

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO PEACE UNITY AND RECONCILIATION IN ZIMBABWE

The history of Zimbabwe is characterised by a series of challenges that, at different turning points, manifested themselves through violent conflicts. Before independence, the issue of achieving sustainable peace and development has remained a challenge due to a lack of comprehensive approaches to issues of human rights violations, resource allocation. The political events since 1840 in Zimbabwe have created challenges that have drawn the attention of both domestic and international actors.

For instance, since the sporadic, violent land seizures of 1890 punctuated by the violent elections in ethnicisation of political and resource allocation by the colonial government, the land apportionment act that segregated land allocation on racial grounds, the Unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Douglas smith, the brutal war of independence, the split of Zanu from Zapu that has been tribalised, the Abel Muzorewa led internal settlement and the Lancaster house conference and the subsequent Lancaster house constitution all created problems for the 1980 government. Whilst different explanations are given for the origins and nature of the current socio-political crisis, it can be argued that Zimbabwe faces a multilayered crisis that requires multi-faceted approaches

Jocelyn Alexander, Joann McGregor and Terence Ranger in their book *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland* (Alexander *et al.*, 2000) captured how violence and its memory shaped the history and identity of the Ndebele people of Zimbabwe. Since 1840 Zimbabwe history has been littered by violent confrontations over the control of resources with the Ndebele raiding the

Shona for both grain and manpower and ladies this strained the Ndebele-Shona relations up to colonization.

In building “a new state in Zimbabwe the Mzilikazi pursued both a violent policy and peaceful policy. By the time he reached Zimbabwe, he had been seriously dented economically, this made it necessary for Mzilikazi to build his wealth by raiding the Shona.” Mavuru (2008; 65). Mzilikazi exercised further violence on the Shona to destroy them as political units to obtain recruits for his army and produce children. While it has been disputed of the extent of the Ndebele raids on the Shona “it is true that that the Ndebele raided the Shona frequently to capture the Shona cattle especially in the 1840s. In some cases they indirectly controlled the Shona that was politically essential as the Ndebele incorporated young men into the army to make it larger and more effective and strengthening the economy. However this had a bearing on the future relationship of the shona and Ndebele that manifested during the colonial and post-colonial state.

The organization of the Ndebele showed that to some extent it was highly stratified and divided into 3 groups the Zansi, enhla and the hole. The hole was looked down upon by the rest of the groups. Thus this social distinctions created gaps and strained the relationship of the Ndebele and the Shona that shaped the relationship in future. From the beginning the Ndebele-Shona relations were strained that also created tensions during the armed struggle.

Between 1836 and 1890 the British entered into various dubious treaties. The Moffat treaties of 1836 and 1888 and the Rudd concession of 1888 that were dubiously signed to pave the way for company occupation of Zimbabwe. Their dubious course directly led to the colonization and invasion of Zimbabwe in 1890. While Mashonaland was peacefully occupied the whites were wary of the might Ndebele empire. As tension

was growing conflict between the invaders and the Ndebele, Gale stated that:

“It was obvious that civilization and barbarism made poor bedfellows they were completely incompatible in traditions, culture, outlook, ways of thought and methods of life. Friction was inevitable. The whites on the other hand regarded the independence of the Matabele as an irksome restriction on their activities. Progress was impossible until the Matabele had been humbled.”
Martin (1984; 45)

To make sure that Matebeleland was completely overrun by the 1893 force each member was promised 6000 acres of land anywhere in Matebeleland, twenty claims in the goldfields and a share of the loot, half of that would go to the company and the remainder to be divided among the officers and men. “The invasion was promised 10000 pounds in hard cash to each man” Martin (1984; 450). Nearly 90000 Ndebele cattle were looted. African reserves were established and the settlers expropriated the most fertile land, a hut tax was imposed adding more misery to the Ndebele.

The wars of dispossession in Matebeleland and Mashonaland in 1893 and 1896 were the highest forms of class struggle for the control of land. Cecil Rhodes was mindful of this when he reckoned that “you will be the first entitled to land .it is your right for you conquered the country” Moyana (1984;179). The resort to violence by the settlers meant that the African masses would have to regain their land by using similar methods. Defeat meant systemization of exploitation of the vanquished by legally altering the productive relations of the two classes. From then on the African was now compelled to use his labour to generate wealth for the rural bourgeoisie and eventually for urban industry.

