

PEACEBUILDING

and Unity Reinforcement Under the Reconciliation Mantra in Zimbabwe, 1980-2011



John Makambanga

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DEDICATION

To my parents, wife Nyaradzai Mukutiri-Makambanga, daughter, Cheryl Nokutenda, sons Carl Nyenyasha and Carroll Naishe Makambanga

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BOOK SYNOPSIS

This study explores the Peacebuilding and Unity Reinforcement Under the Reconciliation Mantra in Zimbabwe, 1980-2011. It examines the various peace initiatives undertaken since independence with specific focus on the reconciliation policy, the Unity accord and the Global Political agreement. It traces the history of political violence to the establishment of colonial rule and conquest. The study also explores the duality of violence and peace during the armed struggle where on one hand the freedom fighters preached peace but enforced it through violence which created a violence prone politics witnessed after 1980. This is a qualitative research study, which draws data from document analysis, interviews and focus group discussions. The central thesis is that violence has been a major affront to peacebuilding, thereby affecting development. Peace building strategies employed have helped to deescalate violence but have failed to advance the democratization and development process in Zimbabwe. The study recommends that governments and political parties must strive to build peace in their political processes in order to achieve sustainable peace and development.

Table of Contents

III	Dedication	
IV	Acknowledgments	
V	Book Synopsis	
1	Chapter 1: Introduction	
12	Chapter 2: Historical Background to Peace Unity and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe	
31	Chapter 3: Post Colonial Peace Initiatives	
54	Chapter 4 Challenges to Peace and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe	
73	Chapter 6: The Future of Peace Unity and Reconciliation	

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Historical memory traces the process of reconciliation in Zimbabwe to 1980 when the then Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe extended a hand of reconciliation to the main rival political party, the Rhodesia Front that was involved in the war of liberation. As such, it can be argued that the notion of reconciliation is not new to most Zimbabweans, as the process began in 1979 with the Lancaster dialogue between all conflicting parties. Having won the elections in April 1980, Robert Mugabe extended a hand of reconciliation to the white settlers in exchange for positive peace and the promise of external foreign aid to rebuild the war-ravaged country.

Since then, the process has gone forward through many contested political 'nationalist encounters' at critical turning points, most notably the signing of the historic Unity Agreement between Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union into the ZANU-PF in December 1987, and now the Global Power-Sharing Agreement between the ZANU-PF, the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara (MDC-M). These negotiated peace processes were couched in reconciliatory amnesty measures.

On 15 September 2008, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was signed by Mr Robert Mugabe, as President of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), and Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai and Mr. Arthur Mutambara, the Presidents of the two Formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Pursuant to Article II of the GPA, the parties agreed “to work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, Sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation” (GPA 2008; 6) Article XII of The Agreement reaffirms the principle of freedom of assembly and association.

Pursuant to the GPA, Constitutional Amendment No. 19 was passed by the Parliament of Zimbabwe on 5 February 2009, creating the constitutional context within that an Inclusive government could be established in accordance with the GPA. Under the GPA, Mr Mugabe remained as President of Zimbabwe and cabinet chair. On 11 February 2009, Mr. Tsvangirai was sworn in as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe and on 13 February 2009, a Council of Ministers Was sworn in, including ministers from the ZANU-PF, the MDC-T and the MDC-M Parties

Many Zimbabweans considered the formation, in February 2009, of the Organ on National Healing, reconciliation and Integration by the Inclusive Government “ formed by elements of the ruling Zimbabwe African National union (ZANU PF\) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to be a watershed opportunity for stemming the national historically entrenched culture of state-sanctioned violence and impunity” (Mashingaidze 2010;19) Zimbabwe had never before comprehensively attempted to prosecute or compel perpetrators of politically motivated violence to acknowledge their transgressions, because the national leadership regularly exploited constitutional prerogatives to pardon perpetrators.

Political expedience has always outweighed the imperatives of victim-sensitive national healing after all the major political crises of the post-independence years. These included the liberation war of the 1970s, the Gukurahundi inferno of the 1980s, recurring election-related violence in the post-colonial era, the land reclamation exercise, and anti-MDC violence after 2000. As asserted by Mashingaidze “the major deficiency in the contemporary conciliatory politics is the lack of clear and binding instruments for achieving national healing and reconciliation. There is also no symmetry in the power relations among the constituent political players in the Inclusive Government” *ibid.* Individuals and interests that fomented violence in the past remain powerful and still arbitrarily

control some levers of the state, and this forecloses meaningful national healing.

Another shortcoming is that national healing is also conceptualised in selective racial terms, with the white community not factored into the ongoing healing exercise Machakanja (2010; 16). In short, the current national healing process does not promise a new future without impunity for Zimbabweans. The ensuing narrative explores the intersecting politics of post-colonial violence, retribution and impunity in three parts. The first part analyses the key determinants of the source of conflict that necessitated calls for national healing and reconciliation. In the second, I contextualise violence in Zimbabwe by exploring the inadequacies of the country post-colonial attempts at national healing. The third section is my critique of challenges faced at stemming the culture of impunity, and of establishing sustainable peace unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe and the fourth section is a look at prospects for and the future.

Huyse identifies four elements necessary for reconciliation to take place. The first element is that of healing the wounds of the survivors. The purpose of opening the wounds is for the victims to understand the truth, to accept the apology, seek justice and be reconciled with the perpetrator. Justice that is the second element makes perpetrators come to account for their actions and this contributes towards the rebuilding of relationships based on equity and respect. It also addresses issues of retribution and/or mercy (ibid). The element of Truth telling gives a historical account of what happened. It also seeks to establish accuracy out of the past. Perpetrators take responsibility of their actions and victims are given an opportunity to tell their stories. Reparation looks into activities and programmes aimed at compensating the victims for the damage inflicted on them. Psycho-social approaches are used to achieve this.

It can be observed that the above elements of reconciliation are interconnected. One element builds onto the other. What it implies is that meaningful healing and reconciliation should seriously take into consideration all the four elements. Any approaches to reconciliation that do not encompass these four elements would be partially beneficial to the affected societies. The above can form the basis of reconciliation issues that communities want addressed. However, in Zimbabwe, communities were not involved and the issues that they want addressed remains obscure. Reconciliation issues need to be taken into consideration as well if Zimbabwe is to achieve national healing and reconciliation. Article VII of the GPA outlines some of the issues like equal and fair development of all regions, tolerance, respect, cohesion etc. While these are very important the lack of public voice in these issues can be drawback in their implementation.

The call for reconciliation at national level is not a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe. History has shown that Zimbabwe has experienced violent conflicts in various stages of its history. This paper cites examples of the war of liberation, the Gukurahundi atrocities in Matabeleland of the early 1980s and a spate of the pre and post-election violence that characterises post-independence Zimbabwe. Some kind of reconciliation has been attempted after each of the above violent conflicts. This includes the call to reconcile with the Rhodesian colonialists made by the new Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe on the eve of the Independence Day in April 1980. A General Amnesty Ordinance of 1980 was issued and it pardoned both sides of the liberation war. In 1988 a Clemency Order pardoned all violations committed by both parties between 1982 and 1987. This period marked the period of the Gukurahundi. A presidential amnesty was given to the ZANU (PF) perpetrators of politically motivated violence during the 1995 elections. In October 2000 the president issued an amnesty to pardon politically motivated crimes committed during the election campaign (Machakanja, 1995; 88)

In all these efforts a top-down approach to reconciliation was used as the general public was not consulted for specific and general issues to be addressed in the process. In 1980 for example the need to forgive and forget was imposed on the general masses and it was not made clear to them how this was going to take place. Some action was taken by the Government with regard to the Gukurahundi atrocities. It set up the Chihambakwe Commission to look into the atrocities committed. It, however, proved to be a futile exercise as the report was not published. The government did not acknowledge its guilt and no formal apology was given to the affected communities and families.

Generally, the reconciliation efforts made by the government proved to be rhetoric given their failure to address the fundamental issues of healing and reconciliation. In the case of politically motivated election violence the amnesties served to maintain the status quo where the perpetrators continued to enjoy impunity at the expense of the victims. These efforts also indicate that victims were not part of the reconciliation agenda as they seek to exonerate the perpetrators of their crimes. The fundamental elements of healing, truth telling, justice and reparations were not taken into consideration. Huyse commented that reconciliation in Zimbabwe has remained hollow and unfinished precisely because one side of a previous divide refused, consciously or unintentionally to acknowledge the need for putting in place and reconsidering the essential codes of democracy like a climate conducive to human rights, economic justice and a willingness to accept responsibility for the past and the future.

In light of the past reconciliation experiences the major question to be asked is whether there is any point of departure in the approaches to national healing and reconciliation used previously or is it a case of history of failure repeating itself. Article VII of the GPA overlooks some of the important aspects of reconciliation just like the previous Ordinances. This Article does not make any reference to perpetrators of

violence in terms of truth telling and justice. Though call for forgiveness can be heard on the state television, the Article does not articulate how the reconciliation process is to be implemented.

Examples of post conflict peace building in other African countries like Rwanda and South Africa have become useful points of reference as to how the Zimbabwean healing and reconciliation should be conducted. The time frame for achieving national healing, cohesion and unity is not specified. This aspect raises questions about the tenure of a ministry formed within the frameworks of the GNU. It is not guaranteed that the Ministry would be recognized or not after the GNU period.

The creation of an Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation can be regarded as a new development in the reconciliation process in Zimbabwe. The Organ was received with relief and great expectations of addressing injustices of political conflicts. The development is commendable as it assigns a ministry to attend to an issue that needs to be addressed as early as yesterday. The country carries a burden of unfinished and half-hearted reconciliation processes of events that date back to the colonial era. At face value, the fact that three ministers were appointed to this ministry gave one a sense of the great need to address the long standing issue of reconciliation in this country once and for all. A closer look at the appointment reveals a gloomy picture of what the appointment really aims to achieve. The composition of ministerial office brings to question the government's commitment to healing and reconciliation and the ministers' ability to withstand political party biases and pressures since they were drawn from the three parties making up the GNU.

The major question is why despite the attempts at peace unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe has there been unprecedented violence each time there are calls for elections and even after

The concepts under discussion are the effectiveness of the organ on national healing and reconciliation in fulfilling its mandate. Before proceeding it is essential to explain what is national healing. Reconciliation means "dealing with pain and resentment, hurt and anger so that broken relationships can be restored and healed." Reconciliation simply means finding ways to live alongside former enemies to necessarily love them or forget the past but to co-exist with them. As asserted by Badza (2002) "for acknowledgement to be effective it must be complete and detailed instead of being assumed". Therefore, reconciliation to be effective it must be owned by the people taking all societal levels from higher ranking politicians and officials to grassroots levels. Reconciliation has become more like a buzzword around the world in places where conflict resolution is in progress. This is perhaps natural in the sense that "before any serious nation building can be undertaken people need to come to terms with their past." (Badza 2002:13). Getting along together as friends when yesterday they were fighting is no mean task. However, if future conflict is to be avoided and the wounds and grievances of the past are to be healed it appears imperative that the ugly stories of the past are told. We have already noted that victims of past injustices often go to their graves with the feeling that their suffering must not be forgotten. What is therefore important is that such acts of recollection be a basis for reconstruction and the healing process, and not a basis for revenge. Reconciliation as a process tries to create an environment conducive to that reconstruction and healing.

Reconciliation can be regarded as a process that re-establishes love and understanding between two or more estranged parties. As asserted by Wiredu (1996:181-2), "what is central to the process of reconciliation is the re-appraisal of the importance and significance of the initial bones of contention". In this regard it may be said that, instead of trying to avoid the causes of the conflict; reconciliation requires that all the parties to the

conflict must present their demands and that any proposed settlement should take into account these various demands.

Reconciliation presupposes estrangement, enmity or conflict. Its objective is to overcome this conflict so that there can be harmony. Because it entails that the bones of contention be re-appraised, reconciliation cannot be unilateral. As Wink (1998:14) points out, "reconciliation is always mutual". It requires that I and the other person from whom I have been estranged by enmity mutually forgive each other and walk together into a common future.

The search for reconciliation must therefore always try to understand the reasons for the conflict. In other words it must ask why the antagonists were fighting. If this view is accepted it becomes clear that the Zimbabwe's prime-minister elect's call to simply forgive and forget past wrongs could not really have been a solid ground for genuine reconciliation. This is because it did not address the bones of contention between blacks and whites.

The act of recollection by the victims of injustice has become a portent source of conflict. Wink (1998:13) aptly warns about this when he observes that "...unresolved hatreds can lead to acts of revenge by those newly empowered". This is due to the fact that under such circumstances the act of recollection tends to open old wounds. As such the unresolved hatreds can easily seep into society like a poison and cause turmoil. What is peculiar about Zimbabwe's policy of reconciliation is that it was a gesture made by the newly empowered to those who had just lost their place of dominance. This reality, combined with the piecemeal resolution of the land question brings the whole reconciliation policy into question. Is it possible or even meaningful to forgive someone who has neither admitted that they benefited from colonial injustice nor asked for forgiveness? The crucial point that must

be appreciated is that unless there is an acknowledgement of wrongdoing forgiveness makes no sense.

Far from requiring that past wrongs be forgotten, “reconciliation and even forgiveness requires that we actually face these wrongs” (Wink 1998:13). Facing them in this case creates the possibility of redress and the symbolic handshake that says we can now put the past behind us. In the world over, such gestures have been hailed as avenues for mending broken bridges. Examples often quoted in this regard include the German acknowledgement of its Nazi past and its payment of reparations to Jews; Japan’s admission of wrongdoing in its treatment of its Asians during World War II, and America’s admission of maltreating its citizens of Japanese descent in World War II. In the Zimbabwean case no apologies were made and neither have symbolic handshakes been exchanged. The story that the Shona were massacred by the Ndebele and their resources looted, the whites stole African land and the Ndebele were butchered by the whites continues to be told showing that people have neither forgotten nor forgiven.

Two issues that merit close attentions in this case are the need to redress past injustices. This at once brings out the fact that unless the underlying causes of the war of conflicts are brought to the fore and squarely faced in the process of creating a new future, reconciliation cannot take place. To the extent that Zimbabwe’s reconciliation policy did not seek to redress past injustices and to bring the causes of conflict into the open, it falls short of genuine reconciliation.

One very important reason why the past must not simply be forgotten is that going back to the past is not just an act of memory. We have made the point that the feeling of having been unjustly treated forms an integral part of the identity of those who suffer it. What also needs to be realized is such acts of recollection are never innocent. This means that what is remembered and for what purpose is always significant to

understanding who we are. We form ideas of who we are in the light of what we think we were in the past, but also in terms of what we want to become.

When people recollect their common past of injustice, both the transgressors and the victims should have an opportunity to construct a shared view of that past. This is what the idea of dialogue seems to entail. For that reason remembering the past together will help us to learn from the past mistakes that were made. Reflecting on the importance of confronting past injustices Waldron asks the salient question, "What is the practical importance now of a judgment that an injustice occurred in the past?" (Waldron, 1992:4). The fundamental point is that remembering the past ought to have practical relevance now and for the future. Precisely because who we are and how we perceive ourselves and how we relate to others is partly shaped by events in the past, the past in that sense is part of the present.

The objectives of the research are to;

- examine Zimbabwe's quest for peace, unity and reconciliation.
- explain the challenges to peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe
- forecast the future of peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe

The research seeks to answer the following questions

1. What are peace, unity and reconciliation?
2. What is the nature of reconciliation in Zimbabwe?
3. Why did peace agreements in Zimbabwe fail to foster reconciliation in Zimbabwe
4. What are the obstacles to peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe?

Many people assume that speaking at public gatherings, sign agreements between former enemies and creating an organ tasked with

healing and reconciliation will translate into relationship transformation which would turn former antagonists into friends.

The research is relevant in that it gives detailed insight into the activities of the ministry whether it is able to meet its mandate. It assesses the usefulness of the ministry in light of the ongoing hostilities and violence in various parts of the country which has showing that the 'peace' prevailing in some parts of the country is real 'peace' or imaginary peace in the country.

The research is also useful in that it provides a detailed case study of communities to understand whether the ministry has been useful and is visible on the ground or not. It gives firsthand information on the experiences of the ordinary people who suffered during the 2008 violence and whether justice was attained and whether they are able to forgive without compensation.

The study was therefore born out of the need to influence policy makers and help research to carry out corrective action that will improve reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO PEACE UNITY AND RECONCILIATION IN ZIMBABWE

The history of Zimbabwe is characterised by a series of challenges that, at different turning points, manifested themselves through violent conflicts. Before independence, the issue of achieving sustainable peace and development has remained a challenge due to a lack of comprehensive approaches to issues of human rights violations, resource allocation. The political events since 1840 in Zimbabwe have created challenges that have drawn the attention of both domestic and international actors.

