

THE HUMAN SECURITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE IN ZIMBABWE:

A Diagnosis of Nonviolent Resistance Approach by the
Opposition Movement for Democratic Change Party, Since 1999



JOHN MAKAMBANGA

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DEDICATION

To my parents, wife Nyaradzai Mukutiri-Makambanga, daughter, Cheryl Nokutenda, sons Carl Nyenyasha and Carroll Naishe Makambanga and all nonviolence practitioners.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIPPA	Access To Information and Protection of Privacy Act
AU	African Union
CCZ	Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	European Union
GPA	Global Political Agreement
GNU	Government of National Unity
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-M	Movement for Democratic Change – Mutambara
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
PF-ZAPU	Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People’s Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes
UN	United Nations
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People’s Union
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZDERA	Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army

BOOK SYNOPSIS

This study critically explores the dimensions of human security and developmental challenges in Zimbabwe using the concept of nonviolent resistance as an analytical framework and entry point for understanding post-colonial violence in this country. It examines the use of nonviolent resistance as a political strategy by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the democratisation process in Zimbabwe, after its formation in 1999. Factors that promote violence in Zimbabwe's polity are identified and recommendations for moving Zimbabwe towards violence-free politics are proffered. It is argued that the practice and discourse of non-violent resistance is neither new nor unique to Zimbabwe. The thesis briefly traces the culture of violence and nonviolent resistance in Zimbabwe since 1980, and the non-violent strategies employed up to 1999. It examines post-independent political and peace-building processes as missed opportunities in ending the culture of violence in Zimbabwe. This is a qualitative research study that draws data from document analysis, interviews and focus group discussions. The central thesis advanced by this study is that violence has been a major affront to human security which adversely affect development. Nonviolence, as a political strategy, has achieved considerable success in the democratisation process. It has helped to amplify the Zimbabwean struggle for democracy on the international scene. The study deploys the nonviolence theoretical framework to unmask political violence and democratisation processes. It leans towards the pursuit of nonviolent resistance as the panacea to human security and development, and as an approach to conflict resolution and peace building. This can help Zimbabwe to achieve its human development goals. The thesis recommends that governments and political parties must strive to achieve peace, human security and development.

Keywords: nonviolent resistance, political strategy, human security, development, democratisation, development, negative peace, positive peace, zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

The study critically explores the dimensions of human security and developmental challenge in Zimbabwe, particularly in Buhera South Constituency, through the adoption of nonviolent resistance by the opposition political party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The concept of human security came into prominence in policy and peace-related discourse, after 1994 following the commissioning of a study by the United Nations (UN) on the new dimensions of security. The resultant report marked the beginning of the use of the term Human Security. Essentially, it marked a change from the traditional state “centric notion of security approach that had prevailed to encompass seven key individual centric components, namely: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security; personal security, community security, and political security” (UN, 1994: 24-25). Human Security is, essentially, about protecting the vital core of humanity to enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. It means protecting fundamental freedoms that are the essence of life. It entails protecting people from severe and widespread threats and situations. Human security means building on people’s strengths and aspirations and “creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.” (CHS, 2003: 4). “Human security complements state security, strengthens human development and enhances human rights” (CHS, 2003: 2).

The concept of human security is developmental in orientation. Human security is based on enhancing people’s capabilities to qualitatively improve their lives. The practice of violence in politics is inimical to the basic concepts of development as it threatens the livelihood of the people and what the government should seek to protect. Violence is anti-developmental in nature. Human security aims to be “developmental in a holistic sense, recognizing that

qualitative improvement to lives must be constructed around not only the notion of people as economic producers and consumers, but also as cultural producers and consumers" (Abatutu, 2005: 107). Violence leads to human insecurity which arises from "existing structures of power that determine who enjoys the entitlement to security and who does not. Such structures can be identified at several levels, ranging from the global, to the regional, the state and finally the local level" (Thomas, 2001: 160). Development "contributes to human security by tackling the long-term structural causes of conflict and by strengthening the capability of societies to deal with conflict in a peaceful manner" (Lodgaard cited in Chillers, 2004: 18). The concept of human security, therefore, includes an obligation on the state to provide a facilitating environment for equality and individual participation through democracy, adherence to human rights and the participation of civil society (Chillers, 2004: 18).

Human security is value-centric which relates to security, stability and sustainability of development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helps to show how violence affects development by defining human security as, including within its conceptual ambit, "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life" (UNDP, 1994: 23). In the Zimbabwean context the notion of violence in politics affects the core values of development. Through violence, the people in Buhera South, a district in the Manicaland Province of Zimbabwe, suffered from life deprivations. However, to counter this violence the MDC party employed the principle of nonviolence resistance.

This study adopts the concept of nonviolent resistance as an analytical framework for understanding post-colonial violence, human security, and development in Zimbabwe. This is conducted through examining the role of the MDC in the democratisation process in Zimbabwe after 1999. The MDC has morphed into different factions having split twice

in 2005 and 2014, respectively. However, this study uses the Movement for Democratic Change Tsvangirai's (MDC-T) faction which remained the bigger faction after the splits. In the process, the study identifies factors that promote violence in Zimbabwe and makes recommendations for steering Zimbabwe towards violence free politics. The practice and the discourse of non-violent resistance are neither new nor unique to Zimbabwe.

The study critically explores the use of the concept of nonviolent resistance as a political strategy in Zimbabwe. Since colonialism in 1890 Zimbabwe has had a chequered history, one that has been dominated by violence. During the years of colonialism, the minority white government sought to enforce their rule on the Zimbabwean landscape using violent and exploitative means. While colonisation was brutal, the local people including the Shona and the Ndebele, among others, responded through violence in 1893 during the Anglo-Ndebele War, during the 1st Chimurenga (war of liberation) from 1896 to 1897 and between 1966 and 1980 during the 2nd Chimurenga which culminated in the achievement of independence from British colonial rule in 1980. Between 1897 and 1966 the Rhodesians enforced their rule through the use of brute force on their subjects. The armed struggle in Zimbabwe from 1966 culminated into Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. During the armed struggle there was internal violence against opponents within the liberation movements. Violence became the backbone of the state formed in 1980. The policy of reconciliation enunciated by the new Prime Minister Robert Mugabe in 1980 became just but a hollow political tool for appeasing white capital than for achieving and attaining human security.

The years after independence marked a continuation of violence. Beginning in 1982, the Gukurahundi military campaign in Matabeleland, the 1990 electoral violence on Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) members, as forms of violence, were unleashed on

citizens, trade unionists and other opposition supporters. The Gukurahundi in Matebeleland and Midlands provinces was a war targeted mainly on PF ZAPU and its supporters. Mugabe accused Nkomo and other ZAPU leaders of harbouring dissidents and threatening to take over power through unlawful means. However, the hunt for dissidents led to indiscriminate killings of mainly the Ndebele ethnic population. In his entire reign Mugabe was a prisoner of his declaration in 1976 that 'The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer, its guarantor. The people's votes and...guns are always inseparable twins' (Mugabe, 1981: 100). The formation of the MDC in 1999 reproduced the Mugabe ideology of violence as he unleashed the state security machinery, the ZANU-PF Youth militia and the war veterans on members of the MDC. The MDC in turn at times used the policy of nonviolent resistance to counter this violence. This study argues that violence affects human security and negates development.

The theory of nonviolent resistance has gained prominence in the fight against established dictatorships. Mohandas K. Gandhi and Dr Martin Luther King Jr. are regarded as the foremost brains behind the nonviolent resistance movements through their work and practice in modern society. There are notable examples of nonviolent resistance throughout the world. The practice had been going on even before Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. Sharp (2005: 4) who notes that "from the late eighteenth century to the twentieth century, the technique of nonviolent action was widely used in colonial rebellions, international political and economic conflicts, religious conflicts, and anti-slavery resistance". Various scholars have been influential in shaping the nonviolent discourse in the modern world, including Tolstoy, Sharp (2005), Shock (2013), Thoreau (1849) and others. Tolstoy particularly "attacked the hypocrisy of religion" (Christoyannopoulos, 2010). Throughout history, campaigns of nonviolence have been done sporadically dating back as far as 449 BC when the Roman Plebs

organised a general strike (Shock, 2013: 278), to the 2010 Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria and the recent Black Lives Matter movement in the USA.

Shock (2013) lists some notable examples of “Nationalist struggles, such as Hungarian resistance to Austrian rule from 1849 to 1867, Finnish resistance to Russian rule from 1899 to 1906, and the Egyptian general strike against British occupation in 1919. These were sustained efforts to promote political transformation through collective nonviolent resistance”. Nonviolent resistance was also used in some labour struggles in Italy in 1904, Spain in 1919, and Britain in 1926. Strikes were a potent weapon wielded by the working-class (Shock, 2013: 278).

The advent of the nationalist struggles for independence in Africa and other colonised territories in the world, provide notable examples of the use of nonviolent means to ending colonialism and oppression. As mentioned earlier, history of non-violence in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the Shona passive resistance against the invading pioneer column in the 1890s. This passive resistance by the people of Mashonaland was the hallmark of non-cooperation with the white settlers. However, in 1896 the 1st Chimurenga marked a violent response to colonial rule. Thus, in 1896, the Shona and Ndebele fought the British South Africa Company (BSAC) settlers resulting in their defeat and a further intensification of oppressive rule.

Through trade unions such as the Railway Workers Union led by Benjamin Burombo in the period 1947-1959, workers engaged in job stay-aways to fight for improvement of workers conditions. In between the 1897-1980 Chimurengas, the Rhodesians intensified their oppressive rule using legal instruments such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 which legislative pieces, greatly disenfranchised Zimbabweans

through land alienation. Faced with these discriminatory laws and segregatory Rhodesian rule, Zimbabwean politicians began to form fully-fledged political parties demanding majority rule. However, the parties were routinely banned. The ANC, NDP, ZAPU and ZANU were all banned upon formation by the Rhodesian government. This laid the basis for revolts. The 1948 workers' strike laid the basis for the development of the first viable working-class organisations, starting with the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress (SRTUC) formed in 1954 and led by Joshua Nkomo. In 1957 the African National Congress (ANC) was formed. This was a working-class-based mass movement that drew most of its leaders from the labour movement, with Nkomo as its president (Gwisai 2002: 6). Nkomo later became the architect of African nationalism in Zimbabwe because of his contribution to the formation of the African National Congress (ANC), the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

The formation of ZAPU in 1960 signalled a drift towards militarism. ZAPU's split culminated in the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963. The two parties morphed themselves into military outfits, namely: The Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) respectively. The military transformation was a last resort to ending the colonial rule. This resulted in a protracted war which lasted nearly 14 years, ending in 1979 with the Lancaster House Agreement. The war of independence was fought through a multi-pronged approach which attracted a wide spectrum of people. The freedom fighters used both diplomatic and military means to fight the war. The Lancaster House conference and the formal agreements of 21 December 1979 charted the course for the transition from white minority rule to black majority rule in Zimbabwe. Under the agreement the parties agreed to a ceasefire and elections to be held in 1980. They also agreed to a new constitution.

The elections were held as agreed during the Lancaster Conference. The elections therefore symbolised a decisive paradigm shift to legitimacy, with power moving from whites organised under the Rhodesian Front (RF) banner to blacks under ZANU. As per the Lancaster House constitution, elections became the hallmark of the electoral process in Zimbabwe. In 1980, soon after being sworn to office, the newly elected Prime Minister, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, announced the policy of reconciliation in the following statement:

We are called to be constructive, progressive and forever forward-looking, or we cannot afford to be men of yesterday, backward looking, retrogressive and destructive.... If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you... The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten... (De Waal, 1990: 48-9).

In the name and spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness, all the grievances of the past were supposed to be forgotten.

While reconciliation was pronounced as the very essence of statesmanship, there were divisive undercurrents in the nascent but fractured unity government. As articulated by Eldred Masunungure (1999), "Zimbabwe as a state came into being in 1980 but Zimbabwe as a nation did not." There was outright and unapologetic building of the state as a ZANU-PF and Shona dominated political formation where other political actors like PF-ZAPU that drew most of its support from Matabeleland and Midlands regions had no dignified space, and the Ndebele were an inconvenience that had to be dealt with. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 12) argues that "from the very day of achievement of independence, the triumphant Shona-dominated ZANU-PF leadership displayed a unique desire to build a party-nation and a party-state that excluded other political formations, crafted around and backed by ZANU-PFs war-time military wing (ZANLA) and Shona historical experiences."

The Matabeleland crisis that hit the post-colonial nation-building project was sparked off by ethnicity and the integration of military forces. The crisis began in the ranks of the military, and it involved open exchange of fire between the triumphant Shona-dominant ZANLA and the Ndebele dominated ZIPRA in Connemara (Gweru) and Entumbane (Bulawayo). This set in motion a reign of state terror in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions in the period 1982 to 1987. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 14) avers, the violence was somehow an inevitable consequence of the way nationalism had evolved and how the nationalist armies had been formed. This is how he snuggly puts it:

To some extent, we accept the notion of the inevitability of a violent post-colonial civil war pitting the former liberation movements and their former armies against each other. But there is need to posit that the inevitability of violence was underwritten by incompatibilities of Ndebele and Shona particularities. The violence was in a way symptomatic of the failure of a smooth blending of major ethnicities into a new national identity called Zimbabwe. The net effect of this was that violence was the only invitation card by which the Ndebele were invited into a Shona-imagined nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 14).

In this analysis, Ndlovu-Gatsheni shows the shaky ground on which the nation state was born in 1980. While independence produced a tribalised nationalism, the unfolding years later proved that tribalism was not the only inherent problem in post-independence Zimbabwe politics and power dynamics. In 1982, the Ndebele became victims of political violence but after 1990 ZANU-PF violence became national and victims transcended tribal lines. In short, the Gukurahundi period became “necessary for the purification of the rest of the nation from the undesirable elements” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 14). In essence the way the Ndebele were treated was an attempt at ethnic cleansing. A Commander of the 5th Brigade named Jesus summed it up by bringing to the fore the following:

You are going to eat eggs, after eggs hens, after hens’ goats, after goats’ cattle. Then you shall eat cats, dogs, and donkeys. Then you are going to eat your children. After that you shall eat your wives. Then the men will

remain, and because dissidents have guns, they will kill the men and only dissidents will remain. That's when we will find the dissidents (CCJP, 1997: 96).

The conduct of the military during Gukurahundi served as a direct warning to future opponents of the regime. This betrayed the regime's lack of hesitancy in eliminating opponents.

The Gukurahundi ended after the signing of the Unity Accord on 22 December 1987 between Prime Minister Mugabe and the ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo. In the words of Sisulu (2008: 494) "the Unity Accord completed what the Gukurahundi had failed to do". It has been observed that "the Unity Accord was a surrender deal by Nkomo to ZANU-PF hegemony, accepting to play a second fiddle as Senior Minister and later Vice President under Robert Mugabe" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 30).

Constitutional Amendment Act (No.7) of 1987 created an executive presidency with Mugabe assuming the post of Executive President and Nkomo becoming one of the two national Vice Presidents. Pursuant to that was the need by ZANU-PF to create a one-party state which was vehemently opposed by Edgar Tekere culminating in the formation of Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) which contested in the 1990 elections. Mugabe had hoped to consolidate power in the aftermath of the Unity Accord through the creation of a one-party state.

After 1990, economic conditions in Zimbabwe began to deteriorate such that the government was running budget deficits. Mugabe had to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) to seek budgetary support. The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) adopted created social and economic problems which gave rise to opposition to Mugabe's regime. These measures had serious implications for the welfare of ordinary Zimbabweans. ESAP led to sudden shrinkage of public service jobs as the government

was advised to privatise state owned enterprises. It further caused a continuous decline in workers' income through devaluation of the currency. Company closures and employee layoffs became regular occurrences following the liberalisation of the economy. Hospital fees, tuition fees skyrocketed beyond the reach of the ordinary citizens. Student demonstrations and industrial actions became the order of the day. All these occurrences became the catalyst for the mushrooming of strong opposition politics in the country.

The call for better wages and working conditions from workers became even more acute. The 1996 public sector strike brought the country to a standstill as nurses, doctors, public service workers and teachers withdrew their services. Confronted with such a situation, the Zimbabwean government responded by waging an undeclared war against its people (Dzimiri, *et al.*, 2014: 231). The ZANU (PF) government assumed that its power was being challenged and as result it unleashed military violence on its citizens. The state security forces used brutal force on protesters which soured relations between the military and the civilian populace. This discontentment culminated in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. The MDC quickly became a powerful opposition political party against the ruling ZANU-PF. Its support base grew among university students, the working class and urban dwellers who acutely felt the pain of the deteriorating economic situation. To maintain its stranglehold on power, the ZANU-PF government used the repressive state apparatus against the opposition.

While violence has been an endemic aspect of ZANU-PF's rule since independence, things took a drastic turn after the formation of the MDC. Buhera South constituents witnessed an unprecedented wave of violence after the formation of the MDC. The MDC recorded increased violence during the 2000 Parliamentary elections in which a ZANU-PF member Kumbirai Kangai narrowly defeated the MDC candidate. It

can also be argued that political violence in Buhera began on 15 April 2000 when MDC's Tichaona Chiminya and Talent Mabika were petrol bombed by ZANU supporters after a meeting in Murambinda (BBC April 2000). This incident flared up violence in Buhera South as the ZANU-PF leadership intensified its targeting of opponents. There have been politically motivated deaths, displacements and violence in Buhera South Constituency since then. The 2008 elections in which Joseph Chinotimba of ZANU-PF lost to Naison Nemadziya of the MDC marked the climax of political violence in the constituency. In all this, the MDC always preached the practice of nonviolence as a panacea to the political problems facing the nation.

Where peace and security are compromised, development suffers. Since colonialisation violence has become one of the most popular means of resolving conflict and subduing opponents in political contests among human beings. Violence has proved destructive leading to loss of life, destruction of property and environment and animosity among survivors. This has negatively affected economic and political progress. Violence has proved to be anti-developmental in character and orientation. States which have been embedded in conflict have seen the destruction of economic, political and social fabric. Development has regressed in those states. In the Zimbabwean polity violence has been a dominant feature in the political discourse. The research analyses how violence has been used in politics since the dawn of colonialism and how this violence has compromised human security and affected development. It is argued herein that the onset of colonialism in 1890 ushered in the beginning of political violence which has become cyclical to date. The liberation struggle which was fought to eliminate oppression ironically entrenched violence as an instrument for the enactment of power and oppressing opponents. Since 2000, the ZANU-PF led government has resorted to violence against its political opponents especially supporters of the main opposition the MDC and civil society. Violence has been a dominant

practice of resolving conflict for a considerable period thereby stalling economic, social and political progress. Non-violence means of resisting oppression has been adopted by the MDC in its fight against ZANU-PF for political space. Nonviolent means of conflict resolution has the potential to bring about sustainable peace and development and progress among Zimbabweans. Non-violent resistance is a step towards attaining human security and development.

The primary objective of the study is to critically examine the dynamics of human security in Zimbabwe which has led to a lack of development in Zimbabwe through analysing the concept of nonviolence as a political strategy and its impact on conflict resolution and development. This is done through examining both the rhetoric and practice of non-violent resistance as a political strategy in Zimbabwe using the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party in the Buhera South Constituency as a case study. Other secondary objectives include the following:

1. To explore the link between human insecurity and development in Zimbabwe.
2. To examine the impact of the adoption of non-violence resistance as a political instrument to achieve peace in Zimbabwe.
3. To examine the impact of both the discourse and practice of non-violent resistance within the Movement for Democratic Change party in attaining peace and development in Zimbabwe.
4. To evaluate the extent to which non-violent resistance has transcended the condition of oppression in Zimbabwe.

The research seeks to answer the following questions:

- (1) What is the impact of human insecurity and conflict on development?

- (2) To what extent has the adoption of non-violence resistance as a political instrument helped to achieve peace in Zimbabwe?
- (3) What conditions led to the necessity of adopting the discourse and practice of non-violent resistance in Zimbabwe?
- (4) To what extent has the MDC's non-violence resistance succeeded in transcending the conditions of oppression and/or violence in Zimbabwe

This study is significant and holds immense intellectual purchase because it explores the dynamics of human security and development in Zimbabwe through analysing the concept of nonviolence and its impact on conflict and development. The study carried extensive document analysis of MDC policies and programmes during the period 1999-2017. History has shown that conflict, violence and wars are enemies of development. Examples in most African countries have shown that resource rich countries like DRC, Liberia, Libya and Sierra Leone are struggling due to unending conflict over resources, dictatorship and political intolerance. The research presents new insights into nonviolence and conflict transformation in Zimbabwe. There is lack of clarity in the nexus between nonviolent resistance and conflict transformation in the African context. The topic reveals the complex nature of conflict management, human security and development especially in areas with questionable democratic tendencies. This helps development practitioners in coming up with development goals within the context of political intolerance. The research hopes to benefit development practitioners, conflict managers, students of politics, diplomats, academia, international organizations and institutions, political parties in Zimbabwe and across the continent through creating an understanding of the nexus between nonviolent resistance and conflict transformation.

Studies on the impact of violence and conflict on development need to be carried out. Zimbabwe needs to have a clearer analysis of how pre-

colonial, colonial and post-colonial violence has affected development. In the case of the post 2000 period, government propaganda has focused on sanctions as an anti-development propaganda. However, this study unpacks how violence has impacted on development. The study uses the nonviolent approach to understand how this method impacted the Zimbabwean conflict. Studies on nonviolence need to be carried out if the current problems facing Africa and Zimbabwe are to be fully developed and understood. The development of the nonviolent resistance discourse is part and parcel of the democratic development of any country. On the African continent this is crucial as it facilitates the active participation of the citizenry in the total development of the continent.

This thesis focuses primarily on MDC and its non-violent resistance politics since its formation in 1999. The study is confined to Zimbabwe from where data on nonviolent resistance will be drawn. Interviews were conducted with selected individuals who have borne the brunt of violence with the intention of understanding their experiences and the coping mechanisms they have adopted. The researcher conducted interviews and distributed questionnaires in Buhera South constituency of Manicaland Province which bore the brunt of violence since the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change in 1999. These provided useful information on the efficacy of nonviolence as a tool to counter political violence. The thesis was largely qualitative using qualitative research methods such as interviews, focus group discussions and document study. Due to the nature of the Zimbabwean problem and for purposes of this study, population is drawn across the length and breadth of Buhera South Constituency with special focus on hotspots of political violence. The sample size for the research was fifty respondents. The sampling procedure used was the snowball sampling.

