CHAPTER TWO: LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MUNICIPAL SERVICE DELIVERY AND DECENTRALISATION: A REVIEW

The purpose of the chapter is to critically review literature related to the study in the canon of research. for the purpose of systematic analysis. The chapter further identifies gaps in the existing literature which will inform further research on the subject. Gerrish and Lacey (2010) contend that a conceptual framework identifies the researcher's world view and so delineates assumptions and pre-conceptions about the area being studied. For Baka (2017), a conceptual framework possesses ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions, and each concept within a conceptual framework plays an ontological or epistemological role. In the same context, a theoretical framework relates to the philosophical basis of the research linking theoretical aspects and practical components of the research by providing a particular perspective through which to examine a topic. The purpose and relevance of conceptual and theoretical framework to this study are multifaceted and include making scientific findings meaningful and generalisable, helping to summarise existing knowledge into coherent systems and stimulating new research by providing both direction and impetus. Key concepts of this study are: Sub-national government, local government, decentralisation, leadership and management, accountability service delivery and efficiency. In the same context, the related body of theories to be examined include the democratic participation theory, efficiency services theory and the systems theory.

A conceptual framework of a study as defined by Miles and Huberman, (1994) and Robson, (2011) refers to the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs and theories that supports and informs research. Miles and Huberman, (1994.18) further added that it (conceptual framework) is a visual or written product that: "explains either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied, the key factors, concepts, or variables and the presumed relationship among them" In a nutshell a conceptual framework is an analytical tool with several variations and context used to make conceptual distinction or a group of concepts that are broadly defined and systematically organised to provide a focus, a rationale and a tool for

integration and interpretation of information. The concepts are discussed in a thematic form in line with the research questions in the preceding chapter and also within the context of the Zimbabwe legal and governance framework.

Local government in Zimbabwe refers to the third tier of government provided for in section 5 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 20 of 2013. Generally local government is considered to be the level of government closest to the people with responsibility for provision of local services and providing a platform for local representation. According Meyer (1999) local governments are local democratic units within a democratic system vested with prescribed, controlled governmental powers and sources of revenue to render specific local service. Local governments, because of their proximity to the people are better placed to execute those functions which central government is too remote to execute efficiently. According to Sebola (2015, 4), "local government, being at lower level, may appear insignificant but it remains the most significant sphere that deals with pragmatic political, social and economic affairs of a country." Teune, (1995) emphasises the same point by stating that: local government is where the day to day activities of politics and government gets done.

Definitions of local government in the literature are many and varied but have the following commonalities:
- it is a decentralised level of government;
- it is largely democratically established;
- it is a legal entity with defined powers;
- it is territorial in nature;
- it is largely self-financing;
- it is largely autonomous

Wunsch and Olowu (2004. 7) observe that "political science is relatively clear that local governments must meet certain basic requirements if they are to be able to solve problems effectively. They must be able to identify problems, set priorities, mobilise resources, implement programs, evaluate results, learn from those results and maintain popular legitimacy." The representation and

service delivery dimension are the most visible characteristics of local government.

Local governments understand the concerns of local residents as the leadership and operational staff is also local. Local Government is therefore intricately linked to the concept of decentralisation (Conyers, 2004, Shah and Shah, 2006; Oates, 1972, UNDP, 2008, Chigwata, 2015). Local government refers to specific institutions or entities created by nations in constitutions, by state constitutions, by ordinary legislation to deliver a range of services to relatively small geographically delineated areas (Shah and Shah, 2006). So from the works of early writers like Tocquiville there is general acceptance of the criticality of local government as a service delivery vehicle.

While local government in Zimbabwe is currently experiencing challenges, this has not always been the case, as noted by Adamolekun (2002; 57), "Examples of good development performance by local governments in Sub Saharan African countries are few. The decent quality of municipal government staff in Zimbabwe is a major explanatory factor for the fairly satisfactory performance of municipal governments in that country. One of the most notable achievements by Zimbabwe's local government is their ability to generate a significant proportion of their total revenue: 70-95 percent for urban local governments and 50-75% for rural and district local governments."

What has gone wrong in Zimbabwe's local government sector in the light of such positive comments is the subject of this study.

Shah and Shah (2006. 3) aver that "several accepted theories provide a strong rationale for decentralised decision-making and a strong role for local governments on the grounds of efficiency, accountability, manageability and autonomy". Shah and Shah go further to argue that Stigler (1957) identifies two principles to support this position, namely that: the closer a representative government is to the people, the better it works and that people should have the right to vote for the kind and amount of public services they want.

Oates (1972) has come up with the decentralisation theorem which observes how each public service should be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that would internalize benefits and costs of such provision because:

- local governments understand the concerns of local residents,
- local decision-making is responsive to the people for whom the services are intended, thus encouraging fiscal responsibility and efficiency especially if financial services are also decentralised unnecessary layers of jurisdiction are eliminated and inter-jurisdictional competition and innovation are enhanced.

The other theory is the principle of subsidiarity which evolved from the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and observes how taxing, spending and regulatory functions should be exercised at the lower level of government. This principle contrasts with the principle common in many unitary states where local governments are assigned functions that central government is unwilling or unable to perform. These principles point to the need for decisions to be made at the lowest level of government, consistent with the goal of allocative efficiency. The other accepted theory justifying the need for local government is the principle of democratic local governance. There is increased recognition that in examining issues of service delivery at local level it is important to consider the role of other players and actors beyond local government. This shift resonates more and more with the notion of a more inclusive approach in policy making and implementation. The concept of democratic local governance has become an integral part of local development approaches (UNDP, 2008). Local governance is thus a broader concept and is defined as the formulation and execution of collective action at the local level (Shah and Shah, 2006).

Local governance has also been defined as a variety of institutions and processes, government and non-government which collectively determine the way in which decision are made and implemented at local level. UNDP (2008. 5) posits that: "while local government is the essential building block for local governance, the wider governance sphere comprises a set of state and non-state institutions, mechanisms and processes through which public goods

and services are delivered to citizens and through which citizens can articulate and exercise their interests and needs, mediate their differences and exercise their rights and obligations."

By broadening the scope of analysis to include other players at local level, a more realistic picture of challenges of service delivery faced by local governments can begin to emerge. Such an analysis enables more realistic mitigation strategies to be crafted. Issues of intergovernmental relations and citizen participation have been cited as central to the prevailing service delivery challenges in Zimbabwe (Muchadenyika and William, 2016; Chigwata, 2015; Muchapondwa and de Visser, 2017 and Chatiza, 2010). The increased emphasis on good governance extends to the local level as citizens clamour for accountability, ethical conduct, integrity and honesty from the elected leaders and local governments staff. Usually, this results in the shift towards decentralised governance in Zimbabwe and other countries. The shift is part of the major public sector reforms aimed at tapping potential benefits from incorporating non-governmental actors particularly given the hypothesis that inclusion of non-government players, including civil society associations improves effectiveness of local government systems (Msyamboza, Ngwira, Dzowela, Mvula, Kathyola, Harries and Bowie 2011; Olowu,2003; Pradeep,2011; Mutema, 2016).

Local governments are generally established to achieve three broad objectives. The first objective is to provide public services at affordable cost to a heterogeneous citizenry particularly those services which can be provided more efficiently and effectively by local governments than by central governments. The second objective is to regulate the conduct of individuals and organisations in areas under their jurisdiction within the limits set by national legislation. Thirdly, local governments are established to promote public participation in government as a means of enabling and encouraging people to exercise their rights and responsibilities as citizens (Government of Zimbabwe, 1999).

Services provided by local governments are typically those which the private sector may not deliver at all or deliver in insufficient quantities. The delivery of such public services ensures inclusion of those who would otherwise not

afford the market price of such goods and services. Economists generally classify such goods and services as public goods and services whose production, because of their characteristics, results in market failure as contrasted to private goods and services where markets operate efficiently and the exclusion principle can be applied. Public goods and services are non – excludable, non-rivalry in consumption and jointed in use. Public goods and services are also subject to free riding, where non-payers can enjoy the goods and services without paying. Private goods and services on the other hand are excludable, rivalry in consumption and rejectable (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1991, Olowu, 2002). Whereas private goods and services are financed from user charges, public goods and services are normally financed from taxes because it is difficult to allocate costs to individual consumers, streetlights being a classic example (Olowu, 2002).

Although the public sector has been the main provider of public goods and services, increasingly now, through various partnership arrangements and technological advances the private sector is becoming a major player. However, the onus to ensure availability of such goods and services to the populace is on local government though it does not necessarily have to produce them. Local governments can provide the enabling and regulatory environment for provision of the goods and services. This is typical under the new public management school where the private sector and markets assume a greater role in the provision of goods and services. Under the new public management, the role of local government is limited to enabling and regulating service delivery to ensure the poor are not marginalised from accessing the services because the private sector's end motive is profit.

A case study in support of service delivery under the new public management is that of failure by local government in South Africa to deliver services resulting in protests erupting in municipalities (IDASA, 2010). Partnering the private sector has yielded positive dividends in terms of service delivery. Some of the common explanations of local government challenges in service delivery in South Africa include, institutional challenges, administrative tensions between councillors and management, lack of trust between citizens and municipalities, irresponsiveness of political leadership, incompetence,

lack of capacity and corruption (Koelble and LiPuana, 2008; IDASA, 2010). Such challenges are common in local government in Zimbabwe.

There is a huge corpus of literature supporting the view that although local government have the role of service delivery in many countries, Zimbabwe included, they are not performing to people's expectations and aspirations. There are service delivery slippages in both quality and quantity. Efficient and effective provision is lacking and accountability is weak (World Bank, 2004, UNDP, 2008; Smoke, 2015; Government of Zimbabwe, 2008; World Bank, 2017; Rogger, 2009; Resnick, 2014; Koeble, 2008; Chigwata, 2017; Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016).

Resnick, (2014) argues that the rapid urbanisation taking place in Sub Saharan Africa and some of the consequences arising from such rapid growth has contributed to the decline in service delivery. The World Bank, observes how by 2030, Africa will become an urban continent with more than 50% of the population living in cities. Resnick (2014p:53) further observes that "while African cities are undoubtedly vibrant locales that generate approximately 60% of the region's economic growth, this increase in demographic pressure places a strain on already weak service delivery". Much of this rapid growth is fuelled more by natural population growth in cities, rather than rural urban migration (Freud 2007). Cohen (2006) argues that rapid urbanisation in developing countries is seriously outstripping the capacities of cities to adequately provide services to citizens.