For instance, since the sporadic, violent land seizures of 1890 punctuated by the violent elections in ethnicisation of political and resource allocation by the colonial government, the land apportionment act that segregated land allocation on racial grounds, the Unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Douglas smith, the brutal war of independence, the split of Zanu from Zapu that has been tribalised, the Abel Muzorewa led internal settlement and the Lancaster house conference and the subsequent Lancaster house constitution all created problems for the 1980 government. Whilst different explanations are given for the origins and nature of the current socio-political crisis, it can be argued that Zimbabwe faces a multilayered crisis that requires multi-faceted approaches

Jocelyn Alexander, Joann McGregor and Terence Ranger in their book *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland* (Alexander *et al.*, 2000) captured how violence and its memory shaped the history and identity of the Ndebele people of Zimbabwe. Since 1840 Zimbabwe history has been littered by violent confrontations over the control of resources with the Ndebele raiding the

Shona for both grain and manpower and ladies this strained the Ndebele-Shona relations up to colonization.

In building “a new state in Zimbabwe the Mzilikazi pursued both a violent policy and peaceful policy. By the time he reached Zimbabwe, he had been seriously dented economically, this made it necessary for Mzilikazi to build his wealth by raiding the Shona.” Mavuru (2008; 65). Mzilikazi exercised further violence on the Shona to destroy them as political units to obtain recruits for his army and produce children. While it has been disputed of the extent of the Ndebele raids on the Shona “it is true that that the Ndebele raided the Shona frequently to capture the Shona cattle especially in the 1840s. In some cases they indirectly controlled the Shona that was politically essential as the Ndebele incorporated young men into the army to make it larger and more effective and strengthening the economy. However this had a bearing on the future relationship of the shona and Ndebele that manifested during the colonial and post-colonial state.

The organization of the Ndebele showed that to some extent it was highly stratified and divided into 3 groups the Zansi, enhla and the hole. The hole was looked down upon by the rest of the groups. Thus this social distinctions created gaps and strained the relationship of the Ndebele and the Shona that shaped the relationship in future. From the beginning the Ndebele-Shona relations were strained that also created tensions during the armed struggle.

Between 1836 and 1890 the British entered into various dubious treaties. The Moffat treaties of 1836 and 1888 and the Rudd concession of 1888 that were dubiously signed to pave the way for company occupation of Zimbabwe. Their dubious course directly led to the colonization and invasion of Zimbabwe in 1890. While Mashonaland was peacefully occupied the whites were wary of the might Ndebele empire. As tension

was growing conflict between the invaders and the Ndebele, Gale stated that:

“It was obvious that civilization and barbarism made poor bedfellows they were completely incompatible in traditions, culture, outlook, ways of thought and methods of life. Friction was inevitable. The whites on the other hand regarded the independence of the Matabele as an irksome restriction on their activities. Progress was impossible until the Matabele had been humbled.”
Martin (1984; 45)

To make sure that Matebeleland was completely overrun by the 1893 force each member was promised 6000 acres of land anywhere in Matebeleland, twenty claims in the goldfields and a share of the loot, half of that would go to the company and the remainder to be divided among the officers and men. “The invasion was promised 10000 pounds in hard cash to each man” Martin (1984; 450). Nearly 90000 Ndebele cattle were looted. African reserves were established and the settlers expropriated the most fertile land, a hut tax was imposed adding more misery to the Ndebele.

The wars of dispossession in Matebeleland and Mashonaland in 1893 and 1896 were the highest forms of class struggle for the control of land. Cecil Rhodes was mindful of this when he reckoned that “you will be the first entitled to land .it is your right for you conquered the country” Moyana (1984;179). The resort to violence by the settlers meant that the African masses would have to regain their land by using similar methods. Defeat meant systemization of exploitation of the vanquished by legally altering the productive relations of the two classes. From then on the African was now compelled to use his labour to generate wealth for the rural bourgeoisie and eventually for urban industry.

When the British South Africa Company got the mandate to colonise Zimbabwe Cecil John Rhodes organised an invasion force of 200 settlers and 500 policemen selected from 2000 applicants. The truth is that when the settlers arrived in 1890 there existed a politically and economically

developed system. The settlers had mainly come for gold and over the next 20 years much of their food was supplied by the African economy however they rushed to farming due to little gold in the process the African economic system and forcing Africans into reserves as they expropriated their land thereby creating a large pool of cheap labour for the settlers' farms mines and developing urban centre's.

The settlers came with high hopes of securing goldfields on the Zimbabwe plateau and as these hopes became dented both the chartered company and the settlers turned to looting and plundering of the African economies. Many measures were instituted to achieve this these included land alienation, taxation and the development of forced labour and lowly paid contract labour systems with stiff penalties for infringement. The little that the Africans toiled for was heavily taxed and the little they toiled to produce was heavily undervalued on the European controlled markets these measures resulted in Africans availing themselves to Europeans as labour providers.

The introduction of taxation in 1894 after royal sanction worsened the disproportionate race relations and economic relations in the country. Its collection was more arbitrary and irregular and appeared more like the collection of tribute than the collection of civil tax. Marauding bands of native department officials despoiled villages and districts of crops and livestock, and forced labour became widespread. Forced labour and taxation demands were intensified due to the reluctance of the Africans to enter the labour economy. The various measures contributed to the 1896-1897 uprising after Africans were angered by forced labour, taxation and general humiliation and ill-treatment in the newly emerging political economy.

Despite attempts by the Africans to circumvent the punitive colonial measures like increase in the acreage under cultivation this further forced Africans into a cash economy they were hardly prepared for. The

BSAC introduced various measures to force the Africans into labour. The Private Location Ordinance that limited Africans to 40 males on a farm, introduction of the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau were meant to solve labour problems. The master servant act, maize control act, cattle levy act were all meant to ensure Africans would provide labour to the Europeans. The whites introduced unfair pricing mechanisms and centralized agriculture to make Africans to sell their labour.

The colonial economy was based on one important aspect of sidelining Africans from major economic activities. The Rhodesians created a racialised economy. It was basically a two tier economy one for blacks and the other for Europeans. The Africans were merely labour providers in a racialised economy. Agriculture and mining were exclusive to the Europeans only. According to Moyana (1984; 66) "perhaps the question of land distribution was one of the thorniest single issues in Rhodesian politics during the colonial period". Moyana goes on to state that "the African regardless of status was alive to the pros and cons of the land question during the colonial period. The farmer, the peasant, and the businessman... felt brutalized effects of the Land Apportionment of 1930." (Moyana 1984; 66)

Discrimination in land distribution and educational opportunities led inevitably to a third area of discrimination, labour conditions and job opportunities. The cornerstone of the discriminatory legislation was the Masters and Servants Act that excluded all Africans employed in domestic service, agriculture and mining from trade union activity. Therefore the majority of the black work force was barred from trade union activity and denied any wage setting machinery or right to collective bargaining.

Methods used to recruit labour by the European farmers were brutal and harsh. The expropriation of the African people's means of production was accompanied by increasing exploitation of their labour. Labour was

obviously needed for the farms to produce and prosper. It was also needed in industry factory railways and mines that were emerging. Methods used to recruit labour like the chibharo were highly unfair. Chiefs were used to forcibly to recruit labour on behalf of the Africans. The settlers employed severe punishments on those who would have tried to escape. Often some were tried and sentenced to jail with hard labour as a way of ensuring cheap labour.

Some European farmers refused to allow Africans evicted from other farms to move from other farms to move across their land to force them to sell their cattle. Landless peasants were heavily exploited because they had nowhere to go they ended up having to serve the colonial masters without questioning. The colonial system made sure that the worker would remain tied to one farmer until they were paid. To make sure that the source of labour remained viable the government enacted pieces of legislation like 1895 law on Compulsory Identity Cards, Registration Of Labour Act 1896, Private Location Act 1908, African Labourers Act 1911 Industrial Conciliation Act 1934 and Native Passes Act 1937. These pieces of legislation were all instruments of oppression. They were meant to fund the settler economy and to supplement European labour

The land apportionment Act became the most important law governing land distribution in Rhodesia. It established

“principle of possessory segregation between black and white and paved way for differential agricultural production. The land apportionment act not only kept the Africans the African population in a state of serfdom but also retarded the economic development by preventing the majority of its citizens from active participation in the exploitation of its resources.” Ranger T.O.(1985; 66)

It did this in many ways giving cultivatable land to European farmers who received more than they could utilize, resultantly a significant was allowed to remain unutilized Africans resettled were alienated from cultivatable land where they experienced an increasing land shortage

and a rapid deterioration of the soil. The redistribution of land was the uppermost in the minds of the revolutionary fighters and in those masses who gave support to the armed struggle.

While Africans were converted into commodities by the land apportionment act their wages were far from satisfactory the Chief Native Commissioner's report stated that;

"As I have frequently stated in my monthly report during the past years, the fashion of not paying natives, particularly Native Farm Workers as and when their wages become due is common if not general through the district. In many cases all the employees are only paid full after the harvest has been reaped."

Moyana (1984)

This created artificial poverty on the Africans that created animosity that resulted in the prolonged armed struggle.

Zimbabwe's historical narrative is built on a foundation of racial exclusion, oppression, and struggle. Like much of Africa at the turn of the 19th century, Zimbabwe faced an influx of European settlers and commercialists eager to profit from the continent's resources. Southern Rhodesia, as it was then called, grew as a by-product of mining development in South Africa. Speculators envisioned it as a mining center to rival that further south. However, extracting Southern Rhodesia's mineral deposits (gold, copper, nickel and chromium among others) was not cost-effective.

In the wake of this realization came the development of large-scale farming and Europeans and white South Africans were lured to Southern Rhodesia to develop its agricultural sector. Between 1904 and 1911, the number of white farmers had more than doubled to 1,324. By 1931, the white population stood at 50,000. Settlement was facilitated by a colonial administration that provided support in the form of loans and training. The ownership and exploitation of land was at the center of the administrations policies; indeed their agenda rested firmly in ensuring white dominance of the agricultural sector. They made land available at

low prices, evicting Africans from their homes in the process; primarily those located in arable areas-relocating them in low-lying unproductive areas. White farmers lobbied for policies that hindered black commercial farming to reduce competition and force Africans to seek jobs on white farms.

Land segregation was institutionalized in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 that made it almost impossible for Africans to buy land adjacent to white farms. The Land Tenure Act of 1969 entrenched the 1930 legislation, by formally dividing the country's land into two equal portions: 45 million acres each for the Africans and the whites whose populations at the time were approximately 5 million and 250,000 people, respectively. The enactment of the Land Tenure Act was part of a hard-line shift in Southern Rhodesian politics. Four years previous, the white minority had announced the Unilateral Declaration of Independence under the rule of the Rhodesian Front's President Ian Smith. The Rhodesian Front sought to move the country to a more separatist future.

Although African agitation was crushed, with leaders being routinely arrested, a liberation movement was rising with two national organizations taking center stage: the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). ZANU took to military action especially in the rural areas. The ownership of land was the dominant theme in this struggle, the Second Chimurenga. Land served as a battlefield as activist peasants boycotted dip-tanks, stole herds, and mutilated cattle. Guerillas politicized peasants, magnified their grievances and placed them in a national context of repression and exploitation. So important was this rhetoric that even in areas where peasants were coexisting with commercial farmers the guerillas contrived grievances to maintain the liberation narrative.

It is my contention that the land issue did more than any other single issue in generating political consciousness among the African population. Having "realized the futility of attempting to achieve land reform without political power, the masses soon clamored for the overthrow settler government," Mavuru (2008;71) Land issue led to political awakening of every class and to the explosion of violence.

Capitalism under colonialism did not pay for an African to maintain himself and family. They never handled money in quantities sufficient to feed clothe and shelter his family. Instead subsistence farming was how peasants managed to eat and the few they earned went to pay tax and to buy increasing things that could not be obtained without money. It should noted that the contribution of African unskilled labour was valued far less than European contribution of skilled labour. In some cases African skilled labour was paid far less than the European unskilled labour. However within some social systems the oppressed found some room to manoeuvre through their own initiative. As asserted Walter Rodney "indeed what was called the development of Africa by colonialists was a cynical shorthand expression of the intensification of capitalist exploitation of Africa to develop capitalist Europe".

What happened to African women under colonialism was that social, religious and political privileges and rights disappeared while the economic exploitation continued and was intensified because pre-colonial division of labour was disrupted;

"Moreover since men entered the money economy more easily and in greater numbers, women's work became greatly inferior to that of men within the new value system of colonialism. The deterioration of status of women was bound up with the political loss of political power by African society as a whole and with the subsequent loss of the right to set indigenous standards of what work had merit and what did not." W Rodney (248)

Division of labour during colonialism was quickly intensified that disrupted the social fabric of society.

There was also neglect of African education that was one of the major grievances of the second chimurenga with the responsibility of educating Africans being left to the missionaries and the Africans themselves. There was great discrepancy between the amount of money spent on African education and European education in 1969 the government spend \$9 and \$103 on each child respectively. With this situation in Rhodesia many people joined the liberation struggle after being denied the right to education. The main purpose of the colonial school system was to help Africans to help the local administration the lowest rank. It meant;

“Selecting a few Africans to participate in the domination and exploitation of the continent as a whole.... It was meant to instill a sense of deference towards all that was European and capitalist.... It was a series of limitations inside other limitations” (*ibid*).

This limitations was political, the Europeans did not want an educated Africa because they feared future uprisings thus why the first public school in Zimbabwe was built in 1946 and thus why they left the education of Africans to missionaries because of their biblical approach to education. Racial discrimination in matters of land, education, employment and health care from 1890 onwards sowed the seeds for a revolution

The vicious guerilla war resulted in over 50,000 deaths. However, even within what may have appeared as a cohesive national struggle there existed factions mapped in an eerie premonition of political tensions to come among the peasants and between the guerillas and the peasants. The guerilla leaders navigated these schisms throughout the war, holding out the promise of land reform as a post-independence certainty

The administration of Prime Minister Ian Smith banned the NDP when it later became Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). Mugabe left ZAPU in 1963 to join the rival Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) that had been formed in 1963 by the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole , Edgar Tekere , Edison Zvobgo , Enos Nkala and lawyer Herbert Chitepo . ZANU was influenced by the Africanist ideas of the Pan Africanist Congress in South Africa influenced by Maoism while ZAPU was an ally of the African National Congress and was a supporter of a more orthodox pro-Soviet line on national liberation. Similar divisions can also be seen in the liberation movement in Angola between the MPLA and UNITA. It would have been easy for the party to split along tribal lines between the Ndebele and Mugabe's own Shona tribe, but cross-tribal representation was maintained by his partners. ZANU leader Sithole nominated Robert Mugabe as his Secretary General.

During early 1964 tension between the two rival nationalist parties boiled over into violent conflict within the black townships. "Many people were killed as rival former colleagues within the nationalist movement turned against each other," write David Martin and Phyllis Johnson; "Homes and stores were burned and looted. The government reacted by arresting political agitators for criminal offences and jailing Nkomo in Gonakudzingwa, a remote detention unit in the south-east of the country. After members of ZANU murdered a farmer, Petrus Oberholzer, on 4 July 1964, ZANU and ZAPU were officially banned on 26 August 1964; their leaders, including Mugabe, were shortly arrested and imprisoned indefinitely ZAPU figures joined Nkomo at Gonakudzingwa while the leaders of ZANU were briefly held in turn at two similar units near Gwelo (Gweru since 1982), first Wha Wha, then, from 15 June 1965, Sikombela before being transferred permanently to Salisbury Prison on 8 November 1965.

In 1971 ZAPU split along tribal lines with James Chikerema, Nathan Shamuyarira and George Nyandoro setting up their own party, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe it had a small force of men drawn from both ZANU and ZAPU. George Nyandoro claimed during the time that the “party should be organized on proper lines” Mavuru (2008; 198). His argument was that all senior positions would be of Shona tribes the Zezuru, Manyika and Karanga people.

There were some tribal elements on both sides and some involved say “regionalism surfaced more than tribalism” David Martin (1984; 185). People who grew with each other went to the same school supported each other to the exclusion of others. Thus in the realm of the armed struggle differences due to tribal orientation emerged. In ZIPA ‘there was also confusion over the political direction after individual commanders had built ideological fiefdoms in different camps’ Martin (1984; 276). Thus during the armed struggle strategy, discipline, organization and training with ZIPA had become poor and it was the reason why Smith was having military successes.

In 1974, while still incarcerated, Mugabe was elected with the powerful influence of Edgar Tekere to take over the reins of ZANU after a no-confidence vote was passed on Ndabaningi Sithole Mugabe himself abstained from voting. His time in prison burnished his reputation and helped his cause Following a South African initiative, Mugabe was released from prison in December 1974 along with other Nationalist leaders and having initially travelled to Zambia, where he was ignored by Kenneth Kaunda, returned then left once again in April 1975 for Mozambique assisted by a Dominican nun, where he was later placed in temporary protective custody by President Samora Machel.

As asserted by Eddie Cross who participated in interviews of the leadership at that time to determine their views on the "longer term future", Mugabe's political viewpoint was that "a new 'progressive'

society could not be constructed on the foundations of the past and that they would have to destroy most of what had been built up after 1900 before a new society, based on subsistence and peasant values could be constructed. Mugabe unilaterally assumed control of ZANU after the death of Herbert Chitepo on 18 March 1975.