The researcher acknowledges some limitations to the study. The initial challenge was to define the concept of human security. The definition was not easily understood by participants as there was conflation of state security and human security. Most participants initially thought that national security overrode human security. Most participants were of the view that the needs of an individual are subservient to the general security of the state. This misnomer came from the ZANU-PF propaganda which put the liberation struggle as the antidote to the needs of the people.

The sensitivity of the topic made people a little curious as to the motive of the research. In societies which are predominantly police states suspicion always creeps in. Most participants thought the researcher was an agent of the regime as very few studies have attempted to find the nature of violence and how it has affected development in the focus area. The COVID19 pandemic also presented challenges in accessing some communities due to the lockdown measures used to contain the disease. The use of electronic communications, the WhatsApp platform and cell phone calls mainly addressed some of those limitations. However, some members also faced data challenges, network connectivity and power challenges.

Nonviolent resistance- Sharp (2013: 16) defines it as a “generic term covering dozens of specific methods of protest, non-cooperation and intervention in all of which resisters conduct the conflict by doing or refusing to do- certain things without resorting to physical violence. As a technique therefore nonviolent action is not passive. It is not inaction. It is action that is nonviolent.”

Nonviolent struggle- entails the fact that one does not capitulate in the face of threats. One does not run away. One also chooses to fight with superior weapons, not the oppressors’ violence, but psychological, moral, social-economic and political weapons with which one’s people

can be strong" (Sharp (2013) cited by Cady S (2010). Ghandi pioneered in the experimentation and use of the tactic claiming that "I have nothing new to teach the world. Truth and non-violence are as old as the hills. All I have done is to try experiments in both on as vast a scale as I could."

State of nature- Thomas Hobbes in his interpretation of the state of nature proposed that "In the state of nature, first, we are roughly equal; no one is so strong that they can dominate others and overpower all resistance. Any difference of physical strength can be matched by the other person finding people to help, or by their intelligence, or by their experience. The best form of defence, the best way to get what we want, is to attack first" (Lacewing 2008a).

Negative Peace- (Galtung 1964: 2) defined negative peace as "absence of violence and absence of war" Positive Peace- (Galtung 1964: 2) defined positive peace "is the integration of human society."

Violence- is defined as an "action or practice that directly physically harms or threatens to physically harm another. Those who engage in violent action are typically armed and their actions involve shootings, bombings, armed assaults, hit-and-run attacks, assassinations, and conventional military engagements" (Gleditsch 2004).

Human security- has been defined to include freedom "from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards" (UNDP, 1994: 22). The UNDP further defined it to "mean, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life - whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (UNDP 1994). The United Nations Commission on Human Security defined human security as,

"to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment" (CHS 2003).

Human insecurity-means the failure to protect and provide freedoms and basic necessities for the fulfilment of life needs. Where there is the "threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards" (UNDP, 1994: 22) it means there is human insecurity.

Peace building- is a notion that is closely related to human security and development. As expressed by Madenga (2016: 8) it "is the holistic process of promoting peace and justice by addressing the root causes of the conflict." Conflicts are anti-development as they tend to destroy infrastructure which usually take years to reconstruct in post conflict building process. This leads to peace agreements and in some instances Unity governments or governments of national unity. Peace in conflict resolution is realised through peace agreements.

Peace agreements- According to Nita and Ouellet (2003) peace agreements are "accords that aim to end a conflict, or to considerably alter a conflict, so that it can be more constructively addressed."

Chapter 1 is the introduction of the thesis; it presents the background to the study, carefully crafts the statement of the problem, outlines the aims of the study, rationale/significance of the study and furnishes summary of the research methodology. Chapter 2 provides a detailed analysis of the literature review. It also presents the theory of non-violent resistance and how this theory has helped the researcher to critique the effectiveness of this concept as it was deployed by the MDC in Zimbabwe. Chapter 3 presents the research design and methodology adopted in this study. It also provides the nexus between objectives, philosophical research paradigm and methodology. It explains the epistemology of research paradigm, ontology of the

paradigm and methodology in detail. Chapter 4 provides a historical overview of the postcolonial attempts at peace. It articulated the political philosophy around the Mugabe regime and its rule, the policy of reconciliation, the Matabeleland disturbances of 1982-1987 and the question of electoral violence. Chapter 5 consists of empirical data that reveals the nature of MDC's rhetoric and practice of non-violent resistance. Chapter 6 critiques the application of the politics of nonviolence by the MDC. It presents the failures and successes of nonviolence in the contest for power in politics. Chapter 7 examines the link between human security and development in Buhera South. Chapter 8 evaluates the MDC's policy of nonviolent resistance and the impact of the adoption of non-violence resistance. Chapter 9 provides the summary, conclusions and key recommendations based on the findings of the study.

This chapter has provided a comprehensive background to research context and problem. It has underlined the problem of violence and human insecurity in Zimbabwe. Human insecurity has become a developmental problem considering the effects of violence. Episodes of political violence on the Zimbabwean political arena have influenced the study to focus on the use of nonviolent resistance to confront the endemic problem. The cycle of violence must be broken, since recurring violence is inimical to national development. The chapter also outlines the research objectives and questions, importance of the study, scope and limitations of the study, and the chapter layout or structure of the thesis.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.

This chapter commences by reviewing pertinent literature in the canon of scholarship on human security and development, followed by a critique of the human security concept. A brief history of violence and non-violence in Zimbabwe will also be furnished with a view to highlighting the lack of human security in the country since the colonial period before we turn to the origin of the non-violence discourse in the modern/colonial world. The thesis then moves on to define non-violence resistance, highlighting the techniques of nonviolence which include nonviolent protest and persuasion, non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention. The key points of leverage in civil resistance movements are then explored followed by the misconceptions about nonviolent resistance. A section on nonviolent resistance in the 19th century is followed by some on nonviolent resistance against extreme dictatorships, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela Martin L King Jr and nonviolent resistance, nonviolent resistance in the Arab World and nonviolent resistance in Zimbabwe in the period 1980-2017. The second part of this chapter focuses on the theory of nonviolent resistance, together with another section on the theory of non-violence and the will to live.

For the purposes of the study, human security refers to two issues, notably protection and empowerment. Protection requires “concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically addresses insecurities”, while empowerment “enables people to [fully] develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making” (MacLean *et al.*, 2006). Protection and empowerment are not exclusive but rather mutually reinforcing, and both are required in most situations. As noted by the then United Nations Secretary General Koffi Annan in 2001, “Africa must reject the ways of the past, and commit itself to building a future of democratic governance

subject to the rule of law. Such a future is only achievable on the condition that we end Africa's conflicts, without which no amount of aid or trade, assistance or advice, will make the difference" (Annan, 2001).

The concept of human security has received a fair share of criticism as some have called it hot air, however its implementation and acceptability has opened up new frontiers for development. Essentially, "the approach of human security is centred on the person and the community, and it focuses on threats and conditions to people's security that are not normally seen as threats to the state" (Abatudu, 2005: 107). Former Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo described human security as "the keyword to comprehensively seizing all of the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and to strengthening the efforts to confront these threats" (cited in Sen, 2000: 1). Human security is therefore about survival, daily life, and dignity of a human being. As pointed out by Chillers (2004: 11), the idea of human security has brought up new frontiers for development notably exposing those states which used to view security in state-centric instead of individual centric terms. The concept of human security (which includes overlapping systems of security at individual, national and international levels), is the security of the individual in his or her personal surroundings and within the community, the ability thus of people and communities to pursue safe livelihoods on equal terms with others.

The concept behind human security shows the intricate nexus between individuals and development in communities. Thomas (2001: 161) describes "human security as a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised". Individuals and communities are no longer bystanders in socio-political and economic governance, but are key stakeholders in the

crafting and implementation of development policies and programmes. Therefore “human development contributes to human security by tackling the long-term structural causes of conflict and by strengthening the capability of societies to deal with conflict in a peaceful manner” (Lodgaard, 2000: 9). The duty of the state therefore is to facilitate development. Where violence is pervasive, development is affected such that the citizenry suffers from multiple deprivations.

Colonialism in Zimbabwe left violent indelible marks on the psyche and socio-political and economic space. The violence compromised human security. The coming of independence in 1980 perpetuated the legacies of colonialism as violence against opponents continued. In the Zimbabwean context development has been affected by the narrow approach to security which mainly focused on sovereignty and territorial integrity. The pursuit of sovereignty saw the state becoming the perpetuator of insecurity, not only through failing to fulfil its obligations towards its subjects but also threatening their very existence. Human security therefore requires the recognition of the interconnections between development, security and human rights. It is the contention of this thesis that human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than political tolerance. It encompasses in its substantive purview, human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that everyone has opportunities and choices to fulfil and capitalise on. Alkire (2003) shows the link between human security and development by stating that “both are people-centred, they are multi-sectoral and multidimensional undertakings; both provide the “broad picture” long-term objective of human fulfilment within any society and they address chronic poverty” (Alkire, 2003: 36). This is the opposite of what has been happening in Zimbabwe, especially in Buhera South since the formation of the MDC in 1999.

Human security has attracted widespread criticism from different scholars since its first use in 1994. Human security is essentially about transformation, transparency and accountability which form the core values of development. Gómez and Gasper have captured it as the core to human development. They see it as the power behind the development of societies. Central to their argument is that “the right to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair... with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential” is fundamental (UN General Assembly, 66th session 25 October 2022 cited in Gomez and Gasper 2014: 3). Musa (2012) posits that human security globally is being compromised by the neoliberal agenda and globalisation which have rendered third world governments ineffective in providing solutions to their people notably through the debt trap. Musa (2005: 108) argues that “the ideology of neo-liberalism constitutes a serious impediment to the provision of social safety nets in Africa. The way the neo-liberal agenda has played itself out in several African countries suggests a serious need to interrogate it as a factor fuelling human insecurity on the continent”.

The UN General Assembly, 66th session 25 October 2022 perhaps provides the link between human security and development. Most importantly, the report concludes by arguing that “human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;” thus human security forms part of the family of human concepts (including human rights, human needs, human development” (UN General Assembly, 66th Session “Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome” A/RES/66/290, 25 October 2012). Muguruza (2018) has argued for human security to reduce poverty through a human security framework. This framework seeks to have a new paradigm of development cooperation with international financiers. The framework would identify genuine threats to human survival, and allocation of

responsibilities to duty bearers so that they become accountable. Thomas (2001: 162) contends that “the qualitative aspect of human security is about the achievement of human dignity which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one’s life and unhindered participation in the life of the community. Emancipation from oppressive power structures global, national or local in origin and scope is necessary for human security.”

However, some scholars such as Johns (2014) and Paris (2001) have opted to view the human security concept as doing more harm than good to the people it seeks to protect. It is seen as a fuzzy and hazy concept lacking a concise definition and working strategy. It leaves the individual and the state vulnerable to externalities. However, Chiller (2004) opines that both traditional state security and human security are interrelated as the goal is to protect citizens. Chiller (2004) sees the disturbances in Africa, notably wars, terrorism and coups as symptomatic of state failure and concentration on traditional security without guaranteeing the security of citizens. He cites colonialism as having created artificial borders and bunching ethnic groups into one big nation thus upon attaining independence most have ignored the security of some ethnic groups thereby rendering the countries insecure. The human security concept is therefore helpful in highlighting the development needs of Africa and Zimbabwe to be precise. Most states are for regime preservation at all costs rather than citizens’ interests. Zimbabwe, since colonialism, has been such a state prioritising regime preservation through “patronage and the associated misuse of governmental instruments of coercion to entrench political and social exclusion” (Bryden, N’Diaye, and Oloniskin, 2008: 3). A brief history of violence and non-violence in Zimbabwe confirms the above stated point.

The actions of the colonial government in both legal and regulatory frameworks clearly showed a negation of the critical elements of

human security. The colonial Rhodesian government cared little about the dignity, respect and rights of Africans. To them, profits mattered more than human security. The Africans were seen as natives and savages deserving no respect. Human security is about empowerment and protection. As pointed out by Maclean (2006), "Protection shields people from dangers, it requires concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities. Empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making." Colonialism itself was a violent imposition of rule on the African. Colonial conquest in 1890 was followed by a violent dispossession of Africans of their land and means of survival. Violence was institutionalised through a series of laws which if not adhered to would lead to torture, imprisonment, or death. This was to continue after the 1st Chimurenga in 1896-97 where the vanquished were left at the mercy of the victors.

Nonviolent resistance during the colonial period was mainly waged through organised labour unions. Mothibe (1996: 180) has provided the framework which guided trade unionism between 1957 and 1963. These were the watershed years in the Zimbabwean resistance movements marked by the formation of the African National Congress led by Joshua Nkomo in 1957. Mothibe (1996) disputes the widely held notion that trade unionism did not end with the formation of nationalist parties in Zimbabwe but rather the two groupings existed together, fighting for liberation using different means. He argues that "workers and nationalist politicians worked closely initially to seek accommodation in the colonial political structures, and following the 1959 emergency, they fought together to demand independence" (Mothibe, 1996: 180). This clearly shows that the workers were advocates of peaceful resistance and engagement with the government to find solution to wage disparities. The years 1897-1966 were years of peaceful resistance though with some flashes of violent protests which often suffered violent clampdown.

The coming in of colonial rule created new frontiers for resistance. Boyd (2017) has brought to the fore the fact that labour became the first frontier of resistance after the collapse of military resistance. Mostly Africans escaped labour through avoidance or migration to areas with less economic activity, crossing into neighbouring colonies or finding respite in Christian religion, feigning sickness or purposefully misunderstanding orders. The Native Commissioner report in 1904 showed that Africans only came to work to fulfil the tax obligations other than that they stayed away. He wrote "to accustom the native of this country to steady work is a task which will take years to accomplish; more particularly as they have no desire to become rich. Their one idea is to obtain money to pay tax which can be obtained in two months, and then return to their homes, and loll about in idleness and drinking beer" (Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, 1904).

Bhebe (1999) has brought to focus how the struggle for independence evolved from 1893 up to 1980. The resistance took various forms from disorganised strikes, boycotts, religious protests, expressed through the formation of indigenous churches, to mass nationalism (Bhebe, 1999: 10). This has provided a historical analysis of the development of the Zimbabwean national consciousness and violence. Thus the fight for political independence, human security and development in Zimbabwe has been a continuous struggle which has taken many turns and forms. Bhebe presents the development of national consciousness from the early years of colonial rule to armed struggle thereby moving away from nonviolent approaches to more organised political parties and mass liberation movements. While this was a welcome development, it also led to an entrenched culture of violence in Zimbabwe. Bhebe shows how even in the early years of military action the guerrillas were "carrying out acts of sabotage which were considered relevant to bring forth fear and despondency to the settlers in Rhodesia to influence the British government and the foreign

settlers in Rhodesia to accede to the popular revolutionary demands of the people of Zimbabwe" (Bhebhe, 1999: 13).

Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopoulos (2000) have articulated how the nonviolent methods used before were suddenly discarded in 1948 in favour of 'mob confrontations'. They cite the 1948 strike as a clash between the elites and the militant workers. Elitism in this instance required a more cautious approach to negotiating while militancy required a scorched earth approach in their fight for better wages. This shows the discordant relationship between leadership and the led. As the people yearned for a strike, the leaders devised various strategies:

When they addressed a large meeting in Bulawayo's Stanley Hall on the Tuesday night immediately before the strike occurred, one leader after another 'advised the workers not to strike until the Salisbury workers were also ready to strike'. This advice was not well-received by the crowd, and when the leaders left 'to consult among themselves', a young man 'clad in a raincoat' shouted out "'Kana sora ratswa ngaritswe'" (. . .if the grass is burning, let it burn). Sticks, knobkerries, hats and all floated in the air as the thousands of workers cheered the young man. The strike was on, but the leaders were still in conference. (Phimister and Raftopoulos, 2000: 292).

This analysis partly explains why the nonviolent resistance movements in earlier years were few and confined to small groupings and yielded little or no success. However, the success of the 1948 strike and the violence witnessed also spurred the formation of nationalist parties. The leadership of these parties began to drift towards militancy to fight the labour problem. One notable feature shown by Raftopoulos (2000) is the lack of cohesion among the elites in nonviolent movements. The leading organisation, Bulawayo African Workers Trade Union, split in 1947 when Benjamin Burombo launched the African Workers Voice Association 'for the benefit of the workers' (Phimister and Raftopoulos, 2000: 297).

The lessons of 1948 gave rise to the need for a united labour movement. As pointed by Mothibe (1996), unionism was regional, mostly active in Bulawayo and Harare. Burombo retreated into the rural areas. Mothibe (1996) shows that these earlier social movements lacked clarity and simple messaging to attract considerable success. Due to this lack, many turned their labour skills into political movements which the Rhodesians dealt with through several anti-terror laws. The emergence of these political movements and their turn to militarism killed the activities of social movements in the period 1966-1980 as the labour problem became a political problem. Mothibe (1996: 180) concludes by arguing that “more important, was the decision of the nationalists to embark on armed struggle. That decision basically shifted the terrain of the struggle from the urban to the rural areas and as a result labour was marginalised.”

After independence the nonviolent resistance continued through social movements. The social organisations movements which had suffered a knock due to the liberation struggle resurfaced. The various workers' unions were grouped under the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU). Mugabe had an indifferent approach to opposition and criticism during his rule especially in the early years after independence. He seemed to embrace multiparty democracy. While he embraced democracy, he targeted all those who challenged his powers. To better understand the history of violence and nonviolent resistance since 1980, there is need to properly interrogate the Mugabe policies after 1980. Mandaza (1986) argues that the Mugabe regime, since 1980, was elite driven. Mandaza accuses the new government in 1980 of failing to acknowledge wrongs of the past and focusing more on power consolidation. Consolidation in this case meant using state repressive apparatus against social democratic movements. Bond and Saunders (2005) have shown that the tentacles of elite driven politics stretched to labour until 1987 when Morgan Tsvangirai took over. Morgan Tsvangirai was a trade unionist who represented mine

workers. He assumed the leadership of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions in 1987. The coming in of Morgan Tsvangirai brought a new dimension to nonviolent resistance as “a decade of unprecedented industrial and social action was launched, featuring a wave of public and private sector industrial actions in the mid-1990s that soon grew to include nationwide “political actions” against government intransigence, unaccountability, and mismanagement” (Bond and Saunders, 2005: 46). The coming of Tsvangirai at ZCTU brought a new wave of nonviolent resistance expressed through strikes and stay-aways. Lucien van de Walt (1999: 106) focused on analysing the ZCTU transformation as it “concentrated on building its organisational strength and linkages to organisations of students, public servants and academics.” The analysis mostly focuses on the organisational structure of the ZCTU and how it eventually transitioned to full-blown politics. However, there is evidence that the ZCTU only transitioned to politics after failure to effect desired labour goals within a ZANU-PF controlled environment. It is therefore important to note that the ZCTU and other social movements had “relatively weak shop floor base, clear relations with other popular sectors, particularly the poor peasantry, and a clear political programme, their impact on the process of change cannot but be self-limiting” (Lucien van de Walt, 1999: 111).

Masunungure (1998), Sithole (1999) and Sithole and Makumbe (1996) have written extensively about the instrumentalisation of the law as violent assault on the legal fraternity emerged. Mugabe used instruments of law and coercion against opponents. It should be noted that since assuming the reins of power in 1977 in ZANU, Mugabe has always attempted to create a one centre of power. Masunungure (1998), Sithole (1999) and Sithole and Makumbe (1996) have all shown that Mugabe chiefly deployed violence against opponents to subdue them in the initial phases of his leadership in ZANU from as early as 1977. After independence he resorted more to law fare as a strategy to subdue his political opponents. Where the use of the law failed, he

turned to the party militia to instil violence against opponents. Mandaza (1996) clearly maintains that Mugabe used any instrument at his disposal to further his hold on power.

Gwisai (2002) has brought to sharp focus how the Mugabe government distrusted social movements. He also claims that the socialist principles adopted after independence were a mere smokescreen to hoodwink workers. The new regime attempted to use such reforms to consolidate its hegemony by falsely proclaiming the state to be pursuing socialist ideals. Thus, patriotism was invented to quell the opposition against unwarranted criticism. In the same vein Brian Raftopoulos (2004) talks of the recuperation of manhood' as a tool for Mugabe's 'authoritarian nationalism that dominated the official nationalism of the state throughout the present crisis. The crisis of violence in Zimbabwe can be understood in the context of failure to uphold the principles human security. The Mugabe of 1977 who assumed ZANU leadership and the Mugabe of 1980 who assumed the leadership of Zimbabwe failed to evolve with the times. After 1980, Mugabe continued where Smith left.

Derek Matyszak (2012) interrogates the role of social movements in promoting the doctrine of nonviolent resistance in the 1990s. He shows how the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum was born with the aim of "effective monitoring of the human and civil rights terrain. When victims of rights violations and political violence approach member organizations, such as the Counselling Services Unit, or Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, for assistance and redress, qualitative and quantitative data are compiled and forwarded to the Forum for collation" (Matyszak, 2012: 135-36). This has provided a compelling account of how various NGOs have contributed to the nonviolent discourse. Matyszak shows that the nonviolent resistance in the modern world has now taken a human security approach which cannot be left to politicians alone. The NGOs, as shown by Matyszak, have

amplified the problem of violence in Zimbabwe to international audiences which have internationalised the Zimbabwean problem.

Richard Saunders (2000) has argued that the Mugabe government attempted to regulate the formation of social movements. Those that were allowed to operate were subjected to party and government patronage “the ZANU-PF government thwarted the chances of the formation of new civic structures outside party and government patronage, representing different voices in civil society that resurfaced with the end of the liberation war to assert an autonomous position” (Saunders 2000: 15-20). Melber, (2010: 4) posits that “tendencies to autocratic rule and towards the subordination of the state under the party, and politically motivated social and material favours as a reward system for loyalty or disadvantages as a form of coercion in cases of dissent are common techniques” deployed by post-independence leaders to maintain a stranglehold on power. In the same vein Rupiya (2004) has proffered the argument that violence in Zimbabwe from 1999-2004 was mainly political. He argues that “the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational character of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of society” (Decalo, 1990: 3 cited in Rupiya, 2004: 82). Rupiya analyses the problematic nature of violence to military-politics matrix which has even affected various nonviolent resistance measures. In this regard, the military was the counter measure to opposition nonviolent resistance measures.