In the case of Zimbabwe, an area requiring further research is the rapid housing development in peri urban areas and the impact of such development on urban services. As the capacity of local governments to deliver housing has declined, this space is now occupied by housing co-operatives and private land developers. While this new initiative has provided much need urban housing, it has not been without its own challenges. Traditionally, before a new housing estate can be developed, there was need to have in place on-site services which included roads, water and sewer reticulation systems and electricity. The new trend in most cities and towns is that private developers will sell stands and the beneficiaries proceed to construct houses even before basic services are in place. This is the concept of parallel development

adopted by the ministry responsible for local governments to fulfil housing construction targets in line with the National Housing Policy thrust of 2004. The consequences of this policy have been disastrous as beneficiaries proceed to occupy their houses after construction with no water or sewer reticulation systems in place, exposing them to the risk of waterborne diseases like typhoid and cholera.

Developers have only approached local governments after houses have already been constructed and are occupied with beneficiaries putting pressure on them for services. The situation has been made worse by adjacent Rural District Councils and traditional leaders also selling stands envisaged to be eventually incorporated into the adjacent urban area. This has played havoc with the service design capacity of cities like Harare. In the case of Gweru, many new housing estates like Woodlands1 and 2, Hertfordshire 1 and 2, Ridgemont Heights, Tatenda Park and Northgate have emerged through stands sold by private developers like River Valley and Striations World Marketing with little or no consent from City of Gweru. In fact, in all these new housing estates there are no approved water, roads and sewer engineering designs. The new suburbs have added an additional 14 455 housing units on the current housing stock of 33 000, an increase of almost 50% with no upgrades in offsite water and sewer infrastructure. GCC is having challenges in servicing current housing in stock which means any additional houses create further pressure on GCC. Developers on the other hand are not contributing to offsite infrastructure upgrades. The residents of the new suburbs continue to pile pressure on GCC for services (Herald 19 December 2017) The pressure arising from unplanned demand for service has to extent compounded an already deteriorating service delivery system.

Another area noted by Rensick (2014) which is also mirrored in the Zimbabwe local government sector is that of vertically divided authority. Through political decentralisation and the consolidation of democracy on the African continent, elections at local level have not always reflected those at national level. Many African cities are now run by the opposition parties. In South Africa, cities like Cape Town and more recently Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth (Nelson Mandela Bay) are run by the opposition Democratic Alliance. In Zimbabwe, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change has

been running virtually all urban councils from the 2000 elections onwards (Dewa *et al.*, 2014) Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016; Chigwata, 2017). Rensick (2014.54) argues that historically, in Africa, cities are where opposition parties first gain a foothold in their countries political scene before potentially garnering national support because not only are cities economic hubs of their countries but they also have large populations and therefore voters. Cities become battle grounds for political competition. In the case of capital cities like Harare, this is also the seat of power. Ruling parties in control of central government have been observed to undermine and subvert opposition controlled local governments. Vertically divided authority has implications for service delivery and governance at local government level as it has a bearing on centre local relations including allocation of resources. The deliberate marginalisation of existing urban local authorities in housing development in Zimbabwe cities and towns bears hallmarks of the ruling party's desire to increase urban votes in its favour and in the process regain control of urban areas. In this thesis, vertical divided authority and its ramifications are further discussed in the context of the concept of decentralised governance. Suffice to say that there is ample evidence in Zimbabwe of centre local discord and tension regards some of the policy directives emanating from the centre which have service delivery implications (Chigwata, 2017, Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016).

In South Africa, service delivery protests have erupted in municipalities (IDASA 2010). Koelble and LiPuana (2008) in a detailed study of 18 municipalities in South Africa, conclude that institutional factors are more important in explaining lack of service delivery as contrasted with funding issues and centre local relations. IDASA (2010) posits that: in South Africa, local government is the least trusted of all public institutions in the country. It is argued that political leadership in local government lacks responsiveness to issues raised by communities. Local governments are further viewed as incompetent and corrupt (IDASA 2010).

To overcome the challenges of service delivery, in South Africa there is need to curb corruption, emphasise open government which should be accountable, transparent and open to public scrutiny (IDASA 2010). There is need to improve the culture of public participation. Municipalities should resolve

political and administrative tensions between the councillors and management. IDASA (2010) also highlights the need for capacity building.

All these recommendations are relevant for Zimbabwe. The World Bank, 2004; World Development Reports observes that too often services fail poor people in access, in quantity, in quality. The Accountability Triangle proposed by the World Bank (2004) provides a useful framework to crystallise and enhance service delivery. In this context local governments play a major role as politicians and policy makers and also as service providers. Accountability which is further discussed in this thesis is defined as a relationship among actors that have five features, delegation, finance, performance, information about performance and enforceability (World Development Report 2004).

Pradeep (2011) observes that major service delivery challenges in Matara Municipal Council Sri Lanka included shortage of sufficient and competent human resource, unclear powers and functions, poor public private partnerships and inadequate financial resources. Similar challenges are noted in the local government sector in Zimbabwe. The human resource challenge in Zimbabwe is particularly acute in technical areas of engineering and health services. In the case of City of Gweru, vacancies exit in these two services mainly because of difficulties with staff retention (City Treasury Report 2010). Zimbabwe suffered a massive skills flight during the hyperinflation period from 2005 to 2009. City of Gweru only recently (2016) filled positions of Director of Health Services, Director of Engineering Services and Director of Housing and Community Services which had been vacant for many years (City of Gweru Caretakers Report 2017). This obviously has implications for service delivery. The Housing and Community Services director's post had been vacant from 2008 to 2017.

The legal framework for effective service delivery is also an area which keeps coming up in the literature (Chigwata, 2017; Muchadenyika and William, 2016; Mushamba, 2010; Chatiza, 2017; Koelble, 2008). As already alluded to, in the case of Zimbabwe, the Constitution and other legal instruments define powers of local government. Some of the services local governments deliver are provided for as 'rights' in the Constitution of Zimbabwe. Sections 75, 76

and 77 observes how every citizen has a right to education, health care and water respectively. Municipal councils have had challenges installing prepaid water meters because residents consider water a right which they must have regardless of whether they pay or not. Local governments are owed millions of dollars by residents who are reluctant to honour their obligation including water charges. This weighs down on service provision. City of Gweru is currently owed $55 million by residents (Director of Finance Report, 2018).

For local governments to unlock there potential and overcome the myriads of challenges faced, it is necessary to consider the quality of leadership running this organisation and the management processes in place. How local governments are managed and led has a bearing on whether services are delivered efficiently or not.

Leadership is a central feature of organisational performance (Mullins 2013, 366). Local Governments as organisations have elected councillors and the appointed staff of council in leadership position. Their performance as leaders has a major bearing on the performance of council. According to Schermerhorn (2008, 320) "leadership is the process of inspiring others to work hard to accomplish important tasks; Leading in organisations is one of the four management functions which include planning, organising and controlling. In the current climate in Zimbabwe, where service delivery has declined, the quality of leadership in councils has come under increasing scrutiny. Cronje (2001) defines leadership as the ability to influence others to cooperate willingly for the attainment of an organisation's pre-determined goals. Bennis (1997) contends that the single defining quality of leaders is their ability to create and realise a vision French (1975) observes how leadership is the process of influencing the behaviour of others in the direction of a goal or set of goals is or more broadly towards a vision of the future.

Chapter 9, Section 194 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 20 of 2013 outlines principles of public administration and leadership which should guide those holding public office. These include
- a higher standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained;

- efficient and economical use of resources must be promoted;
- public administration must be development-oriented;
- service must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias;
- public administration must be accountable to Parliament and to the people;
- transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely accessible and accurate information;
- Public officers in leadership positions must abide by the following principles of leadership provided for in Section 196 of the Constitution;
- Objective and impartiality in decision-making;
- Honesty in the execution of public duties;
- Accountability to the public for decision and actions; and
- Discipline and commitment in the service of the people.

From the foregoing it clear issues of honesty, integrity and transparency and accountability are key if councillors and officials are to earn public trust in the service delivery mandate. Council officials are there to serve not rule. Issues of corruption and abuse are anathema to service delivery and local governance. Local leaders must be accountable to their constituency, the residents. Effective leadership should influence both individual and organisational performance.

Mullins (2013, 3) quotes the Confederation of British Industries report which observes that "Effective leaders, who can inspire their people to realise their personal and collective potential are often the deciding factor between a company being good at what it does and achieving greatness." The performance of local Government management leaders in general and City of Gweru in particular needs to be interrogated from both perspectives.

It is clear in Zimbabwe that some local Governments are performing better than others. The service level benchmarking awards carried out by the ministry responsible for local government which have now become an annual event try to speak to these performance variations.

Concerning the transition in leadership theories, leadership today is increasingly associated not with command and control but with the concept of teamwork, getting along with other people, inspiration and creating a vision with which others identify with (Mullins, 2013.369). In this regard, council officials are there serve not rule. A massive body of knowledge on leadership now exists ranging from classical theorists including Fredrick Taylor, and his Scientific Management, Henri Fayol's Administrative Principles and Max Weber's Bureaucracy. The early theories focused on coming up with universal principles which would be applicable in any management situation. Later theories including Great Man and Trait theories, Transactional and Transformational Theories focus more on leadership of organisations, characteristics and behaviours of successful leaders and the role of followers and the contextual nature of leadership.

The table below outlines some of the main theoretical perspectives on leadership.

Table 2:1 Main Theoretical Perspectives on Leadership (Bolden R, Gosling, J, Marturano, A., and Dennison, F., 2003)

Greatman Theories	Based on the belief that leaders are exceptional people, born with innate qualities, destined to lead. Leadership was thought to be a male preserve hence the use of the term 'man'
Trait Theories	Developed from Great Man theories and list the traits or qualities associated with leadership.
Behaviourists theories	Concentrate on what leaders do rather than their qualities. This manifests itself in styles of leadership
Situational leadership	Sees leadership as specific to the situation. Some situations may require autocratic style while others may require participative approaches
Contingency theory	A refinement of situational approach where leadership response is contingent or depends on the situation at hand. There is no one best way to lead.
Transactional leadership	Emphasises relationship between leader and followers focusing on mutual benefits derived – where leader delivers rewards for commitment or loyalty
Transformational leadership	The central concept is change and the role of the leader in formulating and implementing the transformation of organisational performance

Trait theories are inconclusive as no consistent traits are identified. Behavioural theories, on the other hand, give little guidance on what constitutes effective leadership in different situations. Contingency theories take on board varying situations, the people, the task, the organisation and the environment (Bolden et al 2003). Transformational leadership theory which was first put forward by Burns (2008) was further developed by Bass (2009) into transformational leadership to enhance organisational performance through transforming the followers. For local governments to perform to the satisfaction of residents, leaders and managers need to bring themselves up to speed with the literature on leadership. Capacity building initiatives which take place with increasing frequency need to develop the leadership and management capacity of elected and appointed staff of council.

Leadership models like the Hamlias Generic Model of Managerial and Leadership Effectiveness can be a useful tool to improve performance. (Bolden et al 2003) The model distinguishes between positive and negative indications of management and leadership.