The assassination of Herbert Chitepo at his home in Lusaka triggered mass arrests of karangas in high positions of the party. The Zambian government blamed tribalism for the death and those accused were detained for 20 months. At the same time Zanu was facing leadership crisis as Sithole was discredited as the leader. The Mgagao declaration ushered to power Robert Mugabe as the new secretary general of the party while Ndabaningi Sithole went on to form ZANU Mwenje. The Rhodesian government later resorted to poisoning refugee and military camps and many people died from poison soaked jeans and t-shirts. They also sent parcel bombs including the one that killed J.Z Moyo, there was also the targeted assassinations and disappearance of leaders of the armed struggle such as Edison Sithole. All these measures were taken to try and frustrate the armed struggle however this had far reaching implications than planned.

Later that year, after squabbling with Ndabaningi Sithole Mugabe formed a militant ZANU faction, leaving Sithole to lead the moderate Zanu (Mwenje) party. Many opposition leaders mysteriously died during this time (Including one who allegedly died in a car crash, although the car was rumoured to have been riddled with bullet holes at the scene of the accident. Additionally, an opposing newspaper's printing press was bombed and its journalists tortured. Smith adopted desperate methods he could think of irrespective of human rights complications like hanging captured guerillas, collective fines, torture and killing of civilian population for supporting guerillas or failing to report them.

He also introduced curfews and protected villages and massacre of guerillas and refugee camps in Mozambique Zambia and Botswana. Nationalist leaders in neighbouring states were killed by parcel bombs and some were abducted never to be seen again. Repressive legislation were passed to restrict amount of food villagers grew, security forces could lawfully impound or destroy property that might be used by the guerillas like cattle crops, cloth, homes. The indemnity and compensation Act 1979 licensed security forces to kill maim and torture civilians. The African peasantry was resettled into protected villages to disrupt supply lines to soldiers.

Various peace initiatives were initiated during the course of the struggle. The Pearce commission, the Geneva Conference 1976 the Malta talks 1978 the Internal Settlement 1979 that all failed because they were an attack on the aspirations of the people. However failure of the talks meant that there was continued war effort and at the same times the continued repression of the people by the smith government.

After two failed conferences convened by the United Kingdom in 1976 and 1978 in Geneva and Malta, increasing international pressure finally led to the 1979 "constitutional conference" at Lancaster House in London. By this time the white minority government had conceded nominal power to Bishop Abel Muzorewa, leading a black civilian government elected in a non-racial election in which the liberation movements did not participate as a result of a combination of self-denial and exclusion. This failed to end the war, but for the UK and the West it created a "recognizable" Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. In these circumstances a constitution was reluctantly accepted and a ceasefire concluded between the liberation movements and the Muzorewa regime on 28 December 1979

The internal settlement was one attempt by Ian Smith to stop the war. On 3 march 1978 Smith, Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and chief

Chirau signed an internal agreement for a one year transitional arrangement which led to the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Through the arrangement "Smith had finally signed away exclusive white rule in Rhodesia but he had by no means signed away white power" J Gilmary (1982; 98). Under the arrangement the four signatories would form an executive council rotating the chair but Smith would retain the title of Prime Minister. In the parliament the Rhodesian Front was guaranteed enough seats to block any constitutional change 28 seats out of 100. The agreement left political and military power in the hands of the minority. Smith's overriding concern was to the welfare of white interests. This led to clashes in the Zimbabwe Rhodesia cabinet with Byron Hove resigning days after assuming office he stated that "I feel sorry for my bishop because he is an honest man dealing with a bunch of rogues" *[ibid]*.

Despite this it was clear that they could not stop the war. Offers for amnesty, jobs, education and money were all ignored by the guerillas. The guerillas were now controlling large areas which were semi liberated and were moving relatively free thus the new government experienced a false start and failed to promote peace reconciliation and unity.

At Lancaster House Agreement persuasion from B. J. Vorster, himself under pressure from Henry Kissinger, forced Ian Smith, the sitting prime minister at the time, to accept in principle that white minority rule could not continue indefinitely. On 3 March 1978 Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and other moderate leaders signed an agreement at the Governor's Lodge in Salisbury, which paved the way for an interim power-sharing government, in preparation for elections. The elections were won by the United African National Council under Bishop Abel Muzorewa but international recognition did not follow and sanctions were not lifted.

The two 'Patriotic Front' groups under Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo refused to participate and continued the war. The incoming government did accept an invitation to talks at Lancaster House in September 1979. A ceasefire was negotiated for the talks, which were attended by Smith, Mugabe, Nkomo, Zvobgo and others. Eventually the parties to the talks agreed on a new constitution for a new Republic of Zimbabwe with elections in February 1980. The Lancaster Agreement saw Mugabe make two important and contentious concessions. First, he allowed 20 seats to be reserved for whites in the new Parliament, and second, he agreed to a ten year moratorium on constitutional amendments. His return to Zimbabwe in December 1979, following the completion of the Lancaster House Agreement, was greeted with enormous supportive crowds.

This multinational representation in Lancaster represented the level of international interest and concern for Rhodesia. Each group, country or party at the conference had an interest staked to the land.

As far as the Lancaster Constitution was concerned, the main area of controversy was the land. The British position was that "all property should be protected from compulsory acquisition and that any legal acquisition required immediate and adequate compensation remittable outside the country". This view was not shared by the other parties.

The ZANU-ZAPU coalition (known as Patriotic Front), held that the war had been waged for the recovery of lost lands of the people. The deadlock over the land was only broken when Britain and America gave assurances about a multinational effort to assist in land, agricultural and economic programs. Based on this agreement, the British government devised a "willing-seller, willing buyer" clause as the basis of its assistance in land reforms. This clause aimed at protecting the property and interests of white farmers.

In a statement issued by Lord Carrington on the 11th of October 1979, he indicated that: We recognize that the future of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership. The costs would be very substantial indeed well beyond the capacity, in our judgement of any donor country, and the British Government cannot commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them. We should, however, be ready to support the efforts of the Government of Independent Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for these purposes (Report of the Presidential review Committee 2003:16). Taking the White man for his word the Nationalists in response announced that: "We have now obtained assurances that...Britain, the United States of America and other countries will participate in a multinational donor effort to assist in land, agricultural and economic development programmes". These assurances go a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question arising from the great need our people have for land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in Government (Report of the Presidential review Committee 2003:17). Believing these assurances was the cardinal mistake which was made by the Nationalists and this was the turning point where they lost the long war. The final agreement did not address the land question adequately as it was silent on the modalities upon which the so called assistance was to be rendered. More importantly, all these assurances were not constitutionalised, but rather were based on a gentlemen's agreement and any party of this vague agreement could easily renege the promise as it later became the case.

Hence the Lancaster agreement was a great betrayal to the aspirations of the Black people. It placed much emphasis on peace and reconciliation while ignoring history and the misdeeds of the past. This was the great tragedy upon which the Republic of Zimbabwe was born out of. In 1980 at independence, the agricultural sector was made up of three sub sectors.

The large scale commercial farming sub sector of 6 000 white farmers who owned 15.5 million hectares which was located in the high rainfall ecological regions where agricultural productivity was at its highest Mamdani (2008:2-6). The other sub sector comprised of the small scale commercial sector made up of 8 500 Black farmers who held 1.4 million hectares of agricultural land located in the drier agro-ecological regions. The final sub sector comprised of 4.3 million people who occupied 16.4 million hectares of agricultural land, 75 percent of which was located in the driest agro-ecological areas where soils were very poor (*ibid*). There was also a lot of land which was unutilized and underutilized, held by absentee landlords and was left derelict for speculative purposes by its White owners. There was nothing much that the new Government could do since its hands were tied by the Lancaster House constitution. Land could only be acquired under the willing seller and willing buyer basis. More importantly, the Government was now concentrating on reconciliation and not interested in frightening the White community.

In many debates about land reforms in post-colonial Zimbabwe, the Lancaster Constitution comes to the fore especially because of its controversial “willing-seller, willing buyer” clause. Mugabe later denounced this clause, accusing white farmers of selling unproductive land.

It can be concluded that

“Colonialism fettered the development of the enslaved peoples. To facilitate colonial exploitation, the imperialists deliberately hampered economic and cultural progress in the colonies, preserved and restored obsolete forms of social relations and fomented discord between nationalities and tribes. However the drive for super profits dictated development of the extractive industry, plantations and capitalists farms, and the building of railways and roads in the colonies.” Rodney (1979; 287)

However the period of nationalist revolution gave rise to certain minority ideological trends which represented the future of Africa’s

development. Most African leaders of the intelligentsia and the armed struggle and labour movement shared the ideologies of the colonialists.

CHAPTER 3: POST COLONIAL PEACE INITIATIVES

The history of Zimbabwe is characterised by a series of challenges that, at different turning points, manifested themselves through violent conflicts. Since its independence, the issue of achieving sustainable peace and development has remained a challenge due to a lack of comprehensive approaches to issues of human rights violations. The political events of the last decade in Zimbabwe have created challenges that have drawn the attention of both domestic and international actors.

For instance, since the sporadic, violent land seizures of 2000, punctuated by the violent elections in June 2000, March 2002, March 2005 and March 2008, the ruling party and government have attracted international censure for their poor human rights record, that resulted in targeted sanctions for the ruling elite. Whilst different explanations are given for the origins and nature of the current socio-political crisis, it can be argued that Zimbabwe faces a multilayered crisis which requires multi-faceted approaches and responses.

The crisis can be viewed as a confluence of several colonial and post-independence conflictual experiences. For instance, scholars who have written on Zimbabwe (Moyo 2001; Campell 2003; Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen 2003) suggest that the theatrical transitions in the country's political landscape can be attributed to: the referendum that rejected the government's draft constitution; the mounting opposition to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party; the illegitimate land seizures by government loyalists; the negative response or unwillingness of the state establishment to remove the unlawful land invaders; political violence before, during and after elections and the sky-rocketing unemployment rate due to the hyperinflationary environment.

By the late 1990s, as a result of the government's continued lip-service to issues of social and economic empowerment, ordinary people and workers responded through their union movements by increasingly showing a capacity for militancy and adopting political positions that were in opposition to those of the ruling elites. In response, the government concentrated wealth and power in the ruling class and stifled popular dissent through repression and the systemic use of military force. Lacking an effective state social policy, people rose up in protest against the experienced poverty and social injustices.

The state increasingly resorted to terror tactics and violence in order to maintain social control. Despite all these repressive tactics, and with the support of a disenfranchised people, political opposition rallied around left-leaning trade-union leaders such as Morgan Richard Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda whose nascent Movement for Democratic Change Party (MDC) sent political shock waves to the ruling government by taking half of the vote in the parliamentary elections of June 2000. This strategic alliance between party politics and trade-union politics marked a critical turning point in Zimbabwe's political and historical memory landscape.

By 2007 Zimbabwe had entered a tragic and devastating stage in its history, with enormous human, material and moral costs. The political landscape was characterised by violence allegedly perpetrated by the state-sponsored militia against political opposition groups or anyone labelled as an enemy of the state. In addition, the violent political and electoral campaigns were characterised by arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, disappearances and the deaths of political opponents and activists.

Preceding these contradictory events were devastating droughts in the early 1990s and the period 2001-2002, coupled with an unsuccessful structural adjustment programme, all of which added up to the transitional challenges and socio-political complications. Today, the

Zimbabwean socio-political crisis is best described as a complex emergency because of the mosaic nature of the crisis. Thus, all these events constitute fundamental flashpoints which help give context and reflective understandings about the factors that influence the evolution and shaping of the politically motivated

At independence in 1980, most Africans expected that the injustices of the past would be redressed. However, Robert Mugabe, then Prime minister elect told the nation on independence eve;

“We are called to be constructive, progressive and forever forward-looking, for we cannot afford to be men of yesterday, backward looking, retrogressive and destructive.... If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. Is it not folly, therefore, that in these circumstances anybody should seek to revive the wounds and grievances of the past? The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten...” De Waal, (1990: 48-9)

In the name and spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness, all the grievances of the past were supposed to be forgotten. Consequently the inequalities and the landlessness, which characterised black Zimbabwean existence before independence, were to be forgotten. The vast majority of Zimbabweans today remain poor and landless. They still stay in all those other marginal lands allocated to them by the successive settler regimes. Meanwhile the small group that benefited through colonialism has continued to hold on to the land. Legally they are protected in their possession. As a result the reality of black labour on white farms has continued to be a fact of life in Zimbabwe.

As soon as the election results were made known, the new Prime Minister designate and the Minister of Defence called for reconciliation, while privately appealing to the British Government to allow Lord Soames to continue in his post for at least three months, Rupia (1992:46) "to dissuade military coup planners". ZANU (PF) further sought to

integrate "the more acceptable elements of the RSF with ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres." (Rupia, 1992:46)) Underlying the integration exercise was the realisation that, for every armed combatant, irrespective of his political views, the new Government had to meet two basic requirements, first, it had to assure his/her perception of personal security, and secondly, eventually provide employment either in or out of the armed forces. The integration exercise welcomed all those who wished to take up a military career in an organisation initially targeted at a strength of between 30 000 and 35 000.

The strength of the integrated military represented a compromise between ideal strength and what the national economy could sustain. Prime Minister Mugabe also secured the services of Lieutenant General Peter Walls, who was appointed as Commander of the Joint High Command (JHC), and "tasked to integrate the three forces and establish a national army". By his own admission, Walls also stayed on to supervise the return of South African war material lent to Rhodesia in the last few months of the war, as well as to reassure those whites who wished to remain in the country and the forces.

The JHC, consisting of the Senior Commanders from the Rhodesian Army, Air Force, ZANLA and ZIPRA, was established and based at Army Headquarters in Harare. Of the assembled guerrillas, 9 500 ZANLA and ZIPRA members were expected to join the army, and the remaining 23 000 to become 'active reservists'. These were to be deployed elsewhere in the economy. Ministries, state departments, parastatal and local authorities were to be encouraged to draw manpower from this group.

One of the key factors that absorbed some of the pressure emanating from the high concentration of military staff at APs, were the vacating of posts by members of the former Rhodesian forces. Furthermore, because the forces had been based mainly on a conscription system, many whites

who stood down, simply returned to their jobs in commerce and industry and on the farms. To understand what was involved, a brief look at the structure of the Rhodesian Army at the end of 1979 would suffice.

The 1963 split in the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) that gave birth to a Shona dominated Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) remains one important event that indicated how tribalism and ethnicity were deeply embedded within nationalism. However hard those who were involved in this split deny the prominence of tribalism and ethnicity as a factor behind the split the subsequent events spoke loudly about the role of ethnicity in spoiling the birth of a nation. The immediate post-split ZAPU-ZANU faction fights in Harare, Gweru, Bulawayo and other sites took clear tribal and ethnic dimensions. Later splits including the one that resulted in the formation of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi) and others also indicated how ethnicity was playing havoc within nationalist politics. The same is true of postcolonial split that rocked the MDC in 2005.

Even factions within ZANU-PF indicate the reverberation of regional, kinship, clannish, ethnic and tribal alignments. In short, the liberation struggle became a terrain of re-tribalisation of nationalism with particular ethnic groups positioning themselves to lead and dominate the imagined postcolonial nation. Even a seemingly unitary Shona identity unravelled as the Karanga fought to eliminate the Manyika and the Zezuru fought for ascendance over the Karanga. Along the way lives were lost due to what Masipula Sithole termed struggles within the struggle.

The sum of all is that the Zimbabwe nation-state that was born in 1980 was a product of a deeply tribalised nationalism. The nationalists who spearheaded the liberation struggle dreamt in both nationalist and tribal languages and terms. The nation-state was therefore born with a terrible

ethnic-tribal birth-mark. As put by Eldred Masunungure, “Zimbabwe as a state came into being in 1980 but Zimbabwe as a nation did not”. There was outright and unapologetic building of the state as a Zanufied and Shonalized political formation where other political actors like PF-ZAPU that drew most of its support from Matabeleland and Midlands regions had no dignified space and Ndebele-speaking people were an inconvenience that had to be dealt with. This mentality was clear from music, symbols, heroes and national celebrations of independence.

As noted above Zimbabwe was born out of an armed liberation war spearheaded by ethnically fragmented leadership, fought by equally ethnically fragmented freedom fighters and supported by masses that were socialised into tribal politics. It was against this background that ZANU-PF electoral victory in 1980 was celebrated as not only a victory of a liberation movement over settler colonialism but also as victory of Shona political elite over Ndebele political elites in PF-ZAPU. While ZANU-PF built their political legitimacy on their nationalist liberation war credentials, they also openly connected the party, the state, and the nation to Shona historical symbols.

This set the stage for an ethnic showdown between the triumphant Shona and the defeated Ndebele that became openly violent in 1982. On this issue, Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2009:12) noted “that from the very day of achievement of independence, the triumphant Shona-dominated ZANU-PF leadership displayed a unique desire to build a party-nation and a party-state that excluded other political formations, crafted around and backed by ZANU-PFs war-time military wing (ZANLA) and Shona historical experiences”. Specific party slogans, party symbols, party songs, and party regalia of the liberation war time continued to be used at national ceremonies like Independence and Heroes Days. It was amidst this fanfare and celebratory mood that Shona triumphalism unfolded against Ndebele .