When the British South Africa Company got the mandate to colonise Zimbabwe Cecil John Rhodes organised an invasion force of 200 settlers and 500 policemen selected from 2000 applicants. The truth is that when the settlers arrived in 1890 there existed a politically and economically

developed system. The settlers had mainly come for gold and over the next 20 years much of their food was supplied by the African economy however they rushed to farming due to little gold in the process the African economic system and forcing Africans into reserves as they expropriated their land thereby creating a large pool of cheap labour for the settlers' farms mines and developing urban centre's.

The settlers came with high hopes of securing goldfields on the Zimbabwe plateau and as these hopes became dented both the chartered company and the settlers turned to looting and plundering of the African economies. Many measures were instituted to achieve this these included land alienation, taxation and the development of forced labour and lowly paid contract labour systems with stiff penalties for infringement. The little that the Africans toiled for was heavily taxed and the little they toiled to produce was heavily undervalued on the European controlled markets these measures resulted in Africans availing themselves to Europeans as labour providers.

The introduction of taxation in 1894 after royal sanction worsened the disproportionate race relations and economic relations in the country. Its collection was more arbitrary and irregular and appeared more like the collection of tribute than the collection of civil tax. Marauding bands of native department officials despoiled villages and districts of crops and livestock, and forced labour became widespread. Forced labour and taxation demands were intensified due to the reluctance of the Africans to enter the labour economy. The various measures contributed to the 1896-1897 uprising after Africans were angered by forced labour, taxation and general humiliation and ill-treatment in the newly emerging political economy.

Despite attempts by the Africans to circumvent the punitive colonial measures like increase in the acreage under cultivation this further forced Africans into a cash economy they were hardly prepared for. The

BSAC introduced various measures to force the Africans into labour. The Private Location Ordinance that limited Africans to 40 males on a farm, introduction of the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau were meant to solve labour problems. The master servant act, maize control act, cattle levy act were all meant to ensure Africans would provide labour to the Europeans. The whites introduced unfair pricing mechanisms and centralized agriculture to make Africans to sell their labour.

The colonial economy was based on one important aspect of sidelining Africans from major economic activities. The Rhodesians created a racialised economy. It was basically a two tier economy one for blacks and the other for Europeans. The Africans were merely labour providers in a racialised economy. Agriculture and mining were exclusive to the Europeans only. According to Moyana (1984; 66) "perhaps the question of land distribution was one of the thorniest single issues in Rhodesian politics during the colonial period". Moyana goes on to state that "the African regardless of status was alive to the pros and cons of the land question during the colonial period. The farmer, the peasant, and the businessman... felt brutalized effects of the Land Apportionment of 1930." (Moyana 1984; 66)

Discrimination in land distribution and educational opportunities led inevitably to a third area of discrimination, labour conditions and job opportunities. The cornerstone of the discriminatory legislation was the Masters and Servants Act that excluded all Africans employed in domestic service, agriculture and mining from trade union activity. Therefore the majority of the black work force was barred from trade union activity and denied any wage setting machinery or right to collective bargaining.

Methods used to recruit labour by the European farmers were brutal and harsh. The expropriation of the African people's means of production was accompanied by increasing exploitation of their labour. Labour was

obviously needed for the farms to produce and prosper. It was also needed in industry factory railways and mines that were emerging. Methods used to recruit labour like the chibharo were highly unfair. Chiefs were used to forcibly to recruit labour on behalf of the Africans. The settlers employed severe punishments on those who would have tried to escape. Often some were tried and sentenced to jail with hard labour as a way of ensuring cheap labour.

Some European farmers refused to allow Africans evicted from other farms to move from other farms to move across their land to force them to sell their cattle. Landless peasants were heavily exploited because they had nowhere to go they ended up having to serve the colonial masters without questioning. The colonial system made sure that the worker would remain tied to one farmer until they were paid. To make sure that the source of labour remained viable the government enacted pieces of legislation like 1895 law on Compulsory Identity Cards, Registration Of Labour Act 1896, Private Location Act 1908, African Labourers Act 1911 Industrial Conciliation Act 1934 and Native Passes Act 1937. These pieces of legislation were all instruments of oppression. They were meant to fund the settler economy and to supplement European labour

The land apportionment Act became the most important law governing land distribution in Rhodesia. It established

“principle of possessory segregation between black and white and paved way for differential agricultural production. The land apportionment act not only kept the Africans the African population in a state of serfdom but also retarded the economic development by preventing the majority of its citizens from active participation in the exploitation of its resources.” Ranger T.O.(1985; 66)

It did this in many ways giving cultivatable land to European farmers who received more than they could utilize, resultantly a significant was allowed to remain unutilized Africans resettled were alienated from cultivatable land where they experienced an increasing land shortage

and a rapid deterioration of the soil. The redistribution of land was the uppermost in the minds of the revolutionary fighters and in those masses who gave support to the armed struggle.