Positive indicators:
- Effective organisation and planning / proactive management;
- Participative and supportive / proactive team leadership;
- Empowerment and delegation;
- Genuine concern of people / look after needs of staff;
- Open and personal management approach / inclusive decision-making;
- Communicates and consults / keeps people informed

Negative Indicators
- Shows lack of consideration or concern for staff / ineffective autocratic or dictatorial style of management;
- Uncaring self-serving management / undermining, depriving and intimidating behaviour;
- Tolerance of poor performance and low standards / ignoring and avoidance;
- Abdicating roles and responsibilities;
- Resistant to new ideas / negative approach.

Closely related to the positive indicators of management are the principles of effective leadership to which public officers in leadership positions must abide by. These include objective and impartiality in decision-making, honesty in the execution of public duties, accountability to the public for decisions and actions and discipline and commitment in the service of the people (Karima, 2018). These principles are key if councillors and officials are to earn public trust in discharging the service delivery mandate. Local leaders must be accountable to their constituency and the residents (Bjuremalm, Molleda and Gibaja2014). The performance of local government management leaders, in general and the GCC in particular, needs to be interrogated from both perspectives. It is clear that some local governments in Zimbabwe are performing better than others. The service level benchmarking awards carried out by the Ministry of Local Government Public Works and National Housing speak to these performance variations.

Though the concepts 'leadership' and 'management' have generally been used interchangeably in literature, in a local government setting it may be necessary to consider the difference and similarities between the two. The term 'management' is normally ascribed to appointed staff of council while the 'leadership' is assigned to the politically elected representatives. However, in practical terms, the appointed staff of council, in their various capacities, have a leadership role.

The concept of 'leadership' has already been defined and it is pertinent therefore to define the term 'management' and further examine their points of divergence. Management is broad and varied thus "it is a function, a discipline, a task" (Peter Drucker, 1974: 6). As a task, management is the process of setting and achieving goals through the execution of the basic management functions using human, financial and material resources (Plunkett & Attner, 1983). Related to achieving goals, management entails a process of coordinating and integrating work activities so that they are completed efficiently and effectively with and through people (Schermerhorn,

2008). Therefore, management is the art of getting things done through people and assuming responsibility for the work performance of one or more persons (Stoner, Freeman & Gilbert,1996). Management activities entail planning, organising, leading and controlling the use of resources to accomplish certain performance goals (Robbins & Coulter, 1999).

Figure 2. 1: The Management Process (Robins & Coulter, 1999)

Whereas the definitions of leadership and management have certain commonalities, there are also significant differences. A manager focuses on the management functions of planning, organising, leading and controlling as a result of the formal position of authority held in the organisation whereas a leader is any person capable of persuading other people to strive for certain goals, formal or informal, irrespective of position (Robbins, 1996). Some of the differences between management and leadership process are illustrated in Table 2.1

Table 2:2 Differences between management and leadership (Kotterman, 2006)

Process	Management	Leadership
Vision establishment	Plans and budgets Develop process steps and sets timelines Displays impersonal attitude about vision and goals	Sets direction and develops vision Develops strategic plans and achieve vision Displays very passionate attitude about vision and goals
Human Development and Networking	Organises staff Maintains structure Delegates responsibility Implements vision Establishes policy and procedures to implement vision Display low emotion Limits employee choices	Aligns organisation Communicates vision, mission and direction Influences creation of coalitions, teams and partnerships that understand and accept the vision Display drive and high emotion Increases choices
Vision execution	Controls processes Identifies problems Solves problems Monitors results Takes low risk approach	Motivates and inspires Energises employees to overcome barriers to change Satisfies basic human needs Takes high risk approach to problem solving
Vision outcome	Manages vision order and predictability Provides expected results consistently to leadership and stakeholders	Proactive useful and dramatic changes such as new products or approaches to improving labour relations

If local councils are to perform efficiently and effectively, it is clear from the comparison that they need both managers and leaders. The managers have to be clear about their roles, with the correct skills mix while the leaders have to possess requisite leadership qualities. Consequently, transformational leadership becomes the leadership style of choice as local government operating environment varies. The importance of high-quality managers and leaders (elected councillors and the appointed staff) for local government service delivery effectiveness is reflected in the concept of "productivity through people" where council members (managers, leaders and followers) are its source of quality and value (Peters & Waterman, 1982: 33). Not only are the managers and leaders necessary for productivity but they are also

critical for the survival of modern institutions (Drucker, 1974). This assertion invariably includes local government.

Elected councillors and the appointed staff of councils are at the coalface of service delivery in urban authorities. Effective and efficient provision of service hinges on the performance of these two groups of officials in their capacity as leaders, as representatives and as managers. It is also pertinent to argue that local governments are organisations and have an environment in which they operate. These concepts therefore are discussed in the next section.

Society depends on organisations for supply of goods and services. Schermerhorn (2008) defines an organisation as a collection of people coming together to achieve a common purpose. Individuals and groups interact within the structure of the formal organisation. Structure is created to establish relationships between individuals and groups, to provide order and systems and to direct the efforts of the organisation into goal seeking activities (Mullins 2013, 10).

Local governments are organisations established to provide services. To accomplish these tasks, local government have a structure which brings the elected leadership of council and the appointed staff of council. Because of the demand for uniformity of treatment, regularity of procedures and public accountability for operations, public sector organisations including local authorities are structured as bureaucracies (Mullins 2013). The management theory of bureaucracy was advanced by Max Weber. Schermerhorn (2008, 63) defines a bureaucracy as a rational and efficient form of organisation founded on logic, order and legitimate authority. In a bureaucracy there is clear hierarchy of authority, formal rules and procedures, impersonality and careers based on merit. The current criticism of bureaucracies centres around red tape and rigidity. This is not what Weber envisaged. Despite criticism however the bureaucratic structure continues to dominate public sector organisations to this day.

City of Gweru is structured as a bureaucracy with four committees of councillors: Finance committee, Environmental Management Committee, Health and Housing Committee and the Audit Committee. On the management side, council employees are divided into departments which include Finance, Engineering, Health, Housing and Community Services and Chamber Secretary's departments

Figure 2.2: Council and Executive Management Structure

Council departments are there to provide technical and performance support and advice to council committees. Council departments also implement council policies and are at the coalface of service provision. Local Governments as organisations operate within an environment which influences their performance. To that end, the system approach has been embraced as an analytical tool in studying organisation because organisations are considered as open systems which interact with their environment and are composed of interrelated parts. The systems approach was developed by biologist Ludwig Von Bertanlarifty between 1930 and 1956 (Griffin, 2017). This marked a turning point from traditional theories which considered organisations as closed systems that were autonomous and isolated from their environment.

Figure 2.3: The Systems Approach

According to Schermethorn (2008.85), "the general environment consists of conditions in the external environment that forms a background context for managerial decision-making." The specific environment on the other hand consists of actual organisations and people with whom the organisations interact. These are also referred to as stakeholders.

The general environment issues affecting organisations include; economic conditions, socio-cultural conditions, legal political conditions and technological conditions. Local governments in their operations have to contend with all these conditions. In the case of Zimbabwe, the macro-economic conditions are generally adverse. In Gweru this manifests itself in de-industrialiSation and a ballooning informal sector. This has implications on residents' ability to pay for council services. Some decisions made by central government are construed by local government as political, for example the cancellation of all debts owed by residents in June 2013 just before a general election in July 2013. Technology conditions require local authorities to embrace information communication technologies including online debt payment platforms. Yet some local authorities are still on manual systems. City of Gweru is still to computerise its financial management and other operational systems. The city has no website to market opportunities available and to communicate with stakeholders (Town Clerk's Report 2016). Important stakeholders for City of Gweru in the specific environment include residents and ratepayers who are also the customers and clients of the city,

suppliers, government departments and the councillors and employees of council. All these impact on the governance of the city and on its service delivery mandate. Stakeholders especially the residents are best placed to assess and comment on the performance of City of Gweru and provide critical input into any research study of Gweru. Various research approaches utilised for this study which are outlined in Chapter 3 of this study focus on stakeholders as sources of information. The open systems approach focuses on inputs into the organisation, the processing or transformation which takes place within the organisation and the outputs from the transformation process, in this case goods and services into the environment.

In a study of City of Gweru, the inputs from the environment like financial resources, raw water, human resources are transformed through work processes in council departments to finished goods and services which are transmitted into the environment as potable water or trafficable roads. The stakeholders in the environment give feedback to council which can be negative or positive if the service is good or poor. Issues of efficiency, effectiveness and accountability which are the centre piece of this study then come to the fore.

Slack (2014) argues that without accountability there is no incentive to be efficient. Accountability can be defined as the obligation of an individual or organisation to account for its activities, accept responsibility for them and to disclose the results in transparent manner (Business Dictionary). Public Accountability is viewed as the obligation of a public enterprise entrusted with public funds to be answerable for fiscal and social responsibilities to those who have assigned such responsibilities to them. According to Olowu (2002) accountability has three crucial components, a clear definition of responsibilities, reporting mechanisms, and a system of review, rewards and sanction. Local governments are financed by the public through taxes and service charges they collect for service delivery and should be held to account for the use of or misuse of finances collected. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 20 of 2013 in its Preamble recognizes the need to entrench democratic, transparent and accountable governance. The whole of Chapter 9 of the Constitution focusses on Principles of Public Administration and Leadership. Some of the principles governing public administration for all tiers of government provided for in section 194 have been stated above. Local

government being a tier of government in terms of Section 5 of the Constitution is supposed to adhere to these principles. Section 196 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe goes further to outline responsibilities of public officials in leadership positions and the manner authority should be exercised. The Constitution states categorically that authority assigned to a public officer is a public trust which must be exercised in manner which 'demonstrates respect for the people and a readiness to serve them rather than to rule them'

Implemented, these provisions can impact positively on service provision. The Constitution Section 71(2) observes how an Act of Parliament must provide measures to enforce these provisions including issues of codes of conduct and regular disclosure of assets. That Act of Parliament is not yet in place although the Constitution was passed in 2013. If services are to improve measures of accountability, including sanction for non – compliant must be in place. The provisions of Chapter 9 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe have not received the much-needed attention in the local government sector. Emphasis and interest in the literature and in practise has tended to focus on section 301 which provides fiscal decentralisation that 5% of national revenue must be allocated to provinces and local government every year. Many of the provisions of Chapter 9 on principles for public administration and leadership noted above do not require an Act of Parliament Acts of or alignment to legislation to be implemented. Issues of efficiency, accountability, economic use of resources and recruitment on merit do not require legislation to be institutionalised in local government. It is therefore failure or reluctance on the part of the local government sector to institutionalise such principles in their dispose which has compromised service delivery. There is need for local government practitioners in Zimbabwe to familiarise themselves with the essence of constitutionalisation of local government instead of cherry picking seemingly favourable provisions only.