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Specific party slogans, party symbols, party songs, and party regalia of the liberation war time continued to be used at national ceremonies like Independence and Heroes Days. It was amidst this fanfare and celebratory mood that Shona triumphalism unfolded against Ndebele particularism reeling under a feeling of defeat.

The triumphant ZANU-PF politicians immediately used the state controlled media to cast PF-ZAPU, its leader Joshua Nkomo, and its military wing (ZIPRA), as no heroic liberators, as no committed nation-builders, but as a threat to the country’s hard won independence. Historians like T. Ranger, N. Bhebe, and E. Sibanda have tried to add the Matabeleland narratives into the story of nationalism through Matabeleland focused research in recent years. This academic compensation has not been accompanied by a clear drive for political and economic inclusion of Ndebele people into the mainstream of post-colonial Zimbabwe save for the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987. Thus there was a systematic attempt to sideline the Ndebele from mainstream political activity due to tribalism inherent in ZANU PF that led to hostilities and antagonism within the newly created army and transcending to the people

The first crisis that hit the post-colonial nation-building project had to do with ethnicity and integration of military forces. A crisis that began in the ranks of the military, involving open exchange of fire between the triumphant and Shona-dominant ZANLA and the Ndebele-dominated ZIPRA in Connemara (Gweru) and Entumbane (Bulawayo), that ignited a reign of state terror in Matabeleland and the Midlands region in the period 1980-1987. The reign of terror that became known as the *Gukurahundi* campaign was ostensibly meant to seek and destroy some ex-ZIPRA combatants who had defected from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) to embark on a life of dissidence.

But as noted by Bhebe the violence was somehow an inevitable consequence of the way nationalism had evolved and how the nationalist armies had been formed. This is how he puts it:

“To some extent we accept the notion of the inevitability of a violent post-colonial civil war pitting the former liberation movements and their former armies against each other. But there is need to posit that the inevitability of violence was underwritten by incompatibilities of Ndebele and Shona particularities. The violence was in a way symptomatic of the failure of a smooth blending of major ethnicities into a new national identity called Zimbabwe.”

The net effect of this was that violence was the only invitation card by which the Ndebele were invited into a Shona-imagined nation.

Matabeleland had to be conquered and forced into part of Zimbabwe. That was the essence of the violence of the 1980s. PF-ZAPU, ZIPRA and Joshua Nkomo only happened to be mistaken for symbols of Ndebele particularism. It is within this context that the impact of that violence has to be understood, particularly its role in the re-packaging of post-Gukurahundi politics in Matabeleland.

The war was a spill-over from the nationalist politics of the 1960s and 1970s. Nationalism had the ambiguity of being both exclusionary and all-embracing. It subsumed class, ethnic and religious differences, and, at the same time, tried to use these cleavages for its sustenance.

Alexander observed that the escalation of violence after the end of the liberation war built on the two guerrilla armies' (Zanla for ZANU and Zipra for ZAPU) regional patterns of recruitment and operation during the 1970s, and the history of animosity and the distrust between the two armies and their political leaders (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000: 181).

Following ZANU-PF's victory in the February 1980, the possibility that the clearly surprised and disappointed ZAPU would use these forces, that were still largely based outside the country, to obtain victory by other means was a source of concern for ZANU-PF. These seeds of distrust and division fell on fertile ground in the early 1980s (Alexander *et al.*, 2000:181). When the war ended guerrillas were supposed to move into Assembly Points (APs) for disbanding, demobilisation or integration into the newly created Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). However, there were incessant, often violent, conflicts between Zanla and Zipra combatants caused by mutual suspicion. This resulted first in the demotion of the ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo, serving in the national unity government, from Minister of Home Affairs to Minister without Portfolio (Alexander *et al.*, 2000:181). This angered ZAPU and Zipra cadres. The government secretly initiated the training of the notorious Fifth Brigade by 106 North Korean instructors.

In February 1982 the government announced it had discovered vast amounts of arms on properties owned by the ZAPU Company, Nitram, and around Zipra Assembly Points. These allegations were used as grounds for confiscating the properties and sacking Nkomo and other ZAPU ministers. Many deserted the army due to fear of persecution and took up arms. After February 1982, the room for political conciliation disappeared. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe treated the caches as definitive proof that ZAPU had always been planning a coup. It was said that it had held back forces and cached weapons to fight in a final

struggle to overthrow a ZANU-PF government if it came to power (Alexander *et al* 2000:181).

Former Zipra cadres were persecuted, especially those in the army. Some fled for dear life while those who remained in the army were often demoted. Alexander *et al.*(2000:181) notes that:

“The desertion in 1982 of thousands of armed former Zipras from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and their persecution at home led to a vast increase of dissident violence in Matabeleland. These dissidents were not the same as those of 1980. Their position was due to the deterioration of relations within the ZNA and targeting of former Zipras outside it, a situation that was to worsen dramatically with the deployment of the notorious Fifth Brigade to Matabeleland North in 1983.”

The Fifth Brigade was unlike other units of the ZNA. It was accountable only to the then Prime Minister, and not to the normal military chain of command. It was specifically intended for what were termed ‘internal defense purposes’ (Alexander *et al.*, 2000:181). From its deployment in Matabeleland North in January 1983 until its withdrawal from Matabeleland South in late 1984, the brigade carried out a grotesquely violent campaign. It targeted party chairmen and civil servants, civilians at large, as well as former Zipra combatants, refugees, and anyone suspected of having crossed the border to Botswana in the course of the liberation war. Former Zipra combatants rarely survived encounters with this brigade.

Its violence largely shaped the spread and character of dissidency (Alexander *et al.*, 2000). The operation to expunge the dissidents was code-named *Gukurahundi* (in Shona, this phrase means the first rains of the year that wash away rubbish). Although the government deployed many sectors of its security apparatus, the Fifth Brigade excelled in repression. Many people were tortured, raped, murdered, and maimed in the pursuit of dissident quashing. Many people still bear the mental and physical scars of the war.

The Matabeleland inferno ended after the signing of the Unity Accord on 22 December 1987 between Prime Minister Mugabe and the ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, who had been persecuted by the ZANU government. The Unity Accord aimed to do what Gukurahundi had failed to do, that is, conquer the last frontier of resistance to ZANU-PF hegemony by delivering the Ndebele-speaking region to the Shona-dominated party. In the same year, Constitutional Amendment Act (No.7) created an executive presidency with Mugabe as President and Nkomo as one of two national Vice-Presidents. One salutary effect of this rapprochement was that former PF-ZAPU leaders were now positioned to urge moderation against the push to create a *de jure* one-party state in Zimbabwe

Perhaps guided by Kwame Nkrumah's injunction to "seek ye first the political kingdom," the ZANU-PF government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe instead gave priority to the consolidation of political power, especially by strengthening the coercive organs of the state. The first task was to ensure party control over key institutions by appointing loyalists from the nationalist struggle to top positions in Cabinet and the state security apparatus.

Thus the leadership of ZANU-PF at independence was a coalition of old-guard nationalists, young radicals, battle-hardened guerrilla commanders, and professionals returned from exile. Unlike Nkomo, who bestrode the pinnacle of his party in the typical dominant style of an African "big man," Mugabe at first occupied a less secure position. Historically, ZANU had always been split by roiling internal divisions between generations of political activists among armed factions within the guerrilla armies, and between the fighting forces on the frontlines and the political leaders involved in international negotiations. Mugabe emerged in 1977 as a compromise leader who was minimally acceptable to all sides including, critically, the military commanders.

The promotion of ex-ZANLA commanders as heads of the security forces and the creation of an exclusively Shona Fifth Brigade ensured the loyalty of the army, both to the party and to the top leader personally. The coherence of the security forces was tested in the early 1980s by sporadic insurgent activities by ex-ZIPRA “dissidents,” which gave Mugabe an excuse to dismiss Nkomo and other PF-ZAPU ministers from the Cabinet in 1982 and unleash a violent pogrom against the rural population of Matabeleland, whom he accused of aiding and abetting South African interests. In addition, senior ex-ZIPRA officers, including Lookout Masuku, then deputy commander of the army, and Dumiso Dabengwa were arrested and charged with treason.

Thus, the elite coalition between the two leading nationalist parties – ZANU (PF) and (PF) ZAPU – effectively unraveled within a couple of years of independence. Former allies were castigated as “enemies of the state,” fit only for destruction. Moreover, atrocities committed by the army’s Fifth Brigade in the *Gukurahundi* campaign in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands Province led to the permanent alienation of most Ndebele-speakers from the governing authorities. However, a Unity Accord of 1987 revived the grand coalition established at independence, rehabilitated Nkomo and other senior PF-ZAPU leaders, and restored a semblance of peace in the countryside.

Given its roots as a national liberation movement, ZANU-PF also moved quickly to penetrate the state apparatus in the peasant farming areas, for example by appointing party loyalists as District Administrators and replacing the old system of native administration with representative District Councils. The party leadership worked hard to get its candidates elected to these local government bodies and to a hierarchy of provincial and district planning boards and ward and village development committees, successfully so in all areas but Matabeleland.

The second decade of independence began with leaders pushing for a *de jure* one-party state, a move ultimately made unnecessary by ZANU-PF's easy *de facto* dominance at the polls. The regime grew increasingly intolerant of dissent and ever more willing to use violence as a campaign tool. The party asserted supremacy over the state by politicizing the bureaucracy and army and turning a blind eye to rent-seeking. Yet, faced with deficits and debts, the government had little choice but to accept reforms to structurally adjust Zimbabwe's outdated economy. Under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai, the ZCTU reacted with a series of strikes and stay-always and, in coalition with civic associations bent on constitutional reform, formed the MDC, an opposition party. For his part, Mugabe was only able to hold together his splintering ruling coalition by using unbudgeted state resources to buy off the militant war veterans..

In 1993, Zimbabwe was in the third year of a five-year Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) designed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and scheduled for completion in December 1995. It seemed unlikely, however, that much would be accomplished by the end date. The stated purpose of the plan was to liberalize the economy and pave the way for capitalist development. Thus, ESAP sought to improve incentives for foreign investors by reducing government spending, providing fewer services (and charging fees for them), cutting back on state employment, removing government subsidies on food products, reducing tariffs, and ending artificial supports for the currency. ESAP's austerity measures were supposed to have short-term costs as they led to the long-term benefits of increased employment and productivity. In fact, the most vulnerable Zimbabweans have suffered and government debt has mounted.

In 1993 an \$83 million subsidy on maize was removed, and prices rose 30 percent. The end of subsidies on wheat and dairy products also made life very costly for the poor. Pledges to reduce the bloated public service by 25 percent were not fulfilled — political patronage (the cabinet had 43

members) and corruption undermined such expressed intentions. In 1992 the gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 8 percent.

As a consequence, ZCTU gradually distanced itself from ZANU-PF, especially after the election of Morgan Tsvangirai as the union's Secretary-General in 1989. Once a foreman in the mining industry and a disaffected former political commissar in ZANU-PF, Tsvangirai emerged as the critical voice of the labor movement. Previously, in the 1980s, union leaders had called for worker representation in ZANU-PF structures; by the 1990s, they came out openly (much as Frederic Chiluba did in Zambia) in support of an alternate, multiparty political system. In 1989, Tsvangirai condemned the closure of the University of Zimbabwe and voiced solidarity with students protesting against corruption. When, in 1992, he led the unions in opposition to government legislation that undercut the ZCTU's financial base the Minister of Labor warned ZCTU not to behave like an opposition political party or risk harsh treatment.

By 2000, average real incomes were one fifth lower than in 1980 and three-quarters of the population was estimated to be living in poverty. Yet food subsidies had been withdrawn. Moreover, as the government turned to policies of cost recovery for social services, access to education and health care, after rising dramatically in the 1980s, reversed direction in the 1990s. Symbolizing these setbacks, school teachers refused to mark exam papers for want of adequate salaries, timely paid. In protest, ZCTU officials took the lead in organizing a national public sector strike in 1996, a general strike in 1997, and mass stay-aways in 1998.

Importantly, the unions expanded their critique of the government beyond sadza-and-relish issues to broader demands for political accountability. Labor leaders nurtured alliances with other social groups, notably university students and human rights activists, which together demonstrated a newfound capacity to confront the government

in coordinated fashion. According to Raftopoulos (2002:45) “The disparity between the *de jure* rights and freedoms enshrined in the Zimbabwean constitution and the *de facto* political rules developed by the state...provided...important openings for contesting ZANU-PF domination.

The watershed entry (or rather re-entry) of the war veterans into a prominent place in national politics had far-reaching effects that stretched well beyond the sacking of the public treasury. Just as important was the radicalization – or for want of a better word, martialization of ZANU-PF and national politics. The payment had unprecedented results on the economy as it accelerated the decline of the Zimbabwe dollar and the economy in general. This economic decline led to strikes in the country with the most violent being the food riots in major towns and cities. As the economy declined opposition against the government grew and as opposition grew the state resorted to violence and intimidation against opponents

Civic groups in Zimbabwe formed the National Constitutional Assembly towards the end of 1997 to force the government to write a new people driven constitution. The groups that were at the forefront of the constitutional movement comprised labour, student unions and academics. Their main aim was to write new constitution to remove the Lancaster house constitution which had been negotiated and had a lot of weaknesses especially on the powers of the executive president.

In response to the NCA the government put up a team of that was to write a new constitution. The Constitutional Commission was led by mostly ZANU PF members of parliament. There was open hostility towards the two constitution making groups with accusations coming from both sides. The NCA spiritedly campaigned for a no vote during the referendum. At the same time the NCA membership became instrumental in the formation of the MDC. After the rejection of the constitution ZANU PF initiated the fast track land reform programme

meant to distribute land. The exercise was characterised by violent occupation white owned farm with 6 farmers reported dead. The violence that the land reform was tackled the international community condemned the exercise and imposed targeted sanctions on the ruling party members and business associated with it.

By the end of the 1990s, therefore, the scattered social interests that had contested the one-party state at the beginning of the decade had begun to crystallize into a nascent opposition coalition. Formal organizations in political society started to align themselves with this civic movement. For example, all but two opposition parties¹⁰ boycotted the 1995 elections because of the absence of electoral and constitutional reforms.

For its part, the NCA effectively advocated a popular boycott of the government's official constitutional commission. While some citizens heeded this call, others felt emboldened to speak up to the government's handpicked commissioners by presenting their own unvarnished views. As an independent civic organization, the NCA claimed (somewhat disingenuously) to have no partisan agenda. Instead, ZCTU took the lead, announcing in 1999 the formation of a political party known as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) whose principal objective was "a struggle for jobs, decency and democracy." Tsvangirai – then NCA Chair as well as ZCTU Secretary General – was elected as President of the MDC at an inaugural party congress in January 2000.

Thus, as the decade ended, an emergent popular movement born in civil society arose to challenge an entrenched ruling party whose mismanagement and corruption had called into question its right to rule. To offset a loss of political support, ZANU-PF tried to shore up its heartland among the Shona-speaking peasantry, for example by providing rural voters with food relief during droughts and distributing free seed and fertilizer afterwards.

In addition, Rural and District Councils were legally merged, thus transferring tax revenues from commercial to communal farming areas. At the same time, ZANU-PF began to reverse its relations with traditional chiefs and headmen by restoring some of their lost powers and including them in the party's patronage network. Formerly the leading source of progressive ideas in Zimbabwe, the party elite thereby began to transform ZANU-PF into a force for social and political conservatism.

By the end of the 1990s, the ZANU-PF leadership coalition had become narrow and less cohesive: few former PF-ZAPU members remained in Cabinet, rifts had begun to emerge among rivals to succeed Mugabe and parliamentary backbenchers were restive. The party's loss of political legitimacy was starkly illustrated by the 1996 presidential elections: although Mugabe won over 90 percent of the vote, rival candidates withdrew because of irregularities and barely one-third of the registered electorate bothered to show up on polling day.

In the next decade, violence and disorder would become the prime instruments of ZANU-PF rule, symbolized most clearly by chaotic invasions of commercial farmland. At the same time, an opposition movement growing out of civil society offered a more orderly and constitutional vision of the future.

The millennium marked the onset of Zimbabwe's descent into political terror and economic collapse. The turning point was a constitutional referendum, that the opposition scored its first electoral victory. The incumbent elite struck back with land invasions, purges of judges, and the mobilization of militias. A Joint Operations Command (JOC) of security chiefs usurped key policy making functions from the Cabinet and the Reserve Bank became a slush fund for the ruling party and armed forces.

The predictable results of these ill-advised policies were economic contraction, disintegrating public services, runaway inflation, and widespread public discontent. After MDC leaders were assaulted at a peaceful rally, external actors from the Southern Africa region stepped up pressure for a political settlement. When a June 2008 presidential election – the most violent in Zimbabwe’s history was blatantly won by Mugabe, SADC forced Zimbabwe’s rival elite coalitions into an awkward power-sharing settlement.

The ruling party strategy for subsequent elections – in June 2000 (parliamentary), March 2002 (presidential) and March 2005 (parliamentary) – was to create “no-go” zones in the countryside that were closed to opposition campaigns. Under the direction of the party hierarchy, local ZANU-PF officials and members ignored constitutional guarantees of free association and assembly by effectively “banning” MDC from operating. In a mounting war of electoral violence, state-sponsored militias harassed, intimidated, raped and murdered MDC candidates and supporters.

