

There are severe challenges concerning the effectiveness of non-state actors' operations in South Africa to complement the government's efforts to provide and guarantee human security to the citizens. While Waever (1995) propounded that human security takes individual people and their community as its main referents, rather than the state or territory, the non-state actors should have come into play to assist in policy management and implementation. According to Khanyle (2003), the South African government was helped by the NGOs in various technical areas to formulate policies which were to address peace support missions in 1998. The support which was extended by the NGOs was not enough to guarantee the peace and security of the individual people and communities.

Although there were instances in this study that the NGOs/CSOs were found engaging in various activities to assist in areas of political, economic and social transformation in South Africa, there were serious areas where they clashed with the government on policy formulation. Cawthra *et al.* (2007) argue that when it comes to policy formulation related to defence and security and broadly foreign affairs, the NGO/CSO cannot be acceptable to the state to participate in policy formulation due to secrecy and nationalistic ethos surrounding it. Although NGOs/CSOs have the capacity to assist the government to formulate policies of defence and security which are able to uphold and guarantee the human security of citizens, limitations of sovereignty of the state makes it difficult for the two institutions to agree on state governance models. Due to state's preservation of sovereign rights, the NGO/CSO efforts to complement the government efforts to address people's human security are limited.

The relationship between the CSO/ NGO and governments have concentrated on humanitarian assistance in times of strife or conflicts. According to Hogue & Harrop (2007), CSOs/NGOs are loosely organised institutions whose origins lay outside the country's

legislature. This makes it difficult for the state to totally embrace the corresponding role of the CSO/NGO in assisting citizens' human security. The importance of the civil society organisations as a human security popular force has captured the political initiative from the state leadership that has resulted in the rapture of trust between the two.

The CSOs/NGOs are portrayed as institutions that want to replace the government on democratisation process. It was the activities of CSOs/NGOs such as IDASA in partnership with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation which contributed by creating platforms to discuss human security issues. The two institutions hosted a conference to discuss the South African economy, political developments, human rights abuse and security sector reforms as an attempt to bring together political organisations, and business groups.

The ANC government was not involved in the discussions hosted by NGOs/CSOs which meant that the efforts of the two institutions to come up with an economic policy and a political realignment initiative were resisted by the government. According to Valentine (2010) the ANC government resisted any policy formulations which were initiated by the CSO/NGO without its involvement.

The changing political, economic and social face of South Africa saw limited roles of CSO /NGO in transitional process to democracy because of scepticism of the ANC government which believed them to be a front for post-apartheid elements. Furthermore, the NGO/CSO's concentration in democracy and governance systems led the government to resist some progressive and brilliant ideas which were going to protect and guarantee the individual citizens' human security. As a result, the government has sovereign rights ahead of NGO/CSO in policy formulation processes.

The decision to co-share some of the state's responsibilities to NGO/CSO groups remains a suicidal move, especially in countries like South Africa, where post-apartheid regime elements still secretly influenced both economic and political systems. The aspects of human security are difficult to accomplish where the government does not involve the NGO/CSO in various social activities which by the end of it all, provide peace and security to individual citizens. This can only be a success when NGO/CSO realise that the question of national sovereignty of any state is the domain of the ruling regime. It is conceptually wrong for the state to invite NGO/CSO to execute peace security roles because these roles are beyond their realm of legal accountability. The state is the constitutional entity empowered to uphold the matters which deal with peace and security.

According to Sisulu (2005), Nkiwane (2000) and Lindley (2004), it is clear that policy formulation in defence and security in South Africa receive a lot of white supremacy bias due to the nature of those who contributed to policy formulation and crafting. The existences of former apartheid regime elements within the South African governance systems remain precarious due to euphemism of social segregation against the blacks. The apartheid system still controls the economics and politics of South Africa because most of the economic resources were in the hands of the whites who were in the apartheid government before the democratic elections of 1994. The black South Africans were subjected to brute inhuman treatment during the apartheid rule, to the extent of being denied the opportunity to education. The majority could not qualify to be promoted to high policy making positions, hence they remained in positions where they implemented policies formulated by the whites. The former apartheid regime loyalist has a cause to continue maintaining the status quo because they must safeguard their economic and social interests which are in danger of evaporating into political oblivion.