Section 309 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe implores the Auditor General to audit all local government. This is an area where many local authorities were found wanting since they were not undertaking annual audits timeously as provided for in the Urban Council Act chapter 29:15. This failure to audit

provided opportunities for financial mismanagement and corrupt practices. Qualified audit reports are beginning to emerge for many local government (Auditor General Reports, 2015 & 2016).

As Olowu (2002:141) points out, "where there is no accountability, the public administration system runs amok." Accountability is one of the basic tenets of good governance, the other being efficiency, transparency, predictability and legitimacy. Quality and effective service delivery by local governments, City of Gweru included, emanate from these basic tenets which should be the core values of the organisation. Perusal of Auditor General's Audits for 2015 and 2016 and the Special Audit Investigation report (2015) for Gweru indicate general failure to institutionalize these tenets as core values. Both councillors and their staff do not demonstrate a clear sense of responsibility especially in meeting residents' service delivery expectations. This also points to the need for more robust citizen participation in local governance. The citizenry through enhanced education and availability of information both print and electronic is demanding more accountability from those holding public office. The decentralisation reform agenda pursued by many countries the world over responds to the need for greater citizen participation by thus in decision-making and governance and points to the need for a more inclusive local governance approach. After all the whole concepts of good governance revolves around the need to embrace ethical leadership, accountability for actions, and honesty in the execution of public duties, integrity and honesty. This is what residents of urban local authorities have been clamouring from those who put themselves up for public office.

Decentralised governance is underpinned by the ethos of accountability. As noted by Yilmaz (2008), 'decentralisation (devolution) offers significant opportunities to improve government accountability. It creates the possibility of exerting stronger precious on governments' performance from below and from above. Decentralisation reshape power relations among the local residents, local governments, producers of local governments services and higher levels of government (including central government) Yilmaz et al. (2008) go farther to develop a conceptual frame work to better analyse the factors that improve local governments based on the following arguments.

Decentralisation reforms grant local governments new powers and responsibilities in three dimensions: political, administrative and fiscal. These dimensions provide local governments' discretionary space. Ensuring appropriate use of such discretionary space requires introducing effective accountability systems. Within their discretionary space, local governments would be accountable to higher levels of government (upwards accountability) and to citizens (downward accountability). Public accountability mechanisms safeguard against misuse and abuse of local discretion, but they have imperfections. New forms of social accountability mechanisms that enable direct engagement of citizens with government, emerge to compliment public accountability mechanisms.

Public and social accountability approaches must be bridged to ensure that citizens have the ability and opportunity to demand accountability and that local governments have the means and incentives to respond to citizen demands for accountability and better service delivery.

Figure 2.4: Framework for local government discretion and accountability

This analytical framework can inform service delivery improvement and accountability in GCC within the context of decentralised governance as argued:

"Decentralised levels of governance have their raison d'être in the provision of goods and services whose consumption is limited to their own jurisdictions. By tailoring outputs of such goods and services to particulars preferences and circumstances of their constituencies, decentralised provisions increase economic welfare above that which results from uniform levels of such services that are likely under national provisions" (Oates 1999p 1112) This views propounded by Oates (1999) has been central in the decentralisation drive by many countries in Africa and the developing world. Decentralisation has gathered momentum in Africa as a key component of public sector reform and also as part of donor nation's conditionalities. As noted by Kathyola and Job (eds) (2011) two key objectives of decentralisation have been to improve public service provision and to empower local citizens and institutions for self-governance.

While decentralisation has been defined variously by different scholars in the literature many of these definitions seem to coalesce around the transfer of power, responsibilities, authority and resources from the centre to sub-national levels of government (Rondinell, Nellis and Cheema 1984, Conyers 1983, Olowu and Wunsch 2004, Bhatta 2006). Rondinelli (1983, 18) defines decentralisation as, "a transfer of planning, decision-making or administrative authority from central government to field organisations, local government or NGOs".

United Nation Development Program (2009) defines decentralisation as a process through which powers, functions, responsibilities and resources are transferred from central government to local government and/or other decentralised entitles. Bhatta (2006 p 155) defines decentralisation as, when the central or the centre cedes some authority and power to lower levels of government. Decentralisation seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different spheres of Government (World Bank 2011). Faquet (2011) observes how the most important theoretical argument concerning decentralisation is that it can

improve governance by making government more accountable and responsive to the governed. As noted by Cameron (2014), while the tendency globally has been towards greater decentralisation, African countries are still comparatively more centralised. This is further confirmed by Wunsch (2014 p.15) who observes that "African decentralisation has resulted in robust changes to legal frameworks but has been circumscribed by strong centripetal forces.

In many African countries, (South Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique) Zimbabwe included, decentralisation is now enshrined in national constitutions. To further strengthen the decentralisation drive, the African Union adopted an African Charter on Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development on the 27th June 2014. In this Charter, decentralisation is defined as, "the transfer of power, responsibilities, capacities and resources from national to all subnational levels of government with the aim of strengthening the ability of the latter to both foster people's participation and delivery of quality services." It is anticipated that all member states would align their legislation to provision of the Charter as provided for in Articles 18, 19 and 20. The African Union went further to declare the 10th August as the African Day of Decentralisation and Local Development. This declaration strengthens decentralisation as the centre piece of reform across Africa.

Despite this significant progress on the legal front, centralisation tendencies in terms of the functionality of local governments are still prevalent. This is especially the case when local governments turn out to be a base for opposition parties or ethnic factions (Wunsch, 2014, Resnick, 2008). Urban local governments are usually the entry point of opposition parties in the national political space, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Uganda being examples of this phenomenon. This loss of control creates situations where central government will pursue strategies to limit the effectiveness of local governments. In Zimbabwe in 2013, just before a general election, the Minister responsible for Local government directed all local governments to cancel debts owed by residents from 2009. This has had negative effects on the ability of local governments to collect revenue as residents waited for

another debt write-off before the 2018 general elections. This is cited by local governance as one of the reasons for their mobility to deliver services.

The literature on decentralisation normally emphasises three forms or strategies of decentralisation: deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Wunsch, 2014). Other authors add a fourth form which is divestment or privatisation. The literature also divides decentralisation into political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation (Kathyola and Job eds 2011). As noted by Devas and Delay (2006), at the heart of the decentralisation debate is the relationship between the various levels of government. In a study on decentralisation Commonwealth Africa. Kathyola and Job (2011) concluded that this relationship revolves around authority, responsibility, accountability and finances and the degree of control or authority that sub-national governments have on these dimensions defines the form of decentralisation that is practised. In a study to establish how decentralisation has fared in 10 countries, (Wunsch *et al.*, 2014) considered the dimensions, of authority, autonomy, accountability and capacity. The point to note from the two studies is the criticality of issues of autonomy and accountability in considering sub-national level governments. The dimension of capacity has often been cited as a major challenge at sub-national and has a direct bearing on the performance of these levels. Perhaps more important in considering the core business of local government which is service delivery, is this issue of efficiency and effectiveness. If decentralisation does not lead to improved service delivery, then the quality of life of residents will not improve. In the case of Zimbabwe, this is an area requiring further interrogation.

Deconcentration also referred to as administrative decentralisation is the transfer of responsibilities and functions to field offices or outpost of central government which maintains control over them (Bhatta, 2006; Adamolekun, 2007). The transfer of functions to field offices allows communities to access such services locally without having to travel to national capitals for services. In Zimbabwe central government services can be accessed in provinces and district with some like agricultural support services available at community level. Because of its upward accountability deconcentration may not respond quickly enough to local preferences and challenges.

The other form of decentralisation is delegation usually to state owned enterprises. These are normally function specific with Boards appointed and answerable to the line minister in the case of Zimbabwe. Delegation according to Kathyola and Job (2011) can be to semiautonomous organisations that are ultimately accountable to central government. Such organisations have a great deal of discretion in decision-making, financing and administration.

The most preferred mode of decentralisation is devolution where central government transfers authority, power, responsibility and resources to an autonomous body with separate political accountability, such as a local government, a state government or regional government (Adamolekun, 2002; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). Such transfers are normally provided for in national constitutions or other legal instruments. The import of this mode of decentralisation is to bring government closer to the people and allow communities to participate in their own governance. Privatisation as a form of decentralisation is increasingly gaining traction. This is where national, state or local government enters into partnership arrangement to provide a service or infrastructure. Various arrangements exist, from simple contracting out of such services like garbage collection to massive infrastructure like roads, power stations and dams. Build operate transfer or joint ventures in infrastructure development are gaining prominence.

Ndengwa and Levy (2003) argue that there are traditionally two types of approaches to decentralisation; the 'big bang' reforms which create local political autonomy, centre-local fiscal systems are deployed and personnel is transferred from the centre in a massive roll out program across all sectors and regions within a short period. In other African countries, including Zimbabwe, the decentralisation thrust has been an incremental process and is usually accompanied by capacity building programs. Such capacity building has adopted 'learning by doing approaches'.

Many factors have attracted many countries to decentralise powers and functions to sub-national levels of government. As many countries, especially in the 1990s democratised, decentralisation through devolution was adopted to broaden political participation (Adamolekun, 2002). The other attraction

was the proximity of subnational governments to the citizenry compared to a more remote central government. In this regard lower levels of government tend to respond more timeously to local needs and are also able to tailor services to local needs and local capacity. Accountability is enhanced as local leaders in sub-national governments are under closer scrutiny for their actions. As Smoke (1999. 10) notes, "underlying most of the purported benefits of decentralisation is the existence of democratic mechanism that allow local governments to discern the needs and preferences of their constituents, and provide a way for these constituents to hold local governments accountable to them."

Decentralisation is also perceived as a way to ensure political stability and limit the risk of civil conflict (Caldeira, Foucault, Rota, Graziosi, 2012; Adamolekun, 2002; USAID, 2010). Devolution in particular addresses issues of distinct communities, be they religious or ethnically/linguistically inclined, as is the case with the Cantons of Switzerland (Adamolekun, 2002). The Comparative Assessment of Decentralisation in Africa Final Report by USAID (2010) found modest evidence that decentralisation may improve service delivery. For local communities, the existence of a decentralised level of government in particular, local governments is to provide services efficiently so that the quality of their lives can improve. Failure on this front raises questions about whether central provision is better than local provision. The issue of recentralisation is thus always looming. In many instances, national bureaucrats and politicians have used the argument of service delivery slippages by local governments to recentralise functions and responsibilities allocated to local governments. In Zimbabwe the water function was taken away from local governments and was given to Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA). ZINWA's inability to improve provision saw the same function being given back to local governments in a worse state. Centre-local relations can thus shape the trajectory decentralisation takes.

As noted by Wunsch (2014), decisions regarding decentralisation are also intrinsically involved in the political economy. Political economic interests of central government ministries that stand to gain or lose control over resources, appointments, budgets, personnel will lead them to block

decentralisation (Wunsch, 2014). Further if decentralisation turns out to be a base for opposition parties or ethnic factions the centre will limit it in practice or law as this creates vertically divided authority (Wunsch, 2014; Rensnick, 2014; Cameron, 2014).