At the same time, the ruling party employed the mass media – especially government-controlled television and radio stations and daily newspapers – to restrict coverage of MDC, except to depict them as pawns of neocolonialism. For its part, the opposition used ZCTU and NCA structures to build a rival network of activists among public service workers like teachers, nurses and agricultural extension workers, including in the ruling party’s rural strongholds. The MDC held special appeal for urban youth, workers, professionals and the residents of disaffected regions: mainly Matabeleland, but also Manicaland. It was a new party with a fresh agenda whose coalition of supporters (including the private media, particularly the *Daily News*) had few associations with ruling or opposition political parties from the past.

In a further bid to reestablish lost authority, the ZANU-PF elite drastically curtailed the residual independence still enjoyed by institutions of the Zimbabwean state. The main victim was the rule of law. Until then, the judiciary had retained a good measure of professionalism and autonomy, often issuing verdicts against the government in constitutional test cases. But the anarchic events of 2000-2, whether land invasions, political intimidation, or election tampering along with an amnesty cynically granted for perpetrators of violence were all clearly illegal.

In ruling on a case brought by the Commercial Farmers' Union, the Supreme Court found the fast-track land reform program had not been carried out in conformity with laws that the government had itself enacted. Rather than complying with the court, however, senior government officials including the Minister of Justice condemned the judges. And war veterans invaded the Supreme Court. Ultimately, in 2001, the Chief Justice and two High Court judges, who happened to be white, were forced into early retirement under threat of physical harm. In place of Chief Justice Gubbay, Robert Mugabe appointed Judge Godfrey Chidyausiku a former ZANU-PF minister and reliable ally.

In May 2005, the government of Zimbabwe initiated Operation *Murambatsvina* (variously translated as "Restore Order" or "Clean Out the Filth"), a massive demolition program aimed at destroying allegedly illegal urban structures, such as informal housing and markets. By early July 2005, an estimated 700,000 urban Zimbabweans had been rendered homeless or unemployed by the operation, and an estimated 2.1 million (in total, almost 20% of the population) were indirectly affected by the demolitions.

Operation *Murambatsvina* had a severe impact on the nation's economy and on the livelihood of its citizens. For many, this was not the first time they had been forcibly removed from their homes. As a result of the 2000

land reform program, an estimated 400,000 black laborers on commercial farms lost their livelihoods and/or homes, and many fled to urban areas to find work.

The government described *Murambatsvina* as a program designed to restore the capital city to its former image as “the Sunshine City,” ridding the country’s urban areas of illegal structures that foster criminal activity and stemming the black market trade in foreign currency. International reaction to *Murambatsvina* was highly critical. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan named Tanzanian-born Anna Tibaijuka, Executive Director of UN-HABITAT, as the U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe to investigate the humanitarian impact of the demolitions. Following a fact-finding mission to the country, she issued a comprehensive report, which concluded:

“Operation Restore Order, while purporting to target illegal dwellings and structures and to clamp down on alleged illicit activities, was carried out in an indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering and, in repeated cases, with disregard to several provisions of national and international legal frameworks.”

The report also described police preventing civil society and humanitarian organization from assisting those affected by the demolitions, and suggested that the groups were operating in a “climate of fear” and practicing “‘self-censorship’ to avoid being closed down or evicted.”

By 2007 Zimbabwe had entered a tragic and devastating stage in its history, with enormous human, material and moral costs. The political landscape was characterised by violence allegedly perpetrated by the state-sponsored militia against political opposition groups or anyone labelled as an enemy of the state. In addition, the violent political and electoral campaigns were characterised by arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, disappearances and the deaths of political opponents and activists.

Preceding these contradictory events were devastating droughts in the early 1990s and the period 2001-2002, coupled with an unsuccessful structural adjustment programme, all of which added up to the transitional challenges and socio-political complications. The Zimbabwean socio-political crisis is best described as a complex emergency because of the mosaic nature of the crisis. Thus, all these events constitute fundamental flashpoints that help give context and reflective understandings about the factors that influence the evolution and shaping of the politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe.

However, with the help of a mediated process by the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the ruling ZANU PF party and the opposing MDC factions signed a Global Political Agreement (GPA) on 15 September 2008. While this historic event marked the end of violent politics, it also ushered in the beginning of the many challenges involved in rebuilding the country. Thus, by signing the agreement, Zimbabwe as a nation entered another challenging process: the creation of a new era of democratic and transparent leadership, anchored in transitional justice with national healing and reconciliation as prerequisites for sustainable peace and nation building.

The Global Political Agreement (GPA) of September 2008 led to the formation of a transitional “government of national unity” (GNU) in February 2009. This new settlement was no leader’s first choice; both Mugabe and Tsvangirai entered reluctantly. On one hand, the elite accord restored a welcome modicum of peace and economic stability. On the other hand, it papered over key issues, especially how to divide executive power, manage the economy, and ensure civilian control of the armed forces. In practice, the GNU has been unable to implement the central provisions of the GPA, leading to repeated breakdowns in communication and cooperation between President and Prime Minister. The roots of the impasse lie in the Mugabe’s unwillingness to share

power and resistance to political reform by senior military elements in the dominant coalition. But the divisions, inexperience and organizational weaknesses of the rival MDC coalition are also to blame.

The Global Political Agreement of 15 September 2008 signaled the end of the political crisis between rival political parties in Zimbabwe. The agreement was signed by the three main rival parties that had won the harmonised elections. The agreement represents a 'framework' that formally recognised the extent of the political tragedy and enshrined the respect of human rights.

Article VII of the agreement focuses on: Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity. The Parties hereby agree that the new Government will ensure equal treatment of all regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin and will work towards equal access to development for all will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and in particular to correct historical imbalances in the development of the regions, shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what mechanisms might be necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre and post independence political conflicts; and will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect among Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation, will formulate policies and put measures in place to attract the return and repatriation of all Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and in particular will work towards the return of all skilled personnel.

The Global Political Agreement between the ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M formations, attempts were made to promote national healing and reconciliation with a view to rebuilding the country. A summit to explore ways of reconciling Zimbabweans divided by almost a decade of political violence between the two main rival political parties was held in April 2009. The ZANU-PF chairman John Nkomo, MDC-M vice

president Gibson Sibanda and Sekai Holland from the MDC-T were appointed as Ministers of State responsible for National Healing and Reconciliation.

The GNU's position on reconciliation and national healing represents what many saw as an acknowledgement and endorsement of the adoption of the need for some form of transitional justice in Zimbabwe. Recognizing the sensitive nature of the reconciliation and national healing project, the mandate of the tripartite team was to come up with a policy framework that was to be presented to the council of ministers for debate, approval and ratification into an act and bill.

However, despite these efforts, there were arguments as to whether the national healing and reconciliation project should be led by politicians, given the politics of partisanship that characterised the political landscape of Zimbabwe since its independence. For example, informed by the South African and Rwandan experiences, arguments by some church alliances are that because issues of national healing and reconciliation are embedded in moral obligations, the church or church-based independent organisations can claim 'moral authority' and 'legitimacy' to lead the National Healing and Reconciliation process, as politicians are viewed as not having the moral integrity to remain neutral and or separate national issues from party political agendas.

Post colonial conflict peace initiatives did not manage to bring about the much needed peace unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe exigent for development. The following chapter is going to analyse why all these have engender peace unity and reconciliation

CHAPTER 4 CHALLENGES TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN ZIMBABWE

In the 30 years since independence Zimbabwe moved from being perceived as a model of racial reconciliation in a post-guerrilla-war context to receiving widespread condemnation as a result of the ruling party's repudiation of this reconciliatory politics. This period was characterised by different phases, the problems and challenges that have confronted the Zimbabwean polity in attempting to build a politics of reconciliation in the context of gross inequalities inherited from settler colonial rule, and within the constraints of particular international pressures. A configuration of political and economic processes that has engulfed the country and concentrated the attention of the region since 1980 has affected the process of reconciliation in Zimbabwe.

Against the background of the emergence of an authoritarian nationalist state confronted with increasing internal dissent, the ruling party has since 2000 carried out a series of political and economic interventions, marked by the widespread use of violence (Redress Trust 2004) but conducted through the tropes of anti-colonial redress and an anti-imperialist critique that have found widespread resonance in the region and on the African continent (Hammar *et al.*, 2003; Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004).

The outcome of this revived nationalist assault by the Zimbabwean ruling party has been a repudiation of the national policy of reconciliation that was enunciated by the newly independent state in 1980. This was a policy born of a compromise between the liberation movement, the former colonial power and the settler elite, and constructed within a particular set of international pressures. Confronted in 2000 with the first real challenge to its rule, Zanu PF, led by Robert Mugabe, radically restructured the terrain of Zimbabwean politics towards a politics of frontal assault that had as its major targets

the former colonial power, Britain, the local white population, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, the civic movement and in general the farm workers and urban populations, among whom the opposition had developed its major support. Against this broad array of 'enemies' and 'traitors', Mugabe and his party declared political war, in a confrontation whose contours have definitively changed the political landscape in Zimbabwe.

To understand the limits of the politics of reconciliation that was attempted in Zimbabwe for most of the 32 years, the years of Zimbabwe's independence. The chapter tracks the political responses emerged in a situation where a combination of unresolved long-term historical grievances and undemocratic post-colonial state practices produces a particular strain of authoritarian politics through the modality of a heightened racialised discourse.

The legacy of this form of politics would be a new set of problems, not only those issues of economic redress that the Zimbabwean ruling party has purported to address, but also the continued deployment of ruling party violence to subdue the voices of dissent and the broadly constructed 'enemies of the people'. As a result of the particular forms of land occupation, the economic interventions based on a contested process of state patronage, the damage to the judiciary, the politicisation of the military and a virulent media campaign aimed at the demonisation of several 'others', enormous challenges await the development of new democratic structures and spaces in Zimbabwe.

Different models of reconciliation seem to be at play on the African continent. Referring to the Great Lakes region Rene Lemarchand (1998:3) notes that "There cannot be reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi without justice, and no justice without truth." such a claim raises the important question, what is the relation between the key concepts here? In other words, just what is the relation between reconciliation and

justice, justice and truth, truth and reconciliation? Is it possible to have one of these things without the other two? Can there be reconciliation without justice and truth? Assuming that these processes are not inter-linked and co-determining, meaning that they are independent of each other, which of them is most important? Whilst these are obviously important questions I cannot fully address them all. The question of primary interest here is the relation between justice and reconciliation. Before attempting to address the question of how justice and reconciliation are interrelated it is important to make the point that justice is a contested concept. That means there are different interpretations of what it is and what it requires. People with different ideological orientations understand it differently and those with different interests to protect will tend to have conflicting conceptions of what it entails. For that reason justice is going to be largely treated as righting the wrongs of the past and paying reparations to those, who as a result of those past injustices, find themselves disadvantaged in the present.

Justice may amongst many other senses be defined as giving to each his/her due. The basis of what is due to an individual may vary. It can be need, work, equal consideration etc. Central to this understanding is the presupposition that in some way people's dues can be determined. Theories of private property, such as Locke's are in their own way attempts to address this issue. As noted at the beginning, a deep sense of injustice is what motivated the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The colonial process and the massive dispossession of land cited earlier robbed the people of Zimbabwe of what they considered their legitimate birthright. Part of the reason why the colonial system was unjust was that it was founded on a violation of the indigenous people's claim to ownership of the land and other resources.

Viewed from the conception of justice as giving to each his/her due it becomes apparent that if reconciliation is to be a reality such

dispossession ought to be addressed. What is paramount on this view is that justice seeks to restore balance. In this sense restorative justice becomes a necessary precondition for reconciliation. This implies that we have at least to attempt to approximate the situation that would have evolved if the dispossession had not taken place. Such an exercise is obviously difficult, but this should not be used as an excuse to maintain the present situation.

It is important to appreciate the fact that for restorative justice to be fully effected there is need to do two things. Firstly, it is important that those who violated the rights of others should admit that such violations took place. We have already come across this point when we made reference to the examples of how recognition of past wrongs has helped mend relations in some countries or between them. The important lesson that these examples teach us is that, unless there is acknowledgement of wrong doing, forgiveness does not make any sense at all. The second thing that seems indispensable to the process of restorative justice is that both sides of the story must be told. In other words, unless there is a genuine effort to know who did what to whom it is impossible to know who benefits from the restoration and from whom the restored dues are to be taken.

If the preceding reflections are accepted it becomes clear that there is an inextricable relation between restorative justice and truth. There cannot be restorative justice unless the truth is known. From this it can be concluded that truth is a necessary condition for restorative justice. If therefore restorative justice is a necessary pre-condition for reconciliation we are led to the conclusion that truth is by implication also logically necessary to reconciliation.

From the reflections above it becomes clear that the Zimbabwean model of reconciliation falls short of the line of thinking developed up to this point. The insistence on justice without truth is also unlikely to produce

genuine reconciliation. Rene Lemarchand is perfectly right to argue that “unless the truth about the history of genocide is uncovered what might appear as justice may actually be revenge”. The cycles of violence of one group against the other ought to be revealed and then people can realize the futility of telling half the story. Crucial to the process is the fact that there has to be mutual face-to-face exchange, something that is indispensable to reconciliation.

In the Zimbabwean instance there have been no attempt to tell the story of who did what to whom, and there was no attempt to redress the injustices of the past. That means there was neither truth nor restorative justice. What is more we did not even have a situation where the victims of the colonial dispossession and the beneficiaries discussed their differences. Those who benefited from colonial dispossession seem to believe that their good fortune is due to the virtues of their race or to their hard work. For this reason they have not seen fit to offer any apologies for the humiliation and impoverishment of blacks in the country. The effects of that past injustice are still being felt to this day. It is one of the characteristics of great injustice that its effects continue to affect people long after the injustice has been legally removed. Some people still suffer from an inferiority complex. It is essential to know that all reconciliation attempts did not fulfill the requirements of restorative justice perpetrators of violence whether during colonialism and post-colonial are still rewarded and victims wallow in poverty no attempt was made bring to justice those who bombed innocent civilians during the war yet the families still have memories of that and even the unity accord failed to provide compensation let alone justice to the murderers. Fundamental to this sense of justice is how goods, services and burdens should be shared by people belonging to the same community. Viewing justice in this particular way is important for reconciliation because it recognizes the fact that even though segments of the community might have clashed in the past they have to live together. This is what reconciliation is ultimately concerned with, that is, how to make people

who shared hostilities are able to transcend these hostilities and live together in harmony. Hope that former adversaries can share the same living space and resources, is the backbone of any meaningful reconciliation process.

Land in our situation is the basis for the majority's livelihood, and it is obviously a limited resource. For that reason, apart from the injustice of colonial acts of dispossession, it must be noted that vast inequalities in access to land under such circumstances is in itself unjust. It is unjust for the reason that it denies the poor the means to meet their basic needs, like food and shelter whilst those who possess it allow the land to lay underutilized or unutilized as has been the case in Zimbabwe.

Recognizing the existence of past injustice and its effects on the present raises the question of what should be done about it. How to achieve a just society from the ashes of an unjust colonial system remains one of the struggles that Zimbabwe must face. Such a society must seek ways to transcend the conflicting claims to resources and to create a sense of common citizenship between former foes. By excluding the majority's demands for land whilst protecting white possession of that land, the Zimbabwean independence constitution was thus unjust. It did not treat blacks and whites equally.

Justice as the resolution of conflicting demands and reconciliation seem to have something in common. They both require that all the demands be given a fair hearing. None of the demands or parties to the conflict should be taken as superior. Justice properly understood and reconciliation seems to lie in the ability to transcend the particularistic demands of the contending parties. Whilst the solution may not be absolutist or even universally accepted, all parties must accept it as fair.

The notion of land rights are extremely important. As Lerato Mbele, Research Co-ordinator for The South African Institute of International Affairs wrote in her article "The Land Question, Myth or Reality?"

Land rights are human rights! Not because Robert Mugabe says so, but because our history and identity are embedded in the soil. Observe any ritual for the rights of passage and you will see offerings being poured out onto the ground. Not just in Africa, by the way. Even in biblical history, people were ordered to present the first fruits of their labour to God... In real terms, land is the mainstay of human survival (whether or not you buy genetically modified foods). This is especially true in Africa where about 80% of the population is agrarian, and approximately 70% of economies rely on agricultural exports. The expansion of African trade therefore depends on the productivity of the land and the profits accrued in the agricultural sector.

Land has always been, and continues to be a significant issue on the African continent. Zimbabwe's internal politics created the land problem in the country, but since its independence, its foreign policy too has been tied to the land crisis. Prior to independence in 1980, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe's former name) was a British colony. Also, the initial phases of Zimbabwe's land redistribution were funded in part by the British government as agreed in the Lancaster House Conference, which created an independent Zimbabwe.

A deep sense of injustice caused by the inequalities and deliberate dispossession of Africans by the White settler regimes was amongst the fundamental causes of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. Top amongst the list of grievances was the massive alienation of the African people from the land, which formed the basis for their livelihood. The process of dispossession was legitimated by a series of pieces of legislation, which sought to entrench white privileges and to bring the Africans under colonial control.