While Africans were converted into commodities by the land apportionment act their wages were far from satisfactory the Chief Native Commissioner's report stated that;

"As I have frequently stated in my monthly report during the past years, the fashion of not paying natives, particularly Native Farm Workers as and when their wages become due is common if not general through the district. In many cases all the employees are only paid full after the harvest has been reaped."

Moyana (1984)

This created artificial poverty on the Africans that created animosity that resulted in the prolonged armed struggle.

Zimbabwe's historical narrative is built on a foundation of racial exclusion, oppression, and struggle. Like much of Africa at the turn of the 19th century, Zimbabwe faced an influx of European settlers and commercialists eager to profit from the continent's resources. Southern Rhodesia, as it was then called, grew as a by-product of mining development in South Africa. Speculators envisioned it as a mining center to rival that further south. However, extracting Southern Rhodesia's mineral deposits (gold, copper, nickel and chromium among others) was not cost-effective.

In the wake of this realization came the development of large-scale farming and Europeans and white South Africans were lured to Southern Rhodesia to develop its agricultural sector. Between 1904 and 1911, the number of white farmers had more than doubled to 1,324. By 1931, the white population stood at 50,000. Settlement was facilitated by a colonial administration that provided support in the form of loans and training. The ownership and exploitation of land was at the center of the administrations policies; indeed their agenda rested firmly in ensuring white dominance of the agricultural sector. They made land available at

low prices, evicting Africans from their homes in the process; primarily those located in arable areas-relocating them in low-lying unproductive areas. White farmers lobbied for policies that hindered black commercial farming to reduce competition and force Africans to seek jobs on white farms.

Land segregation was institutionalized in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 that made it almost impossible for Africans to buy land adjacent to white farms. The Land Tenure Act of 1969 entrenched the 1930 legislation, by formally dividing the country's land into two equal portions: 45 million acres each for the Africans and the whites whose populations at the time were approximately 5 million and 250,000 people, respectively. The enactment of the Land Tenure Act was part of a hard-line shift in Southern Rhodesian politics. Four years previous, the white minority had announced the Unilateral Declaration of Independence under the rule of the Rhodesian Front's President Ian Smith. The Rhodesian Front sought to move the country to a more separatist future.

Although African agitation was crushed, with leaders being routinely arrested, a liberation movement was rising with two national organizations taking center stage: the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). ZANU took to military action especially in the rural areas. The ownership of land was the dominant theme in this struggle, the Second Chimurenga. Land served as a battlefield as activist peasants boycotted dip-tanks, stole herds, and mutilated cattle. Guerillas politicized peasants, magnified their grievances and placed them in a national context of repression and exploitation. So important was this rhetoric that even in areas where peasants were coexisting with commercial farmers the guerillas contrived grievances to maintain the liberation narrative.

It is my contention that the land issue did more than any other single issue in generating political consciousness among the African population. Having "realized the futility of attempting to achieve land reform without political power, the masses soon clamored for the overthrow settler government," Mavuru (2008;71) Land issue led to political awakening of every class and to the explosion of violence.

Capitalism under colonialism did not pay for an African to maintain himself and family. They never handled money in quantities sufficient to feed clothe and shelter his family. Instead subsistence farming was how peasants managed to eat and the few they earned went to pay tax and to buy increasing things that could not be obtained without money. It should noted that the contribution of African unskilled labour was valued far less than European contribution of skilled labour. In some cases African skilled labour was paid far less than the European unskilled labour. However within some social systems the oppressed found some room to manoeuvre through their own initiative. As asserted Walter Rodney "indeed what was called the development of Africa by colonialists was a cynical shorthand expression of the intensification of capitalist exploitation of Africa to develop capitalist Europe".

What happened to African women under colonialism was that social, religious and political privileges and rights disappeared while the economic exploitation continued and was intensified because pre-colonial division of labour was disrupted;

"Moreover since men entered the money economy more easily and in greater numbers, women's work became greatly inferior to that of men within the new value system of colonialism. The deterioration of status of women was bound up with the political loss of political power by African society as a whole and with the subsequent loss of the right to set indigenous standards of what work had merit and what did not." W Rodney (248)

Division of labour during colonialism was quickly intensified that disrupted the social fabric of society.