One area which has been noted in the literature as a challenge to the decentralisation thrust in Africa is the lack of capacity at local levels (Wunsch, 2008; Adamolekun, 2002) At both political and technical managerial levels, local government capacity is limited. On the political front, many local leaders' calibre is questionable as they have limitations academically and professionally (Dewa *et al.*, 2014). Cases of corruption at local level have also been cited as a drawback to effective governance and service delivery. Other challenges to successfully decentralise include incomplete legal reforms, persistent emphasis on control by the centre, weak professional and technical support by the centre and weakness in local publics and civil society and failure by local officials to honestly and effectively supervise service delivery officials (Olowu, 1990; Smoke, 2008). Decentralisation should not create unfunded mandates or be used as a strategy to dump unwanted services by central government. Further, many central governments refuse to pay the political and financial cost of decentralisation of roles and responsibilities (UN Habitat, 2014).

Successful decentralisation requires adequate financial resources to carry out the decentralised mandates. Local government tend to have limited fiscal space to mobilise adequate resources. Higher yielding taxes are normally monopolised by the centre with local governments relying on revenue sources which are difficult to collect or are unpredictable. Fiscal decentralisation which may be enshrined in legislation is not always honoured by the centre. In Zimbabwe, section 301 of the Constitution provides for not less than 5% of National Revenues to be allocated to Provincial and Local Government but since the Constitution was passed in 2013, this transfer was only honoured in 2019, six years later.

Over-reliance on central transfer can also compromise the autonomy of sub-national governments as they are compelled in instances to follow central dictates not local priorities in terms of spending. Decentralisation can also

bring high risk of capture by local elites for their own benefit. This is particularly noticeable in the awarding of tenders awarded by local or state governments. Beneficiaries of such tenders would normally be well connected to those in control at local level or even at higher levels although the work or service to be carried out will be paid for by local or state government. To overcome some of the challenges of decentralisation (Kathyola and Job, 2011) noted five actions which can advance decentralisation:

- Constitutional protection and clear assignment of responsibilities to local authorities;
- Financial and human resource provision to match assigned mandates;
- Reconciliation of development planning to local planning;
- Mobilisation of local resources - financial and human;
- Empowerment of citizens and local councils to contract and cooperate with other stakeholders in the governance arena

The USAID Comparative Assessment Reports (2010) argues that decentralisation is increasingly entrenched in many African countries. They also argue that legal authority has been transferred to sub-national government to a considerable degree. While local elections are being conducted, issues of accountability and autonomy are limited. Public services, according to this report, seem to have modestly improved. For successful decentralisation, Adamolekun (2002) outlines some of the strategies African countries can adopt, bearing in mind each country`s 'unique institutional conditions and its historical political, economic realities to include:

1. the need to articulate a coherent and comprehensive policy that enjoys public support;
2. ensure commitment of central government's political and administrative leadership to deemphasise control, transfer adequate resources and appreciate complementarities;
3. devolve adequate powers to sub-national levels to ensure that qualified persons are attracted to those levels;
4. Provide training programs on decentralisation for civil servants at all levels and skills building for those in sub-national government;
5. Promote associations of local government including twinning.

Noting the above, one would also add that capacity building should not be confined to civil servants and local government employees only but should include the elected leadership of sub-national governments. In addition, civil society organisations participation in the decentralisation process should also be a crucial ingredient for success. In the case of Zimbabwe, the inclusion of such groups as resident and ratepayers' association is an imperative for the smooth functioning of local governments.

The issue of intergovernmental relations or centre- local cited by several authors (Adamolekun, 2002; Conyers, 2003; Chakunda, 2015) has a bearing on service delivery. Adamolekun (2002, 61) observes that "in the existing literature on intergovernmental relations, three topics are usually given prominence: the allocation of jurisdictional powers among levels of government; the administrative mechanisms for managing intergovernmental relations and intergovernmental fiscal relations." Bevir (2009.44) defines centre-local relations as the political and administrative relationships that exist between a central state and the local governments within its territorial boarders. Local authorities, on the other hand, are decentralised lower tiers of government which are closer to the people under the control of locally elected councillors. The study, conceptualisation, theorisation and analysis of the relations between local and central governments have proved to be a difficult task and expectations on the part of several government officials, academics and political analysts. Chatiza, (2010) prefers to stereotype this relationship as "disconcerting" given the differences in political and socioeconomic ideologies of the central government on the one hand and the local government on the other. Ogborn, (1991) questioned the orthodox dualist analysis of the relationships between local and central governments of the nineteenth century and argued that local power was not based on the communal conception or the ideology of local possessive pluralism that is characteristic.

While the above arguments may have stereotyped ideals, it is important to rationalise that decentralisation is a creature of state governments that retains the prerogative to determine the quality and quantity of authority to delegate to local governments. If the general assumption that the state exists for the good of its people implies, among other efforts, the decentralisation of

sufficient power for local governments for the efficient provision of services to citizens, this can be contradicted by overestimation and simplification excessive. Some bureaucracies have tried to concentrate power at the national level, leaving local governments as mere extensions of central government authority. Therefore, it is questionable whether decentralisation in the sense of government policy theory has strengthened local autonomy or whether there is a greater propensity for recentralisation.

Crook (2001: 12), in his attempt to criticise decentralisation as a mechanism for vertical and horizontal diffusion of central government power to its various agencies, pointed out that:

> Different governments have different political objectives and motivations for introducing decentralisation that are incorporated in the structure and form of decentralisation or, more subtly, in the functioning of the system after its introduction, but the political variables determine the results of decentralisation (in terms of greater response capacity and poverty reduction), not only because of the variations in the formal structure or the technical failures of implementation, but also because of decentralisation resources, both between the different levels and between the territories, the state and between different interests in their relations with the governing elites. The policy of relations between the centre and the local authorities explains what interests could be gained or lost with any set of institutional opportunities, political initiatives and so of resources, and associates these factors with the political objectives of decentralisation.

However, Boone (1998) makes an interesting analogy with Crook (2001)'s observations when he postulated that similar decentralisation reforms could have diametrically opposed objectives, depending on whether they are aimed at reinforcing vested interests in the models. Existing sponsorship and local-to-local coupling, or challenge local elites of groups that use decentralised institutions to "mobilise" central resources to strengthen local struggles for power. In the African context, the ethno-regional conflict policy is particularly important in shaping the decentralisation structure and even insofar as it is accepted by the ruling elite.

Smoke (2006), analysing the horizontal integration between central and local government in the decentralised systems of Kenya, Zimbabwe and Nigeria, argue that the first two examples are systems dedicated to maintaining the power of the ruling party at the level of local government, while the Nigerian

government has used it since 1983 as an instrument of successive military regimes to create "bosses" and loyal local agencies for the distribution of central clients that avoid federal states. It is difficult to find positive evaluations of these countries in the research literature. In the search for Smoke (year)'s observations, it may be necessary to analyse Ogborn's views at this point. Ogborn (1991) believes that understanding the relationship between central government and local governments as part of an extension of state government oversight is explained and supported through an analysis of the shape of these relationships, especially rationality and returns. Vincent-Jones supplemented this argument by arguing that the legitimacy of the state's regulatory objectives and the manner in which they were determined must be confronted as part of a broader task of evaluating government practice, including technical evaluation of regulatory effectiveness.

In Zimbabwe, section 5 of the Constitution provides for three tiers of government; national government, provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. Chapter 14 of the Constitution focuses on provincial and local government. Section 264, in same chapter, provides for devolution of governmental powers and section 265 outlines general principles of provincial and local government.

The legal system allocates powers to both central government and local government. An issue not sufficiently discussed in the literature on local government in Zimbabwe is how this relationship actually plays out. Section 110 of the Constitution outlines the executive functions of the President and Cabinet. Section 110 (3) outlines the responsibilities of Cabinet of which the minister responsible for local government is a member and these are: directing the operations of the government, conducting government business in Parliament, preparing, initiating and implementing national legislation, developing and implementing national policy. Due to these functions, in their jurisdictional relationship, central government expects local governments to be guided in their operations by national policies, to be accountable, transparent, efficient and effective in the delivery of services. Central government, hence, has an oversight, supervisory, regulatory and facilitatory role. Local governments, in terms of sections 264 on devolution and section 276 on functions of local authorities expect a high degree of autonomy within

their space where they exercise initiative and tailor functions to local needs and local capacity however it does not give clear indication on the powers allocated to in local authorities. This leaves the central government taking over in all grey areas.

Local governments have frequently complained about the interference by the minister responsible for local government in their space (Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016; Chigwata, 2017). Issues of directives by the minister in terms of section 313 of the UCA have attracted many criticism from local governments and the media. The minister's intervention in local governments has also been considered as interference (Chatiza, 2010). Hlatshwayo (1998) cites about 200 instances where the minister can intervene in Rural District Councils Suspension and dismissals of elected councillors and appointment of caretakers and commissioners have often been construed as victimisation of opposition party politicians (Dewa, 2010, Muchadenyika and William, 2016). The paradigm that some studies do not seem to explore further is one of final accountability. The question is, "who is finally accountable to the Executive, Parliament and the people for the local government function? Considering section 110 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Minister of Local Government has final accountability if things go wrong, just like the Minister of Health or the Minister of Education. Although decentralised and devolved, with a high degree of autonomy, it is important to strike a balance between the centre and the local to minimise mistrust and polarisation. Role clarity is fundamental in this regard. It should be noted that decentralisation succeeds where the legal framework for intergovernmental relations is clearly defined including assignment of mandates and the requisite resources.

Though commercially defined as intangible objects only, in the context of this study, services include both intangible and tangible goods (roads, health, water infrastructure, sanitation, housing, natural disasters management, environment, public spaces, and land-use management) which are required to satisfy human needs and wants and improve the quality of life. Service delivery is, therefore, a process concerned with planning, provision and management of these services. Service delivery can, therefore, be conceptualised as a system comprising of inputs, process, outputs and outcomes to enhance the quality of life (World Bank Group , 2016).

Service delivery typologies vary and include the beneficial service jurisdiction model, monopoly government provision and PPPs. The beneficial service jurisdiction model proposes that for each municipal service, there exists a geographical limitation of the spatial size over which a particular service can be delivered efficiently. Therefore, the efficient service boundaries for a particular municipal service can be drawn and this may extend beyond the legislative boundaries or falls below the legislation boundaries of a municipality (Dillinger, 1995). In addition, the efficient service boundary is not the same for all services but vary with the type service- transport, water supply, physical planning, public amenities, and safety. Based on this observation, it is therefore rationale to observe that to improve overall welfare of service beneficiaries, decision-making for service delivery is made at different levels of government– some services are better delivered at local levels whereas some are efficiently delivered at higher levels of government (Dillinger, 1995).