Mediel Hove’s (2016) thesis on nonviolent campaigns has focused more on effectiveness of the methods without focusing on the critical aspects of human security. He articulates that the nonviolent discourse does not yield results in political change as the findings from the research shows that violence is the solution to state sponsored violence. He

failed to go beyond strategies and methods, rather limiting his argument to a narration of events of what happened and could have happened. This thesis goes beyond that by looking at the concepts of nonviolent resistance, human security and development. The study analyses how violence and nonviolent resistance affected human security thereby affecting the development of Zimbabwe. It holds the view that the goal of politics should be to advance the interests of the people rather than those of the few rulers. Where there is use of dictatorship to govern, violence occurs and human insecurity deepens. To counter this, nonviolent resistance is proposed as the solution. The dissertation now moves on to review the origins of the non-violence discourse in the modern/colonial world.

Nonviolent struggles have occurred in widely differing cultures, periods of history, and political conditions throughout the world. Nonviolence resistance has been practiced since time immemorial in attempts to transform conflicts. Nonviolent resistance is an ideal concept to study because of its transformative role in conflict situations. Nonviolent resistance cannot be examined outside an understanding of both the nature of the structures that produce and reproduce violence and the role that it plays in either transcending or reproducing violence. Nonviolent resistance is developmental in orientation because it is anti-destruction as witnessed by those countries which have gone through years of intractable violence. Examples from countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Liberia have shown how violence is counterproductive as it leads to underdevelopment and human insecurity. The emergence and perpetuation of violence which continues to affect Zimbabweans in the current political situation is examined using the nonviolence theory. Nonviolence can be traced to around 527 BC when it was introduced to the world as a tool for social change.

Henry David Thoreau's (1849) use of the term 'civil disobedience' is quite instructive and useful in this study which sought to evaluate the nonviolence discourse and its impact in the Zimbabwean conflict since 1999 when the MDC was formed. The American author Henry David Thoreau as the pioneer of the modern theory behind this practice with his 1849 essay on Civil Disobedience argued against people being used as agents of injustice by a government which they chose. The essay had profound influence on both Martin Luther and Mahatma Gandhi. His essay on Civil Disobedience has received critical acclaim for it shaped the nonviolent resistance movement. The dissertation moves on now to define non-violence resistance.

Sharp (2013:16) defined nonviolent resistance as a "generic term covering dozens of specific methods of protest, non-cooperation, and intervention in all of which resisters conduct the conflict by doing or refusing to do- certain things without resorting to physical violence. As a technique therefore nonviolent action is not passive. It is not inaction. It is action that is nonviolent." He further postulates that "nonviolent struggle means, of course, that one does not capitulate in the face of threats. One does not run away. One also chooses to fight with superior weapons, not the oppressor's violence, but psychological, moral, social-economic and political weapons with which one's people can be strong" (Sharp (2013) cited by Cady, 2010). Gandhi pioneered the experimentation and use of the tactic claiming that "'I have nothing new to teach the world. Truth and non-violence are as old as the hills. All I have done is to try experiments in on as vast a scale as I could" (Sharp, 2013).

However, examples abound of its usage throughout history. Oftentimes it has become the choice of the weak to use the power of conscience than that of vengeance. From its wide use, it can be argued that nonviolent resistance has become a common tool for the weak against established dictatorships throughout the world. One of the

foremost thinkers in the nonviolent action, Gene Sharp (2013), defined it as “a technique of action by which the population can restrict and sever the sources of power of their rulers or other oppressors and mobilize their own power potential into effective power”. This definition aptly shows how conflicts in modern times can be transformed or contained to avoid fatalities or escalation. It suits the MDC approach since its formation in 1999 against the backdrop of potentially damaging confrontation with the ZANU-PF regime.

Ronald Regan while addressing the United Nations Assembly in 1984, said "All problems could be peacefully resolved if adversaries talked to each other on the basis of love and truth. All through history, the way of truth and love has always won. This was the belief and vision of Mahatma Gandhi and his vision remains good and true even today" (Cited in Bharati, 2003). Nonviolence provides us with tools, the positive means to oppose and stop wars and preparations for war, to resist violence, to struggle against racial, sexual and economic oppression and discrimination and to seek social justice and genuine democracy for people throughout the world (Ishu, Kamla, Singh, Neha, 2013a).

Where there is power imbalance, nonviolence is the perfect response. Gene Sharp (2013) identifies sources of power which rulers often use against opponents and which needs to be understood by those who want to wage nonviolent resistance. The sources include among others: authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, material resources and sanctions (Sharp, 2013: 7). Thus, for dictatorship to flourish and succeed it depends on the obedience of the people to these varying sources of power. For the effectiveness of nonviolence resistance, it is critical to understand these sources of power and appropriate the necessary action to avoid retribution. The non-violence approach is premised on the fact that “revolutionary change can be brought about by non-violent means; it focused on the social roots of the power of the

state and refused to challenge the state on its own terms, that is with violence (Shock cited in Hardman, 2013: 45).

Govier conceives nonviolence as constitutive of “those methods of protest, non-cooperation, and intervention in which the actors, without employing physical violence, refuse to do certain things they are expected or required to do; or do certain things they are not expected, or are forbidden, to do” (Govier, 2008: 63). Nonviolent struggle is identified by what people do, not by what they believe (Sharp, 2005: 8). The action of the people becomes the basis of its implementation. In violent regimes those weaker choose to be passive to state sponsored violence. Chenoweth & Cunningham (2013) have defined it as the application of unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent.

Dudouet (2004a) has argued that the basic “principles of nonviolent resistance encompass an abstention from using physical force to achieve an aim, but also a full engagement in resisting oppression, domination and any other forms of injustice”. These principles can be used against direct or structural violence used by state actors. For the purposes of this study, the three approaches given by Sharp will be used, namely nonviolent protest and persuasion, non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention. These are related to the political choices of the MDC. Nonviolent resistance covers a wide range of actions. The nonviolent approach is not a sign of weakness but rather “a response of how to act effectively in politics, especially how to wield power effectively” (Sharp, 2013: 18). This study uses the definition by Sharp which groups nonviolent action as a form of protest, resistance and intervention without physical violence which he summarised as follows:

such action may be conducted by (a) acts of omission that is, the participants refuse to perform acts that they usually perform, are expected by custom to

perform, or are required by law or regulation to perform; (b) acts of commission that is, the participants perform acts that they usually do not perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation from performing; or (c) a combination of both" (Sharp, 2005: 547).

Thus, nonviolent struggle "connotes the waging of strong forms of nonviolent action against determined opponents who are prepared to impose serious repression (Sharp, 2005: 548).

The 20th Century represented an era of colonial rebellions. The creation of overseas empires provided a basis for the use of nonviolent resistance throughout the world. This type of struggle has been used to gain national independence, to generate economic gains, to resist genocide, to undermine dictatorships, to gain civil rights, to end segregation, and to resist foreign occupations and coups d'état (Sharp, 2005: 5).

The Nazi and Communist dictatorships in Germany and Russia respectively produced some of the most damaging dictatorships ever experienced in Europe. The Germans used nonviolent resistance against the Kapp Putsch in 1920 and against the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 and the Nazi dictatorships under Hitler. Nonviolent resistance was used by the Norwegians, Danes and the Netherlands against Nazi occupation. It was also used to save the Jews in Berlin, Denmark and other occupied European nations (Sharp, 2005: 5). The end of communist dictatorship in Europe in 1989 also saw the adoption of the nonviolent resistance in most Russian occupied territories. Nonviolent struggle brought about the end of Communist dictatorships in Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1989 and in East Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1991 (Sharp, 2005: 5). In East Timor "the Clandestine Front, developed a large decentralized network of activists, who planned and executed various nonviolent campaigns inside East Timor, in Indonesia, and internationally. These

included protests timed to the visits of diplomats and dignitaries, sit-ins inside foreign embassies, and international solidarity efforts that reinforced Timorese-led nonviolent activism” (Chenoweth, 2015: 4). This led to the ousting of Suharto the Indonesian dictator in 1998.

In modern times nonviolent resistance has been applied by Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr and Nelson Mandela, among many others. Sharp (1973) defined it as “a general technique of conducting protest, resistance, and intervention without physical force” while Martin Luther argued that “non-violence is a powerful weapon and just weapon. Indeed, it is a weapon unique in history which cuts without wounding and enables the man who wields it”. Ghandi defined it as people power (Gaur 1977). Mahatma Ghandi further advocates that non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the brute.

Ghandi having been inspired by the readings of Tostoy (1867, 1878 and 1886) and Thoreau (1849) used nonviolent means in political and practical action. He also introduced a greater attention to strategy and tactics in campaigns of mass defiance (Sharp, 1973: 82). From the 1950s Martin L King jnr used it in nonviolent civil rights campaigns including bus boycotts. Nonviolence was deployed in countries including Chile in 1988, the Philippines in 1986, South Africa in 1994, Poland in 1989, Serbia in 2000, and Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. These nonviolent movements were all Ghandi inspired.

In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) used nonviolent resistance in their struggle against the Apartheid regime in 1952. The ANC ran a defiance campaign against apartheid rallying members with the slogan ‘Open the jail doors, we want to enter’. Leaders such as Nelson Mandela were imprisoned for openly challenging the apartheid system peacefully. While the ANC formed the military wing Umkonto we Sizwe with the idea of using military means to fight apartheid, “it

was the nonviolent strategies such as boycotts and talking to intermediaries that brought de Klerk and Mandela to the negotiating table when they realised that violence would not bring an end to the conflict" (Marks, 2006: 54-56). This was a successful attempt at defying segregatory apartheid laws in South Africa. As a result of this, membership in the ANC drastically increased. Ghandi also inspired African leaders like Kenneth Kaunda who said 'It is by the power of forgiveness we are freed from the burden of past guilt so that we can act boldly in the present' (Kaunda, 1982: 182)." As pointed out by Kaunda, nonviolent resistance has been a matter of faith and Africanism. Having hosted the Zimbabwean freedom fighters and played an active role in the formation of the frontline states, Kaunda said "there are times when revolutions are a tragic necessity because the extension of human rights to large numbers of oppressed citizens can be achieved in no other way" (Kaunda, 1982: 93). His argument was based on a dilemma between human security and resistance. This can be found in most proponents of nonviolent resistance after facing atrocities committed by the other side.

Ghandi believed in truth and love as the guiding principle for the non-violent movement to succeed. His teachings were based on the principle of satyagraha and ahimsa. Mary King explained "satyagraha as the quest for Truth, satyagraha blended the mind, body and soul for the attainment of personal and, ultimately, social transformation" (King, 1999: 15). "Satyagraha was both sophisticated and filled with moral ramifications. Nonviolent movement was construed as the means to convert the power in nonviolence, or ahimsa into political action" (King, 1999: 264). Satyagraha combined ethical and practical action to guide the daily endeavours of people. Central to satyagraha was the idea that proponents of nonviolent struggle were to commit themselves against any forms of injustice and be willing to serve and be servants of the community. "Non-violence and Satyagraha (pursuit of Truth) presuppose humility and readiness to understand even the

most unpleasant stand of the opponent. This is applicable to those in power if they want to deal with problems non-violently” (Ishu, etal 2013a).

Ahimsa was a religious teaching of love blended with political messaging. Ghandi remarked that “Literally speaking ahimsa is non-killing. But to me it has a world of meanings and takes me into realms much higher, infinitely higher than the realm to which I would go, if I merely understood ahimsa as non-killing. Ahimsa really means that you may not offend anybody; you may not harbour an uncharitable thought even in connection with one who may consider himself to be your enemy... for one who follows the doctrine of ahimsa, there is no room for an enemy, he denies the existence of an enemy. . . If we return blow for blow, we depart from the doctrine of ahimsa...” (Ghandi Cited in Mazmudar, 2002).

King developed the principles through which nonviolence can be applied. Martin Luther King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” laid out the philosophical basis of nonviolent resistance which became the basis of the civil rights movement in the sixties America (Shippy, 2005a). Nonviolence principles can be summarised as a way of life for courageous people, it seeks to win friendship and understanding and defeat injustice, not people. Nonviolence holds that suffering can educate and transform, it chooses love instead of hate and believes that the universe is on the side of justice (King, 2005).

These principles are used to attain peace without bloodshed. They give contrary views to what Malcom X (2005:144) advocated, “if there is to be bleeding, it should be reciprocal... bleeding on both sides.” Malcolm X encouraged people to reciprocate whenever faced with a violent organisation. The principles which King stood for show a strict adherence to truth, non-injury, commitment to love, and upholding morality. King believed that the universe serves justice to the suffering

masses. A commitment to nonviolence is a commitment to self-suffering and not cowardice. Admittedly, nonviolence in the “truest sense, is not a strategy that one uses simply because it is expedient at the moment; it is ultimately a way of life that men live by because of the sheer morality of its claim” (King, 1999: 248). He further asserted that “We must somehow confront physical force with soul force and stand up courageously for justice and freedom. And this dynamic unity, this amazing self-respect, this willingness to suffer and this refusal to hit back will cause the oppressors to become ashamed of their own methods and we will be able to transform enemies into friends” (King, 1999; 274). King (1999) remarked that “I can never be what I ought to be until you are what you ought to be. And you can never be what you ought to be until I am what I ought to be.”

The Arab spring provided a classic example of nonviolent resistance. The Palestinian resistance of Israel occupation through the intifada in 1987 shows that nonviolent resistance is a tool for successfully challenging repressive forces. However, there is need to guard against a resort to violence as it can mark a turning point in the war. As stated by Roberts (1991: 6-7) the intifada internationalised the Palestinian agenda. Despite the brute show of force by Israel, the world has put the Palestinian cause into the international arena.

In Egypt and Tunisia, the Arab spring movement helped in ousting two longstanding dictators from office. The Arab spring was a turning point in the demand for accountability and human security. Even in Sudan Al Bashir faced the same fate when the Sudanese roundly protested against his rule leading to his ouster. As pointed out by Hove (2016), “evidence from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Egypt shows that although nonviolence strategies face challenges, there is room for success if the strategies are well implemented.” With the exception of Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan have regressed to military rule while in Syria the Free Syria faction turned a peaceful campaign into

an all-out war. Nonviolent resistance was eclipsed and Syria became a battleground of international forces which has led to deaths and imprisonment of prominent campaigners. Hove (2016: 65) rightly pointed out that “the USA and allies supported the Free Syrian Army which was composed of fighters drawn from different countries such as Libya, Afghanistan and Chechnya among others, thereby weakening nonviolent resistance. In fact, this reduced the fighting force to a US sponsored group trying to bring about regime change in Syria”.

This study adopted the theory of nonviolent resistance that was introduced by scholars such as Tolstoy, Thoreau and others. Henry David Thoreau (1849) formed the basis of nonviolent struggles against authority. He argues that “man should not be an instrument of oppression in pursuit of political correctness of the state rather man should strive to resist any movements towards enhancing oppressive rule” (Thoreau, 1849: 14). He argues that “under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison” (Thoreau, 1849:14). He goes on to say “the authority of government, even such as I am willing to submit to... is still an impure one: to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and consent of the governed” (Thoreau, 1849: 27). He views man as the power behind the state thus can withdraw his powers passively when those in power start abusing it. He sacrificed his freedom by opting to go to prison rather than pay taxes which he felt were oiling an oppressive system. Many people view Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr as the brains behind the nonviolent resistance movements owing to their work and practice. Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr are two prominent practitioners of the discourse. There are notable examples of nonviolent resistance throughout the world. The practice has been going on even before them. Sharp (2005:4) notes that “...from the late eighteenth century to the twentieth century, the technique of nonviolent action was widely used in colonial rebellions, international

political, economic and religious conflicts and anti-slavery resistance". Various scholars have been influential in shaping the nonviolent discourse in the modern world; among them are Tolstoy, Sharp, Shock, Thoreau and others. Throughout history the campaigns of nonviolence have been done sporadically dating as far back as 449 BC when the Roman Plebs organised a general strike (Shock, 2013: 278) to the 2010 Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria.

The advent of the nationalist struggle for independence provides notable examples of the use of nonviolent means to ending colonialism and oppression in Africa. Shock (2013) critically enumerates some notable examples of "nationalist struggles, such as Hungarian resistance to Austrian rule from 1849 to 1867, Finnish resistance to Russian rule from 1899 to 1906, and the Egyptian general strike against British occupation in 1919, were sustained efforts to promote political transformation through collective nonviolent resistance". Nonviolent resistance was also used in some labour struggles in Italy in 1904, Spain in 1919, and Britain in 1926. General strikes were a potent weapon of working class protest (Shock, 2013: 278).

There are three main techniques used in nonviolent resistance which are nonviolent protest and persuasion, non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention. Ackerman points to the effectiveness of technique in nonviolent resistance. He asserts that:

...the skills involved in waging nonviolent conflict, the ability to plan, mobilize and maintain civic pressure on unjust power, can overcome structural conditions heretofore considered insurmountable. Why? Because strategies of civil resistance are incremental and their effects cumulative. The versatile use of nonviolent tactics can unfreeze unfavourable conditions and so raise the temperature underneath autocrats (Ackerman, 2007: 8).

Nonviolent resistance is about skill, technique and execution which contribute to its success. There is need to adhere to the principles to

achieve success failure to use these often results in the failure of nonviolent resistance.

Nonviolent protest and persuasion is a physical peaceful protest against authorities. Sharp (2013) noted that “nonviolent protest and persuasion is a class which includes a large number of methods which are mainly symbolic acts of peaceful opposition or of attempted persuasion, extending beyond verbal expressions but stopping short of non-cooperation or nonviolent intervention.” Among these methods are parades, vigils, picketing, posters, teach-ins, mourning, and protest meetings. The methods used clearly shows that those involved are against what the government is doing. The methods used avoid confrontations and allows people to protest without leading to bloodshed. This method may also include sit in, strikes, and disrobing. What informs these actions is the consciousness of the need to avoid violent confrontations. Protests and demonstrations have been identified as the most common and widely used actions in nonviolent struggle which serves as the backbone of dissent. They are symbolic in that they bring people with the same grievances to a wider audience. They help to recruit the wider populations into peaceful resistance.

Non-cooperation is a method where the people disassociate themselves from the oppressor. This method was first used in 1920 by Ghandi against the ruthless British rule in India. The method encourages people to ignore goods and services from the oppressor and those linked to the regime. This is intended to cripple the operations of those associated with the government and leading them to empathise with the people. “One of the more powerful forms of nonviolent resistance is disobedience or non-cooperation with the rules of the regime, it is also the most known form of nonviolent action, and the one mostly connected to the old state-paradigm” (Vinthagen, 2006a). People deliberately target the sources of power. The use of non-cooperation “consciously and deliberately stands to end or limit

engagement or participation in specific activities, either partially or completely. At the heart of such methods lies the reality that all political relationships and systems depend upon the cooperation of the governed, whether through consent, acquiescence, or duress" (Miller, 2006: 45).

Notable methods of non-cooperation include rejection of authority such withholding of allegiance, illegitimising a government and refusal to join a coalition government. People can choose not to cooperate with the government by rejecting government employment, rejecting government institutions and funding. For non-cooperation to be effective, in the case of Zimbabwe, there were calls for ignoring punitive government laws such as Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA).

Nonviolent intervention involves third parties to the conflict. Boothe & Smithey (2007: 39) have argued that "the approach increasingly known as third-party nonviolent intervention... is a collection of tactics and methods used to support, rather than direct, social change work in intense conflict situations". The aim is protecting vulnerable groups by avoiding the escalation of the conflict. In cases of acute conflict, nongovernmental organisations may pressure the state actors to use civil means against protestors which might help in lessening the violent repressions. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 12) argues that "external actors may organize sanctions against repressive regimes that repeatedly crack down on unarmed protestors". Boothe and Smithey (2007:43) further assert that "the main methods of contemporary third-party nonviolent intervention all seek to protect vulnerable non-combatants, support local activists, confront oppressive power structures, and open space for democracy to flourish" (Boothe & Smithey, 2007: 43).

Those who advocate for nonviolent intervention use four approaches of intervention which include protective accompaniment, observing or monitoring, interposition, and presence. Protective accompaniment means putting activists in the international glare for them to be protected from harm. Those in the international glare become the focal persons of the international community and their views become internationally publicised. Observing or monitoring entails recording every activity especially during election time to counter fraudulent activities and vote rigging. This can be done through the use of both local and international observers and in some instance polling agents for political parties. In the Zimbabwean context there was the invitation of Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU) observers who gave their views once elections were held. These observers become the international eyes. This is probably “the most frequently used technique of third party intervention, and it is often used by organizations, such as the United Nations or international political agencies in the United States, that are not otherwise engaged in third party intervention” (Boothe and Smithey, 2007: 43).

The central concepts in understanding dynamics of civil resistance are mobilization, resilience, and leverage (Shock, 2013: 282). For nonviolence to work there is need for proper education on would be practitioners otherwise without proper training some members might resort to fighting back injustice as it occurs to them during the course of the struggle. There is need to understand the underlying conflict situation so that activists are better prepared to deal with both physical and structural violence applied against them. There could be need for showing the effectiveness of the methods to be applied so that people can have confidence in their choices.

A key characteristic of nonviolent resistance is the way it is organised, coordinated, and the quality in which civilians use it for a particular

goal. It relies on the shared grievances by participants. There is convergence of factors which binds people together towards a certain goal. There is need for a multidimensional strategy to mobilise resilience against the government.

Planning of a nonviolent resistance is of critical importance especially when dealing with a ruthless and cunning opponent. Most “democratic” states co-opt the state institutions such as police, army and intelligence service to serve the functions of the party rather than the people. In such instance, there is need to plan effectively so that the movement will not be hijacked for ulterior motives. The people need to be taught about the tenets and the purposes of such a struggle in order for it not to degenerate into a violent uprising. This might defeat the purpose of the resistance.

For a nonviolent movement to gain traction it should be organised well so as not to fall into the trap of hoodlums. Lack of a well organised structure in civil resistance becomes its albatross. In China the students used an “extensive network to organise their protests often using marshals for crowd control, a telephonic network for communication, pass system for access to their command structure and a propaganda machinery going into the neighbourhood to air student grievances and drums to alert citizens of troops movement” (Sharp & Jenkins, 1990: 44). Organisation and strategy should be the key leverage points. Using the Chinese example Sharp & Jenkins (1990) found out that the students in China made a strategic blunder by physically occupying the Monument of the Peoples Heroes which played into the hands of agents’ provocateurs and was a daring challenge to the government.