There was also neglect of African education that was one of the major grievances of the second chimurenga with the responsibility of educating Africans being left to the missionaries and the Africans themselves. There was great discrepancy between the amount of money spent on African education and European education in 1969 the government spend \$9 and \$103 on each child respectively. With this situation in Rhodesia many people joined the liberation struggle after being denied the right to education. The main purpose of the colonial school system was to help Africans to help the local administration the lowest rank. It meant;

“Selecting a few Africans to participate in the domination and exploitation of the continent as a whole.... It was meant to instill a sense of deference towards all that was European and capitalist.... It was a series of limitations inside other limitations” (*ibid*).

This limitations was political, the Europeans did not want an educated Africa because they feared future uprisings thus why the first public school in Zimbabwe was built in 1946 and thus why they left the education of Africans to missionaries because of their biblical approach to education. Racial discrimination in matters of land, education, employment and health care from 1890 onwards sowed the seeds for a revolution

The vicious guerilla war resulted in over 50,000 deaths. However, even within what may have appeared as a cohesive national struggle there existed factions mapped in an eerie premonition of political tensions to come among the peasants and between the guerillas and the peasants. The guerilla leaders navigated these schisms throughout the war, holding out the promise of land reform as a post-independence certainty

The administration of Prime Minister Ian Smith banned the NDP when it later became Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). Mugabe left ZAPU in 1963 to join the rival Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) that had been formed in 1963 by the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole , Edgar Tekere , Edison Zvobgo , Enos Nkala and lawyer Herbert Chitepo . ZANU was influenced by the Africanist ideas of the Pan Africanist Congress in South Africa influenced by Maoism while ZAPU was an ally of the African National Congress and was a supporter of a more orthodox pro-Soviet line on national liberation. Similar divisions can also be seen in the liberation movement in Angola between the MPLA and UNITA. It would have been easy for the party to split along tribal lines between the Ndebele and Mugabe's own Shona tribe, but cross-tribal representation was maintained by his partners. ZANU leader Sithole nominated Robert Mugabe as his Secretary General.

During early 1964 tension between the two rival nationalist parties boiled over into violent conflict within the black townships. "Many people were killed as rival former colleagues within the nationalist movement turned against each other," write David Martin and Phyllis Johnson; "Homes and stores were burned and looted. The government reacted by arresting political agitators for criminal offences and jailing Nkomo in Gonakudzingwa, a remote detention unit in the south-east of the country. After members of ZANU murdered a farmer, Petrus Oberholzer, on 4 July 1964, ZANU and ZAPU were officially banned on 26 August 1964; their leaders, including Mugabe, were shortly arrested and imprisoned indefinitely ZAPU figures joined Nkomo at Gonakudzingwa while the leaders of ZANU were briefly held in turn at two similar units near Gwelo (Gweru since 1982), first Wha Wha, then, from 15 June 1965, Sikombela before being transferred permanently to Salisbury Prison on 8 November 1965.

In 1971 ZAPU split along tribal lines with James Chikerema, Nathan Shamuyarira and George Nyandoro setting up their own party, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe it had a small force of men drawn from both ZANU and ZAPU. George Nyandoro claimed during the time that the “party should be organized on proper lines” Mavuru (2008; 198). His argument was that all senior positions would be of Shona tribes the Zezuru, Manyika and Karanga people.

There were some tribal elements on both sides and some involved say “regionalism surfaced more than tribalism” David Martin (1984; 185). People who grew with each other went to the same school supported each other to the exclusion of others. Thus in the realm of the armed struggle differences due to tribal orientation emerged. In ZIPA ‘there was also confusion over the political direction after individual commanders had built ideological fiefdoms in different camps’ Martin (1984; 276). Thus during the armed struggle strategy, discipline, organization and training with ZIPA had become poor and it was the reason why Smith was having military successes.

In 1974, while still incarcerated, Mugabe was elected with the powerful influence of Edgar Tekere to take over the reins of ZANU after a no-confidence vote was passed on Ndabaningi Sithole Mugabe himself abstained from voting. His time in prison burnished his reputation and helped his cause Following a South African initiative, Mugabe was released from prison in December 1974 along with other Nationalist leaders and having initially travelled to Zambia, where he was ignored by Kenneth Kaunda, returned then left once again in April 1975 for Mozambique assisted by a Dominican nun, where he was later placed in temporary protective custody by President Samora Machel.