In this process Africans were denied rights to own land in the most agriculturally productive parts of the country. In addition to this, Africans were also denied training for skilled labour. The cumulative

effect of these pieces of legislation was to make Africans serve the settlers by providing manual labour on white commercial farms, in industry, in the mines and in the domestic realm. Due to the fact that Africans were denied political rights the colonial system reduced them to subjects in a country they considered their own. Those Africans, who were previously in power in the different African polities, were considered outsiders to the newly established white dominated power structures unless they paid tribute to it.

The fact that the land question was the root cause of Zimbabwe's war of liberation is widely acknowledged. Josiah Tungamirai, one of the top leaders of Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) makes this point when he says "The unequal distribution of land was the main reason why the African people fought the settler regime." (1995:37). Africans felt that the land was rightly theirs and it was a matter of justice that they fought to regain their lost heritage. Invoking John Locke's argument that conquest does not found any property rights may vindicate indeed such a view. The fact that Locke holds such a view is particularly important because of his defense of private property.

The foregoing considerations help to highlight the fact that the struggle for independence was not just about political freedom and the right to vote, as the popularized slogan "one man one vote" may seem to have suggested. The struggle for independence must be seen as an exercise of the right of the descendants of those whose rights had been violated by conquest. Such descendants, Locke argues, have a right to revolt and regain title to their heritage.

In the case of Zimbabwe colonial rule was essentially based on conquest. The 1893 and 1896-1897 wars in Zimbabwe bear testimony to African resistance to colonial rule. However, it should be noted that Locke, the acclaimed founder of liberalism had argued that..."conquest is as far

from setting up any Government, as demolishing a House is from building a new one in the place." (1994:385).

Politically, the act of conquest and the setting up of the colonial administration deprived Africans of the right to set up their own government. The colonial government reduced them to subjects. Economically, Africans were made manual labourers dependent on subsistence wages. The colonial set up was thus characterised by black labour on white owned farms, firms, and mines. This reality has not changed that much since independence and this is why it is crucial to question the efficacy of the reconciliation policy in bringing justice and peace to Zimbabwe. Is it possible for there to be genuine reconciliation when the fundamental injustices of the colonial past have not been addressed?

The perpetuation of the pre-independence property ownership structures and their protection by the law amount to recognition of and protection of the very injustices the liberation struggle sought to defeat. These are important questions, and any meaningful understanding of justice and reconciliation in this context must be able to deal with these issues.

The best way to bring peace and reconciliation in communities is through truth telling and a shared willingness to reconcile by all the major actors in a war. Civil wars and systematic repression need to end and the keyword in post-conflict reconstruction is 'reconciliation'. The government, social organisations, the churches, and the entire population have to come to terms with the past in one way or the other. All cultural and religious traditions have forms of reconciliation. Each of these traditions also puts forward certain requirements regarding reconciliation.

For example, the truth is to be established 'officially', damages are to be paid, the guilty are to be recognised publicly, the victims are to be restored their honour, or the guilty persons are to be submitted to real or symbolic punishment (Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2003). These are also manifest in international law. The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, 'that it is of utmost importance that the human rights are protected by the supremacy of law'. A government is, therefore, obliged to investigate all accusations of violations of human rights, and report the violations from the past (Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2003).

In Rwanda, the government built memorials to remember victims of the genocide and revived the traditional *gacaca* system of justice as a way of healing the nation in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. Helen Vesperini (2002: 20) noted that:

The Rwandan government has revamped a traditional style of community justice known as the *gacaca* court system. The dual aim of the courts is to deal with the backlog of genocide suspects crammed into the country's prison, and heal the deep scars left by the 1994 genocide that killed at least half a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

The 1987 Unity Accord ended the war but did not bring peace and reconciliation. It was elitist and embodied a top-down approach to governance.

Nkomo and Mugabe signed the Accord and then sold it to the people. The grassroots were never consulted in the peace-making process and no reconciliation efforts were made. It was an imposed peace settlement without the input of the affected people. The government could not accept responsibility and own up, to now no government official has come up to openly condemn and ask for reconciliation. Some government officials refer to the atrocities as a closed 'chapter' and the president has only admitted to the period being the moment of madness yet there is need for truth telling. Since the death of Joshua Nkomo,

ZANU PF has failed to gain any seats from Matebeleland because of the Gukurahundi atrocities.

According to Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2003),

“the foundation of reconciliation is the recognition of suffering. This distinguishes reconciliation from a process which does not go beyond political negotiations and compromises. Recognition of individual suffering may be shaped by extensive official reports great deal of attention to individual cases or by measures of compensation and redress which benefit the victims, by remembering the names of the victims, as in religious celebrations, on memorial stones, in literature, etc., or by lasting public recognition of the pain and grief the victims and dependents have to live with”.

Reconciliation is the first step towards a society which can give a lasting guarantee for dignity and justice. The 1987 Accord resulted in the cessation of hostilities but brought no peace and unity. Victims of the violence have not been compensated. Neither have those who perpetrated the violence been tried nor have they sought the forgiveness of their victims, at least through acknowledging their roles in the crisis.

The Zimbabwean Unity Accord is viewed, perceived and analysed in personality terms rather than as a communal and national undertaking. Many saw the passing away of Nkomo, in July 1999, as the death knell of the Accord. Bulawayo Human Rights Lawyer David Coltart (2000) noted that

Just as the President Robert Mugabe is the cement that holds ZANU (PF) together, Nkomo was the cement that held PF ZAPU together and those former (PF) ZAPU members who are now ZANU PF. I think there is a possibility that his death will unleash some political battle to get his mantle. It could speed up the disintegration of the party in the region but much will depend on the public who respected him because of history.

Former ZANU-PF Central Committee member, Norman Mabhena, noted that after Nkomo the ruling party had no chance of dominating the Matabeleland region echoed the above sentiments by observing that

‘there is no way ZANU-PF can rise again in Matabeleland. It won in the last elections (1995/6) because people respected Nkomo’ (*Sunday Mail*, 2 July 2000 and also the *Financial Gazette*, 13 March 2002).

The people of Matabeleland and the Midlands have survived two terrible civil wars in as many decades, and they have received no guarantee that it will not happen again. In spite of apparent state and dissident atrocities there has been no official apology. In fact, the war episode is spoken of in muffled voices by officialdom. The Ndebele ethnic communities in Matabeleland and the Midlands are still hostile towards the ruling ZANU-PF party and its government (Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2003:2).

Some of the weaknesses of the Unity Accord are that it was crafted in a minimalist way that did not go beyond a power-sharing formula between the leading political elites in ZAPU-PF and ZANU-PF. The dominant post-Unity Accord politics in Matabeleland and the Midlands regions revolved around the issues of marginalisation, state accountability, and quest for an apology, as well as compensation for the victims of the state sanctioned violence of the 1980s.

These demands proved that the Unity Accord had a poor post conflict peace-building framework that encompassed the aspirations and demands of the grassroots (Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2003:2). The post-Unity Accord scenario in Zimbabwe did not embrace prerequisites for reconciliation and durable peace. Lasting peace can be established through a number of mechanisms which include the establishment of all-embracing political system through power-sharing arrangements between erstwhile protagonists. This was partly achieved in Zimbabwe because (PF) ZAPU assumed posts in government and Joshua Nkomo became one of the country’s two Vice-Presidents, a post that he held until his death in July 1999. Democratic rebuilding involving eradication

of fear among citizens, and enhancing accountability, transparency, legitimacy, human security, and social peace is also necessary.

There was no psychological rebuilding to communities that have survived the ravages of violence. The CCJP report noted that part of the process of psychological healing for any victim of abuse is being given the opportunity to recount that suffering to a supportive, non-judgmental audience. There was no process of opening up which involves not just the victims but also the perpetrators of violence. There was need for an atmosphere of truth telling in order to purge themselves of their memories of events. National exorcism is imperative. In African cultures those who do injustice to others need to compensate their victims in order to avoid the wrath of avenging spirits. It is in this spirit that Truth Commissions have been set up in many parts of the world, notably South Africa and Rwanda.

The establishment of effective and impartial systems of justice is crucial to reconciliation. The state should also regard court verdicts in order to establish citizen confidence in the judicial system. In the context of the 1982-1987 crises the government showed a pathetic disregard of the verdicts of the courts. In 1982, Zipra commanders Lookout Masuku, Dumiso Dabengwa and others were arraigned before the courts for treason and the evidence against them failed to convince a high court judge, but they remained in jail until 1986 (Alexander *et al.*, 2000:188).

Reconciliation also entails reconstruction and economic development. Victims have a right to material compensation. Post-colonial Zimbabwe's development paradigm was rural-oriented, and Matabeleland and some parts of the Midlands Provinces did not benefit due to the ongoing disturbances. In this context, after the Unity Accord massive, infrastructural development and rehabilitation should have been undertaken. Unfortunately, not much was done and the people feel alienated from national development processes. This was confirmed in

the 2000 Parliamentary elections in which the ruling ZANU-PF was trounced in all but two of the Matabeleland constituencies.

One of the ex-Zipra luminaries, Dumiso Dabengwa, a losing ruling party candidate in the elections, observed that:

The people have rejected us not only as candidates, but also as ruling party ZANU-PF now. The reason is that since the signing of the Unity Accord in December 1987, the people of Bulawayo feel they have not gained anything. The people have been saying what is the use of supporting ZANUPF and its candidates and that is their message (*Sunday Mail*, 2 July 2000).

The Zimbabwean Unity Accord glossed over truth telling, an integral component of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, thereby downplaying its relevance to reconciliation (Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2003:2). The Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice (1997:3) noted that:

One of the most painful aspects of the 1980s conflict for its victims is their perception that their plight is unacknowledged. Officially, the state continues to deny any serious culpability for events during that year, and refuses to allow open dialogue on the issue. In effect, there is a significant chunk of Zimbabwean history, which is largely unknown, except to those who experienced it first hand. All Zimbabweans, both present and future, should be allowed access to history.

The Government of National Unity is associated with a lot of physical (torture, killings, intimidation and disappearances) and emotional pains, let alone the economic difficulties and the moral decadence among the community in particular due to unemployment versus the law of survival through criminal acts such as robbery, and prostitution. The greatest aftermath is that how do we transform and rebuild the bad relationships that existed before between the perpetrators, victims and the community without forgetting the structures that were used to cause these pains without compromising the procedural judicial accountability.

Surprisingly, the GPA of September, 2008 in itself is an exclusionary document that focuses basically on power sharing, sovereignty, governance and the micro and macroeconomic way out to improving the economy. Article VII of the GPA (Government promotion of Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity), does not bring about on board national healing, it's silent. For example, the provision does not stipulate the type of national healing, a time frame to institutionalize the aspect of national healing (be informed though that there is a ministry of national healing), the provision is not exhaustive on the injuries people have suffered such as the gukurahundi and impecunious state of the people are not particularized and thus this will restrict the scope of healing to limited aspects.

Meanwhile, the success of the healing process is largely dependent on the community demand and the readiness of the local structures to offer support. Consequently, as long as power politics and the political elites create negativity in this process by abusing the social systems and structures, national healing shall remain a myth than reality. However the past cannot be forgotten as long as history, time and memory inform our consciousness. Therefore, it becomes strategically imperative not to only focus at a resolution aspect of healing but transformational approaches with focus on building sustainable relationship.

A particularly damaging feature of the ruling party's response to the crisis in Zimbabwe has been the state's overarching articulation of an intolerant, selective and racialised nationalist discourse. Through the deployment of what Ranger (2004) has called 'patriotic history' the ruling party has conducted a saturated ideological attack on a range of internal 'enemies' as part of a sustained project of delegitimizing opposition politics (Raftopoulos 2003). The outcome has been a narrowing of a usable national past and the further loss of democratic space in which to conduct a critical national dialogue about both the colonial past and the post-colonial present. Instead, Zanu PF has set out

to expunge any complex viewing of the past, preferring a monologue around the centrality of the ruling party itself, and the inherent 'outsider' status of any historical interventions which have not fed into this one-dimensional discourse.

Barnes demonstrates that in the teaching of history in schools since 1980, the emphasis has been more on racial unity among the formerly oppressed groups than on racial reconciliation between the major racial groupings. As Barnes summarises her argument:

... in Zimbabwean nationalism and nationalist educational historiography, the concept of a bifurcated racial unity, although at times bitterly contested, has been more successful than that of racial reconciliation ... The success of unity was no accident, ... it was achieved at the direct expense of reconciliation.

Raftopoulos' stated that

Authoritarian nationalism that has dominated the official nationalism of the state throughout the present crisis. The proscriptions on a more critical reading of the past and the essentialised constructions of race have created new blockages to the deepening of a politics of national reconciliation. It is true that there are many sources in the past for the construction of fixed and seemingly naturalised notions of racial identity, and that this remains a key reservoir for nationalist mobilisation in former settler states.

While the revived nationalism of the ruling party has been constructing a series of exclusions, the racial minorities in the country have faced severe difficulties in attempting to negotiate a place in the post-independence dispensation. These difficulties stem both from the legacies of identity construction under colonial rule and also from the limits and increasingly intolerant protocols of nation-building in the post-colonial period.

Alexander attempts to understand the constituent elements of white identity in Zimbabwe, both by tracing some of the major contours of its historical lineage, and by unraveling its post-colonial features. Alexander traces what she views as:

... the formation of a white community unified by race, over and above ethnicity or class, whose national identity was founded on racialism and an idea of nation that excluded the majority of its inhabitants.

However, it is important to note that notwithstanding the seeming unity of race in definitive periods of Zimbabwe's history, the white history, the white community also affected the reconciliation process.

Given such historical constraints, the policy of reconciliation remained merely a formal political hope, especially given the continuing legacy of structural inequality in the sphere of the economy. One consequence of this limited vision has been the eagerness of the ruling party to celebrate the exceptional in white achievements while at the same time carrying out a more general denigration of this particular minority

Although Zimbabwe has not been at war since 1979, the country "...suffered from war-like trauma to its polity and economy" (Moss and Patrick, 2005, 2006) and being a fragile state, the country is also currently experiencing a host of horrific consequences of state fragility. Among the diverse definitions of fragility, OECD consider fragile states as "those where the state power is unable and/or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its people: security, protection of property rights, basic public services and essential infrastructure" while UN-WIDER (2008) define fragility as a situation "wherein government cannot or will not provide an environment for households to reduce, mitigate or cope with poverty and other risks to well-being". Crisis States Research Centre's (CSRC) short, though elaborated definition, regards fragile state as "a state significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its sub-systems"³. Mirroring any of these and other definitions on Zimbabwe since 20004 to today, the country is with no doubt a fragile state. Also all the four instruments and indexes that claim to measure different dimensions and indicators of state fragility indicates Zimbabwe as a fragile state and one of the worst performing country since the beginning of the new millennium.

The problems faced by Zimbabwe included, among other things, hyperinflation with last official figure putting the monthly inflation rate at 231.2 million percent as of July 2008. On the other hand, IMF (2009) estimates the hyperinflation rate to be 489 billion percent as of September 2008, and independent analysts, for instance, Hanke (2008) put this inflation rate at 6.5 quinquidillion percent.

Zimbabwe's political environment has been typified by severe restrictions on political and civil liberties. The intensification of political instability and macroeconomic instability following the coming into fore of resilience opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, the controversial land reform since 1999 and most importantly, the fact that the country been increasingly isolated from the international community, have resulted in political factors being some of the major determinants of state fragility in the country. That is, because of this dictatorial, repressive and undemocratic regime, the then government was not willing to create an environment whereby the majority citizens can endeavour to mitigate poverty, neither was the government willing and able to

In 2000, forcible seizures of white-owned land by ZANU-PF "war veterans" (often party thugs too young to have fought in the wars of independence) began to seriously destabilize Zimbabwe's economy. The 2000 Parliamentary elections saw a ZANU-PF victory over the newly formed opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by trade unionist Morgan Tsvangirai, but Mugabe's party lost its margin to change the constitution.

This explains President Mugabe's refusal to have the security sector reformed, declaring, "May I state this clearly and categorically, as ZANU (PF) the defence of our sovereignty rests with us and with no other. Any manoeuvres to tamper with the forces will never be entertained by us" (Raftopoulos 2008:16).

Leaders of the security forces themselves have made it abundantly clear that they would not salute any political leader without liberation war credentials. They thus shunned the swearing in of the leader of the MDC as Prime Minister at the launch of the GNU. Thus even in the government of national unity reconciliation is and remains a pipedream as important sectors of the country do not recognize the Prime Minister. While the GNU was ushered in to promote reconciliation and national healing major players in the 2008 violence have not reconciled and usurping civilian authority for personal gain and political power.

Then there is the critical question of civil-military relations, in particular, the highly militarised nature of the country's institutions. Rupiya (2003:251-64). succinctly shows how the executive has since the 1990s militarised civilian posts, denting the 'institutional inter-relationships' that had hitherto evolved in the country.

This concentrates power in the executive and entrenches state control over the affected institutions since the military appointees to civilian posts are answerable to the executive rather than the institutions. Inevitably, the military has become heavily involved in law enforcement in times of protests and demonstrations (Hendricks and Hutton, 2009b:4). For this and other reasons, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 33) concludes that "Until Zimbabweans are delivered from the pervasive fear of their police; their army, their government and their leaders, there will never be cordial civil-military relations in the country."