The media should play a critical role in promoting and outlining the principles through which nonviolence is promoted. Media is the medium through which the message is propagated by publishing the successes and importance of nonviolence. Cases where violence has

led to disastrous consequences such as in Rwanda during the genocide in 1994, the Libyan and Syrian conflict should be highlighted in the media to show how important nonviolent resistance can be. The media should show how:

the events of the Arab Spring of 2011 have made clear the importance and potential efficacy of nonviolent resistance... In January and February 2011, nonviolent activists, protestors, and labour organizations in Tunisia and Egypt were able to accomplish what years of violent rebellion could not – fundamental regime change (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013: 272).

Sometimes nonviolent resistance is motivated by the practical realisation that the protesters have no real chance of armed insurrection against a heavily armed government. In China, the students who protested against the government cited “the 1986 student march which was heavily crushed as a reason for protesting non-violently” (Sharp & Jenkins, 1990: 43). The students had realised that the socio-economic contradictions of China could not be solved violently but rather through engagement. They wanted to reform rather than overthrow the government.

Participation in a nonviolent movement is key to its success. The more the people participate the higher the chances of success. Nonviolent action requires people participation, rallies, boycotts and demonstrations. Participation “shows that more people care about an issue, and sometimes can produce a bandwagon effect, winning over ever greater numbers until opponents feel outnumbered and give up. It provides a sense of mutual support, as those involved are encouraged by the fact that others are too” (Martin, 2005: 45). The more people participate, the more resources to the movement are unveiled.

Abrahams’ works delves into the correspondence inference theory as a tool for success of nonviolent resistance movement. Correspondent inference theory can help to sway neutral observers as methods used

sometimes are stronger than the goals of the protesters. The methods used are vital for the leverage of protesters. Some state actors such as police and military might choose to remain neutral while neutrals may choose to join the movement. Some might choose to fraternise their opponents which means winning them over through explaining the reasons for their actions. Martin (2005) concluded that “by explaining what they are doing, and making personal contact protesters can win over some police and soldiers. Through all these means, nonviolent activists can undermine the willingness of opponent troops to use violence, and thereby neutralise what is seen as the ultimate sanction by the regime, physical force.” In essence, “through nonviolent empowerment, the underdogs increase their acceptability as a legitimate party in the conflict, and also their range of bargaining options” (Dudouet, 2017a).

Many people fail to distinguish between a nonviolent campaign and a violent one because of the violence usually perpetrated by one group. Nonviolent activists might suffer from government violence but as long they do not violently respond, the campaign can legitimately be classified as nonviolent. Most studies focus on the successful struggles, but a critical understanding of the failed ones is valuable for deeper analysis.

There is a general misconception on the incompatibility of nonviolence and military action. Studies have shown that nonviolent activists and the military might win over each other and end up fighting the same enemy. In the 1960s, during the civil rights era, government institutions responded by addressing the concern of the protesters. In time of war nonviolent action may resort to non-cooperation and other forms of underground resistance to thwart military action. What we learn from the struggles during World War II is that nonviolent resistance at the grassroots level, and military action at the

governmental level, can pursue a common goal in their efforts to bring an end to extreme aggression and persecution (Wolfe, 2005).

The rise and evolution of the modern state has limited the significance of nonviolent resistance. Most modern states have shown the superiority of violence which has undermined efforts and importance of nonviolent action. Martin (2015) has opined that “it seems plausible to look for associations between changing social structure and the rise of nonviolent action as a distinct approach to struggle... The modern nation-state, with its bureaucracies, militaries, and police, enabled great concentration of power in the hands of rulers”. More often, history has tended to focus on the great man, mainly those who have used war as a means to an end, but those who have used nonviolent approaches have been seen as lacking both tact and results. In this regard, many are motivated by the popular culture which portrays violence as a tool for expressing hegemonic power in society.

Nonviolent action is not a method of the ‘middle class’ or a ‘bourgeois’ approach to political contention. Nonviolent action “can and has been implemented by groups from all classes and castes, from slaves to members of the upper-class” (McCarthy and Kruegler, 1993). For obvious reasons, it is used more frequently by the less-powerful, that is, those without regular access to power holders, than by the powerful.

The effectiveness of nonviolent action is not a function of the repressiveness of the oppressors. In fact, nonviolent action has been effective in brutally repressive contexts, and it has been ineffective in open democratic polities. Repression, of course, constrains the ability of challengers to organize, communicate, mobilize, and engage in collective action, and magnifies the risk of participation in collective action. Nevertheless, repression is only one of many factors that

influence the trajectories of campaigns of nonviolent action, not the sole determinant of their trajectories.

One of the arguments raised against nonviolent action is that it cannot succeed against opponents willing to use violence. This argument assumes that the “willingness to use violence” cannot be affected by what the protesters do. With the right choice of tactics, police and military personnel are more likely to refuse orders and more likely to defect. In other words, willingness to use violence can be influenced by the actions of protesters. By remaining nonviolent, protesters pose no physical threat to opponents, thereby reducing their incentive to use violence. By careful choice of tactics and messages, protesters make their cause more appealing, increasing the chance of defections. By making themselves vulnerable, by protesting and putting themselves at risk of harm, protesters show themselves as human beings, as people who are like other people, and thereby harder to attack. From the perspective of empirical research, the argument that violence represents the only realistic option ignores the wide variety of documented historical experiences where nonviolent actions were able to prevent, deter, or end violence by oppressive actors (Jackson, 2017: 3).

Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, in his interpretation of the state of nature, proposed that “in the state of nature, first, we are roughly equal; no one is so strong that they can dominate others and overpower all resistance. Any difference of physical strength can be matched by the other person finding people to help, or by their intelligence, or by their experience. The best form of defence, the best way to get what we want, is to attack first”. This argument is buttressed by the belief that power should be used on other people to get or maintain it. Through the Law of Nature violence becomes a threat to self-preservation. The fundamental Law of Nature is “the Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally,

the more or less Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first that is Desire of Power, For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but several sorts of Power" (Hobbes, 1992: 53).

The theory of nonviolence emasculates various arguments given by pro-power scholars who argue and justify war as the basis of power. Frederic Nietzsche (2002) advocates the importance of war in politics christening it as a natural being. He questions the value of values? Nietzsche emphasises power retention at all costs arguing that "the world seen from inside, the world determined and described with respect to its 'intelligible character' – would be just this will to power and nothing else" (Nietzsche cited in Horstmann and Norman, 2002). In all willing, there is, first, a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of the state 'away from which,' the sensation of the state 'towards which,' the sensations of this 'from' and 'towards' themselves, and then also an accompanying muscular sensation that, even without our putting into motion 'arms and legs,' begins its action by force of habit as soon as we 'will' anything" (Nietzsche, 1966: 9).

This study disputes the claim that war occurrences happen naturally without the deliberate effort of people. Disastrous wars the world over are machinations of people such as the World Wars in 1914 and 1939, the liberation movements in Africa and the Civil Wars thereafter. Thus, the Gandhian and Martin Luther King approaches were after a careful realisation of people power in a peaceful way. The MDC approach to political power had the same realisation of how colonialism through brutalisation failed to stop future war, the liberation struggle from the 1960s to independence in 1980 gave peace which was wrecked by the Gukurahundi in Matabeleland from 1982-1987. Tsvangirai often stated his desire by claiming that he 'would not walk to state house on dead bodies'. The MDC first identified constitutionalism as the problem towards democratisation and vigorously campaigned for a new

constitution through the National Constitutional Assembly in 1999 followed by a series of nonviolent strikes and stayaways.

Nonviolent resistance, through its practical use, should be construed as an integral part of conflict transformation in the Zimbabwean conflict especially after the destructive effects of the 1st and 2nd Chimurenga and the Matabeleland disturbances from 1982-1987. All these wars have left lasting memories and societies divided and displaced and thousands killed. Thus, nonviolent discourse offers a “possible approach to achieving peace and justice, alongside other methods of conflict intervention focusing on dialogue, problem-solving and the restoration of cooperative relationships” (Dudouet, 2008). This thesis focuses more on ways it has been used by non-state actors in Zimbabwe since 1999 and other social movements in the civil society and grassroots organisations.

As stated by King (1957), “I never intend to adjust myself to the tragic effects of the methods of physical violence and to tragic militarism”. He goes further to buttress the fact that:

As maladjusted as Jefferson, who in the midst of an age amazingly adjusted to slavery could cry out, “All men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights and that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” As maladjusted as Jesus of Nazareth who dreamt a dream of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. God grant that we will be so maladjusted that we will be able to go out and change our world and our civilization. And then we will be able to move from the bleak and desolate midnight of man’s inhumanity to man to the bright and glittering daybreak of freedom and justice (King, 1957).

This study argues that the typical structural conditions leading to resort to nonviolent struggle are that more conventional political and legal channels appear blocked, yet people are unwilling to abandon their goals. Out of their own creativity or, more often, through hearing of or remembering events that seem relevant, people discover a way to

act. In a very real sense, nonviolence is the leaven for the bread that is a new society freed from oppression and bloodshed, a world in which persons can fulfil their individual potentials to the fullest (Ishu *et al.*, 2013a).

Sometimes nonviolent action is used in a political crisis as an improvisation after the realisation that the opponent being faced has the entire state arsenal at their disposal making it difficult to wage violent resistance. It is very critical to carefully plan nonviolent resistance to prevail against violent opponents. Different social groups might use strikes and sit-ins to force the government to increase wages. In the case of Zimbabwe, the MDC was born out of convergence of different interest groups such as workers, lawyers and human rights defenders thus resistance often took sectoral interest.

The conventional view of power is that it is something some people have and others don't. Power resides in soldiers, authority, ownership of wealth, and institutions. The use of nonviolent means is an attempt to show that people wield enormous power which can defeat the powerful who exercise control over state repressive apparatus. The social movements after realising that they neither have control nor influence in these institutions often use the social base to air out their grievances and in some cases highlight their cause.

The widespread practice of this technique is more "often based on the undeniable capacity of human beings to be stubborn, and to do what they want to do or to refuse to do what they are ordered, whatever their beliefs about the use or non-use of violence" (Sharp, 2005:12). Due to the nature of political power, the use of nonviolence is essential as it exposes the weaknesses of most unflinching political systems which are dictatorial but rely on the people for political legitimacy. When people repudiate their opponents' authority, refuse cooperation, withhold assistance, and persist in disobedience and defiance, they are

denying to their opponents the basic human assistance and cooperation that any government or hierarchical system requires (Sharp, 2005: 12).

Zimbabwe has had a painful history of violence since colonisation. This history has created a culture of violence in Zimbabwean politics. From the violent colonisation process to the 2nd Chimurenga, violence has been amplified as a political tool. Within the liberation movement, violence was glorified as a punishing tool for 'sell outs'. After independence, Mugabe continued with this approach. The theory of nonviolence shows a shift from this violent politics to politics of reason. This chapter presented the literature review and the theory of nonviolence, what it is and what it stands for and its applicability to the Zimbabwean context. The next chapter focuses on the research methodology.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter critically lays out the research design and methodology used in this thesis. Firstly, it explains the research paradigm informing and underpinning the research. The thesis uses the interpretivism research paradigm to show how nonviolent resistance has been used to the benefit of society in Buhera South Constituency in Zimbabwe. Interpretivism helps to explain the link between research objectives, research design and methodology. In this chapter I explain in detail how the research methods specific to the research area were used. The chapter explains and justifies the methodology used. The research largely used qualitative research methods of data collection and analysis.

For purposes of this thesis the paradigm provided a philosophical approach to research. The major four elements of this research are summarised as epistemology, ontology, methodology and axiology. They help to facilitate an explanation of the methodology used. “The philosophical approach underpins all facets of the study from assessing the general philosophical ideas behind the enquiry to the detailed data collection and analysis procedures” (Creswell, 2003: 3). The philosophical approach in this research helped to underpin the appropriate research tools to be used giving way to appropriate explanation of tools used. Guba and Lincoln (1994:116) buttress the view that “paradigm issues are crucial; no inquirer, we maintain, ought to go about the business of inquiry without being clear about just what paradigm informs and guides his or her approach.” Okesina (2020) underscores the importance of a paradigm by stating that “the choice of a paradigm in research clearly shows the research intent and motivation. A paradigm defines a researcher’s “philosophical orientation, or perspective, or thinking, or school of thought, or set of

shared beliefs, that influence what should be studied, how it should be studied, and how the results of the study should be interpreted” (Okesina, 2020: 58)

Interpretivist paradigm is useful for loose and flexible methodology, such as phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, ethno-methodology, narrative research or hermeneutics (Edwards & Holland, 2013:16). The aim is to study the experiences of participants and their perceptions. Interpretivism shows that social phenomena are socially constructed thus the aim is to generate meanings and insights from such phenomena.

The methodology in this regard favours qualitative method or approaches in data gathering and analysis. It focuses on the full complexity of human sense-making as the situation emerges. The methodology under interpretivism augers well with purposeful sampling techniques and selects individuals and sites that are information rich in conducting research. In short, a paradigm complements a methodology as it is “a shared world view that represents the beliefs and values in a discipline and that guides how problems are solved” (Schwandt, 2001). The methodological process is guided by philosophical beliefs about the nature of reality, knowledge, and values and by the theoretical framework that informs comprehension, interpretation, choice of literature and research practice on a given topic of study. Methodology is where assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge, values, and theory and practice on a given topic come together. A “paradigm hence implies a pattern, structure and framework or system of scientific and academic ideas, values and assumptions” (Olsen, Lodwick, and Dunlop, 1992:16). Figure 3.1 below shows factors the link between research paradigm, methodology and objectives.




Figure 3.1: The Link between paradigm, theory, principles and knowledge (*Chilisa and Kawulich, 20011: 3*)

The diagram above reflects how choosing appropriate methodology is influenced by the research paradigm in this instance the interpretivism paradigm. In turn, the methodological process is influenced by epistemology, ontology and axiology. A paradigm is a product of theoretical framework and literature study, value systems and ethical practice and assumptions about knowledge and reality.

This research adopted the interpretivist philosophical research paradigm. Interpretivism has its foundation in the works of Max Webber (1864-1920) and Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) “who attempted to establish an objective science of the subjective” (Pullar & Carter 2018). Ferguson (1993: 36) simplified the definition of interpretivism by stating that “at the risk of oversimplification, interpretivism might be simply characterized as the belief that “facts” are not things out in

some objective world waiting to be discovered, but, rather, are the social constructions of humans who apprehend the world through interpretive activity". They delved into the more basic or inherent features, character and qualities of meaningful social action and how meaning can be attributed.

Many research paradigms have been proposed but three main research paradigms stand out namely positivism, interpretivism and critical theory. The difference in the three research paradigms can be explained by the figure below.




Figure 3.2 Research paradigms (Ryan & Gemma, 2018: 2).

As depicted above Interpretivism shows that truth and knowledge are subjective, culturally and historically situated, and based on people's experiences and their understanding of them. The interpretive paradigm is concerned with understanding the world as it is from subjective experiences of individuals. It uses meaning oriented methodologies that rely on a subjective relationship between the researcher and subjects such as interviewing or participant observation. Interpretivist research is about 'exploring and

understanding phenomenon inductively and believe that the social event is understood from the point of the individuals who are part of the ongoing action being investigated” (Osekimo, 2020: 60). Researchers can never be completely free from their own values and beliefs and ideological ‘colouring’ of their suppositions, so these will inevitably inform the way in which they collect, interpret and analyse data (Ryan and Gemma 2018: 8).

The researcher chose the interpretivist philosophical paradigm taking a leaf from Costelloe (2016) who argues that there is a distinction between the natural and social world and more importantly, social organisation and social experiences form our perceptions of reality and truth. This approach is particularly important for this study. Further to that, interpretivism has a relativist ontological perspective whereby it asserts that reality is only knowable through socially constructed meanings and that there is no single shared reality (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). This reflects the proposition that there are multiple realities because of individuals’ different perceptions. Meanings are ‘the categories that make up a participant’s view of reality and with which actions are defined... culture, norms, understanding, social reality and definitions of the situation’ (Krauss, 2005).

In using the interpretivism paradigm, epistemology is critical. Epistemology is “used to describe how we come to know something; how we know the truth or reality. It is concerned with the very bases of knowledge, its nature and forms, and how it can be acquired, and how it can be communicated to other human beings” (Kivunja and Kuyini, 2017: 27). Schwandt (1997) defines epistemology as the study of the nature of knowledge and justification. To unpack this, there is need to identify the four basic sources of knowledge through which the research unfolded. The four sources of knowledge as identified by Slavin (1984) are “intuitive knowledge, authoritative knowledge, logical knowledge, and empirical knowledge”. Epistemology shows

that truth lies with human experience, what is true is culture specific and historically bound or even context dependent.

Ontology in this study answers the question of reality and its relativism. Reality is a social construct which differs from society to society or from people to people. It is limited to time, space and culture. Ontology is therefore the “philosophical study of the nature of existence or reality, of being or becoming, and the basic categories of things that exist and their relations” (Kivunja and Kuyini, 2017: 27). Ontology is so essential to this study and the use of the interpretive paradigm because it helps to provide an understanding of the things that constitute the world, as it is known (Scott & Usher, 2004). Patton (2002) explains that “ontology relates to whether we believe there is one verifiable reality or whether there exist multiple, socially constructed realities.” In this study ontology answered the social reality of violence, development and human security. It exposes the reality of political violence in Zimbabwe from 1999, and how this violence has curtailed development in Buhera.

Research design provides a framework created to answer research questions. Creswell & Clark (2007: 58) define research design as ‘procedures for collecting, analysing, interpreting and reporting data in research studies.’ The research is purely qualitative in design showing that “research design should be a reflexive process operating through every stage of a project” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995: 24). The research design for this study focused on answering questions on evidence or data collected and how the evidence is gathered.

The research was conducted under the interpretivist paradigm which has a wide choice of methodologies. The purpose of the research is to understand people’s experiences regarding the issue of nonviolent resistance as deployed by the MDC party in Buhera, Zimbabwe. Methodology is the broad term used to refer to the research design,

methods, approaches and procedures used in an investigation (Keeves, 1997). The methodology of a paradigm provides a strategy of enquiry, the strategy moves from the underlying assumptions to research design, and data collection and analysis.

This research combined case study methodology and phenomenology. The research uses qualitative research methodologies that involve “an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter and attempts to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Domegan and Fleming (2007: 24), explain that “qualitative research aims to explore and to discover issues about the problem on hand, because very little is known about the problem. There is usually uncertainty about dimensions and characteristics of problem. It uses ‘soft’ data and gets ‘rich’ data’”. Qualitative methods include interviews, focus group discussions, observations and document analysis among others. Methodology is influenced by the theoretical framework and research practice, assumptions about the nature of knowledge and reality and value systems and ethical principles.

“A case study is a general term for the exploration of an individual, group or phenomenon” (Sturman, 1997: 61). Therefore, a case study is a comprehensive description of an individual case and its analysis. Its main elements are the characterization of the case and the events, and a description of the discovery process of these features (Mesec, 1998: 45). Simons (2009) formulated the following definition of a case study based on a critical review that sought commonalities of various case study definitions: “a case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or system in ‘real life’” (Simon, 2009: 21). In this study, the case studied is Buhera South Constituency in Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe.

Phenomenology helps in understanding the people's experiences in Buhera South constituency and how they interpret that experience. This research is political in nature as it exposes the link between violence, development and human security. As explained by Qutoshi (2018: 216) phenomenology is an approach to educate our own vision, to define our position, to broaden how we see the world around, and to study the lived experience at deeper level. It generally describes the essence of experiences from an individual perspective. This emanates from Edmund Husserl (1927) who coined "descriptive phenomenological methodologies." Husserl (2012, 2001, and 1973) in his reductive phenomenology alludes to reduction, knowledge of essence and emphasis in original. Essence is the centre of knowledge in phenomenological methodology. This was further developed by Heidegger who combines Husserl essence with interpretation as an integral party of the methodology. Heidegger (1996: 141) argues that "interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something to us" as everyone is conditioned in their cultural, historical and political environment. In this case participants are conscious of their subjective consciousness (Qutoshi, 2018: 217).

The phenomenological methodology holds both the characteristics of philosophy and a method of inquiry. Phenomenology is part of constructivist/interpretivist paradigm that is both philosophy and methodology. The notion behind all these philosophical and methodological views of phenomenology and procedures directly link to the core concept of understanding the phenomena related to a human being with a deeper level of consciousness. The consciousness in this context applies to how the people in Buhera are conscious of their development failures due to violence in politics. Violence has forced some to migrate, abandon homesteads and lose property to appease their opponents; some have failed to go further with education to advance their lives. Thus, phenomenological approaches are more effective in describing rather than explaining subjective

realities, insights, beliefs, motivation and actions and folk wisdom (Husserl, 1977). Phenomenological approach to research may be based on single cases and multiple cases, with a clear principle emphasis on minimum structure and maximum depth to keep a balance of research focus within limitations of time and other resources (Lester, 1999). This type of research, like other qualitative researches, uses many methods including interviews, observations, action research, discussions, focus group meetings and document analysis. The focus is on more in-depth understanding of phenomena. The analysis is messy, as data do not tend to fall into neat categories and there can be many ways of linking between different parts of discussions or observations. Creswell (1998) argues for the centrality of understanding of human experiences as the best tool for using phenomenology.

A tradition of interpretivism can be tethered to the ethnographies of non-western peoples in the 19th century and continues to be a popular way to explain human behaviour and social phenomenon today. The interpretivist view invites the researcher to investigate meaning behind the understanding of human behaviour, interactions and society. This involves the researcher attempting to develop an in-depth subjective understanding of people's lives (Pullar and Carter 2018). Creswell (2005: 39) defines qualitative study as: "a type of educational research in which the researcher relies on the view of participants, asks broad, general questions, collects data consisting largely of words (or texts) from participants, describes and analyses these words for themes, and conducts the inquiry in a subjective, biased manner". Qualitative research is inductive oriented as the researcher comes with broader generalisations and theories from specific observations.