As asserted by Eddie Cross who participated in interviews of the leadership at that time to determine their views on the "longer term future", Mugabe's political viewpoint was that "a new 'progressive'

society could not be constructed on the foundations of the past and that they would have to destroy most of what had been built up after 1900 before a new society, based on subsistence and peasant values could be constructed. Mugabe unilaterally assumed control of ZANU after the death of Herbert Chitepo on 18 March 1975.

The assassination of Herbert Chitepo at his home in Lusaka triggered mass arrests of karangas in high positions of the party. The Zambian government blamed tribalism for the death and those accused were detained for 20 months. At the same time Zanu was facing leadership crisis as Sithole was discredited as the leader. The Mgagao declaration ushered to power Robert Mugabe as the new secretary general of the party while Ndabaningi Sithole went on to form ZANU Mwenje. The Rhodesian government later resorted to poisoning refugee and military camps and many people died from poison soaked jeans and t-shirts. They also sent parcel bombs including the one that killed J.Z Moyo, there was also the targeted assassinations and disappearance of leaders of the armed struggle such as Edison Sithole. All these measures were taken to try and frustrate the armed struggle however this had far reaching implications than planned.

Later that year, after squabbling with Ndabaningi Sithole Mugabe formed a militant ZANU faction, leaving Sithole to lead the moderate Zanu (Mwenje) party. Many opposition leaders mysteriously died during this time (Including one who allegedly died in a car crash, although the car was rumoured to have been riddled with bullet holes at the scene of the accident. Additionally, an opposing newspaper's printing press was bombed and its journalists tortured. Smith adopted desperate methods he could think of irrespective of human rights complications like hanging captured guerillas, collective fines, torture and killing of civilian population for supporting guerillas or failing to report them.

He also introduced curfews and protected villages and massacre of guerillas and refugee camps in Mozambique Zambia and Botswana. Nationalist leaders in neighbouring states were killed by parcel bombs and some were abducted never to be seen again. Repressive legislation were passed to restrict amount of food villagers grew, security forces could lawfully impound or destroy property that might be used by the guerillas like cattle crops, cloth, homes. The indemnity and compensation Act 1979 licensed security forces to kill maim and torture civilians. The African peasantry was resettled into protected villages to disrupt supply lines to soldiers.

Various peace initiatives were initiated during the course of the struggle. The Pearce commission, the Geneva Conference 1976 the Malta talks 1978 the Internal Settlement 1979 that all failed because they were an attack on the aspirations of the people. However failure of the talks meant that there was continued war effort and at the same times the continued repression of the people by the smith government.

After two failed conferences convened by the United Kingdom in 1976 and 1978 in Geneva and Malta, increasing international pressure finally led to the 1979 “constitutional conference” at Lancaster House in London. By this time the white minority government had conceded nominal power to Bishop Abel Muzorewa, leading a black civilian government elected in a non-racial election in which the liberation movements did not participate as a result of a combination of self-denial and exclusion. This failed to end the war, but for the UK and the West it created a “recognizable” Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. In these circumstances a constitution was reluctantly accepted and a ceasefire concluded between the liberation movements and the Muzorewa regime on 28 December 1979

The internal settlement was one attempt by Ian Smith to stop the war. On 3 march 1978 Smith, Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and chief

Chirau signed an internal agreement for a one year transitional arrangement which led to the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Through the arrangement "Smith had finally signed away exclusive white rule in Rhodesia but he had by no means signed away white power" J Gilmary (1982; 98). Under the arrangement the four signatories would form an executive council rotating the chair but Smith would retain the title of Prime Minister. In the parliament the Rhodesian Front was guaranteed enough seats to block any constitutional change 28 seats out of 100. The agreement left political and military power in the hands of the minority. Smith's overriding concern was to the welfare of white interests. This led to clashes in the Zimbabwe Rhodesia cabinet with Byron Hove resigning days after assuming office he stated that "I feel sorry for my bishop because he is an honest man dealing with a bunch of rogues" *[ibid]*.

Despite this it was clear that they could not stop the war. Offers for amnesty, jobs, education and money were all ignored by the guerillas. The guerillas were now controlling large areas which were semi liberated and were moving relatively free thus the new government experienced a false start and failed to promote peace reconciliation and unity.

At Lancaster House Agreement persuasion from B. J. Vorster, himself under pressure from Henry Kissinger, forced Ian Smith, the sitting prime minister at the time, to accept in principle that white minority rule could not continue indefinitely. On 3 March 1978 Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and other moderate leaders signed an agreement at the Governor's Lodge in Salisbury, which paved the way for an interim power-sharing government, in preparation for elections. The elections were won by the United African National Council under Bishop Abel Muzorewa but international recognition did not follow and sanctions were not lifted.