It has been noted that victims of great injustices tend to remember and re-live these injustices for a long time. They seem to remember their suffering much longer than the perpetrators of the injustice. For this reason in many societies unresolved hatred and the desire for revenge tends to lie underneath the façade of peace and harmony. From time to time these pent up emotions burst out in violent conflict which may in turn create new scars.

CHAPTER 6: THE FUTURE OF PEACE UNITY AND RECONCILIATION

The current reconciliation and peace initiatives in Zimbabwe face a lot of challenges. In fact the future of reconciliation in Zimbabwe is bleak as there has not been any transformation of crucial state apparatus to suit the needs for reconciliation. While the GPA was meant to promote sustainable peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe it has faced many challenges and has failed to stem out political violence and promotes political unity within Zimbabwe. These challenges have not been adequately addressed that paints a gloomy picture on the future of reconciliation. The major players in Zimbabwean political are deliberately sabotaging the process for political survival. Oppressive pieces of legislation that dates back from the smith regime have been used and even remodeled to oppress people.

As a prelude to assessing the dynamics of leadership struggles within the GNU, on one hand, a coalition of reform elements on the MDC side was able to achieve a modicum of policy innovation and modest socioeconomic gains. On the other hand, entrenched elements in the ZANU-PF coalition were able, more often than not, to offset meaningful reforms by countermanding MDC political initiatives. Their strategy centered on provoking MDC to withdraw from the unity accord, thus ensuring its failure without ZANU-PF incurring blame. Indeed, the post-2008 transition period barely alleviated prior conditions of political crisis.

The fundamental problem with the transitional government is that power is not shared, but divided. ZANU-PF and MDC-T exercise power separately within largely exclusive, and often competing, zones of authority. Moreover the distribution of power is unequal, with the balance tilted in favor of old guard elements from the previous regime. Thanks to its intransigent stance during power-sharing talks, ZANU-PF

managed to retain exclusive control over the coercive instruments of state, including the security, intelligence, and judicial services, and the politically strategic ministries responsible for land, agriculture, and local government. MDC was unsuccessful in a bid to obtain a Deputy Minister post in the Ministry of Defence, instead accepting that ZANU-PF would be denied a similar position in the Ministry of Finance.

And, under intense pressure on an issue that threatened to derail the entire settlement, MDC was forced by the South African negotiators to accept co-leadership with ZANU-PF of the Ministry of Home Affairs, that controls the police. As nominal heads of economic and social ministries, MDC ministers are well placed to serve as gatekeepers between the government and the purveyors of aid. But, because no party enjoys ultimate control, a divided government is unlikely to push through major pieces of economic or political reform that can meaningfully change the rules of governance.

Instead, democratization and development are largely stalled for as long as Zimbabwe remains one country with two rival governments. Moreover, a patronage culture endures. The Global Political Agreement called for a six-person executive (a president and prime minister, each with two deputies) and a large cabinet of 31 ministers and 16 deputy ministers. Yet the accord was violated at birth when ZANU-PF and the two MDCs colluded to appoint 41 ministers and 19 deputies, the largest and most expensive cabinet in Zimbabwe's history.

The expansion of official posts to accommodate political allies suggests that both sides are willing expediently to sacrifice the careful management of scarce public resources to distribute political spoils. And some MDC cadres may well regard a government position as an opportunity to gain access to assets and rents previously enjoyed by ZANU-PF, as reflected in demands for state-of-the-art vehicles and other perks by MPs across the three parties. But, so far in Zimbabwe (in

contrast to the dynamics of power sharing in Kenya), contestation between rival elites is far more common than collusion.

The GPA signatories rarely work well together. Indeed, Mugabe treats Tsvangirai with open contempt. For example, he has systematically prevented the PM from chairing the Cabinet in the President's absence, despite a GPA provision codifying this understanding. And, in practice, the Council of Ministers – that the PM does chair – has been side lined. From central role in policy debate and is treated as a subcommittee of Cabinet. Nagging disputes over “outstanding issues” of GPA implementation have led MDC Ministers to boycott Cabinet meetings, appeal for the intervention of SADC negotiators, and, in October 2009, to temporarily suspend participation in the coalition government.

The inclusive government is beset with problems from the onset there are problems with implementation and policy inconsistency within the ZANU PF and MDC T. These problems have shown that the warring parties are far from settling their differences and therefore any call for election would be a declaration of war The Global Political Agreement of 15 September 2008, signaled the end of the open political crisis between rival political parties in Zimbabwe.

The Parties agreed that the new Government will ensure equal treatment of all regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin and will work towards equal access to development for all, will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and in particular to correct historical imbalances in the development of the regions shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what mechanisms might be necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre and post-independence political conflicts; and will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect among Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency irrespective of age, gender,

race, ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation will formulate policies and put measures in place to attract the return and repatriation of all Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and in particular will work towards the return of all skilled personnel.

An analysis of Article VII reveals ambiguity and vagueness in addressing critical human rights issues of equality, national healing, cohesion and unity. Human rights provisions are framed in general terms, that mask fundamental details of transitional justice in the post-independence period.

There is lack of detail and ambivalence in the content and up structures of transitional justice during the interim period. These structures should aim to confront issues of impunity and crimes of the past to lay foundations for the establishment of legitimate judicial systems and democratic reforms and norms. However, as a result of this vagueness, issues of human rights violations continue to invoke controversial negotiations among the three principal political actors.

The agreement also does not set a time frame for when the mechanisms and processes of transitional national healing should start. In addition, there are no provisions for an exit strategy to the process. The critical key words of 'justice' and 'reconciliation' are missing in the article. Whilst articles 7.1(a) and 7.1(b) do state that the 'government will ensure...,' this phrase evokes a sense of willingness but not commitment. Article 7.1(c), that focuses on national healing, cohesion and unity, is also stated in very vague and ambiguous terms as it lumps together conflicts from different historical periods. This lack of clarity and specificity makes the job of national healing overwhelming as the process may take decades. Such vagueness abrogates the ZANU-PF party from taking social responsibility in accounting for post independence human rights violations.

Whilst the use of 'shall' in 7.1(c) implies a sense of obligation, the use of 'consideration', implies that the new government will think about the proposed mechanisms, but will not be committed to fulfilling the obligation. Article 7.1(d) is also problematic in that it vaguely states that the new government 'will strive...' (GPA 2008) Whilst this implies that the new government will make every effort to create an environment of tolerance, the use of a relative word such as 'strive' suggests that although they might want to create an environment of tolerance and respect, they might fail. This means that the political security of certain individuals would not be guaranteed by the state. This skepticism becomes valid, given that political tolerance as a measure of reconciliation remains contested in the political culture of Zimbabwe.

A further challenge in respect of the agreement is that the GPA was transitional or short term, 24-month, power-sharing agreement and not a comprehensive Peace Agreement in its truest sense. As such, one of the key mandates of the transitional government was to facilitate the making of comprehensive and radical constitutional reforms that will pave the way for a new 'people-driven' constitution within 18 months but the time frame has already changed and no one really knows the end of the process. There is haggling over the constitution even before the draft is not completed. The three drafters have received criticism from ZANU PF for failing to account for people's views and the party wants them fired this is despite the fact that the party has a focal person in the process.

This constitution was supposed to set a foundation for the creation of democratic spaces that will enable all parties to contest in 'free' and 'fair' elections, within a period no longer than 5 years. The logic from the perspective of all parties, including ZANU-PF in particular to have elections soon after completion of the constitution making process but is the conditions for elections ripe? If this question is being constantly asked it shows that peace unity and reconciliation is far from being

achieved as elections have proved to be divisive and create war like situation.

The Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) established under article 22 of the GPA was given 5 major functions that include ensuring the implementation of the letter and spirit of the GPA, to assess the implementation of the GPA from time to time and to consider steps that need to be taken to ensure the speedy and full implementation of the GPA in its entirety and to receive complains in respect of any issues related to the implementation enforcement of the GPA. An appraisal of JOMIC shows that it has failed to fulfill its mandate because it's a self saving organisation advancing the interests of the political parties and not for peace unity and reconciliation because it has no legal powers to enforce decisions and recommendations.

What should be understood is that constitution alone is no guarantee for a credible election process. Charles Ray the United States Ambassador said "you can have the most perfect constitution on earth but if it's not adhered to or carried out it's just a piece of paper" daily news (March 8; 2012). The question that needs to be asked is there a political will to adhere to the constitution or its just there to protect the interests of the elite? And why is ZANU PF calling for elections without the completion of the process. As of now the Human Rights Commission has not been constituted that shows insincerity on the part of the government in addressing human rights abuses. The reason is that some people within the government do not want the past abuses to be investigated for fear of arrest. Even the past commissions of enquiries have not been made public and no action taken that means the elite is protecting their interests and there is no guarantee that in future peace can be guaranteed.

From the perspective of ZANU PF spin doctors the new drafts being presented to the public is Lancaster 11. Jonathan Moyo (Sunday Mail

march 4-10; 2012) argued that “the time has come for us to understand that some among the political divide want to hide the ambitions and schemes behind COPAC to seek leadership change, government change or regime change by transforming COPAC into a treacherous Lancaster 11 for a new negotiated political settlement fronting local puppets to reverse the gains of liberation under the guise of constitution making That should not only be food for thought but also for anyone who still does not understand that the 2012 elections would be held under the current constitution”.

Thus the views of ZANU PF as a party are always supreme to the views of the people. This means that as long as ZANU PF controls the process no reconciliation will take place as the party has dismally failed in the process since independence. With the concept of the ‘winner takes all’ form of elections, this process will give due prerogative to the winner of the post-transitional government to determine the type and form of transitional justice it considers desirable.

Thus the focus on political issues related to the cessation of violent hostilities and the emphasis on provision for elections founded on the ‘winner takes all’ principal becomes apparent. The agreement, and in particular Article VII, fails to articulate more complex questions of transitional justice and human rights abuses in specific terms. As the agreement was essentially negotiated by political elites, issues of human rights were drafted in very obscure terms as a way of protecting dominant political groups allegedly implicated in post-independence and post-2000 human rights abuses.

In the GPA, emphasis is placed on equality with regard to social and economic development (7.1(a) and 7.1(b)). Of great concern, is that the GPA is silent on amnesty issues, hence the since the signing of the Interparty Political Agreement (IPA) on 15 August 2008, and since the inception of the inclusive government on 13 February 2009. Controversy

surrounds the ZANU-PF's alleged continuing manipulation of power and use of coercive tactics in making unilateral decisions representing its party interests, contrary to the IPA, its preceding Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and GPA agreements. For example, to many people, the unilateral relocation of communications responsibilities from an MDC-T Ministry to a ZANU-PF Ministry appears to signal a lack of commitment and political will to enforce the IPA and the GPA

Furthermore, the inability of the new inclusive government to initiate and table bills on fundamental reforms of repressive legislative laws and review laws governing investment in sectors such as mining, or tackle corruption has prevented the required aid and investment inflow. All these events are compounded by the continued arbitrary arrests of political opposition members. For instance, since the signing of the GPA more than 30 political activists have been abducted and some remain detained under torture in police custody and maximum prisons.

Thus, for a country emerging from years of sporadic violence, the perceived failure to deal with political detainees, the lack of police response to violence and the arrests of journalists, students and lawyers, does not send the right signal to the global community that of a new wave of democratisation in transition. The continued impunity undermines the whole concept of inclusive power sharing and a government of national unity assumed to have been founded on the GPA's principles of social cohesion, national healing and unity.

The alleged continued contravention of the GPA principles by the ZANU-PF revealed a disregard for both the rule of law and commitment to transformative change, that could be premised on the loose and misleading interpretation of the meaning attached to the concept of rule of law and the safeguarding of national and state security.

While Article VII is a step in the right direction that will hopefully lead to a full restoration of democratic justice and peace in Zimbabwe, the peace agreement is framed and interpreted in the context of strong hegemonic party politics.

Perceptions are that the ZANU-PF's insistence on controlling security Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Communications signal an apparent pattern of partisan interests that perpetuate a minimalist viewpoint about democratic peace, reconciliation and national healing. The ZANU-PF continues to monopolise the use of the media and the police in its political campaigns by coercively presenting itself as the liberator and legitimate patron of the Zimbabwean people to whom the people remain indebted.

In this way, issues of peace, security, reconciliation and national cohesion as well as healing and stability become heavily compromised and politicised. Article VII was designed to respond to socio-political issues at a macro or national level and to resolve national political challenges with a view to restoring social cohesion and national unity. It is the needs of the nation, not individuals that are of paramount concern in this Article. The logic of this macro perspective is grounded on the argument that the National Healing and Reconciliation Organ is a political entity born out of a negotiated political process aimed at serving national interests as enshrined in the GPA.

Therefore, in the interest of the nation, Article VII precludes civil claims against perpetrators as this is likely to erode the state's limited fiscus. In addition, it is very unlikely that the ZANU-PF will endorse monetary compensation for political survivors from opposition political parties, irrespective of how genuine the claims might be. Bearing these important caveats in mind, it can be argued that Article VII does not represent an individual-friendly process but rather a politically-orchestrated national healing and reconciliation project.

Article VII pointed to the divergent views on the perceived 'reconciliatory compromises' claimed to have been reached through a negotiated process that, to some people, perpetuate semblances of the autocratic status quo of the old regime. To some people, Article VII represents a flawed response to the pain and suffering experienced by those who were labelled as enemies of the state as it waters down issues of transitional justice.

Whilst objections have been voiced about retributive justice, other people are of the view that without accountability, impunity reigns. The aforementioned objections have been raised on the grounds that retributive justice may further destabilize the fragile peace agreement and obstruct a smooth transition to democracy as it is equated with vengeance. Many civil society groups in particular expect transformative change that accounts for human rights violations and abuses of power as a crucial prerequisite for democratic peace and justice but as it stands now the inclusive government has failed to do so.

Robert Mugabe has come out calling for fresh elections but with the perpetrators of the 27 June violence walking free there is no guarantee that there will not be a repeat of the same violence as MDC meetings are being barred or disrupted by elements from ZANU PF. And even within the MDC-T there is no unity because their meetings are sometimes disrupted by violence from rival factions and as they can not be united within the party there is no guarantee that they will tolerate different political views. What unites them at the moment is the desire to dislodge ZANU PF but once ZANU PF is removed from power there is no guarantee that they will focus on internal differences.

The biggest challenge however, for any healing process, is that unless the problem is acknowledged by the ruling elites, Zimbabweans will continue to deal with the mental effects of the political violence in an ad hoc and unsustainable fashion. As such, the work being done by some

public and private health sector organisations and emergent psychiatric and counseling units in promoting justice, psychological relief and reconciliation, represents an important step in facing up to the challenges of a traumatic past, albeit challenging and costly.

The question that has puzzled many people is the sincerity of ZANU PF in the new government. While the 2008 elections were inconclusive and very violent the ZANU PF party in the inclusive government has been advocating for election without the full implantation of the GPA this has given rise to the belief that the party wants to maintain political control at all costs. The conditions for the elections have certainly not changed.

Writing in the *Newsday* Brian Mangwende (March 7; 2012) argued “there is no point in going for elections if you do not desire for the people to exercise their right to vote and if you are not going to accept the people’s choice, rather turn the country into a monarchy and rule forever”. The 2008 elections were “characterised by self-indulgent debauchery and callous abductions of innocent in the period leading to the June 2008 run-off elections, the world and Africa in particular, took a step back and said the June 2008 debacle was not an election” (*ibid*).

Grave inequalities were identified in the electoral process and all parties agreed to the recommended reforms and signed the GPA but surprising the implementation process has been stalled due to constant bickering rendering the Government of National Unity inoperable. Elections without the necessary reforms serve the selfish interests of individuals and not the nation. There is no guarantee that the situation of June 2008 can not be repeated.

After the Matabeleland events and in the face of widespread demands from civil society, the ZANUPF government set up the Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry. Its report was never made public. There was and remains no official acknowledgement of guilt, no apology, and only extremely limited redress. Just as in colonial times, amnesia was now the

preferred strategy. In the mid-1990s NGOs, like the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, tried to break the silence by collecting massive amounts of data on the events. The Catholic hierarchy, that had initially promised to publish the data, was so shaken by its findings that publication of the report was postponed and finally cancelled, resulting in an “unauthorized” publication.

The culture of impunity, originally conceived to deal with the human rights violations of the liberation war period, also became a driving force. A Clemency Order of 1988 pardoned all violations committed by all parties between 1982 and the end of 1987 - thus covering the Matabeleland atrocities. The Amnesty International report of 2002 on impunity in Zimbabwe notes that a 1995 presidential amnesty “officially excused the politically-motivated beatings, burning of homes and intimidation perpetrated by supporters of ZANU-PF during the 1995 elections, by granting amnesty to those liable to criminal prosecution for, or convicted of, these crimes.