Chief among the objectives said to have been achieved by entrenched apartheid system in the South African context, are labour disputes in every economic sector. Many daily and weekly newspapers in South Africa have attributed the deaths of thirty-five mine workers at Marikana Gold Mine as caused by the low wages offered by the employers. The wages in the mining sector among other economic sectors were very poor and were far below the national poverty-datum-line (PDL). The owners of the Marikana Gold Mine received a lot of complaints from workers unions which included COSATU, but no action was taken. The irony behind the resistance to award salary adjustment remained political. If the wages of the workers were adjusted to levels of the agreed PDL in South Africa, that alone would have threatened the racial structure where the whites enjoyed the high echelons of the social structure.

The efforts to consolidate hard won independence stability and democratic governance continues to be undermined in South Africa by the forces of the apartheid legacy which were vividly visible in the military, mining, civil society groups, education and civil service among other sectors. The human security dividends of the peace and security processes where the country was not able to see impending threats such as xenophobic attacks, food insecurity, labour injustices and high homicide rates could only have been avoided if security mechanisms were under the guidance of the democratic systems stemming from the inner government circles rather than a racial group. A human security approach that emphasises special security attention to vulnerable groups and communities is the ideal panacea to maintain peace and security in most urban and rural areas of South Africa.

The struggle between the NGOs/CSOs and the state often take the form of an attempt by the state to overpower NGOs/CSOs by bringing them under government control. The pretext for the attempt to bringing non-state actors into the sphere of the state is often given as

their financial mismanagement, the lack of control of their funds. But the reality behind the attempts is linked to a fear by government of the potential NGOs/CSOs have for organising people outside the state structures. Human security is focused on the developmental processes which improve and guarantee peace and security of the individual citizens. Although, the strategic conception of security policy is conceived in abstract values, its preservation is based on livelihoods of the people. It is quite lucid that human security has been receiving little attention from SADC governments. Thus NGOs/CSOs can be seen to be in direct competition with government over donor funds. However, the non-state actors have proved that if they were to get conducive environment from the state, they were going to compliment the state to provide and guarantee peace and security to the citizens and individuals with peace and security they deserved. This again proved that human security aspects in terms of peace and security for the individual citizen cannot be left to the state alone. The NGOs/CSOs need to complement the government's effort in services delivery.

The most remarkable roles of civil society organisations were observed in South Africa during the apartheid era and after independence in 1994. The civil society groups such as IDASA worked with the ANC cadres to dismantle racial segregation and the apartheid system. Although, relations between these parties were fluid due to security threats imposed by the entrenched post-apartheid system, the ANC had the advantage of publicity, funding and mandate of policy formulation. The CSOs/NGOs were participants in the fight against the apartheid regime through organising peace talks and aiding the victims of war. The CSOs/NGOs engagement with the apartheid ruling elite made it possible for the ANC to negotiate for a peace process which brought independence in 1994. The NGOs among other civil society organisations in the sub region and South Africa in particular, were given both political and economic space to legitimise

policies and then build support for the government actions. In this case, the objective was to achieve what was called the "social consent" to avoid further criticism and antagonism from government critics.

Chief among achievements by the human security approach to peace and security in SADC was the formation of the SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDSC) in 1996. Its "injure one injure all" security conceptual framework played a significant role in bringing peace and stability in most SADC member states. The NGOs/CSOs were involved in arm twisting the government to formulate policies which guaranteed peoples' human rights, peace and stability.

The dividends of the peace and security processes in SADC and South Africa are premised on the consolidation of the availability of political, food and personal security. It has remained the wish of everyone to enjoy peace and stability in the SADC region but with poverty in most people's doorstep, there will be a serious political and personal insecurity. The peaceful co-existence of people in a country or region can only come by if there are strong public institutions and civil society groups to provide the foundation for achieving and sustainable development for the individual peoples. Many conflicts which erupted in the SADC region were of political, economic and social in nature. These were ostensibly caused by segregation, racial and tribal enmity over resources and to a larger extent competition over domination in every facet of life. The peaceful co-existence of the individual citizens depends on the management of issues and materials which threaten their livelihood. Peace and stability can only be achieved if a state formulates policies which guide the existence of people with different ideas to live in appreciation of one another.