The thesis of beneficial service jurisdiction justifies an organisational framework where sub-national governments enjoy autonomy in making decisions for delivery of particular services whereas they are controlled by or depend on the central government or a higher or other jurisdiction external to it for provision of services which extend beyond its territorial boundaries (Dillinger, 1995). One model emanating from this theory is special districts. Other typologies of service delivery include the public sector provision (municipalisation) where local authorities assume the overall responsibilities. Contemporary models include public-private partnership arrangements where local governments partner the private sector to augment capacity deficiency in service delivery. Beyond partnerships, other models include outsourcing services.

Special districts can be defined as inter-jurisdictional authorities, catering for a single service across different territories. These either come under metropolitan governments or exist as independent inter-municipal arrangements. Special districts are independent and autonomous, not depending on government grants but are self-funded (Brown, 2009). Therefore, special purpose districts are often immune from excess political control in service delivery which explains their historical development in

South Illinois, in the 1960s where they were initiated to hedge service delivery against political interference (Advisory Committee on Inter-organisational Relations, 1964). However, the financial autonomy powers are usually declared by state legislature (DiNapoli, 2007; Hamilton, 2012). Similarly, in Poland, special districts are a product of government legislation over concerns of poor service delivery and high costs of services in independent small authorities (Hamilton, 2012) whereas in Vancouver, the intention was to coordinate and cater for the growth needs of Vancouver and other urbanising peri- urban areas. Purposes of the special districts vary and can include water, sanitation, health, land-use planning services, housing, transport planning and environmental management.

Concerning service delivery challenges of special districts, in New York, one of the challenges is the population growth and the settlement urbanisation where some lower tier towns are expanding the boundaries for services (DiNapoli, 2007). In addition, some of the special districts in Nassau, New York were overcharging service users. Likewise, there issue of equality in charge of transport infrastructure by special transport districts in the United States is a contentious issue. Lack of standard pricing across districts is pervasive in the setting of charges to consumers of transport infrastructure services (Mathur, 2015). Consequently, in the rest of the United States, property owners feel they are paying more than the fair share of the costs of transport infrastructure under special transport districts (Mathur, 2015). This erodes popularity of the special transport districts among property owners and other service consumers. On the other hand, special service districts in Vancouver and Florida also grapple with competition over loss of both autonomy and responsibilities by local municipalities (Hamilton, 2013). The effect is a further reduction of political support for special districts by smaller municipalities.

Other than financial and inter- jurisdictional equity concerns, absence of uniform zoning regulations across cities made environmental management complex affecting the capacity of the metropolitan environmental authority in New York (Rizzo, 2001). In addition to this, climate change and natural factors also constrain service delivery by special districts. For example, though London is considered to be one of the cities with advanced water

infrastructure systems, water supply systems in London are threatened by climate change where the city has longer dry seasons, negatively affecting the natural water availability (London Assembly, Health and Environmental Committee , 2012).

Service challenges in Australia include a stress over the financial resources under shared responsibilities at metropolitan level. This emanated from poorly structured to lack of inter-municipal financial responsibility sharing. This burden is transferred to the local municipalities negatively affecting service delivery (Dollery and Robbotti, 2008). Contrary to this state of affairs, in some states, the metropolitan government has the ability to raise substantial funding across different cities and accumulates more financial resources than it demands for financing own projects (Tomlinson &Spiller, 2018). However, this excessive capital accumulation at the metropolitan level occurs at the expense of municipal governments (*ibid*.). Though there are alternative explanations to financial challenges at municipal level, they all point to the outcome of a deficiency of financial resources for municipal governments.

One of the challenges the social housing sector has been grappling with has been the population composition dynamics where the housing facilities have formerly been provided to non-working populations (housing supply was more important than quality Australian Government Productivity Commission (AGPC, 2016). Therefore, the clients of social housing services have changed from the non- working citizens to include the elderly, government workers and low-income residents (Jordan, 1984). These changes in the clients of social housing imply the need to repackage the social housing component to suit the diversity of interests and make the same service affordable to all the clients. However, there is a contrast between the social housing services provided by the local government versus expectations from the social housing market (AGPC, 2016). Therefore, unaccounted social dynamics can negatively affect delivery of housing services. Furthermore, since housing services are self-financed under State Housing Departments, further contradictions also emanate from the charges and cost expectations of producers versus what can be afforded by citizens (ACG, 2016). As such, financial capacity challenges are one of the challenges of the state housing

departments in extending affordable social housing units in Australia (Pawson, Milligan & Martin 2019). However, this varies across states.

Service delivery challenges in some local authorities in South Africa range from lack of human capacity (Sekhukhume District) to political interference where political ideologies and the need for votes undermine the thrust for rational service delivery and financial challenges (Beyers, 2016). The reason for this comparison is that Zimbabwe just like South Africa faces the same challenges in the decentralisation of being done halfway through with political elites interfering with service delivery (Sibanda 2013). Lack of effective human capacity has been accelerated by the devolution of responsibilities to local and metropolitan councils without the development of the necessary resources including finance (Smith &Morris, 2008). In such instances, the responsibilities and service delivery expectations from both the central government and the community is beyond the methods and techniques employed by municipal tiers (Pakaya, 2014). In some cases, service delivery responsibilities like waste management overlaps within the internal municipal departments- the sanitation, public health and the Department of Environment (Pakaya, 2014).

Regarding financial capacity, municipalities in South Africa also grapple with financial challenges which range from limited internal finance generation capacity, excess regulatory control of financial raising, reduced financial wavering (Beyers, 2016; Ndebele &Lavhelani, 2017). This affects not only the municipalities in Limpopo but also metropolitan authorities.   However, financial capacity challenges vary across municipalities since municipalities in 'black areas' have generally more financial challenges in delivering services than those in former 'white areas' even in post-apartheid South Africa (Palmer *et al.*, 2017).

In cities across Zimbabwe, service delivery covers transport, land-use, health, housing, public services, the environment, water, health, sanitation, public spaces and parks. Transport service challenges include inefficiency and fragmentation of service delivery (Mbara, 2015). These problems in the case of Harare are related to poor institutional capacity in terms of the requisite human capacity coupled by financial challenges of outsourcing (Mbara, 2015).

Other than fragmentation of institutions, financial challenges are another setback. Financial challenges emanate from limited financial generation capacities as local authorities' financial generation capacity and borrowing powers are restricted and subject to central government approval (UCA [Chapter 29:15]. Furthermore, unwillingness of citizens to pay rates for services as in Chegutu further weakens the financial capacity of municipalities for funding service delivery (Sifile, Madzorera and Chavunduka, 2015).

Concerning delivery of water in Harare and Masvingo, politicisation is a challenge (Mumvuma, 2016; Murimoga and Musingafi, 2014). Politicisation also affects the delivery of social housing facilities under the Zimbabwean government's *Operation Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle* Programme. This was a rationalisation programme that was done to rehabilitate the victim of Operation Restore Order that came as a move to deal with informality. It was intended to provide low-cost housing for the restore order victims (Tibaijuka, 2005). Politicisation and contamination of service delivery with political ideologies is a challenge across all service spectrums in Zimbabwe's urban councils. This emanates from an organisational structure where politically appointed councillors have the discretion for making service delivery policies at local level whereas professional experts' role is limited to recommendation of options (de Visser *et al.*, 2010). An example is water supply in Kadoma where lack of political will to implement reform in water pricing negatively affected financial sustainability (Remigios and Never, 2010). Therefore, generally politicians do not sympathise with rational service delivery policies that undermine their status among voters.

Other than conflict of ideologies, the other challenge in environmental service delivery in Zimbabwe cities is rapid urbanisation where municipalities such as the City of Harare fail to align waste management services supply to cover rising demand (Tsiko and Togarepi, 2012). In addition, since they are marked differences in the state of sewage infrastructure between the affluent northern suburbs and the low-income areas of the south, the environmental challenge in the City of Harare may be colonially inherited (Togarepi and Tsiko, 2012). The other challenges in effective sanitation and water provision in the City of Harare emanate from the absence of inter-municipal

cooperation despite dependence on the same resources. A typical example is the delivery of potable water in Greater Harare. Though Chitungwiza depends on Harare's bulk water and waste treatment infrastructure, there are no cooperative arrangements for sharing the cost (Manzungu, 2008). This negatively affects supply of water in both Harare and Chitungwiza.

The service delivery challenges in Zimbabwe closely tally with those in African regions and beyond – financial, political intrusion, organisational challenges, urbanisation and policy challenges. Therefore, not only is service delivery challenges policy, financial or institutional-related but like in the case of water delivery in London, physical conditions and climate change is also a challenge particularly in the delivery of water services. It appears service delivery challenges have a common calibre, though the intensity of the problems varies.

The World Bank Group (2016) classifies service performance indicators into groups related to components of the service delivery process. Service delivery performance can be assessed on the basis of inputs where concern is on factors including funding, human capital and technology (World Bank Group, 2016). Other than assessing service delivery based on input indicators, it can also be assessed based on service implementation indicators determining the implementation capacity of Sub-national governments. These factors include the service delivery contexts, policy, political environment and the institutional context (Mizel, 2008). Implementation indicators also consider issues of accountability. In addition to assessment of service delivery based on assessing the implementation process, service delivery can also be assessed through output-oriented indictors (World Bank Group, 2016). These are mostly quantitative measures of how much of a particular service is produced usually for purposes of measuring efficiency (when the output is compared to inputs) or for assessing service supply gaps (Shah, 2006).

 The other group of indicators are outcomes-oriented methods where consideration is given to accessibility, affordability, service reliability, equity and service-user satisfaction (World Bank Group 2016). The outcome indicators are discussed in detail. One of the outcome indicators is accessibility. Accessibility defines the ease with which citizens (different

citizens) can access transport, public services, and any other services provided by local authorities (World Bank Group, 2016). Accessibility takes into consideration issues of geographical proximately, time to access the services and any other costs that citizens may incur in trying to access a service. From the sociological and equity point of view, accessibility can be assessed in terms of how easy it is for different population groups or age groups to access a particular service provided by local authorities (Papa *et al.*, 2015).

The other indicator is affordability. Affordability deals with the cost consideration of service relative to average income levels of the population. To minimise the financial burden in assessing services be they transport, water and sanitation and housing the local government took certain steps. Affordability of service determines both the consumption, (who consumes the service) as the public trust in the municipal authorities (OCED, 2013). However, the concept has no universal approval to setting the affordability level for pricing services since community, employment level and income levels vary (Gutorovia, Schellekens & De Groot 2018). The argument is that affordable pricing levels cannot be determined through mere numbers (low or high but has to be justifiable economically). In addition, the affordability level must balance not only the demand side but the supply side service pricing interest for financial sustainability. In addition, just like the concept of affordability has multiple facets including the ability of all citizens, specific groups or the low-income citizens to pay to access a service without disruption on their enjoyment of access (GutorovIa *et al.*, 2018). This reveals that service affordability is a subjective issue.