The research was conducted in Manicaland Province focusing on Buhera South constituency as the case study area. Buhera South constituency has a population of around 80000 people. The choice of the study population was rather deliberate. Buhera South is one of the

most impoverished districts in Manicaland which receives minimal rainfall and mostly survives on food donations from Non-Governmental Organisations. In terms of infrastructural development, it has no tarred roads, heavily relying on ungraded gravel roads. It has no functional big business centres, and cell phone connectivity is poor. However, despite these apparent failures, in 2000, the area witnessed unprecedented violence. There were several reported cases of murder, torture and general violence and intimidation of people during the period under review. Buhera South was one of the hotspots of the liberation struggle. Foxtrot now Dzapasi in Buhera was used as an Assembly Point during the last days of the liberation struggle. It is also no coincidence that the murders of Talent Mabika and Tichaona Chiminya in the year 2000 were in Buhera at Murambinda. During the period under study, 2000-2017, Buhera South became a target of derision from politicians who felt the 'challenges' facing the country were attributable to the leadership of the opposition party.

As alluded to by Awoniyi, Aderanti & Tayo (2011), "a sample refers to any portion of a population selected for the study and on whom information needed for the study is obtained. Samples in qualitative research are usually purposive". The participants in this study were selected on their usefulness to the area under investigation. Due to the complexity of the research topic the researcher used snowball sampling to cover the interested groups in the study. Snowball sampling was preferred because it is a referral form of sampling where the researcher was helped in identifying interviewees by other interviewed victims. This sampling is important in political situations where victims might not be willing to open up fearing reprisals. This sampling procedure is critical in that it included research within the opposition parties, civic society, the ordinary people and the Zimbabwe Republic Police. The target population consisted of 50 people from across the district. This sample ensured that data saturation was reached when additional input from new participants did not continue to generate new information, themes and new understanding on the study topic. This sample size was ably assisted by other data collection techniques which include document analysis.

As suggested by Jacobs (1987), the researcher initially chooses methods based on the questions to be addressed. The questions, issues, and topics of the study themselves may change as the researcher's conception of the reality of the "world" being studied changes. The most appropriate data collection strategy for phenomenological research is the open or semi-structured interview. These two types of interviews allow the researcher to address the phenomenon profoundly, providing space for the informants to express their experiences in detail, approaching reality as faithfully as possible. The detailed descriptions or interpretations brought by the participant in the profound-phenomenological interview should be as representative of experienced reality as possible. The focus of the phenomenological interview is the description of the meanings of phenomena (Rubin and Rubin, 2012).

Interviews were the main data gathering instruments. Interviews were held in the months of November and December 2021. Interviews are optimal for collecting data on individuals' personal histories, perspectives, and experiences, particularly when sensitive topics are being explored. The purpose of interviews is to learn from participants, in this case their individual experiences during the period under review. Interviews solicited data on how conflict/politics affected their development. 35 interviews were carried out mostly with victims and perpetrators of violence. The sampling used to carry out and identify participants was largely snowball sampling. The researcher initially contacted a few potential respondents and then asked them whether they knew of anybody with the same characteristics being addressed in the research. The researcher identified himself as a researcher working on nonviolent resistance and after that sought consent to proceed from the participants. This research sample conveniently limits the quantity but gives quality in terms of participants as quantity gives the same message each time again and again. As pointed out by Jacobs (2010), data gathered can be used to make generalisations of the population under study.

Questionnaires also helped in reaching some difficult places for the purpose of the research. For this research 25 questionnaires were distributed across the broad spectrum of Buhera South constituency.

However, only twelve questionnaires were returned while the rest were no returns. Upon the relaxation of Covid-19 induced lockdown restrictions, face to face interactions were possible with strict adherence to World Health Organisations (WHO) Covid19 protocols to ensure that meetings would not compromise the health of participants and the researcher. Questionnaires were distributed to respondents through email, WhatsApp and through a central research participant. Of the three methods the email was a bit problematic as some respondents hardly checked their emails. However, WhatsApp was a more effective platform to use. The advantage of questionnaires is that they gave respondents enough time to answer the questions and send them when they were free. The advent of the use of smartphones was handy as most people had access to the gadgets giving them ample time to answer the questions.

The first set of interviews held were with the local MDC Buhera South Constituency leadership as they were the main sources of information in terms of violence and vulnerability of MDC membership in the area. The second category involved the Provincial and national MDC leadership, and groups such as the Zimbabwe NGO Forum which represents mostly NGOs in human rights work, and the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights who helped victims of violence in the constituency.

For the purposes of this research an interview guide was used. This interview guide had questions for specific audience notably scholars, MDC leadership and the victims of violence. The use of different interview guides was deliberate for it provided probing questions for specific sectors. The interview guides are attached in Appendix A.

Focus group discussions were carried out notably to have a group feeling of the violence perpetrated on individuals and families and to create a platform for sharing trends in nonviolent resistance. 'A focus group is a carefully planned series of discussions designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a non-threatening

environment' (Steiberg, 2011). For the purposes of this study, three groups were chosen namely MDC members, ZANU-PF members and mixed groups of youth. The idea to use the youth was strategic in that these are the foot soldiers deployed to perpetrate acts of political violence across the political divide. The idea was to get their shared experiences and how they were coping. Focus groups were useful in providing an interactive platform for both victims and perpetrators and mapping the way forward in maintaining and cementing relationships in the community. Hotspots of violence were identified for focus group discussions namely Mavhungire Shopping Centre, Chapanduka Business Centre and Chabata shopping centre. The participants were identified through the local political leadership. Three focus group discussions were held at the above shopping centres. These focus group discussions were held in November and December 2021 taking advantage of the relaxed lockdown restrictions in Zimbabwe. The lockdown measures had been reduced to a level which allowed for the gathering of around 100 people in public spaces.

The focus group discussions were specific to victims of violence. The guide used was open ended to ensure that it left room for further probing, openness, honesty and truthfulness. It also ensured that the discussants provided information without much leading questions from the investigator. The Focus Group Discussion guide is attached in Appendix B.

Document study is important in qualitative research because while the research sample has the memory, they hardly keep records to verify information. There has been extensive documentation of violence in Zimbabwe, but the communities are not the owners of the information. It was prudent for the researcher to sift through both primary and secondary data for cross checking purposes. Madenga (2016) opines that "the criterion involves weighing the authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning of documents intended for research purposes." By this he referred to genuineness, free from implacable

sources, credible, free from bias and relevant. The researcher was privileged to access documents from Human rights organisations, research institute, political parties and various journal articles, blogs, books and newspapers. This helped to verify information provided from interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires. Access was obtained to the National Archives where most information is readily available while internet sources were consulted.

Qualitative data analysis can be defined as “working with data, organising it, breaking it into manageable units, synthesising it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be learned and deciding what you will tell others” (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982:145). Shank (2002:5) similarly defines it as “a form of systematic empirical inquiry into meaning.” Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 3) posit that qualitative researchers study “things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.” For this study inductive and coding methods were used in data analysis. Kelle (1995) defines inductive data analysis as “a series of alternating inductive and deductive steps whereby data driven inductive hypothesis is followed by deductive hypothesis examination for the purpose of verification.” Inductive approach allows researcher to derive frequent, dominant or significant themes from the raw data. It is free from the restraints imposed by other methodologies. Thomas (2003) summarises the purpose of inductive approach into two namely: to condense data in summary format and show the link between objectives. Findings may help to develop a theme.

Inductive approach helps in creating data codes in data analysis. Coding is the core of inductive data analysis. Data coding can assume the form of descriptive coding, topic coding and analytical coding. Open coding involves line by line coding where concepts and key phrases are identified and highlighted and moved into subcategories, then categories. This breaks the data down into conceptual

components and the researcher can start to theorise or reflect on what they are reading and understanding making sense of the data. The data from each participant will be 'constantly compared' for similarities.

Axial coding at this stage relationships are identified between the categories, and connections identified. Selective coding: this involves identifying the core category and methodically relating it to other categories. The relationships must be authenticated and categories refined. Categories are then integrated together and identified. See the figure below.




Fig 3.3 Data coding process (Note Adapted from Creswell, 2002, Figure 9.4, p. 266)

Qualitative researchers are interested in the accuracy of the final report. They utilise various methods, to ensure accuracy such as member-checks (where the participants get to review their comments), or the use of many sources to verify a theme. To begin with the researcher took note of the major sources of error in research namely the researcher, the participants and the methods used. Measures were taken to ensure validity through removal of bias and ensuring

trustworthiness. For participants, the researcher ensured clarity of questions, building a relationship of trust, and comparing results obtained. Qualitative validity procedures rely on the participants, the researcher, or the reader (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). Relying on the participants ensured that the researcher also got first-hand information from victims of violence and development failures. The research paradigm used ensured the testing of validity and reliability since the purpose is to "engage in research that probes for deeper understanding rather than examining surface features" (Johnson, 1995:4). Thus, there was methodological and data triangulation to ensure the recheck of both methodology and data to verify validity and reliability.

The research methodologies were tested in a pilot test. Pilot testing ensures the adjustments of data collecting methods to suit the demands of the research. To present the methods clearly, precisely and thoroughly they were pretested for accuracy and reliability. Pilot testing is about assuring the quality of methods used through pretesting and refining them.

The research was informed and underpinned by ethical issues that needed to be considered when conducting research. The ethical issues include the following: informed consent, voluntary participation, confidentiality, anonymity, researcher's positionality, do no harm, safety in research, storage of research data. Research participants were given the informed consent form which spelt out their rights during the research process. Informed consent ensured that participation was voluntary and those who felt they no longer wanted to participate could withdraw from the research process. The researcher promised the anonymity of participants. Anonymity meant that their identity was protected. This research has ensured the anonymity of respondents due to its political nature. It ensured the confidentiality of

respondents by making them anonymous. Data gathered from respondents and other sources was secured in safe soft copies which could only be accessed by the researcher through multiple passwords. To ensure the safety of the researcher and participants the local police was advised of the visits. The police were informed of the scheduled visits through getting clearance letter from the Provincial Police member in charge. The clearance letters protected the researcher and the participants from violent political opponents as the clearance letters gave the go ahead to carry the research. The research was explicit in that it explained that this was an academic exercise which had no political bearing. The consent from local traditional leaders such as village heads, and Headman was also given to make sure participants were not victimized after the research. The research dealt with the politically sensitive issue of political violence and its effects on development. Since reality and knowledge are social constructs, societal inquiry is influenced by values.

Participants to the research process were cognisant of the ethical requirements. The fundamental of this research was guided by the following basic principles namely: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice and respect for communities interacted with. Ethical considerations are of paramount importance. Participants were informed and not coerced into the research. Data gathered was secured on cloud in a google drive whose password is known to the researcher. The data can only be destroyed after 5 years by the researcher.

Mutual consent was the first step before interviewing the participants. In this research participants were made aware of the nature of the study and the title before the interviews and focus group discussions commenced. Those who felt uncomfortable were excused. During interviews, those who felt the topic brought bad memories and did not want to continue with the interview were respected. Participants were

informed of the consent primarily that should they feel to participate and withdraw it was within their rights to do so. The consent to participate form was given to each participant to sign and acknowledge willing participation.

The researcher guaranteed no harm to the research participants. While the topic was particularly sensitive to some I explained to them the procedures to their safety. Emphasis was made to explain that this is an academic endeavour devoid of political or organisational affiliation, thus anonymity was guaranteed unless participants wanted exposure. Permission for the study was sought from relevant authorities. However, getting permission from the state did not unveil the confidentiality of my sources.

The researcher guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality as articulated above. I guaranteed the anonymity of participants and ensuring their confidentiality and confidence in the research.

This chapter critically examined the research methodology and the research paradigm. It explained the interpretivist paradigm, described and enunciated the research methodology underpinning the study, detailed the sampling technique, data collection tools and data analysis and presentation strategies employed in the study. The chapter also explained the research design by highlighting the case study approach used. The fieldwork was an eye opener as it was done during the Covid19 pandemic and the state induced lockdowns. Interviews booked were conducted well, however, travel arrangements were affected by the transport situation prevailing as the Zimbabwean government had banned other transport operators preferring state owned Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO). Questionnaires distributed had to be followed up to get feedback. Carrying out interviews with political leaders was cumbersome as they

were frequently busy. Some interviews were postponed and rescheduled which meant the interviewee had to be patiently waited for to get feedback. The next chapter discusses the history of non-violent resistance in Zimbabwe from the colonial to the post-colonial era.

CHAPTER 4: VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE 1980-1999

This chapter furnishes a political background to violence and nonviolent resistance by the political actors before the formation of the MDC in 1999. The chapter explores how the state founded in 1980 by the Mugabe government was a violence valuing state. It shows how democracy was subverted by various overt and covert measures. These measures were legalised through various laws and supported by some government policies. The chapter brings to the fore how earlier political players faced violence each time they attempted to carry out political activities.

After getting into power, the formerly exiled nationalist party began a process of nation building. The process of nation and state building was rather rushed. As argued by Mlambo (2016: 54) “after independence in 1980, there was no social or legal process to deal with the trauma suffered during the struggle, and therefore the bitterness and mutual suspicions continued.” The new government faced several problems after its inauguration. Important political and social reforms were side-lined for an ill-thought out process of national reconciliation and appeasement of white capital.

Despite the challenges of years of war no one was taken to account for the massacre of peasants, the atrocities of the militias, the missing school children, massacre of refugees and landmines across the country. These issues buttress the point by Duduoet (2006: 39) that “the transition from armed resistance to conventional politics requires adopting a new political culture, formulating a new programme, installing party organisational structures, recruiting party cadres, and building their capacity to govern.” Zimbabwe witnessed the continuation of liberation rhetoric which betrayed incapacity to transform. Further, the deliberate employment of party cadres in

positions not befitting them and the incapacity to build institutions independent of political interference was a worrying trend.

Mugabe ignored one of the most important fundamental aspect of peace building which is truth telling and justice especially through the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as was the case in South Africa. The challenges of the war became a footnote of the nation building which created fissures in the newly independent nation. The Lancaster House Conference and the subsequent constitution showed that “both Zimbabweans and the international community were too much in a hurry to declare the success of democracy over minority white rule, and did not stop to deal effectively with the past, and that ugly past continued to affect the new Zimbabwe” (Mlambo, 2006: 55). No one was prosecuted for human rights violations, and victims of war received no compensation; there was no truth telling and no one accounted for their misdeeds. In the elections of 1980 “ZANLA controlled two thirds of Zimbabwe and had promised the population that any result other than a ZANU-PF victory would entail the resumption of war, something that Muzorewa had failed to stop” (Munemo, 2016: 135). This is clearly explained by Ndlovu-Gatsheni who argues “the ZANU-PF government was concentrating more on the consolidation of regime security at the expense of a clear nation-building agenda beyond the policy of reconciliation” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b: 211). These proclamations in 1980 elections have been a constant feature of ZANU-PF electioneering up to date. Each time it is faced with threats to its political power, ZANU has been quick to remind the people of its liberation exploits and that given an option it would choose war over elections.

The postcolonial state created in 1980 has been deficient in providing basic necessities and institutional reforms aimed at achieving lasting peace and human security. It is correct to use the argument by Mamdani that “Africa’s real political challenge is to reform and thus

transcend the form of the state that has continued to reproduce race and ethnicity as political identities, alongside a discourse on nativism and ‘genuine’ tradition” (Mamdani, 2003: 149). This resonated with the 1980 state building by the new government. Ethnicity and regionalism became the new divisive instruments after the fall of the Smith regime. The Mugabe regime virtually adopted all the mechanism and repressive laws of the Smith regime. While independence came to Zimbabwe in 1980, impunity and repression continued. The violence unleashed by Smith on political opponents became a common feature of the Mugabe regime.

The history of Zimbabwe since 1980 has been characterised by a series of challenges which, at different turning points, manifested themselves through violent conflicts. Since its independence, the issue of achieving sustainable peace and development has remained a challenge due to a lack of comprehensive approaches to issues of violence and human security. The political events of the period 1980-2017 in Zimbabwe have created challenges that have drawn the attention of both domestic and international actors. To confront emerging challenges which lay ahead, the Mugabe regime attempted to rebuild the nation through a delicate balancing act. First was the pronouncement of the policy of reconciliation, a half-hearted attempt at removing colonial institutions, colonial laws, colonial practices, culture and ethnic integration. Within the army the former warring parties were integrated into a single unity comprising of ZANLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesian forces. The newly introduced cabinet was in a way a unity cabinet which included Rhodesians, ZAPU and ZANU members. However, ZANU controversially presented a narrow narrative of the liberation struggle conveniently ignoring other liberation actors especially ZAPU. This was problematic because it affected relations within the newly created national army posing a risk to peace and unity. The attempt to present a united front however failed because of ZANU Shona triumphalism.

As noted by Kriger “this historical moment of ZANU-PF triumphalism was also characterised by the use of Shona pre-colonial heroes and historical monuments to imagine the nation, while Ndebele heroes and history were marginalised” (Kriger, 2003: 74-75). The presentation of this narrow history created a platform for disunity as the ZAPU liberation war efforts were suppressed for a carefully laden propaganda which portrayed Mugabe as the symbol of liberation resilience. In fact, even within ZANU itself some luminaries of the struggle such Ndabaningi Sithole, Herbert Chitepo received little recognition for their efforts. With this propaganda, Mugabe dictatorship was born and violence became a celebrated tool against opponents.

The first crisis that beset the post-colonial nation-building project had to do with ethnicity and integration of military forces. A crisis which began in the ranks of the military, involving open exchange of fire between the triumphant and Shona-dominant ZANLA and the Ndebele dominated ZIPRA in Connemara (Gweru) and Entumbane (Bulawayo), ignited a reign of state terror in Matabeleland and the Midlands region in the period 1980-1987 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). The reign of terror that became known as the Gukurahundi campaign was ostensibly meant to seek and destroy some ex-ZIPRA combatants who had defected from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) to embark on a life of dissidency. To some extent, the atrocities showed clear mistrust and distrust in the nationalist project after independence. Firstly, the 5th Brigade was formed outside the official government system and was directly responsible to the Prime Minister. In a letter to Mugabe, Nkomo wrote that:

It is obvious to me that you decided to form the Fifth Brigade outside the structure and command of the National army, so that you may use it as a party Tribal brigade for eliminating or liquidating, as you have many times said, those you chose to destroy. As a matter of fact, when I questioned the formation of the Fifth Brigade outside the Zimbabwe National Army

without consultation, you angrily replied and said, "Who are you to be consulted?" "This Brigade," you said, "has been formed to crush those who try to subvert my government and if you attempt that, they will crush you (Informative letter to Mugabe, 1981).

Mugabe unleashed the Gukurahundi violence to finish unresolved differences from the nationalist struggle. The letter clearly showed the limits to the policy of reconciliation and the rushed Lancaster House Peace Conference. Mugabe initially used ex-Rhodesian forces in Matabeleland in 1982 before deploying the 5th brigade who were protected by the emergency powers of 1982. The emergency powers were used to protect the activities of the 5th brigade in Matabeleland and its deployment. In short they were a declaration of a state of emergency. Further to that they were used to detain ZAPU leaders like Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku without trial. The severity of repression was somehow planned to suppress ZAPU support and to clear the path towards a one-party state.

The statements attributed to the ZANU-PF leadership during the Matabeleland disturbances show how the unfinished reconciliation process of 1980 compounded the security situation and promoted violence as the means to achieve peace. There was an open threat not only to the ZAPU leadership but to everyone who resided in the place of conflict. Mugabe openly remarked that "where men and women provide food for dissidents, when we get there we eradicate them. We don't differentiate when we fight, because we can't tell who is a dissident and who is not..." (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986:38). Emmerson Mnangagwa, the then Minister of State Security went further to say "blessed are they, who will follow the path of the government laws, for their days on earth shall be increased... but woe unto those who will choose the path of collaboration with dissidents for we will certainly shorten their stay on earth" (The Chronicle, 1983).

Enos Nkala, the then Minister of Home Affairs summed the intention of ZANU as follows:

We want to wipe out the ZAPU leadership. You've only seen the warning lights. We haven't yet reached full blast...the murderous organisation and its murderous leadership must be hit so hard that it doesn't feel obliged to do the things it has been doing. (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986: 52).

The chilling statements were a clear threat which provided impetus to the armed forces to use all the means necessary to stop dissident activity. Within two years of independence the ugly scourge of violence engulfed Zimbabwe just as it had done before. This violence somehow shows the nature of the nationalist discourse and how it evolved. To some extent, it was a continuation of the ZAPU-ZANU split of the 1960s which had left unresolved political differences and 1982 provided an unsavoury opportunity to settle the longstanding dispute.

The violence in 1982 was a consequent of a narrow developmental agenda. As noted by Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2016) the violence was somehow an inevitable consequence of the way nationalism had evolved and how the nationalist armies had been formed. This is how he frames it:

To some extent we accept the notion of the inevitability of a violent post-colonial civil war pitting the former liberation movements and their former armies against each other. But there is need to posit that the inevitability of violence was underwritten by incompatibilities of Ndebele and Shona particularities. The violence was in a way symptomatic of the failure of a smooth blending of major ethnicities into a new national identity called Zimbabwe. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016).

The cumulative effect of this was that violence eschewed human security. To ZAPU, the end of the war spelt insecurity and a threat to its existence and to some extent the existence of the Ndebele ethnic group.

The Matabeleland war was triggered by the “discovery” by the government of vast amounts of arms on properties owned by the ZAPU Company, Nitram, and around Zipra Assembly Points in February 1982. History has shown that to crush opponents Mugabe repeatedly used the “discovery’ approach against Joshua Nkomo in 1982, Ndabaningi Sithole in 1996 and Morgan Tsvangirai in 2002. These spurious allegations were used as grounds for confiscating and sacking Nkomo and other ZAPU ministers from government. ZAPU members and military deserted the army due to fear of persecution. After February 1982, the political pronouncement of reconciliation became a mirage and it completely disappeared. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe used this pretext as definitive proof that ZAPU had always been planning a coup. It was said that it had held “back forces and cached weapons to fight in a final struggle to overthrow a ZANU-PF government if it came to power” (Alexander *et al.*, 2000: 181).

Former ZIPRA cadres were persecuted, especially those in the army. Some fled for dear life while those who remained in the army were often demoted. Alexander *et al.* (2000) note that:

The desertion in 1982 of thousands of armed former ZIPRAs from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and their persecution at home led to a vast increase of dissident violence in Matabeleland. These dissidents were not the same as those of 1980. Their position was due to the deterioration of relations within the ZNA and targeting of former ZIPRAs outside it, a situation that was to worsen dramatically with the deployment of the notorious Fifth Brigade to Matabeleland North in 1983 (Alexander *et al.*, 2000: 181).