The national security aspects in the SADC region need to be developed to equally compete with those of the developed countries like United States of America, Britain and Japan. The national security frameworks need to be balanced between the central direction of government systems and the security organs of the state. The country's intelligence system plays a critical role if it provides intelligence services to the state to formulate policies which are compatible with the contemporary trends of political, economic and social development. The intelligence service of any of the SADC member state should contain features whereby their mandates and the way they conduct it, mirrors the priorities and value systems of the society they serve. It is also necessary to appreciate how the emergence, growth and strengthening of democracy affected a decisive shift in intelligence. Human security aspects can only be effectively nourished in a state if the intelligence service can collect, evaluate, analyse, integrate and interpret all available information, supportive of the policy and decision-making processes pertaining to the national goals of stability, security and development. In this analysis of intelligence, the priorities of the intelligence community assume a focus on the greater national agenda of stability, security and development.

However, the human security aspects together with its complexities need to be viewed as an indispensable adjunct to statecraft. The SADC region needs to address the citizens' peace and security exuberance by fully utilising and arming the secret intelligence services so that human security ethos could be promoted and guaranteed. Since intelligence services provide the governments with intelligence information obtained secretly and discreetly on domestic threats or potential threats to national stability, this enables the ruling elite to implement policies to deal with the threats. The intelligence sector in a state needs to identify, monitor and neutralise the manifestation of threats against the society. The goal of any intelligence service in the SADC region should be to know the potential threats against the state so that

corrective measures could be taken before they are catastrophic to the society or any individual citizen.

Peace and security in the SADC region need great attention, due to lack of cohesion in terms of humankind's economic and political development. In Southern Africa, the Collective Security concept has been concentrating on the security of the member states' sovereignty giving less attention to the security of the individual and community. Individual citizens' security remains a nightmare because the immigration laws of each member state do not address the illegal movement of people across the borders. The SADC region needs to harmonise the immigration laws so that the movement of people can be coordinated and guided in a manner that does not expose the individual citizens to the vagaries of societal abuse.

The SADC region needs to put in place security mechanisms that regulate movements across the borders especially against people who do not have stable employment contracts in foreign nations. The threats which are posed by emigrants from various SADC member states are a great security concern to South Africa. There is a need for SADC member states to come up with specific policies which should be adopted to prepare for, prevent or engage in military conflict. The structural inhibitions that left the whites to remain in possession of the best economic resources subjected the South African citizens to live in poverty.

Controversy still surrounds the desirability of a regional hegemon for the achievement of stated goals and objectives of regional integration which include advanced opportunity to start meaningful development that improve the human security aspects. The analysis in this study has demonstrated that the strong economic growth of South Africa compared to other SADC member states contribute to democratic

practice and culture that embraces broad participation in the provision of peace and security to the individuals and community.

The focus on the aspects of human security variables is framed in terms of national and regional peace and security settings. This advocates a paradigm shift from a state approach to people centred approach to security. The central important issues that are anchored on the transformations in approach and thinking about peace and security paradigm must adopt a common regional policy to give political direction to all member states. The SADC region should focus on the individuals as the referents for security rather than the state. Regardless that states provide security to the individuals and community, the traditional security task of the maintenance of sovereignty and territorial integrity should be paramount. However, borne out in some areas of this book, states continue to vulnerable to various human security threats. Due to the diversity of threats which are encountered by the states, the nature of national security problems differs from state to state.

The state finds itself in a murky new environment where it is challenged by a whole range of insecurities that are not fundamentally of a state security nature. These insecurities are often not about threats to state, that is, its boundaries, institutions, people and values. In many cases, it is the state itself that poses a threat to its people in a variety of ways. At the same time, some of the emerging security threats target people and the state. Therefore, one cannot revealing see human security and state security in stock terms.