This set a further precedent for yet another presidential pardon for political violence, Clemency Order of 2000, that was declared after the June 2000 parliamentary elections. Once again, those involved in human rights violations - such as kidnapping and torture, but excluding murder, rape and fraud - were placed beyond the reach of the justice system”. Many of these acts of violence were perpetrated against men and women in Matabeleland

The GPA is not an exception again the parties to the agreement especially ZANU PF has called for a blanket amnesty on all committed during the run up to the June 27 election runoff. This culture of impunity and immunity makes reconciliation and unity impossible. Many people during the elections lost their livestock and there were also reported deaths of around 200 MDC supporter s thus without proper justice being done the people would neither forgive nor forget. History

as shown that people do not forget easily as many still bear the scars of colonialism, Gukurahundi and 2000 political violence. As long as nothing is done there will be no proper reconciliation and unity is impossible. ZANU PF has been loosing elections in Matebeleland since the 2000 elections because there are many grievances that have not been solved like the lack of development in the area and unsolved Gukurahundi.

Thus to them anything associated with ZANU PF is bad and should be rejected. This shows that peace agreements on their own are not conclusive in addressing the injustices committed. One weakness of the GPA is that it is addressing surface issues and not taking a holistic approach because the Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation is trying to reconcile the parties to the 2008 violence without addressing all the unresolved issues of the past. From atrocities committed by the white rulers, the freedom fighters and post independent problems these should have fallen under the framework of the reconciliation mantra under the GPA.

Because of the role of the ruling elite in some of the issues they want it to be swept under the carpet yet some will still want to unravel those issues. For instance Emerson Mnangagwa came out recently and claimed that the Gukurahundi issue is a closed chapter but how can it be a closed chapter when it is still fresh in the memories of the victim some who still believe that it was meant to totally exterminate the Ndebele from Zimbabwe. It is very difficult for people to be reconciled when the leadership does not show any remorse to their actions. Some have not yet forgotten and forgiven the war veterans for loss of livestock during the war while others were raped and bore children from that rape and those children still do not know their fathers thus these people are still alive and want justice to done. As long as they are alive they still have memories they are not reconciled to their enemies. The current

reconciliation will not yield meaningful results. There is still ZANU PF and MDC violence despite the prevalence of the organ

A stable peace unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe will remain a distant dream as long as the sad legacy of violence and discrimination against an ethnic/regional minority is not dealt with in a genuine and thorough process of reconciliation. This will need to be historically all-encompassing and deal with issues of justice across a range of political, social and economic acts, involving not only the communities and races in Zimbabwe, but also the global and colonial actors implicated in this drama over the past century.

There was no doubt, very good reasons to avoid explicit retributive justice in the Zimbabwe of the early 1980s. However, other less menacing strategies were available to the new elites that include a fair degree of truth-seeking, forms of restorative justice, reparation of the damage inflicted to the victims, and the fight against economic inequality. The white heirs of the Rhodesian regime and the black leaders preferred to impose a shallow, “cheap” form of reconciliation without historical, restorative or economic justice. Cheap, imposed and based (for whatever pragmatic reasons) on amnesia and impunity – in such a form, reconciliation can only damage fundamentally. As long as there is no justice victims will always seek revenge and the current process is elite driven and as such the elite have not suffered from past injustices thus they have not experienced the degree of suffering that the poor have suffered.

Perhaps most importantly, security sector reform has yet to begin. Because civilian-military relations lie at the heart of Zimbabwe’s fraught power-sharing experiment, we devote special attention to this topic here. A leading security sector specialist declares that, “Zimbabwe’s security sector is both the lock, and the key, to the success or failure of the GNU” and asserts that “de-politicizing and re-professionalizing the military is a

critical objective, but cannot be done overnight” (Chitiyo 2009). And yet, the MDC is under tremendous pressure to reign in the security forces, a matter of considerable interest to external stakeholders. For example, the U.S. Senate recently called for “civilian control over security forces” as one of the preconditions for full normalization of relations between Zimbabwe and the United States (U.S. Senate 2009).

Prior to the transition, top leaders of the defence forces vowed publicly not to recognize Prime Minister Tsvangirai in any official capacity. Some security chiefs – the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, the Commissioner-General of Police, and the Commissioner of Prisons – still refuse to salute him. These holdouts from the old order have also declined to attend milestone events in the life of the transitional government, including the inauguration ceremony for the Prime Minister and official gatherings to launch the *Short-Term Economic Recovery Program* and *100-Day Plan*. Thus, Zimbabwe’s transitional government inherited a deeply politicized security establishment whose loyalty to elected civilian leaders is in open doubt.

In accordance with the power-sharing deal, a National Security Council (NSC) with multiparty civilian representation was intended to replace the Joint Operations Command. Chaired by the President, it has as its membership the two national Vice-Presidents (ZANU-PF), the Prime Minister and his two deputies (MDC), ten other ministers, five security chiefs, and two top bureaucrats. The Act specifies that the Council reviews national policies affecting security, defence, law and order (nationally, regionally and internationally) and directs appropriate action.

The Act provides for at least one NSC meeting per month and for decisions to be reached by consensus. Although the Act establishes the Council’s supremacy over any law other than the Constitution, it applies only for the duration of the transitional government and therefore will cease to have effect on the date on that the GPA terminates. In practice,

six months passed before the NSC held a formal introductory meeting. But it transacted no serious business and now only meets sporadically. Given the improbable requirement that its decisions must be made by consensus, the NSC is an unlikely vehicle to engineer the necessary security sector reforms. In reality, the civilians in the MDC lack the expertise and authority to compel the military to renovate itself (Pion-Berlin 2005, Trinkunas 2005).

Unlike ZANU-PF, that had a military wing when it gained power in 1980 and could therefore bargain effectively with the generals in the Rhodesian Security Forces, the MDC has no armed structure. As Chitiyo notes, the MDC is “an overwhelmingly civilian organization that will have to learn the language of the military if it is to engage with them” . Thus, Prime Minister Tsvangirai seems to have tacitly resigned himself to playing second fiddle to President Mugabe with regard to the critical security sector. As long as the likes of Brigadier Douglas Nyikayaramba continue to utter political statements to the effect that they will resign if Tsvangirai wins the next election then reconciliation in Zimbabwe remains bleak.

The past has many layers. This fact needs to be acknowledged before addressing the past through a reconciliation process. Many violent conflicts and wars are not simply the outcome of one particular set of recent circumstances that led to violence. For example, reconciliation processes in Latin America often focus quite naturally on the violence of a particular military regime, but a full understanding of many of those conflicts also requires an investigation of the much longer history of the treatment of indigenous people at the hands of settler cultures.

In Croatia, the focus of reconciliation is on the violence of the war in the 1990s, but no reconciliation process could function properly without the understanding that there is a long history of violent episodes between the opposing sides, and that the oppressor side at one stage has also been the oppressed at other times. The Zimbabwean GPA is specifically

focused on the 2008 violence yet some even pressing issues need to be addressed from mysterious murders of the liberation struggle, Matebeleland violence and alleged CIO disappearances. All these issues needs to be addressed yet no one is willing to have them addressed thus people will not reconcile as long as they still feel grieved and want closure.

The same applies in Rwanda and Burundi, where the tables have been turned more than once over time, so that the victims of one outburst of violence have become the perpetrators of the next. This clearly raises the question of the period of time the reconciliation process should cover. Does it refer only to the latest outbreak of civil war or violence? If it does, will that leave unresolved the atrocities committed at another time by another group? How far back in history should a reconciliation process reach? Is living memory the realistic limit? Or can, and should, amends be made for historic wrongs? There are no easy answers, that such complexity must be thought through and resolved, even if there are apparently logical arguments for reducing the problem to the least complex form, that seems most amenable to a solution. A realistic balance must be struck that takes into account all the conflicting claims on justice, all the differing demands for truth, and all the pain and suffering that may arise from the many layers of a complex social history.

More global factors may impact as well. For example, in some regions, especially in Africa, the pre-independence history of a country will have a vital role to play in explaining the dynamics of post-colonial conflict. In many situations the cold war will have been a factor. While the greater, global agenda of East-West ideology inflamed many violent conflicts, it also acted as a fire blanket on others, keeping them “on hold” so that those involved were released only in the 1990s to continue their struggle on their own terms. Conflict analysis is always complex and

wide-ranging, and the analysis that underpins the reconciliation process must be no less nuanced and extensive.

There is considerable debate concerning the starting point for transitional justice mechanisms. The post-March 2008 electoral violence was the latest of several periods of violence. The others include, but are not limited to: resistance to colonial intrusion, the liberation war, the gukurahundi massacres, the land invasions of 2000 onwards, and Operation Murambatsvina (ICTJ *et al.*, 2008). While it would be practical to focus on political repression since 2000, there are concerns about leaving earlier periods out.

These earlier periods are considered important to develop historical understandings of processes of state and community violence, and because it is believed that a culture of impunity developed from these earlier periods (Eppel and Raftopoulos, 2009; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2009). The specific choice of dates and periods for national healing generally seemed to be motivated by individual and group experiences (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2009).

In situations where ethnicity is an issue in the choice of time coverage (e.g. Shona advocating for the most recent period and Ndebele concerned with the 1980s), it is important to give consideration to the different periods to prevent a divisive dialogue (ICTJ *et al.*, 2008; RAU, 2009b). Ultimately, the question of who decides what to „remember“ and what to „forget“ can be very political (de Plessis and Ford, 2009). The current political experience is not forthcoming when it comes to taking a broader perspective of the conflict it just dealing with surface issues to the conflict.

The ethnic differences in Zimbabwe are broadly reflected in geographical location, for instance, in the physical separation of the Ndebele and the Shona to specific parts of Zimbabwe. It is difficult to

generalize about the effect of geography on conflict, except to say that either situation can work positively or negatively in creating the space for reconciliation, and so must be taken into account when planning for a reconciliation process.

Geographical separation can make it easier to coexist, or that very distance can make it more difficult to generate the interaction that could lead to cooperative relationship-building. On the one hand, “good fences make good neighbours”. On the other hand, it is virtually impossible for people to challenge their negative images and stereotypes of a former enemy to engender better understanding and a minimum of respect if they do not encounter them as a human

It is difficult to generalize about the effect of geography on conflict, except to say that either situation can work positively or negatively in creating the space for reconciliation, and so must be taken into account when planning for a reconciliation process. As long as Zimbabwe is divided into Shona Ndebele Karanga tribalised region group identity will always rule supreme over national identity. Matebeleland will always identify itself as victims of Gukurahundi while the Shona will also have differing views over the Ndebele.

Geographical separation can make it easier to coexist, or that very distance can make it more difficult to generate the interaction that could lead to cooperative relationship-building. On the one hand, “good fences make good neighbours”. On the other hand, it is virtually impossible for people to challenge their negative images and stereotypes of a former enemy to engender better understanding and a minimum of respect if they do not encounter them as a human.

The problem with the Zimbabwean situation now is that it has transcended geographical context. It has moved from being a Matebeleland and Mashonaland problem but has changed to village

against village, family against family and brother against brother thus a lot of players are now involved that makes it difficult to have lasting reconciliation. The 2008 political violence was a countrywide phenomenon that affected the generality of the population

The government's frequent claims of external plots to destabilize Zimbabwe encompass a long and increasingly irrational list of saboteurs, such the International Monetary Fund, the British government, and an international gay conspiracy. In occasional bouts of official schizophrenia, the government sometimes combines these threats, such as President Robert Mugabe's public rant against Tony Blair as the "the gay government of the gay United gay Kingdom." Another recent example is the claim in the *Herald*, a government mouthpiece, that the US, at the behest of the UK, is now controlling the weather to cause a drought in Zimbabwe. While these outbursts suggest either cynical propaganda or growing paranoia among the leadership, they are simply not credible explanations of the crisis.

A less hysterical version of external blame could be related to the cutoff of international aid. Certainly, donors have withdrawn hundreds of millions of dollars in aid from Zimbabwe and the government could plausibly argue that this precipitated the crisis and contributed to violence. Even Bulawayo province governor Cain Mathema went on to claim that the British were responsible for the Gukurahundi shows that the future of reconciliation in Zimbabwe is bleak as there is no acknowledgement from those responsible and is an assault on those who suffered and continue to suffer due to the crisis.

Thus while the country is under western sanctions the government continues to use this as an excuse to trample upon the people with impunity. ZANU PF in particular has devised a method of dividing the people along political lines and anyone holding views contrary to theirs is an agent of the West. Through the public media many people are

constantly labeled as sellouts. While in Masvingo Jabulani Sibanda the war veterans leader labeled Tsvangirai a snake that should be killed. This makes it difficult to envisage a situation where Zimbabweans are reconciled. While there is an inclusive government the leadership is not united with Tsvangirai describing the government as dysfunctional while ZANU PF continues to accuse Tsvangirai of running a parallel government which shows that reconciliation is far from being achieved.

Instead of taking stock of its past rule ZANU PF has created a situation where every outsider is evil. Thus there is no reconciliation between the West and the former ruling party which transcend down to the grassroots as people are forced to toe the party line. In the present situation the focus should be on internal cohesion and not on imaginary enemies because violence against each other is not as a result of foreigners.

In Zimbabwe one critical factor that comes into play when considering issues of reconciliation is the role of the international community in facilitating transitional justice. In the absence of a broad-based international involvement, the parties to the conflict may be limited to the option of trading justice for reconciliation and peace as a way of avoiding continued violence. Those who support the discourse of non-interference argue that in most cases, international actors do not speak with one voice as they have their own interests and agenda regarding transitional justice processes.

In the case of Zimbabwe, those who oppose the involvement of the international community in the transitional justice process argue that their agenda is limited to regime change by undemocratic means. There is also the view that long-lasting reconciliation and peace needs to be home-grown in the sense that every stage of the reconciliation process should reflect the will of those who are directly concerned with regards

to participation, decision making and the implementation of the reconciliation and national healing project.

Whilst such questions are open to debate, past cases have shown that the involvement of the UN or SADC has been successful in cases where social and political spaces are constrained and world concern over the situation of human rights violations and human security were high and persistent. Conditions for successful reconciliation national healing and reconciliation to achieve the desired objective of uniting the fractured social and political groups, certain factors must be present.

Legislative Reform would ensure that the concerns of all Zimbabweans are assuaged. The process of recommending specific services to deal with the particular and extensive effects of trauma and grief requires secured legislative backing through the setting up of the National Healing and Reconciliation Commission. The National Healing and Reconciliation Commission would have to be secured by a bill passed through Parliament and enacted into an act of law. Such an act would allow the commission the discretion to: establish the time periods to be covered by the Commissions investigations; determine the nature of human rights abuses to be investigated; determine the social and economic effects of the abuses including recommending preventive and health promoting approaches, assessment, counseling, healing programmes and community interventions.

Political will is important in raking past atrocities and human rights abuses is an excruciating exercise. If badly managed, the exercise could backfire, and further widen the chasm in an already politically-fractured nation. Indeed, this fear often deters the introduction of just reconciliation processes where victims feel a genuine sense of satisfaction over the claimed entitlements. Hence, the political will to promote genuine reconciliation is paramount.

There should transformative and restorative justice that is based on a theory that emphasises healing and the transformation of harm to the wholeness of people's lives. Emphasis is on repairing harm caused or revealed by criminal behaviour and is best achieved through cooperative processes that include all stakeholders. The fundamental principles are that justice requires that different categories of people work to restore those who have been injured and that those most directly involved and affected should have the opportunity to participate fully in the response programme. The role of government would be to preserve a just public order and secure and safe social and political spaces, while the role of the community would be to build, nurture and maintain a just peace. Such collaborative encounters would create opportunities for victims/survivors, offenders and community members to discuss their personal experiences of atrocities and their impact and opportunities for meaningful contribution in their own lives and society.

True reconciliation cannot occur when the truths about past wrongs are not told. Truth-telling encourages the verification of past repressive actions and incidents by individuals and government. The process may also challenge stories widely, but inaccurately, circulated in the public domain as rumour. Knowledge of the truth helps to set the record straight and creates an environment where forgiveness may occur. As the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission revealed, the value of telling ones traumatic story to a supportive audience provided a significant sense of healing to the survivors of apartheid. In this sense, the right to be heard and acknowledged with respect and empathy can contribute to a process of healing.

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
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Carter Center (associated with Emory University)

Synopsis

This study explores the Peacebuilding and Unity Reinforcement Under the Reconciliation Mantra in Zimbabwe, 1980-2011. It examines the various peace initiatives undertaken since independence with specific focus on the reconciliation policy, the Unity accord and the Global Political agreement. It traces the history of political violence to the establishment of colonial rule and conquest. The study also explores the duality of violence and peace during the armed struggle where on one hand the freedom fighters preached peace but enforced it through violence which created a violence prone politics witnessed after 1980. This is a qualitative research study, which draws data from document analysis, interviews and focus group discussions. The central thesis is that violence has been a major affront to peacebuilding, thereby affecting development. Peace building strategies employed have helped to deescalate violence but have failed to advance the democratization and development process in Zimbabwe. The study recommends that governments and political parties must strive to build peace in their political processes in order to achieve sustainable peace and development.

About the Author



John Makambanga is a PhD holder from the University of South Africa. He has MA and a BA Honours in History and Development Studies both from Midlands State University. His research interests are in Human Security, Human Rights, peace building, social justice, and Politics and Development. He is the Director of Postgraduate studies at Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University.