The creation of the Fifth Brigade reflected deep-seated mistrust as it was only accountable to the then Prime Minister, and not to the normal military chain of command. It was specifically intended for what were termed ‘internal defence purposes’ (Alexander *et al.*, 2000: 181). From its deployment in Matabeleland North in January 1983 until its

withdrawal from Matabeleland South in late 1984, the brigade carried out a grotesquely violent campaign. It targeted party chairmen and civil servants, civilians at large, and former ZIPRA combatants, refugees, and anyone suspected of having crossed the border to Botswana during the liberation war. Former ZIPRA combatants rarely survived encounters with this brigade. Its “violence largely shaped the spread and character of dissidency (Alexander *et al.*, 2000). The operation to expunge the dissidents was code-named Gukurahundi (in Shona, this phrase means the first rains of the year that wash away rubbish). Although the government deployed many sectors of its security apparatus, the Fifth Brigade excelled in repression. Many people were tortured, raped, murdered, and maimed in the pursuit of dissident quashing. Many people still bear the mental and physical scars of the war.

Mugabe had a contrasting nationalist view to achieve development. His idealism was based on his political security and of his ZANU party. He narrowly believed that development could only be achieved on his terms rather than on multiparty democracy. That was the essence of the violence of the 1980s. It is within the purview of this context that the impact of that violence has to be understood, particularly its role in the re-packaging of post-Gukurahundi politics in Matabeleland. Incapacity to tolerate political difference and/or the lack of tolerance to share political space by the ruling elite marred Africa’s post-colonial nation building processes. Zimbabwe’s civil war of 1982 to 1987 was an outcome of weak conceptualisation and practice of nation building in Africa. Close to twenty thousand people perished in what became known as the Matabeleland crisis. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (Alexander, *et al*, 2000) give a detailed critique on the history of violence in Matabeleland. The war pitted the newly formed (Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front, ZANU-PF) government against its liberation ally, Zimbabwe African People's Union Patriotic Front (ZAPU-PF).

The 1982 war can somewhat be seen as a spill-over from the nationalist politics of the 1960s and 1970s. Nationalism had the ambiguity of being both exclusionary and all-embracing. It subsumed class, ethnic and religious differences, and, at the same time, tried to use these cleavages for its sustenance. Alexander observed that the escalation of violence after the end of the liberation war was built on the two guerrilla armies (Zanla for ZANU and Zipra for ZAPU), regional patterns of recruitment and operation during the 1970s, and the history of animosity and distrust between the two armies and their political leaders (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, 2000: 181).

The impact of the war was that it left bitter memories and hatred amongst the Ndebele. “In the eyes of the Ndebele public, what was portrayed as a mission to stamp out dissidents became an anti-Ndebele campaign that deliberately conflated Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU, ex-ZIPRA and every Ndebele-speaking person into a dissident; a dissident collaborator; a dissident sympathiser and sponsor” (Muzondidya & Gatsheni, 2007: 286). The way this violence evolved had far reaching consequences on future political differences. The war led to the underdevelopment of Matabeleland.

The Matabeleland war ended after the signing of the Unity Accord on 22 December 1987 between Prime Minister Mugabe and the ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, who had been persecuted by the ZANU government. The Unity Accord aimed to do what Gukurahundi had failed to do, that is, conquer the last frontier of resistance to ZANU-PF hegemony by delivering the Ndebele-speaking region to the Shona-dominated party. This delivery was in part a political settlement which exposed the nation to a singular view political narrative as Mugabe used the settlement to close all opposition against him. The road to the Unity Accord began in 1985 but it was only signed two years later with the chief players failing to agree to a solution. Within the period of negotiations ZAPU leaders were arrested and harassed while Dumiso

Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku languished in prison despite court orders for their release. This was a sign that Mugabe wanted a capitulation of the ZAPU leaders, and peace to be achieved on his terms. In fact, several reports show that the imprisoned ZAPU leaders were promised release only if they agreed to join ZANU.

The outcome of this conflict was the Unity Agreement in 1987 that, while it ended the atrocities in Matabeleland, effectively emasculated the major opposition party PF ZAPU and confirmed the regional subordination of Matabeleland. Thus, while the ruling party used the language of reconciliation to structure its relations with the white elite and international capital, it deployed the discourse of unity to control ZAPU and its members. The terms of the Unity Accord clearly showed that Nkomo had been forced to surrender. It was a capitulation in which Nkomo had to save his people from the continued onslaught by the 5th Brigade. Masipula Sithole stresses that:

Even a cursory look at the terms of the Unity Accord (let alone the Chiwewe minutes) gives one the impression that the document spells out terms of surrender and not compromise. Nowhere in the eleven-point agreement does Nkomo's name appear, but Mugabe's appears three times. (Nkomo's name only appears as a signatory to the document)...Eight of the eleven points are pregnant with victorious Mugabe's ideas. Where mention is made of PF-ZAPU it is to indicate that henceforth it shall be called ZANU (PF) (Sithole, 1991: 285-6).

“The Unity Accord offered ZAPU very little except a commitment that killings in ZAPU strongholds would stop. In short – you cease to exist and we will stop killing you” (Eppel, 2009: 8). What the Unity Accord taught ZANU-PF was the continued use of the military to solve political disagreements. ZAPU was left powerless to demand concessions from Mugabe. It was a Mugabe deal sold to the world the same as the reconciliation mantra was initiated.

Just like the national Reconciliation Policy of 1980, the Unity Accord hardly addressed the key issues to the conflict. It was a political

settlement which was devoid of key aspects of human security. Communities affected were not consulted and their views were not taken aboard, rather the leadership assumed that their agreement would be fully embraced by everyone. It was a continuation of their “liberation heroism” in which they felt whatever agreed would be embraced by the people. The affected people did not come to terms with it but rather were subdued to avert further massacre. The CCPJ (1997: 3) note that:

One of the most painful aspects of the 1980s conflict for its victims is their perception that their plight is unacknowledged. Officially, the state continues to deny any serious culpability for events during that year, and refuses to allow open dialogue on the issue. In effect, there is a significant chunk of Zimbabwean history that is largely unknown, except to those who experienced it first-hand. All Zimbabweans, both present and future, should be allowed access to history (CCPJ, 1997: 3).

The closest that the leadership was to accept, and acknowledge the atrocities was during Nkomo’s burial in 1999 that Robert Mugabe described it as a moment of madness. This showed a basic lack of understanding of the key reconciliation program. The Unity Accord ceased hostilities but brought no peace; it left lasting memories which played into the future.

The Unity Accord has been ethnicised. It is somehow viewed with ethnic lens as people view it as Unity between the Ndebele and the Shona which is somehow misleading as the events leading to the conflict were not ethnic motivated but rather a culmination of long standing unresolved national differences. By viewing ethnicity as the cause of conflict it also gives credence to those who see the operation of the 5th Brigade as ethnic cleansing. The agreement falls short of the requirements of proper peace and national healing. Just like in 1980 when the reconciliation policy was pronounced, the Unity Accord left room for bitterness as it was a cover up for atrocities committed. The Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry in Matabeleland and Midlands

(1984) atrocities' findings were never made public and people had to rely on the CCJP for findings. The Chihambakwe Commission was tasked by the Zimbabwean government to investigate reports of atrocities committed by the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland during the period 1982-1983; however, its findings were never made public. The government since then has ignored the Matabeleland issue despite demands from various groups.

The Unity Accord failed to live beyond Nkomo's death in 1999. The unity failed to materialise due to the politics of exclusion practised against the people of Matabeleland region. Sikhanyiso Ndlovu, a former senior ZAPU member commented that "if you neglect people on the basis that they are former Zapu then those people won't feel emotionally attached to unity" (Nehanda Radio, 23/12/2014). The CCJP and other groups:

have called for government accountability and an apology as steps towards healing and reconciling the bitterness that remains. These organisations conceived reparations, in the form of justice, compensation and rehabilitation for the victims of organised violence, to be fundamental to reconciliation. In the light of ZANU-PF's continuing refusal to acknowledge the atrocities its forces committed in Matabeleland, a broad spectrum of Zimbabweans believed the ruling party lost the moral authority it had enjoyed at independence to reconcile the nation. Notwithstanding the State's own problems with historical remembrance and accountability, the President continued throughout the 1990s to espouse the idea of reconciliation. It was a principle deployed to support ZANU-PF's political platform, and racial and regional minorities were cajoled and threatened to respond (Fisher, 2010: 52).

The government and ZANU-PF were quick to use the reconciliation and Unity Accord rhetoric to cow critical voices. They have used these policies to create a false sense of unity while violently silencing those opposed to their policies. The amnesty of 1980 and 1987 discouraged critical thinking on areas of disharmony. Broadly speaking the unity Accord was a minimalist approach focused on ending conflict rather than affording the people human security. It was elitist in orientation as

it looked at the causality of conflict as simply political differences between Nkomo and Mugabe, yet the problems were multi-layered.

The signing of the Unity Accord did not stop ZANU-PF's quest for a one-party unitary state. Rather the Constitutional Amendment Act (No.7) was drafted to create an executive presidency with Mugabe as President and Nkomo as one of two national Vice Presidents. One salutary effect of this rapprochement was that former PF-ZAPU leaders were now positioned to urge moderation against the push to create a *de jure* one-party state in Zimbabwe. In all this, ZANU-PF campaigned for a unitary state where differences would be articulated and presented in a one-party system. Raftopoulos (1991:18) commented that "in reality, the push for a one-party state in Zimbabwe, as in most other African states, has been an attempt to consolidate the domination of the State by sections of the petty-bourgeoisie, particularly in the face of growing opposition within the country." The main opponents to this were ZUM, student movements, civil society, the academia and labour. This was a method of keeping power while shutting opposition activities. Mugabe believed that the Unity Accord had united the nation from a polarised ethnic culture to a centrally united nation. There was no longer room for other political parties. Through Amendment No.7 Robert Mugabe became the Executive President while Nkomo and Muzenda were his two Vice Presidents. The post of President was given a variety of unlimited powers. He had become the supreme leader. Those who protested against the grotesque and obscene powers given to Mugabe were fired from ZANU-PF. Notable among those was the then Secretary General of ZANU-PF Edgar Tekere who formed his own party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM). ZUM contested in the 1990 general elections which were marred by violence and voter intimidation. A senior official in ZUM, Patrick Kombayi, was short by state operatives who despite being convicted for the crime were pardoned and promoted by Mugabe. This clearly showed the triumph of violence over peace.

The constitutional amendment and the attempt to force a one-party ideology was a veritable move towards a one-party state. The ideology was enforced through violence and coercion of the citizenry. Brian Raftopoulos viewed this attempt as "the displacement of questions and alternatives to the dominant discourse" (Raftopoulos, 1991: 3). This increased authoritarianism especially in view of the worsening economic situation. One factor which can be attributed to the attempts at one-party state is that those that "have failed to carry out their major tasks of consolidating nation states, unifying the various social and political forces through democratic structures and an accountable state, and providing effective economic strategies for growth and redistribution" have attempted to create an imaginary unitary state through one-party state. Thus, the role of the State "changed from the prime mover of development to that of its main obstacle" (Doornbos 1990 in Raftopoulos, 1991: 4). Evidence has shown that despite spirited attempts by the elite to chart a free market economy, the state had become the major obstacle to free enterprise since one-party state ideology is construed as largely a commandist economic model.

The second decade of independence began with leaders pushing for a *de jure* one-party state, a move ultimately made necessary by ZANU-PF's easy *de facto* dominance at the polls. The regime grew increasingly intolerant of dissent and was ever more willing to use violence as a campaign tool. The party asserted supremacy over the state by politicizing the bureaucracy and army and turning a blind eye to rent-seeking.

Two general Parliamentary elections took place during this period, in 1990 and in 1995. The 1990 elections were important in that they were held against a rebel party of former ZANU-PF Secretary General Edgar Tekere who had protested against the one-party state imposed by Mugabe. Violence was instrumentally used to send a lesson to the renegades. Political violence was perpetrated against the opposition

supporters, and candidates. Patrick Kombayi a Gweru based ZUM heavy weight was injured in the 1990 general elections in an attempted assassination attempt which left him paralysed. The perpetrators of this violence were the Zanu-PF Government organised supporters. State agencies were also directly involved in the Kombayi case. The perpetrators were pardoned by Mugabe after the elections General Notice 424A of (1990), while in the 1995 elections the Clemency Order No. 1 of 1995 was used to free ZANU-PF members arrested for violence, especially the CIO. The violence was more in the form of politically motivated intimidation, assaults and destruction of property. Faced with deficits and debts, the government had little choice but to accept the IMF and World Bank sponsored reforms to structurally adjust Zimbabwe's ill-performing economy. Under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai, the ZCTU reacted with a series of strikes and stay aways and, in coalition with civic associations bent on constitutional reform, formed the MDC, an opposition party. For his part, Mugabe was only able to hold together his splintering ruling coalition by using unbudgeted state resources to buy off the militant war veterans. Mugabe continued to implement his structural adjustment policies. By 1997 pressure was coming from different angles as the economy continued to bite. Civil servants, war veterans, peasants, students, the unemployed all pressurised Mugabe for economic recovery. The War veterans were pacified by lump sum payment for participating in the war. This pacified them and ensured their continued support for ZANU-PF. These different groups by 1999 coalesced to form the MDC.

Since attainment of independence in 1980 Mugabe faced opposition from different quarters. The most notable at independence were ZANU Ndonga led by Ndabaningi Sithole the founding president of ZANU and the UANC led by the former Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa. While ZAPU was initially co-opted into the 'Unity Government' at independence in 1980, by 1983 it was effectively an opposition political party against ZANU. In 1990 Zimbabwe Unity

Movement (ZUM) led by the ZANU former Secretary General Edgar Tekere emerged opposing the ZANU-PF government. The main reason for all these political parties was a lack in human security. By the end of the 1990s, the scattered social interests that had contested the one-party state at the beginning of the decade began to crystallize into a nascent opposition coalition. Formal organizations in political society started to align themselves with this civic movement. For example, all but two opposition parties boycotted the 1995 elections because of the absence of electoral and constitutional reforms. The failure to institute and provide an inclusive government can be traced to the execution of the liberation struggle mainly in ZANLA led areas where violence against political opponents was instrumentalised. Mugabe's approach in the nationalist discourse since independence was shaped by the liberation values. His approach was enforced by the war veterans who deemed anyone opposed to Mugabe an enemy. The liberation discourse was reinvented to ensure regime survival. The regime survival was ensured at the expense of human security. In fact, it was a return to the old traditionalist security survival. In the 1990, 1995 elections, Edgar Tekere and Ndabaningi Sithole the ZANU Ndonga leader respectively faced hostilities and resistance.

The rise in human insecurity between 1990 and 1997 led to various groups, notably in civil society, to fight insecurity through constitutional challenges. The underlying argument by members of the civil society, academia and students was that the underlying human insecurity in Zimbabwe since independence was due to a defective constitution which served narrow political power interests than citizen interests. The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) was formed by civil society organisations, labour and student unions to fight for constitutional change. For its part, the NCA effectively advocated a popular boycott of the government's official constitutional commission. While some citizens heeded this call, others felt emboldened to speak up to the government's handpicked commissioners by presenting their

own unvarnished views. As an independent civic organization, the NCA claimed to have no partisan agenda. The NCA on its part pressurised the government to draft a new constitution. Initially the government rejected the idea but in 1999 the government led Constitutional Commission was tasked with drafting a new constitution.

Thus, as the decade ended, an emergent popular movement born in civil society arose to challenge an entrenched ruling party whose mismanagement and corruption had called into question its right to rule. To offset the loss of political support, ZANU-PF tried to shore up its heartland among the Shona-speaking peasantry, for example by providing rural voters with food relief during droughts and distributing free seed and fertilizer afterwards. In addition, Rural District Councils were legally merged, thus transferring tax revenues from commercial to communal farming areas. At the same time, ZANU-PF began to reverse its relations with traditional chiefs and headmen by restoring some of their lost powers and including them in the party's patronage network. Formerly, the leading source of progressive ideas in Zimbabwe, the party elite thereby began to transform ZANU-PF into a force for social and political conservatism.

By the end of the 1990s, the ZANU-PF leadership coalition had become narrow and less cohesive. Few former PF-ZAPU members remained in Cabinet, rifts had begun to emerge among rivals to succeed Mugabe and parliamentary backbenchers were restive. The party's loss of political legitimacy was starkly illustrated by the 1996 presidential elections. Although Mugabe won over 90 percent of the vote, rival candidates withdrew because of irregularities and barely one-third of the registered electorate bothered to show up on polling day. In the next decade, violence and disorder would become the prime instruments of ZANU-PF rule, symbolized most clearly by chaotic invasions of commercial farmland. At the same time, an opposition

movement growing out of civil society offered a more orderly and constitutional vision of the future.

The food riots of 1998 were a momentous activity in the Zimbabwean history. Food riots can be defined as “a violent, collective unrest leading to a loss of control, bodily harm or damage to property, essentially motivated by a lack of food availability, accessibility or affordability, and which may have other underlying causes of discontent” (Berazneva and Lee, 2013: 29). The riots, looting and violence occurred as people were reeling from the devastating effects of ESAP which had led to high inflation, corruption, high demand for housing, war veterans’ compensation and the subsequent payments which were unbudgeted. People were generally disenchanted by ZANU-PF. A study commissioned by the government “indicated that 74% of Zimbabweans were poor, with 45% of Zimbabwean households living below the food poverty line. Food shortage was reported as the primary indicator of poverty, followed by shortages of clothing, lack of draught power and inability to send children to school” (ZIMRIGHT NGO FORUM, 1998: 10). Labour increasingly demanded constitutional reforms while the landless under Chief Svosve invaded white owned commercial farmers. War veterans became rebellious demanding compensation for their role in the armed struggle which Mugabe agreed to pay straining the fiscus. People in Chitungwiza and Harare protested by looting shops in townships and the city centres. The government used its police and military in beating, arresting and torturing people.

The heavy-handed response by the government to the food riots showed fear and panic. It can be argued that this was the first real challenge to Mugabe’s rule. Mugabe’s response resonates with *The Economist* (May 17, 2012) which stated that “from the start, food has played a bigger role in the upheavals than most people realize”. The violence meted out on culprits shows that he feared for regime survival

more than the interests of the people. After the people retreated, they coalesced to form the NCA and later the MDC. Mugabe resorted to violence against opponents. The food riots signified a real confrontation against Mugabe's confrontational politics. As Makumbe (2009) attests the food riots and the general economic decline culminated in the suspension of the rule of law to suppress opponents. To curtail the continued opposition due to worsening economic conditions "The rule of law was effectively suspended to enable the war veterans to harass, beat up, rape and even murder people who were perceived to be supporting opposition political parties, or resisting forcible land redistribution" (Makumbe, 2009: 11). What the country experienced between 2000 and 2017 was a consequence of these actions. The violence was an unprecedented show of force in which the Minister of Home Affairs Dumiso Dabengwa (ZIMRIGHT NGO FORUM, 1998: 10) stated "let no one tempt the police ... I want to warn the demonstrators who think they want to take to the streets to loot and commit acts which are in breach of the law that they stand a danger of being shot at by the police". Critics claimed that "the success of the demonstration indicates the anger of the people. It shows that they are no longer going to allow the Government to do whatever it wishes. The demonstrations indicate that people are far from being happy with the ruling party. We will see more of these (demonstrations) as the economic gravy train grinds to a halt" (ZIMRIGHT NGO FORUM, 1998: 10).

The chapter has furnished a comprehensive analysis of the development of violence in Zimbabwe. Violence practised after 1980 increased the level of human insecurity. The use of security services to intimidate opponents benefitted the Mugabe government and not the people. The denial and negation of basic rights in a way undermined development as Mugabe policies were state-centric and not individual-centric. The analysis concludes that violence in Zimbabwean politics was a result of the intensification of repression reminiscent of colonial

rule. The nature of Mugabe's rule entailed subjugation of the opponents in the economy, politics and the social life. Post-independent Zimbabwe failed to rein in the use of violence against opponents. In fact, violence became its default settings against opposition. Mugabe perfected the state machinery to his advantage. The Gukurahundi atrocities and the 1990 General Elections violence, reflects a systematic resort to violence. The next chapter will probe the historical background to the formation of the MDC.

CHAPTER 5: THE FORMATION OF THE MDC AND THE RISE OF THE NONVIOLENCE IDEA

This chapter seeks to provide an historical overview of the circumstances around the formation of the MDC. It will articulate the political philosophy of the MDC, its key stakeholders and why it ended up preferring non-violent resistance as its political strategy. The chapter critically interrogates the MDC founding values and the discourse on nonviolent resistance. It analyses the founding principles of the party and how it sought to marry nonviolence and the violence espoused and practised by ZANU-PF. The chapter begins by analysing the National Peoples working convention which mapped the MDC political journey and the MDC policies which followed later.

From 26-28 February 1999, after a decade of clashes with the government, the leadership of the ZCTU with other civil society organisations, convened an all working people's conference in Chitungwiza which gave rise to the formation of the MDC. The result was the creation of the National Peoples Convention in May 1999 "mandated to map out strategies to protect workers from the economic hardships and put in place a strong, democratic popularly driven and organised movement which represented a broad spectrum of society" (Dansereau, 2003).

Forty popular groups and over 20 000 people witnessed the official launch of the MDC and its declaration to contest the 2000 parliamentary elections (*The Worker*, September 1999). The MDC claimed in Article 3.1 that "the MDC shall be a Social Democratic Party whose core values shall be solidarity, justice, equality, liberty, freedom, transparency, humble and obedient leadership and accountability". Article 4.8 states that the MDC has its roots in the working people of Zimbabwe. It recognises the role of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, (ZCTU), National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the

Church, Women's and Student movements in its formation (MDC Constitution, 2000: 4). The MDC while purporting to be a worker's party as it was led by workers' representatives was funded by the black petit-bourgeoisie and white elites, and international allies.