The two 'Patriotic Front' groups under Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo refused to participate and continued the war. The incoming government did accept an invitation to talks at Lancaster House in September 1979. A ceasefire was negotiated for the talks, which were attended by Smith, Mugabe, Nkomo, Zvobgo and others. Eventually the parties to the talks agreed on a new constitution for a new Republic of Zimbabwe with elections in February 1980. The Lancaster Agreement saw Mugabe make two important and contentious concessions. First, he allowed 20 seats to be reserved for whites in the new Parliament, and second, he agreed to a ten year moratorium on constitutional amendments. His return to Zimbabwe in December 1979, following the completion of the Lancaster House Agreement, was greeted with enormous supportive crowds.

This multinational representation in Lancaster represented the level of international interest and concern for Rhodesia. Each group, country or party at the conference had an interest staked to the land.

As far as the Lancaster Constitution was concerned, the main area of controversy was the land. The British position was that "all property should be protected from compulsory acquisition and that any legal acquisition required immediate and adequate compensation remittable outside the country". This view was not shared by the other parties.

The ZANU-ZAPU coalition (known as Patriotic Front), held that the war had been waged for the recovery of lost lands of the people. The deadlock over the land was only broken when Britain and America gave assurances about a multinational effort to assist in land, agricultural and economic programs. Based on this agreement, the British government devised a "willing-seller, willing buyer" clause as the basis of its assistance in land reforms. This clause aimed at protecting the property and interests of white farmers.

In a statement issued by Lord Carrington on the 11th of October 1979, he indicated that: We recognize that the future of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership. The costs would be very substantial indeed well beyond the capacity, in our judgement of any donor country, and the British Government cannot commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them. We should, however, be ready to support the efforts of the Government of Independent Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for these purposes (Report of the Presidential review Committee 2003:16). Taking the White man for his word the Nationalists in response announced that: "We have now obtained assurances that...Britain, the United States of America and other countries will participate in a multinational donor effort to assist in land, agricultural and economic development programmes". These assurances go a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question arising from the great need our people have for land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in Government (Report of the Presidential review Committee 2003:17). Believing these assurances was the cardinal mistake which was made by the Nationalists and this was the turning point where they lost the long war. The final agreement did not address the land question adequately as it was silent on the modalities upon which the so called assistance was to be rendered. More importantly, all these assurances were not constitutionalised, but rather were based on a gentlemen's agreement and any party of this vague agreement could easily renege the promise as it later became the case.

Hence the Lancaster agreement was a great betrayal to the aspirations of the Black people. It placed much emphasis on peace and reconciliation while ignoring history and the misdeeds of the past. This was the great tragedy upon which the Republic of Zimbabwe was born out of. In 1980 at independence, the agricultural sector was made up of three sub sectors.

The large scale commercial farming sub sector of 6 000 white farmers who owned 15.5 million hectares which was located in the high rainfall ecological regions where agricultural productivity was at its highest Mamdani (2008:2-6). The other sub sector comprised of the small scale commercial sector made up of 8 500 Black farmers who held 1.4 million hectares of agricultural land located in the drier agro-ecological regions. The final sub sector comprised of 4.3 million people who occupied 16.4 million hectares of agricultural land, 75 percent of which was located in the driest agro-ecological areas where soils were very poor (*ibid*). There was also a lot of land which was unutilized and underutilized, held by absentee landlords and was left derelict for speculative purposes by its White owners. There was nothing much that the new Government could do since its hands were tied by the Lancaster House constitution. Land could only be acquired under the willing seller and willing buyer basis. More importantly, the Government was now concentrating on reconciliation and not interested in frightening the White community.

In many debates about land reforms in post-colonial Zimbabwe, the Lancaster Constitution comes to the fore especially because of its controversial “willing-seller, willing buyer” clause. Mugabe later denounced this clause, accusing white farmers of selling unproductive land.

It can be concluded that

“Colonialism fettered the development of the enslaved peoples. To facilitate colonial exploitation, the imperialists deliberately hampered economic and cultural progress in the colonies, preserved and restored obsolete forms of social relations and fomented discord between nationalities and tribes. However the drive for super profits dictated development of the extractive industry, plantations and capitalists farms, and the building of railways and roads in the colonies.” Rodney (1979; 287)

However the period of nationalist revolution gave rise to certain minority ideological trends which represented the future of Africa’s

development. Most African leaders of the intelligentsia and the armed struggle and labour movement shared the ideologies of the colonialists.