Service performance can also be assessed using reliability indicators. Generally, reliability deals with the probability of failure of the service delivery systems to respond to shocks and risks without negatively affecting the delivery of services. Such risks may include climate changes, unanticipated population growth and demand dynamics, natural disasters, economic or political dynamics. However, one of the challenges is the absence of a universal measure of service supply reliability (Xu and Powel, 2007). Some of the indicators of reliability include the frequency of breakdown of the systems and service supply shortage, rate of restoration after breakdown, days

per given time with or without services (Shar, 2007). Where the service consumers and interests are diverse, equity is an important measure for assessing service delivery. Equity measures can be used to ensure fair distribution of services. It includes equal payments, and equal outputs. The other measure of service delivery is customer satisfaction, where satisfaction is a matter of citizens realising value from consumption of municipal services. However, this value is subjective and depends not only on individual traits but also on the consumer's experience and expectations (Zakaria, 2013). As such, the level of satisfaction varies across different social groups and age groups as so does tastes and expectations.

On the other hand, the performance of service delivery systems can be assessed based on effectiveness, that is; the extent to which service delivery targets set in the municipal service delivery plans are met within the desired time frame. However, whereas both systems efficiency and effectiveness measure productivity (Shar, 2005), it is pertinent to argue that a service can be provided (Savas, 1978). However, it is important to argue that the issue of equity can become contentious over the pricing of the same services and provision of services across districts – equal number of schools, equal street lights, and equal transport infrastructure can be applied for equality (Savas, 1978) though contentiously. Since the term equity does not necessary refer to similarly but per need.

Practically, these service delivery performance indicators are adopted and modified depending on the type of service targeted and the area. Though using the broad indicators, sub-national governments build their own objectively verifiable indicators in local development plans or strategic plans. Furthermore, depending on the level and purpose of service delivery performance (either reporting to the national government or improving service delivery in future), sub-national governments across the globe either adopt process-oriented, output or outcome-oriented indicators. However, there is extensive use of outcome-oriented indicators. For example, in Australia and Afghanistan, outcome-oriented indicators are widely used (Mizel, 2008; Integrity Watch, 2017). In South Africa, these performance indicators are developed at metropolitan levels though further service targets are also developed in the IDPs at local level. For some indicators like

affordability and accessibility, there is need for contextually- derived definitions since what they mean is subjective and depends not only on geographical areas but also vary depending on who is defining them. In addition, the measurable indicators also tend to evolve with time (what is affordable today, to whom, may not be affordable tomorrow as the economy and social demographics evolve. After considering the various concepts underpinning the study, the next section discusses theories informing this study.

While it may be possible to profile a range of theories that can underpin a study of sub-national government service delivery, the researcher has approached the issue of theoretical framework from a relevance and applicability point of view. This indicates that the theory and related issues discussed here are not just exploratory but are focused to ground the thesis herein specifically as challenges of sub-national government service delivery in Zimbabwe and inevitably involve elements of both efficiency and effectiveness. This study is informed by three theories which are, the democratic participatory theory, the efficiency services theory and the systems theory. While it may be possible to profile a range of theories that can underpin a study of sub-national government service delivery, the researcher has approached the issue of theoretical framework from a relevance and applicability point of view.

The Democratic-participatory Theory of Local Government holds that local government exists to bring about democracy and give opportunities for political participation, educating and socialising the local citizenry (Ola, 2007). The view is rooted in John Stuart Mills' utilitarianism in which the good form of government is representative and promotes liberty, equality and fraternity, makes men look beyond their immediate interest, recognises the just demands of other men, and promoting political education, participation and communication (Noun, 2012). The democratic role of local government is to create accessible opportunities for political activity, representation of all interests and social interaction which help inculcate the ideals of democracy. Consequently, advocates of this theory view local government as a prime element of democracy.

While this theory explains an important paradigm of local governments in lubricating the wheels of democracy at the local level, the theory has a limited focus centred only on democracy and hence cannot be applied to explore the complex multifaceted aspects of service delivery. While democracy remains a pillar for citizen input in local government processes, there are many factors outside the democratic paradigm that influence the overall performance of local government. These, among others, include policy and administrative competences and structural functional factors. The Efficiency Services theory provides the major criticism to the Democratic-participatory Theory of Local Government.

The Mackenzie *et al.,* (1928) proposed the Efficiency Services Theory believing that the idea of participatory democracy does not apply to different political systems in the same manner especially in modern societies. Contrary to the Participatory Theory of Local Government, the Efficiency Services Theory opines that the role of local government is to provide services to the local people on the grounds that it is the most efficient agent for providing local services. This is because delivery of some services is so compelling that it has to be done at local level. As such, local government must be judged on success achieved in service provision as measured by national standards (Ola, 2007). This study will therefore develop a framework to measure and assess the quality of services delivered by local authorities using national standards and international best practice established in chapter 3.

This has culminated in the development prescriptive approaches, one of which is the Systems Approach. Using a Systems Approach, the basis for understanding political and public administration systems is to study the functioning or properties of its individual parts (Chikere and Nwoka, 2015). The Systems Theory focuses on the relations between the parts (Flood and Jackson, 1991). Rather than reducing an entity, the Systems Theory focuses on the arrangement of and relations between the parts and how they work together as a whole within a particular environment (Schoderbek and Schoderbek, 1985). The way the parts are organised and how they interact with each other, determines the integrity of the whole system. This provides a holistic approach to understanding phenomena. As such, the model can be applied to human activity and public policy (Checkland, 1981).

The Systems Theory, that is; the interdisciplinary study of systems in general and of the dynamic properties that they exhibit has been long applied in many fields of scholarly inquiry, including biology, ecology and engineering. Yet, the use of a Systems Theory to public policy has been relatively modest to date. In part, it would be fair to acknowledge that theories of the policy process are systemic in nature, in the sense that they build on ontology of component parts (including policy-makers, constituencies, lobbies, target groups and various other stakeholders) and on an epistemology that posits attention to mutual influences between them. Theories of the policy process, however, make relatively little use of the conceptual resources of Systems Theory, such as the importance of feedback loops, the cascading effects of small perturbations and the emergence of aggregated behaviour out of interactions between component parts.

The exploration of complexity is an intriguing contemporary development in the field of public policy (Marsh, 2017). While undoubtedly still a specialist interest, there have been several notable recent contributions to the literature. The Systems Theory presents a symmetric method that can be applied to public policy research, analysis and practice. The method encapsulates the combinatorial complexity of the policy problem with little simplification, selectivity and skewness.

To define sub-national government, it is necessary to define the term government. Government refers to all organisations operating in an institutional environment where sovereignty is invented and the officials have the authority to make binding decisions (Raadschelders *et al.*, 2015: 18). Sub-national governments can be defined as, "organisations not located at the centre of the administrative system" (Gray, 1994, p.12). However, not all organisations below the centre are Sub-national governments but, only those, 'elected through universal suffrage, have general responsibilities and some autonomy with respect to budgets, staff and assets" (OCED, 2016, 14). Likewise, the issue of legal existence is prominent where Sub-national governments are products of national constitutions or provincial legislation (Shah, 2006). Responsibilities of Sub-national governments vary as defined by statutes, and include, providing services or "public goods" over defined jurisdictions (Watt, 2006: 4). This thesis explores the service delivery

systems of the GCC in relation to its current state, problems and challenges and possible strategies for improvement.

This section presents the theoretical bases for sub-national government. This is followed by an exploration of the typologies of sub-national governments across the global, regional and local level. Particular focus is on understanding the structure, functions and relations with the central point or other sub-national governments and the evolution of such sub-national government structures. After reviewing the definitions of sub-national governments from different sources, this study adopts the OCED definition which defines sub-national governments as organisations that are legally declared, with own budgets, staff and responsibilities that are in most cases defined by law and occur below the central government (OCED, 2013). As such, not all sub-national authorities are sub-national governments.

Theories and typologies are largely based on economic efficiency arguments for local as opposed to central government (Bailey, 1999). Decentralising management to local governments improves allocative efficiency through allowing for the requisite adjustments to the local/contextual market failures (Bailey, 1999). This economic argument for sub-national governments is expressed in the Oates Decentralisation Theorem. However, this theory is critiqued by the Theory of Economies of Scale where administering development at national levels or through consolidations results in economies of scale by eliminating unnecessary duplications (Fox &Gurley, 2006). The size of sub- national governments (population size, geographical size) has implications on the economic effectiveness, particularly in service delivery (OCED, 2013).

Systems Theory of Governments, though formulated in the 1970s, is relevant given the globalisation of nations and the need for place competitiveness. Since government units exist as a system with dependent and interlinked units, effective management should therefore consider needs and policies at different levels, that is; the local scale and needs of adjacent authorities (Beetham &Weir, 2002). Similarly, policies implemented by one sub-national unit within its defined jurisdiction should not infringe the interests of adjacent jurisdictions, in so doing, creating a system of interrelated and

harmoniously coordinated units of sub-national governments to uphold the interests of governments at different levels. The role of the central government, in this context, is to ensure that the needs of all sub-national governments are in harmony (Chandler, 2010). Therefore, while sub-national units know interests of own citizens better, an oversight authority is necessary to regulate negative externalities of adjacent authorities on service delivery. In addition, as policies of one unit of government are made to satisfy needs over defined territories, there is need to consider service delivery concerns of communities outside a government's intermediate territorial boundary (Chander, 2007). The Systems Theory has implications on the outcome sub-national governments structure as it creates an interlinked, multi-tiered and complex organisational structure where all units are harmoniously interrelated (Chandler, 2010). Contrary to the common understanding that sub-national governments are a competitor with central governments, the Systems Theory calls for complementarily and co-existence of sub-national governments and the central government (Katz and Nowak, 2018). As such, sub-national governments are not competitors but complements of the central government.

The Bulprit Dual Polity Theory is another theory that explains the structure and functions of sub-national governments. The model has implications on the division of roles and relations between the central and Sub-national governments. It also defines the structure of sub-national institutions. The model proposes that the central government concentrate on high polity responsibilities, usually policy areas whereas other low tier government structures concentrate on the minor responsibilities – usually lower polity, lower value responsibilities duties (services, spatial planning or health). However, the role of sub-national governments is not only lower tier but also distinct from those of the central government (Gray, 1994). Central government set priorities that impact on roles and structures of lower tier governments. Therefore, Sub-national governments have structures, methods and policies distinct from those of the central governments (Gray, 1994). This provides a model where Sub-national governments are semi-autonomous and there are no responsibility overlaps between the sub-national governments and central government.