In 1999-2000 the government initiated the drafting in of a new constitution to replace the Lancaster House Constitution through a government sponsored Constitutional Commission. A massive campaign instigated by and comprising the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the MDC and the white Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) led to the defeat of the draft constitution at the polls, with Mugabe immediately accepting the result. But, within days, twelve war veterans occupied farms in Masvingo Province, proclaiming that the white farmers had connived to defeat the constitution in the referendum. The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) supported these occupations and called for further action as a way of demonstrating the need for land. When leaders of the war veterans association and the ruling party realised by the end of March that white farmers were actively campaigning for the MDC, and encouraging farm workers to do the same, farm occupations became more violent with the build-up to the political campaign for the June 2000 parliamentary elections (Moyo, 2001: 318). At the end, of the National Working People's Convention the members came up with various recommendations. These recommendations gave birth to the MDC. The preamble to the resolutions provide that:

AND WHEREAS the Convention noted the need and desire for forming a political movement that would seek to address the broad concerns of the Convention. AND WHEREAS it was subsequent to the Convention established through wide consultations throughout Zimbabwe that there is an overwhelming desire for the formation of a broad - based political party. AND WHEREAS a political Party known as the Movement for Democratic Change dedicated to the promotion and advancement of human rights and to setting up of a government based on the principles of freedom and good governance, was launched at Rufaro Stadium on the 11th of September 1999 (MDC CONSTITUTION, 2000: 3-4).

The members gathered for the national working convention set out the stage for the formation of the MDC as a broad movement of labour, workers, students and lawyers. This formulated the stage for its political birth struggle against ZANU-PF.

The rise of the MDC in 1999 is arguably one of the most important political landmark activities in the history of Zimbabwe. Its challenge to ZANU-PF hegemony has been profound and arguably changed the political landscape in Zimbabwe. While there has always been opposition political movement in Zimbabwe throughout independence, the MDC shook the stranglehold of ZANU-PF in politics especially in the urban areas where it constantly trounced ZANU-PF whenever there was an election. Years of ZANU-PF rule had produced nothing but socio-economic hardships as a result of gross economic mismanagement and misplaced priorities. On its part ZANU-PF blamed the West for creating and subsequently funding the MDC in an effort to effect regime change. The MDC and its members were ostracised and declared enemies of the state by the Mugabe government. The Commercial farmers immediately became victims and the land issue was reignited and became a political mantra, journalists in the private press were targeted and newspapers closed, the rural areas were cordoned off and there were threats to close western embassies. On the other hand, it is also argued that there was Western influence in the creation and/or funding of MDC. This created polarization in the country leading to widespread violence as there was a redefinition of patriots and puppets. The rise of MDC challenged ZANU-PF's leadership.

Several factors converged to influence the formation of the MDC and its political standing as an iconic movement towards the political hegemony of ZANU-PF. Its formation received widespread support throughout the length and breadth of the country shaking the ZANU-PF stranglehold of the political movement. While being officially

formed in 1999 through the Peoples Working Convention the seeds and signs were already there. Firstly, the seeds came unfulfilled promises of independence in land, jobs, repression, Gukurahundi atrocities in Matabeleland, the vagaries of the Structural Adjustment Programmes, attempts at creating a One-Party state, and the general economic meltdown. The general economic decline after 1991 SAPs and the subsequent crushing of the Zimbabwean Dollar on the now infamous Black Friday after the unsanctioned War Veterans compensation converged to unite people of all social, political and economic classes to come together against ZANU-PF. Its invincibility was now put to question, and it resorted to underhand tactics. The introduction of structural adjustment began the process of broad-based convergence of democratic forces to form a mass movement different from the previous political parties before it.

The formation of the MDC was as a result of an enmeshed confluence of factors, some of which dated back to pre-independence; the ZANU-PF government failed to address the systematic lingering problems after gaining power in 1980. The government also failed to address critical issues emergent in the independent era thus breeding a ground for opposition politics. ZANU-PF viewed the economic problems and some of its mistakes as immaterial to the formation and rise MDC. It can be argued that most ZANU-PF Members of Parliament and the national leadership began to view itself as the divinely appointed leadership of the country. They cared less about their respective constituencies and national development, and corruption deepened.

The MDC has adopted various Policy documents from inception to date. In 2000, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014 and 2018 various policies were promulgated. The 2000 MDC constitution set the tone for the party to adopt a nonviolence principle. Article 4.4.3 of the constitution provides that “The MDC is against all forms of violence and does not believe in the use of violence as a way or means of attaining any political, social,

economic or religious objective” (MDC Constitution, 2000: 5). The MDC Policy document promulgates that the party recognised the values of the liberation struggle, the need for land reform and social justice in Zimbabwe. The MDC in 2008 stated that:

The M.D.C. has always recognized the need for land reform and has since its inception phase, called for reform and equity in land occupation and use...The M.D.C. will also establish a system of compensation for displaced farmers that will address their rights, make restitution for their losses, and ensure justice for those whose basic rights, including the right to safety and security and life, were violated. Those farmers who have been displaced and who no longer wish to resume production will be dealt with fairly and within the same framework as all other landowners...Potential claims for losses by displaced farmers are thought to exceed US\$ 8 billion and will, by the time the transition takes place, be backed by several local and international court cases (MDC Policy Document, 2008).

At its formation, the MDC received funding from USA, Britain, through the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), and major commercial farmers which gave rise to the “regime change” label pasted on it by the ZANU-PF political leadership. Commercial farmers funded the MDC following the violent seizure of their farms by the war veterans. War veterans of the 2nd Chimurenga became the foot soldiers of ZANU-PF campaign.

State security agents became spectators in the ensuing violence. In many ways, contemporary Zimbabwe politics assumed a new trajectory after the February 2000 constitutional referendum when an alliance of diverse civil-society organizations including the ZCTU and its National Constitutional Assembly allies, defeated the government through their ‘Vote No’ campaign in the 2000 Constitutional referendum. It was the first referendum in the country’s history, and the first ever defeat of ZANU-PF in a national poll. The result sent shock waves through the ruling establishment and the looming June 2000 parliamentary elections precipitated a series of deeply destabilizing events including the farm invasion by veterans of the

liberation war of settler- owned commercial farms. Since then, state institutions have been dramatically restructured, and the militarization of society has altered the nature of both the ruling-class alliance within the political hierarchy and the terrain of civil-society activism. The state's onslaught on the MDC's structures, leadership, and rank and file did not eliminate the opposition, but severely constrained the party's capacities on the ground. Some commentators focus narrowly on leadership politics within the MDC and highlight significant dangers for popular constituencies in the MDC's apparent confusion over whether to advocate social democracy or neoliberalism, and internal divisions between competing blocs.

The MDC was formed as a broad-based consensus movement encompassing a variety of groups including business, students, workers, intellectuals, farmers and the general people namely the peasants, unemployed and the elderly. Article 3.4 clearly sets out the key stakeholders in the party as follows "the MDC believes in the principle of active civic participation in public affairs and shall, in pursuit of this principle, work with trade unions, business and employers, human rights organisations and other civic groups in the formulation of national policies" (MDC Constitution Article 3.4, 2000: 6). The MDC through article 4.8 asserts that it "recognises its roots in the working people of Zimbabwe and in particular recognises the role of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, (ZCTU) National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the Church, Women's and Student movements in its formation" MDC Constitution Article 3.4 (2000: 7). Provides:

The MDC shall recognise the sovereign equality of all countries and shall promote progressive forms of economic, social and political cooperation that advance national development goals. The MDC shall maintain the unity and integrity of Zimbabwe as a nation state and shall oppose any forms of tribalism and any attempt to divide the country on tribal or regional lines (MDC Constitution Article 3.4, 2000: 7).

The MDC therefore promised to form alliances with political organisations, or united or popular fronts. It also promised to join national or international organisations which share the same social democratic values with it.

The MDC viewed itself as a pro-poor political party whose core values were informed by social democracy, non-racial and non-sexist philosophy. It was formed as an inclusive party as reflected by its demographically representative inaugural leadership. The political philosophy was aptly captured in Article 4.3 which stated that “the MDC is against all forms of violence and does not believe in the use of violence as a way or means of attaining any political, social, economic or religious objective” (MDC Constitution, Article 3.4, 2000: 7). Democracy was to be the core value of the movement as it sought to entrench the people’s basic freedoms of speech, ideas, right to information and expression.

The MDC Goals were to create an inclusive and sustainable democracy which supports multiparty democracy to address the demands of justice in the country. The Goals can be summed up as follows:

1. A participatory democracy through constitutional and other democratic institutions.
2. A strong economy with market principles and state intervention strategies to promote economic and social justice.
3. A redistributive state that addresses social rights and development.

The MDC vision was to create a corruption free country to counter the widespread corruption and pervasive nepotism in the ZANU-PF government; they wanted to create an impunity free country and an equitable justice delivery system. In its vision, it sought to democratise the country by assigning powers to the 3 levers of the state which are Executive, Judiciary and the legislature at the same time respecting the

ethos of the liberation struggle and protecting human rights and the freedoms of press. In its Policy Document encapsulates the above as follows:

The MDC is fundamentally committed to the creation of a state that will consult all stakeholders on all aspects of the management of the country that affect them. It will hold itself accountable to the people at all times and will ensure that all elections are open to all who want to monitor them and witness the procedures and the outcome. We will ensure that Zimbabwe becomes a constitutional democracy in which the rule of law is applied fairly and objectively to all. We are committed to total transparency in leadership and will require all MDC leaders to declare their assets on a regular basis. Gender will be mainstreamed in all areas of the State and the government administration (MDC Policy Document, 2013: 2).

The MDC (2013: 3) is committed to the following key principles, an Executive that is fully accountable to the people and to Parliament, an Executive that is fully accountable to the people and to Parliament and a Constitution that fully recognises the rights of all Citizens including the right to dual citizenship. In the MDC policy document, it is highlighted that:

Constitutionalism and the respect of the rule of law were the fundamental principles of the party. The MDC also promised to prioritise economic development through a democratic devolved state which gives powers to provincial councils. The MDC also wanted to create structures for broad participation between labour and government. The party also claimed that it would transform the rural areas by initiating pro-poor policies and supporting rural enterprise and agriculture. In short, the MDC vision promised “a modern, healthy, functional, integrated democratic developmental State with a vibrant, socially just, green economy that takes pride at leaving no one behind (MDC Policy Document, 2013: 2).

The party also undertook to advance a violent free political terrain where there was virtual respect of the rule of law and disbanding the youth militias which were instruments of violence since independence. Emphasis was also put on a programme of national healing and integration and community socio-economic empowerment. The MDC

also prioritised the reform of the security sector to become constitutional and non-partisan in operation.

The MDC split several times due to several of reasons. The MDC split in 2005, 2014 and 2018. These splits were attributed to lack of constitutionalism and the use of violence within the party. The 2005 split was more acrimonious as it tore the basic fabric of the party. In 2005, “MDC youths camped out at Harvest House ... and then attacked people after they were fed ethnic propaganda about Welshman Ncube planning to take over the MDC” (Mushangwe, 2018: 16). The 2005 split followed a contentious vote over whether the party would participate in the newly reintroduced Senate. The Welshman Ncube group won the internal party vote to participate which was out rightly rejected by Tsvangirai effectively splitting the party. The 2014 split was engineered by the need for party renewal after the loss in the 2013 elections. Roy Bennet summed up the split as “Mr Tsvangirai has served two terms and he is completing a third. Deep introspection needs to be undertaken by our collective leadership, not for purposes of looking for scapegoats, but for our party to reinvigorate its leadership which reflects the will of the people. Regrettably, some do not wish the democratic will of the people” (ZDI, 2014: 4). The split in 2005 led to the emergence of two MDCs the MDC-T led by Tsvangirai and the MDC led by Welshman Ncube, the 2014 split led to the MDC T and the Renewal Democrats led by Tendai Biti which further split to Renewal Democrats and the Progressive Democratic Party. Thus by 2014 the MDC had morphed into five splinter groups. In the 2018 election the MDC-T split again into MDC Alliance led by Nelson Chamisa and the MDC T led by Thokozani Khupe. The common factors in the MDC splits were unconstitutionalism, factionalism, violence and poor performance in elections.

Violence within the MDC has been rampant against opposing factions. Since its formation the MDC has prided itself as a nonviolent party but

the youths within the party have been used against party leaders. It has been a culture that each party dispute has been settled 'politically' by the members of the youth movement. Makonye (2021) has outlined how the post 2005 MDC has been a haven of violence within. He points out that in 2005, 2018 and 2018 each time the party split violence has been used against the weaker factions. Firstly, intra MDC violence was launched against Welshman Ncube, Trudy Stevenson and others, then against Tendai Biti and members of the Renewal Democrats in 2014 and lastly against Thokozani Khupe in the fight for the control of the MDC-T after the deaths of Morgan Tsvangirai. In an interview with the *Sunday News*, Welshman Ncube former MDC Secretary General lamented that "if this man could do this now before he was in State House, what will he be like if he was in State House commanding the CIO, the police, and the army?" (Mpofu, 2005).

Tsvangirai often used party youths to settle political scores. Even where the MDC National Executive Council issued disciplinary measures suspending the youths involved in the violence Tsvangirai often redeployed them or simply ignored the recommendations as aptly pointed out by Coltart:

The senior member of staff dismissed by the National Council in its June 2005 meeting has been re-employed by the Tsvangirai faction; the youths responsible for the violence in Harvest House in September 2004 and May 2005 expelled from the party by the Management Committee (and endorsed by the National Council) have been re-employed by the Tsvangirai faction (Coltart, 20056a).

The above example exhibits the elements of mafia style organisational management. This was compounded by the godfather status given to Tsvangirai by his supporters. Thus, the national nonviolent values the party espoused were ignored by some members of the MDC. Several commissions of enquiry into MDC internal violence were set up but as pointed out by Welshman Ncube:

To date, we have had several commissions of enquiry into violence within the MDC dating back to 2001 when MDC MPs and activists, including Priscilla Misihairambwi, Gabriel Chaibva, Edwin Mushoriwa and Janah Ncube, were set upon by hired thugs during a Harare provincial meeting. We had another commission of enquiry into the attempted murder of the MDC's security director, Peter Guhu. Another enquiry related to an attack on other senior party officials, including the Bulilimamagwe MP, Moses Mzila Ndlovu. When the findings were revealed, the party expelled some of the youths involved but they were rehired by Tsvangirai (New African Magazine 2007).

This violence was also partly due to the personification of the MDC with Tsvangirai. In a study the "The Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) recorded a high number of intra-political party violence within the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) than in the ruling party ZANU-PF. Prospects of peaceful elections are not guaranteed as there are many tensions between members of the party" (EU 2018: 22).

The violence within the MDC was elite driven while the ZANU-PF violence against the MDC was targeted at the poor in society, those in rural areas and urban townships. The MDC created a party para military wing named the Vanguard. This wing became a party 'disciplinary' wing and a rival to the ZANU-PF National Youth Service. Its duty was to defend the party in principle but in practice it was used against opponents to Tsvangirai. Those who fell victim to it were Trudy Stevenson, Tendai Biti, Elton Mangoma and Thokozani Khupe. There were other silent victims of this group in the districts. The authoritarian nature of colonialism, liberation movements and post liberation ZANU-PF rule reproduced itself in the MDC.

The MDC Vanguard youths' movement operated outside the confines of the MDC party structures. Many in the party lamented the extent of the violence in the party even claiming that:

We have become so accustomed to violence being used as an acceptable political weapon that we have lost sight of the fact that the democratic world has moved on and that such methods are anathema. By a silent and insidious process of osmosis, we have absorbed this disease and tragically we do not understand the extent of the problem (Coltart, 2006a).

While it paled to the state sponsored ZANU-PF violence, the MDC violence became a bigger problem in the democratisation agenda and increased human insecurity to some extent.

The first test to ZANU-PF hegemony was the February 2000 referendum in which the civil society and the MDC campaigned for 'No Vote' against the constitutional commission inspired document. The instrumentalisation of power included the deployment of the security sector to discharge political roles in the state. The main motive of involving the security sector in important matters of the state was to ensure ZANU-PF's self-preservation. There was fear that:

Had ZANU-PF lost power in 2000, senior officials would probably have been held accountable for a range of unresolved issues such as the genocide in Matabeleland, key corruption scandals of the 1990s, and the looting of the War Victims' Fund. Senior officials therefore had a clear interest in retaining power which clearly influenced ZANU-PF's post-2000 strategies. The nature of the state changed considerably during the late 1990s with the co-option of the war veterans and the growing influence of an impatient and radical empowerment alliance (Selby, 2006: 4).

A referendum held in February 2000 led to an overwhelming defeat for the ruling party. Kagoro posits, 'it was a protest vote against the manner in which the constitution-making process had been carried out by the government', and 'an angry protest against the performance of the government and parlous state of the economy' (Kagoro, 2004: 249). This unprecedented defeat of the ruling party by an opposition party (which, according to ZANU-PF, was backed by white commercial farmers and the West) appeared to precipitate the largely state-

sponsored land invasions, political violence, institutional interference and economic decline that were to follow (Hammar, 2005: 4).

What is clear is that from 1997 the government became increasingly paranoid. The challenge to Mugabe by the war veterans rejuvenated the security sector into dabbling in political activities. Military officers were appointed in almost the key sectors of the economy. The war veterans and the youth league became the vanguards of the party. They mainly targeted MDC sympathisers. The aim of the party in securitising the state were probably regime survival to escape from possible prosecution for atrocities and criminal activities committed since independence. Makumbe (2003) drew parallels between the Mugabe government and the UDI government in terms of securitising the state and using the security sector as instruments of power retention.

The Fast Track Land Reform Programme carried out in early 2000 reflected the instrumentalisation of power by the Mugabe regime. The reform programme was carried out in disregard of all the basics of the rule of law. The police were bystanders in the violation of property rights while the war veterans and the youth militia were given free rein on the farms to loot property and displace both the farm owners and the farm workers. In a study carried out by the Research and Advocacy Unit (2010: 19) 4000 farm owners and 1,3 million farm workers were subjected to 8 years of political violence and intimidation and nearly 82297 violations were recorded. The violence was rather systematic in that most perpetrations were carried out during election time which shows that there was a systematic abuse of the farm workers for political gain. The official government position was that the programme was carried out in a peaceful and orderly manner, however events on the ground showed otherwise.

The government professed ignorance of the violence and claimed that if there was any it was carried out by unruly mobs. However, no action was taken by the police against the mobs. The judiciary was intimidated to give favourable judgements on violence related cases brought before them. Judges who were deemed enemies of the regime were hounded out of office, notably the then Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay who was fired for being anti-revolutionary. Court orders were often ignored and sometimes unenforceable. Murder, rape and torture were used to intimidate farm workers who were forced to contribute towards ZANU-PF activities. The war veterans and the youth militia were the major perpetrators of violence while the police and the army provided them with protection.

The government passed laws to support the invaders. Constitutional Amendment No. 17 and the Rural Land Occupiers Act (Protection from Eviction) (RAU, 2016: 36-37) closed the doors for farmers and farm workers to seek recourse from the courts. In fact, it legalised an illegality which showed the complicity of ZANU-PF in the violent invasion of white-owned farms. The Commercial Farmers Union was shell shocked by the callousness of the whole land reform initiative and the violence which followed. Jerry Grant (CFU Director) lamented that:

I'm shell shocked, I can't believe a government can behave in this manner... the word is out that this is punishment for whites rejecting the constitution... it is orchestrated at the highest level... there are government and party vehicles involved in delivering (the invaders)... The police are aware of this and they're still doing nothing about it. They've had an instruction from the top not to interfere. (Mail and Guardian, 2 March 2000).

Violence became a convenient instrument used by those who felt threatened politically to deal with their political opponents to achieve political ends. The MDC has performed fairly well in the elections that it has participated in since 2000 up to 2008 however in the elections

which followed it has declined. In the 2000 general elections the party nearly snatched victory from ZANU-PF. In the presidential elections of 2002, the MDC was defeated by ZANU-PF though it contested the results in the courts. In 2005, it lost the parliamentary elections to ZANU-PF but snatched the 2008 elections.

The year 2000 saw a multi-pronged approach to political opponents by the ruling party. The first victims of the violence were the farm owners and the farm workers. However, the approach to the June 2000 Parliamentary election worsened the political temperatures in the country. The strategy behind the land reform strategy was to weaken the MDC support base through intimidatory tactics. Mugabe labelled opponents of his land seizures enemies of the revolution and neo-imperial puppets of the West. The rural arrears were cordoned off by ruling party youths and the war veterans.

Mugabe issued threats to the MDC and the white community promising to deal with them with equal force and measure. He threatened that people “who try to cause disunity among our people must watch out because death will befall them” (*Daily News*, 17 March 2000). Other senior government officials such as Moven Mahachi the then Minister of Defence and Sydney Sekeramayi the then Minister of State Security promised witch hunts against MDC supporters. Mahachi went as far as claiming that as the defence minister he had the authority to kill using the army. Talent Mabika and Tichaona Chiminya senior officials in the MDC were also petrol bombed by known state security operatives. ZANU-PF would use the names of the two to threaten to unleash further violence against opponents. War Veterans leadership threatened to take up arms if the MDC was voted into office. The Amani Trust (2000: 20) notes that there were over “over 200,000 incidents of political violence in the first half of 2000 which forced the MDC to cease campaigning a few weeks before the election in over 20 constituencies, mainly rural ones.” The level of violence towards the

June 2000 election was one of the worst in the country's electoral history.

The violence was national and encompassed most rural areas of Zimbabwe. The urban centres were spared of pre-election violence. The post-election period saw the deployment of the police and army details to maintain order. Urban centres became the new targets of ZANU-PF violence for overwhelmingly voting for MDC. ZANU-PF leadership issued threats against members of the MDC and all those suspected of supporting it. Stan Mudenge had this to say to civil servants supporting the opposition: "you will lose your jobs if you support opposition political parties in the presidential election. As civil servants you have to be loyal to the government of the day. You can even be killed for supporting the opposition and no one would guarantee your safety" (*Daily News*, 18 July 2001). These threats were followed by violence and complete blackout of the rural arrears for opposition members.

In its policy document in 2000 the MDC proposed to "The creation of Defence and Security services that are fully accountable to the people and the civilian leadership of the nation" (MDC Policy Document 2000: 3). They further note that:

The mission of the MDC government is to transform the Defence Forces so that they are guided by the following: The Zimbabwe Defence Force shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture. The Zimbabwe Defence Force shall be subordinate to the elected civilian authority. The Zimbabwe Defence Force shall respect human rights and democratic political process. The Zimbabwe Defence Force shall be non-partisan with respect to political parties. The Zimbabwe Defence Force shall endeavour to develop a non-racial, nonsexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture (MDC Policy document, 2000: 245).