It is that democracy and human rights issues have brought into the limelight the peace and security paradigm. The civil society groups and non-governmental organisations find hegemony in state sacrosanct areas of influences. The importance accorded to the non-state actors in the international relations, has rendered the state

ineffective carry out her sovereign fundamental mandates which buttress legitimate power to rule independently. Although, the civil society groups and the non-governmental organisations were driven by the interests of those institutions which fund them, they targeted areas of specific competences for national policy formulation processes which had a gender setting and socialising influence for the governance systems.

The domestic and the international settings, in which the South African government operated, shape that country's foreign policy for the sake of improving the citizens' human security. The term human security just after South Africa's independence in 1994 was synonymous with the absence of the protracted armed struggle. It was therefore, after 2000, that the citizens began to understand the concept of conflict prevention, crisis management and civil-military coordination to achieve peace and security. The South African liberation struggle however was all about the simultaneous institutionalisation of the democratic rule and deracialisation of the societies.

The concept of a community security in a largely conceptual manner has been where the human security paradigm responded to the complexities and interrelatedness of both new and old security threats. The security threats which included political insecurity, food insecurity, health insecurity and economic insecurity topped in the SADC region during finding the process of political integration. It was apparently, that there was a need to broaden and deepen the understanding of a community security set up so that human security threats could be talked through conceptual mechanisms. The book however, demonstrated that for human security aspects to be realised in SADC, the intelligence sector of member states need to firmly entrench values which provide peace and security to the individual citizens.

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Overall, the study underscores the continuing challenge of human migration in SADC that continued to fail to unmask the extent of how the movement of people threatens peace and security of the host countries. South Africa and Botswana remained the fertile grounds in SADC for both political and economic migrants, who prey on the vulnerabilities created by political instability, poverty, food insecurity, unemployment and lack of democracy among others. The push factors of immigrants to South Africa were a result of the growth of economic activities of 1999. On the same, the government eliminated restrictions on the free movement of people across the borders of its neighbours. The xenophobia attacks witnessed in South Africa over the years were generally confined to the individual citizens who were occupying the lower end of the socio-economic and educational spectrum of the South African community.

The knowledge which derives from this study is related to the ruling elites' actions to create a national political and economic environment that could meet the country's ever changing development needs. Although, human security is often being related to the actions of civil society and international institutions, the government has the ultimate role in providing peoples' human security. The South African government has a critical role to play in transforming the public service institutions from the influences of the entrenched apartheid systems without compromising on systems, efficiency and best practices in the economic and political fronts. This is no small task given the entrenched white apartheid system ethos which had made the whole government institutions a key lever of settler rule, black discrimination and oppression

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Synopsis

In order to understand the effectiveness of the state to guarantee peace and security of the society and individual peoples, the book examines political and economic variables of human security. It focuses on human security aspects which bring together the human elements of peace and security, rights and development that display characteristics of interdisciplinary concepts such as that of people centred, context-specific, multi-sectoral and prevention oriented. The research was conducted within neo-liberalism and neo-realism theoretical frameworks. Furthermore, this book argues that non-state actors have a role of complimenting government's efforts of providing human security aspects to the individual citizens in developing nations. The book revealed that the colonial legacy of apartheid has a lot of influence crystallised in relation to black segregation on racial and employment spheres. To this end, the book recommends that the NGO/civil society groups should complement government efforts in human security provision to the citizens of South Africa. At the heart of this research are issues concerning the interpretation and development of the South African government's democratic transformation, from the apartheid systems of political and economic injustices to that of empowering all citizens regardless of race, creed or nationality. The book contends that South Africa's narrow focus on the state and top governments elites leaves threats to peace and security issues generating unresolved. It has therefore paid lip service to creating more inclusive peace and security management processes. South Africa, and largely SADC, has largely failed to pioneer new ways of crafting new policy frameworks that could lead to safer, resilient and prosperous society in the country. This research also seeks to bring out strong human security mechanisms to guarantee and preserve peoples' fears from economic and political threats.

About the Author

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