The Weberian Theory explains the power relationship between the central and local governments. Sub-national governments are instruments used by the powerful state to maintain political power and control in local jurisdictions. As such, they are run and centrally controlled by centrally crafted policies governing financial resources and policies to ensure that sub-national governments continue to serve the ideologies of political elites. Therefore, power remains centred in central governments (Gray, 1994).

Britain was chosen as a case study in this study because the colonial administrative system of Zimbabwe was derived from that of Britain. As such, the structure of Sub-national governments in Zimbabwe shares characteristics to that of Britain up to 1980 when Zimbabwe became independent. The sub-national government systems in Britain evolved from the 1800, during the industrial revolution when the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 was promulgated which promoted the formation of municipalities to regulate commercial and social development concerns in the industrial city in Britain (Chandler, 2007). The rise of liberal democracy (through the Labour movements) and a civil society calling for equal representation of community interests further prompted the rise of local government institutions (Chandler, 2007). This had implications on the development of the administrative structure in Britain, where rather than having a monopoly, local authority is a hybrid of institutions and the private actors- the Guango state (Weir & Beetham, 2005).

Concerning the structure of the sub-national governments in Britain, they are multi- tiered. Not only are functions of Sub-national governments different but the population sizes and geographical territories also differ (Gray, 1994). From the central government some of the common sub-national government structures are the regional governments and local authorities. Regional governments are mainly a central government administrative tool responsible for overseeing implementation of central government policies at the regional level. The functions of the regional governments are defined by the Constitution. However, the Constitution often serves to ensure subordination of regional governments to the central government interests (Henig, 2002). Therefore, the central government agencies and development agencies were mostly active at this level, these being appointed by the central

government to serve the regional interests though being accountable to the central governments (Henig, 2002). However, interest in regional authorities has been declining since 2007 with more interest focusing at planning at the sub-regions (Smith nad Wistrich, 2016).

Interest in planning at sub-region level was stimulated by the realisation of wider variations within the declared regions in both natural resource endowment and interests. Furthermore, interest in sub-regional governments was stimulated by the need to improve local autonomy in economic growth, urban regeneration and service provision (Smith and Wistrich, 2016). Consequently, central government appointed regional authorities have been abolished in the post-2010 era (Garnett and Lynchn, 2016; Willet, 2015) and replaced by city regions focusing specifically on urban management policies and multi- regional cooperation in areas of transport, health, environment and housing among other areas (Smith and Wistrich, 2016). This indicates continuous adjustment to improve the relevance of the regional governments in mediating between the local, and the central government development interests.

Other than the regional council, the other sub-national government structures are local authorities or boroughs. These evolved from the 1835 Municipal Act. There are rival explanations for the rise of municipalities in Britain. These include the economic and political imperatives. Economically, municipalities were meant to expand services at the expense of the tax payers (Chandler, 2007), whereas politically municipal governments were a strategy through which liberal industrialists wanted to overthrow the partisan based city administration structure. Some of the functions of the local authorities include responsibilities over health services, roads and sanitation (Gray, 1994).

In terms of the relationship between the central government, regional governments and boroughs, the central government control policy making and spending at local levels. Spending at local level is controlled through condition attached grants from the central government (Weir and Beetham, 2005). Other than controlling policy and spending decisions, the central government also has, "*power to life or death over local authorities* (Weir and

Beetham, 2005:235). This implies that there is unrestricted control of all the other activities of local authorities. Though functions of local authorities are defined by the constitution, the central government has the discretion to exercise negative limit on local authority functions. As such, reform or no reform, local authorities remain objects of the state.

The American administrative system is organised in terms of federal states. America is one of the countries that had been attempting to promote decentralisation under the government decentralisation policies. Australia is also a federal nation like the United States of America. Sub-national governments in Australia include states and municipal governments (Sawer, 2018). Though the roles of states are defined by the national constitution, states enjoy different levels of decision-making powers and have different roles and responsibilities (Ward Murphy-Gregory, Kefford, Jackson, Cox, and Carson. 2018). In addition, the states have different local government arrangements – which reflect local and state specific interests. Furthermore, the legislation guiding municipal authorities is designed by the states. These states also enjoy the discretion to amend statutes guiding municipal activities in their jurisdictions when need arises (Dollery and Byrnes, 2008). This indicates some level of autonomy for states in Australia.

The other type of sub-national government is municipalities. These operate under the guidelines of respective states from which duties are assigned or withdrawn (Ward *et al.*, 2018). Though responsibilities vary by state, municipalities are generally responsible for managing social, economic and environmental concerns within their respective areas (Dollery and Marshall, 1997). In terms of the relationship with the state, the local authorities are monitored by the state department in various departments- transport, housing, water and energy (Dolley and Brynes, 2008). The municipal roles though traditionally tied to property related services, have been extended to human welfare services such as health, education, public safety in the 1990s. The change in the scope of responsibility was due to growing demands for more human welfare services at the local level by civil society and privatisation of some services which altered the traditional functions of municipalities (Dolley and Bynes, 2008). In line with the changes in service functions and roles for local authorities, some states adjusted municipal

legislation to separate the policy-making and administrative roles between elected and appointment council members (Marshall, 2010) in the process, depoliticising the municipal system. However, in other municipalities in South Wales, the change in responsibilities was not accompanied by any structural adjustments to re-capacitate municipalities (Grant and Drew, 2017).

In the case of India, the administration of urban areas is structured in the form of states and districts. This is typical of the Weberian model where sub-national governments are used to advance the central government interests at local level and therefore, the functions are similar to those of the central government. Districts are a replica of the functions of the state but at a local level (Le Roy and Saunders, 2006). However, numerous reforms have been affected particularly on the composition of these Sub-national governments. Concerning the relationship between states, local authorities and the national government, local authorities are regulated by the central government in both policy and financial matters. The central government also has the discretion to approve or suspend such authorities (Islam, 2015).

One form of sub-national government in South Africa is the provincial or metropolitan governments. The political argument is that these larger metropolitan governments were made in the interests of the African National Congress (ANC) party for political influence at larger scale (Dicovick and Wunsch, 2014). Provincial authorities enjoy discretion to policy-making in their provinces (Siddle and Koelble, 2013), though the legislation is subject to approval by the national government (Federico, 2014). Though the national government still makes policy in different areas of interests, functions of provincial governments are not uniform but vary across provinces. Some of the functions include responsibility over health, housing and education.

Below the metropolitan tier are local authorities or municipalities. These are classified into A, B and C categories depending on population size. Responsibilities of local governments are spelt out in the White Paper of 1996 and include infrastructure services, improving livelihoods, economic improvement and delivering liveable settlements. The preserve of the national government remains over policy-making (Siddle and Koelble, 2013). Some of

the White Paper reforms of local government included reformulation of boundaries and reform of legislation to improve the capacity of local authorities in service delivery through integrated development planning (IDP) and improving financial autonomy (Shah, 2006). Adding to these is the reform of local governments in the "black areas" after 1994.

The reform of sub-national government, after apartheid, was meant to promote democracy, public participation and development. However, by default, the local government systems suffer from elite capture by the political elites of the ANC and DA parties. The infiltration of political ideologies in the institutional structures of municipalities partially translates to the inability to meet demands of citizens (Siddle and Koelble, 2013).

Most of the sub-national governments are closely related to the Weberian model where they are controlled and are guide by the political ideologies of the state. Some of the Sub-national governments in developed countries resemble the bipolar- dual polity model where they have responsibilities that are divorced from those of the central government and enjoy some autonomy in policy-making (states in Australia). These are more autonomous than the local authorities in Africa where they are merely administrative arms of the local government. Whereas the Systems Theory claims for the need for interlinked multi-tier government is true and has been experimented through inter-municipal cooperation, empirical studies examined reveal that there is competition rather than complementarily where the functionality of metropolitan governments is a threat to the survival of municipalities.

Concerning reform of sub-national governments, there are mixed imperatives for reform. Whereas reforms across the globe are commonly dressed in the name of improving policy and financial capacities of Sub-national governments, they are also motivated by other hidden political agendas. As such, the influence of political ideologies in shaping the functions and reforms of sub-national governments is not restricted to Zimbabwe or Africa but permeates across the globe.

Privatising or outsourcing services to the private sector has been one of the attempts that have been taken to improve delivery of services such as

transport, water and housing in the global context. This was meant to cover the financial challenges of local governments by bringing services under the market. Whereas in some cases there has been success, there are wider issues and citizens' concerns over affordability of privatised service, particularly in Africa. The other option has been the creation of inter-jurisdictional special service districts. In New York, with over 6000 town special districts, special districts raise a considerable amount of funds for towns as compared to the smaller municipalities (DiNapoli, 2007). Owing to this, special districts have been tapped for developing rail and other roads transport infrastructure in Los Angeles and Washington (Mathur, 2015). Infrastructure Districts were effective in the provision and maintenance of transport, water supply infrastructure provision faster than local governments (Scutelnicu, 2014). Likewise, in New York, the special districts are important for delivering environmental services across cities (Rizel, 2001). Though in New York, consolidated authorities could raise more financial resources than their counterparts, in Netherlands, inter-municipal cooperation had no effect on reducing service spending for larger municipalities whereas spending for smaller authorities ironically increased under municipal cooperation (Allers and de Greef, 2018). Furthermore, though special infrastructure districts in Florida provide infrastructure development and maintenance services faster than local authorities, the services are neither cheaper nor of higher quality than those of the local governments (Scultenicu, 2014). This indicates contrasting views surrounding the implementation of inter-jurisdictional service districts to improve service delivery across neighbouring municipalities.

In South Africa some attempts are made towards total de-politicisation to promote what they term a professionalism government for service delivery (Madumo, 2016), some political input is necessary. However, it has to be reduced to levels which do not undermine efficient service delivery (Reddy, 2016). Since the end of the apartheid era efforts to restructure local governments to improve local government capacity have also been attempted to improve service delivery in South Africa (Reddy, 2016). The other option taken to improve the governance of service delivery planning is through the use of IDP where citizens, the private sector jointly cooperate in shaping service delivery. However, in the Limpopo Valley, local authorities are ill-

capacitated to manage and mobilise effective public forums ending up adopting council-perceived service delivery goals (Mathebulaet *et al.*, 2016).

Various attempts including special districts (particularly in global region), privatisation, contracting out services, policy reform, institutional reforms, IDPs are among some of the strategies that have been taken to enhance service delivery across the globe. However, these strategies have varying degrees of success where, like in some context, special districts and inter-municipal governments for service delivery wielded some achievements in consolidating financial resources and improving the economies of service delivery, in some contexts like Netherlands inter-municipal governments, arrangements for service delivery rather increased costs for service delivery. In addition, as social, economic, and environment conditions evolve, formerly effective strategies continue to lose effectiveness. Consequently, there are no permanent solutions.

The next chapter focuses on the Zimbabwe experience on decentralised governance and service delivery.