These policy measures were meant to depoliticise the Zimbabwe military as evidenced by its close relations with the ZANU-PF party.

One of the most notable and remarkable statements was by the Army Commander Vitalis Zvinavashe in 2002 towards the country's Presidential elections. He remarked that they would not salute anyone without liberation war credentials. The statements were not new but rather a reaffirmation of a known, but a-never-before succinctly articulated position. Mugabe further used the army for the furtherance of his political interests. The army became a key cog in politics through the Joint Operations Command (JOC) whose "role was to advise the President on any issue having security implications, narrowly defined as anything that threatened ZANU-PF's tight grip on power. Closely related to this strategy was the move to ensure that several state institutions were under the control of former freedom fighters or military personnel" (Magure, 2007: 137). In addition to the militarisation of state institutions, the national youth service was revived. The youths were deployed to harass members of the opposition. Furthermore, the graduates of the programme were given preference for employment in the civil service. The invitation of the army in ZANU-PF politics became a common feature.

The MDC faced a two-pronged attack from ZANU-PF which inherently affected the democratic space. Firstly, there was violence in the countryside; secondly the ZANU-PF Party used its two thirds majority in parliament to further weaken the democratic space. ZANU-PF used the legal route to limit the operations of the opposition. Various laws were enacted which greatly affected the MDC and the political space. Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), Public Order and Security Act (POSA), Political Parties (Finance) Act, Broadcasting Services Act (BSA), Non-Governmental Organisations Bill (2004) and Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act were all targeted at the opposition. AIPPA was basically used to close Independent newspapers such as the *Daily News*, *the Tribune*, *the Daily Mirror* and Joy TV after it had aired an interview with Morgan Tsvangirai. While this appeared to be a legal route to curtail and close rogue newspapers, the

net effect was that it send a chilling message to journalists to play to the demands of the regime than to oppose the government. AIPPA was used to curtail the freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Thus, the MDC solution was to enact “An Act of Parliament to provide for the establishment, organisation, training, conditions of service and other matters concerning the permanent force and part time reserve. The Zimbabwe Defence Force will refrain from furthering or prejudicing any party political interest and no member of Permanent Force shall hold office in any political party or organisation” (MDC Policy Document, 2000: 246). Thus, the MDC sought to professionalise the defence forces for it to uphold the constitution. These policies were meant to ensure a violence free politics and society. These policies also applied to the Police and the Central Intelligence organisation.

In 2002 the USA, Britain and the EU imposed sanctions on the ZANU-PF leadership, their businesses and immediate families. The USA enacted ZIDERA (2001) “... to support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect peaceful, democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable economic growth, and restore the rule of law.” The sanctions were targeted at members of ZANU-PF; these were imposed as a result of gross Human rights violations. Targeted sanctions involve “... the selective use of sanction measures with the intention to minimize unintended negative humanitarian impact by specifically targeting single persons...” (Grebe, 2010: 4). “Targeted sanctions are thought to be useful in specifically identifying the culprits for punishment without necessarily dragging the innocent citizenry into bearing the unpleasant consequences of the sanctions regime” (Masaka, 2012: 54). The sanctions were used by ZANU-PF to drum up support. Mugabe sought support in and outside Zimbabwe focusing more on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The immediate victims of the imposition of sanctions were the MDC and the white community in Zimbabwe. Mutumbaranzou & Guzura

argued “ZANU-PF declared a political war against the imagined and real supporters of the opposition MDC and in the process destroyed opposition structures that were in their formative stages of development” (Mutumburanzou & Guzura, 2011:346). As a result of the sanctions “the construction of the hegemonic project saw the emergence of revived nationalism delivered in a particularly virulent form with race as a key trope within the discourse” (Mutumburanzou & Guzura, 2011: 347). “The institutionalization of violence as an electoral tool, disregard of the rule of law, and rampant violations of human and people’s rights” (Masaka 2012: 56), became a common feature of ZANU-PF. *The Herald*, (7 July 2011) shows the government’s interpretation of the sanctions as a declaration of war on Zimbabweans. ZANU-PF, as a result declared war on citizens in defiance of Western machinations.

In 2005 Mugabe violently ‘removed’ MDC supporters in the urban areas through the draconian Operation Murambatsvina. It should be noted that from 2000-2005 the rural areas were the most affected by political violence, but in 2005 the government began a clean-up campaign in urban areas. This resulted in the destruction of houses and illegally built structures in urban areas. Operation Murambatsvina (Drive out the Filth) in May 2005 followed the poor showing of ZANU-PF in urban constituencies. “Operation Murambatsvina (Drive out the Filth) cost some 700,000 Zimbabweans their homes or livelihoods or both and otherwise affected nearly a fifth of the troubled country’s population” (African Report No.7, 2005:1). There was wanton destruction of homes without offering alternative settlements to people. Human Rights organisations were not allowed to assist those affected. The affected were forced into rural areas where they were victimised for being MDC members. It was reported that:

Zimbabwean authorities also engaged in a concerted effort to coerce the people displaced by the evictions to leave the cities and move to the rural areas. In different areas across the country Zimbabwe Republic Police threatened, harassed, or beat the Internally Displaced Persons, forcing them

to relocate to the rural areas where many have no homes or family and where social service provisions and economic opportunities are minimal. Fearing further displacement, many have resorted to hiding during the day and only returning to the places of their temporary residence at night, to avoid detection and harassment by the police. In addition, the government tried to compel the relocation by ensuring that international assistance is not provided to those who choose to stay in the urban areas, meanwhile using the food packages as an incentive for families to move to the villages (Human Rights Watch, 2005: 3).

This was one way in which the MDC and their supporters were violently attacked by the government through the using state institutions. Operation Murambatsvina was an attempt to frighten and scatter opposition supporters from towns and cities where they were concentrated.

The operation was mounted to break the MDC urban stronghold after years of ZANU-PF rejection. It was a continuation of the violence against citizens which had been on-going since colonialism. It was an attempt to weaken the MDC structures and punish those who supported it. The findings of the UN team led by Ana Tibaijuka aptly summarised the Operation as follows:

...the Zimbabwe government collectively mounted a brutal, ill managed campaign against its own citizens. Whatever its intent -- the urban clean-up claimed by authorities, or more sinister efforts to punish and break up the political opposition lest resentment explode into revolution -- that campaign has exacerbated a desperate situation in a country already sliding downhill for a half-decade. (Africa Report No.7, 2005: 1).

The operation underscores the perpetuation of violence against the MDC. The MDC was powerless to act with equal measure opting for nonviolent resistance. The Minister of Local Government had also violated the constitution by firing an elected mayor and then imposing a Commission to run the affairs of Harare. The government also relied on Rhodesian Legislation to mount the clean-up campaign, in

particular, the Regional Town and Country Planning Act of 1976 that enforced inequalities by segregating against blacks. The use of such laws also shows the limitations of legal reform in independent Zimbabwe. It also gives credence to those who have argued that Mugabe left or refined some Rhodesian Legislation for use against opponents.

Zimbabwe held its harmonised elections in March 2008. These elections were held in a relatively free and fair environment. The electoral commission released the Parliamentary, council and senate results without much hassle except for a few constituencies which were delayed because of verifications. The results showed that ZANU-PF had lost the elections as it had 99 seats to MDC-T's 100 seats and MDC-M's 10 seats. The results of the presidential elections were released 6 weeks later. The Presidential results gave 47.9% of the vote to Morgan Tsvangirai, 43.2% to Mugabe, 8.3% to Makoni. Tsvangirai failed to garner the required 50% plus one to get outright victory. A runoff was therefore slated for 27 June 2008. The net effect of the delays was that ZANU-PF used the 6 weeks period to prepare for a bloody run off. The SADC mediation team led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki did not help matters as he claimed that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe. These pronouncements gave ZANU-PF a subtle legitimacy to attack MDC supporters throughout the country.

The conditions prevailing in the country leading to the runoff were a clear declaration of war on the people. ZANU-PF summoned all its security structures under its control on the people. The army, CIO, Police, war veterans, the youth militia and the traditional leaders were all used in its campaigns. The police, in many instances, refused to arrest perpetrators of violence. In most cases, MDC members who reported violations to the police were arrested for the crimes they reported, the traditional leaders were forced to hand over names of MDC supporters to the ZANU-PF leadership. Those accused of

supporting the MDC were taken to ZANU-PF bases where violence was inflicted on them. According to a Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR) report:

[T]he current pattern of organized torture and violence being perpetrated by state agents in the rural areas of Zimbabwe is similar to that documented prior to the 2002 elections. However, the current violence is dramatically more intensive and unrestrained. The level of brutality and callousness exhibited by the perpetrators is unprecedented and the vicious and cowardly attacks by so called war veterans on women, children and the elderly shames the memory of all true heroes of the liberation struggle (ZADHR, 8 May 2008).

The attacks were not limited to MDC members but to people and government officials accused of having facilitated MDC victory in the harmonised elections. Even Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) officers were targeted and arrested for failing to discharge their duties. The targeted violence was such that no one was willing to work for ZEC in the runoff and those willing were mainly ZANU-PF supporters angling to give their party a clean sweep. MDC activists were abducted, beaten and tortured to death. The use of unmarked vehicles in the run up to the elections became a common feature. Prominent MDC leaders were hounded out of the country. Tsvangirai fled to Botswana, while Tendai Biti fled to South Africa and youth leaders such as Tonderai Ndira were abducted and tortured to death.

Compared to the Gukurahundi, the scale of violence during the 2008 run-off was different as it transcended ethnicity and covered the whole country, the intention was to maintain political power at all costs. The state media portrayed ZANU-PF members as the victims of large-scale MDC violence. The police “continued with their long established pattern of arresting, charging and denouncing the innocent” (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2008: 28). The MDC Headquarters, Harvest House, became a home of displaced persons. The displaced persons were not spared from the violence. Solidarity Peace Trust reported that “Over 200

displaced victims of abuse including women and children who had sought shelter at the MDC headquarters in Harare, were in late April arrested and accused of being responsible for burning down homesteads in rural areas" (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2008: 28).

Some observers recounted the horrors of seeing victims of violence. One observer recounted that "what we have heard and seen is shocking. We have heard horrific stories of extreme brutality and seen the victims. We have seen people with scars, cuts, gashes, bruises, lacerations and broken limbs, and bodies of those killed. It is a horrifying picture" (*Business Day*, 14/05/08). The violence was a well-orchestrated and choreographed decimation of the MDC leadership, structures and supporters. Teachers in rural areas were displaced and the schools were taken over by the ZANU-PF militia as bases for political orientation. The Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU) reported that:

As the reports on teachers detailed, teachers were seen as *prima facie* supporters of parties in opposition to ZANU-PF, more especially because the independent trade union representing many teachers, the Progressive Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ), had frequently been in conflict with the government. Furthermore, teachers were usually involved as polling officers in elections, and hence their loyalty (or usually, their independence) became a major issue in elections. Finally, being the more educated members of local communities, their opinions could be very influential in any election (RAU, 2013: 14).

The attempt was to silence all possible areas of dissent. Opinion leaders in rural areas were targets of violence. Some accusations stemmed from longstanding differences which had nothing to do with politics.

The Human Rights NGO Forum (2007) recorded 60 politically motivated murders in the month of June 2008 alone, while the MDC claimed that lost a total of 200 members during the run off period. People in the streets were routinely stopped to recite ZANU-PF

slogans; travellers were stopped at checkpoints where ZANU-PF youth would openly attack those perceived of being MDC supporters. The new slogans chanted by ZANU-PF youth were inciting violence. The commonly used slogan during the campaigns was “27 June Win or War” or “27 June VaMugabe MuOffice (27 June everyone to vote for Mugabe)”. These slogans were an incitement for war and were followed by violence on opponents.

Because of the political polarisation and the continued violence against its supporters, the MDC was forced to withdraw from the runoff. Tsvangirai cited the uneven electoral and political field which had affected his campaign. He had failed to access the rural areas to campaign. Mugabe entered into a one-man election in which he claimed a landslide victory. The international community failed to recognise his victory. The various observer reports claimed that the elections were a sham and failed to meet the minimum requirements of electoral practice. The SADC report found that there was:

politically motivated violence resulting in loss of life, damage to property, and serious injuries sustained and hindering political activities... disruption of campaigning of the opposition party and the regrettable inaction of the law enforcement agencies... did not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe (SADC Observer Report, 30/08/2008).

Other observers’ reports from the Pan African Parliament and AU condemned the election outrightly because of the violence and the higher levels of intimidation and coercion. They questioned the impartiality of ZEC in the whole election.

After being heavily criticised for the manner the runoff was conducted, ZANU-PF changed the tactic from physical violence to structural violence. Defining structural violence, Lee avers, "it refers to the avoidable limitations society places on groups of people that constrain them from achieving the quality of life that would have otherwise been possible. These limitations could be political, economic, religious,

cultural, or legal in nature and usually originate in institutions that have authority over particular subjects" Lee (2016: 109). It is, 'the disabilities, disparities, and even deaths that result when systems, institutions, or policies meet some people's needs and rights at the expense of others' Schirch (2004: 22). This form of violence has been described by Galtung as referring to (1969:168) "a form of violence wherein some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs". He goes on to say 'violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisation is below their potential realisation' Galtung (1969:68). See figure 5.1 below




Figure 5.1 Galtung's Violence Model (*Galtung's Triangle of Violence Model, 2004*).

The above depicts shows the mutation of ZANU-PF violence after the 2008 debacle. From 2008, the shift was more on structural violence where the ZANU-PF psychologically threatened the electorate through subtle means. The most common way to cow the electorate was through denial of food hand-outs on perceived supporters of the opposition. In some cases, village heads were used to jot down the names of those who supported the opposition. This form of violence permeated societal structures. As succinctly put by Galtung (1969: 170):

The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal and consequently as unequal life chances. Resources are unevenly distributed, as when income distributions are heavily skewed, literacy/education unevenly distributed, medical services existent in some districts and for some groups only, and so on. Above all, the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed. The situation is aggravated further if the person's low on income is also low in education, low on health, and low on power – as is frequently the case because these rank dimensions tend to be heavily correlated due to the way they are tied together in the social structure.

The ZANU-PF government from 2009 deliberately employed tactics to frustrate Zimbabweans in economic, political and social spheres. The 2013 elections and the 2018 elections were relatively free and fair to the observers. However, within the country, structural violence was inherent.

Election observers for the 2013 and 2018 elections focused on direct violence. This was informed by previous experiences in Zimbabwe from 2000-2008 when ZANU-PF used direct violence against MDC supporters. They focused on direct violence because it is “the most obvious and overt form of violence perpetuated by one or more disputants directly upon those with whom they are in conflict” (Christie *et al.*, 2001: 12). The period after the 2008 elections was one in which legal instruments were used against the opponents of the regime. Various legislations were operationalized against MDC supporters mainly for undermining the authority of the president. More time was spent in the courts as MDC members were accused of various criminal activities. Victims of organised violence had limited opportunities to seek redress in courts. Legislations such as the “the State Liabilities Act Chapter (8.14) that does not permit the attachment of state property in execution of a court judgment” was used to avoid paying compensation in instances of state litigation. This exclusion from government-initiated programs and the protection of state property against court judgements rendered the judiciary powerless to

enforce judgements. Court judgements against the state institutions which were used to advance ZANU-PF interests became academic judgements. “For Zimbabwe, the wider context of the socio-political economy has been the key to determining the nature of structural and personal expressions of violence in which vulnerability and powerlessness of the general public has been evident” (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2014:16).

The 2013 and the 2018 elections were managed and run by the military on behalf of ZANU-PF. After the 2008 elections, the army was neck deep in ZANU-PF factional politics therefore they were protecting their interests and the interests of their candidate. The Zimbabwe Democracy Institute in its 2018 report advanced the thesis that:

During the 2018 election period, there happened numerous incidents that demonstrate the symbiotic relationship between ZANU-PF and ZEC mounting suspicion within citizens that later broke out into post-election violence. This paper abridges these incidents supporting its main thesis into three clusters of evidence namely: (i) mutually beneficial defensive proclivities; (ii) sacrificial negation of constitutional obligations to donate victory to ZANU-PF and; (iii) employment and/or appointment of ZANU-PF supporters and military personnel to manage the election. (ZDI, 2018: 4).

This probably explains the use of live ammunitions against MDC supporters on 1 August 2018. The conflation of the civil-military relations structurally affected the MDC in challenging the ZEC decisions in court. The appointment of the ZEC acting CEO who was a serving army officer and presided over the shambolic 2008 elections drained the people’s confidence in the electoral body. “Where military elites are involved, unorthodox politics have been practiced. More importantly, blatant human rights violations and electoral violence becomes the common practice in the electoral process” (ZDI, 2018: 7). 2013-2018 was a period of unorthodox politics in Zimbabwe. In all the electoral malpractices and the violence before and after elections, ZEC has been a spoiler because of its bias and lack of goodwill to attain free

and fair elections. The spoiler attitude has led to both direct and structural violence.

This chapter has comprehensively traced the origins of the MDC within the context of political violence and repression. It critically traced the MDC's founding values since its formation and whether the values have been adhered to. Since its inception, the MDC has advocated for democracy and human rights as its trump card. However, the party has failed in internal democracy tests. It has been found wanting in the respect of constitutionalism and divergent opinion. The party members have resorted to violence as a political normative value and ideology against each other while preaching nonviolence externally. The party has also been a victim of violence from state institutions which are aligned to the ruling party. The next chapter will critically examine the methods used by MDC counter violence against its leadership and members.

CHAPTER 6: THE MDC PRACTICE ON NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE

The description furnished by Mugabe in 2001 clearly sets out the stage for violent political confrontations. He noted that:

The MDC should never be judged or characterised by its black trade union face; by its youthful student face; by its salaried black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough and violent high-density lumpen elements. It is much deeper than these human superficialities; for it is immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule. MDC is as old and as strong as the force that controls it; that converges on it and controls it; that drive and direct; indeed, that support, sponsor it. It is a counter-revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday (Mugabe, 2001: 88).

Mugabe was preparing for a violent showdown with the party through the contrived use of state agencies and state machinery and the entire party's youth militia and the Liberation veterans. Words such as 'unpatriotic' and 'puppets' became common features of Mugabe's speeches at each and every address. As a result, "elements of the police, the intelligence service, the army, the war veterans, party supporters and the youth militia, the ruling party has inflicted enormous damage on the personnel and structures of the opposition" (Raftopoulos, 2004: 163). The MDC used nonviolence to counter the brutality it endured at the hands of ZANU-PF.

The June 2000 parliamentary election was the beginning of highly institutionalised violence against the MDC and its supporters. The violence led to farm displacements and cordoning off of rural areas. The MDC participated in each election since 2000 and preached nonviolence each time there were threats of violence. The MDC wrote letters to SADC leadership imploring them to act in light of the violence. The Parliamentary elections were characterised by systematic

state sponsored violence against supporters of the MDC. Chief victims of the violence were those in the rural areas and farm workers. It was reported that:

31 deaths relating to political violence were reported during the run-up to the 2000 election, most of them perpetrated by ZANU-PF supporters. The majority of victims were MDC activists or supporters, many of whom had to go into hiding during the election campaign. Roy Bennett, the MDC candidate in Chimanimani, whose pregnant wife was attacked, as a result of which she suffered a miscarriage, and Blessing Chebundo, MDC candidate in Kwekwe were among them (Zimbabwe Country Assessment Report, 2002 Chapter 4:17).

The 2000 violence was instigated by war veterans under Chenjerai Hunzvi. In Buhera South Constituency the major villains in the orgy of violence were identified as Joseph Chinotimba, the then war veterans leader, Madziturira, the Buhera Rural District Council Chair, Wevhu (war veteran) and Chapeyama, a local welder. Notable youth commanders whose names featured prominently include Tawedzerwa Mcharwa, Langton Nehumambi, John Madidi, Chendinofira Gwengwe, Zvabhenda Mbavara, Kerenia Dambudzo, Uta Amosi Marowa, Rennei Muzerengwa, Mafunde Modikai, Nyaradzo Mudete, Beauty Chongore and Charles Mukanwa. The violence targeted mainly MDC supporters. The MDC appealed to the police to act. It seemed the police were in collusion with the perpetrators or were afraid of acting.

The MDC approached the Courts, but to no avail. The Murambinda Magistrate Courts in Buhera were a hive of legal manoeuvres as the perpetrators of violence often used the police to arrest victims. Notable victims of this were Julius Chivandire, Norosi Dzere and Chitombo Mundiriri who spent two months in Rusape prison after thwarting the ZANU-PF violence. Arrested ZANU-PF militia were released from prison after President Mugabe issued decrees granting them amnesty. These decrees became a systematic way of encouraging violence in

elections as they were issued in 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2013 elections.

In Buhera South, the MDC leadership and its supporters hoped that a negotiated settlement would be reached in 2002. ZANU-PF and MDC attempted to find common ground in 2002. The talks were initiated by South Africa and Nigeria. These two countries proposed to find common ground between the political parties. The agendas of ZANU-PF and MDC were parallel in that the MDC was contesting the outcome of the election wanting a rerun while ZANU-PF wanted legitimacy. The MDC insisted that it was talking with ZANU-PF on the basis that ZANU-PF was a political party and not the government.

The imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe by the United States of America, the European Union and Britain in 2002, received the backing of the MDC. The MDC also supported the expulsion of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. The MDC advocated for targeted sanctions on the political leadership in Zimbabwe and their businesses and government owned companies which financially supported the regime. The MDC party supported sanctions because they thought sanctions were a nonviolent way to political change. The sanctions were motivated by high levels of violence in Zimbabwe and intimidation and murder of political opponents. Sanctions have been used against rogue regimes such as the Saddam and Gaddafi regimes in Iraq and Libya respectively.

The MDC lobbied for the imposition of sanctions against the ZANU-PF leaders, their family and their businesses. More than 50 ZANU-PF members were sanctioned by the European Union and America. The sanctions coincided with the general economic decline in Zimbabwe. The imposition of sanctions resulted in the heavy-handed approach by ZANU-PF against the MDC. Violence became a recurring feature in the national political discourse. To those in Buhera, the sanctions lobby

was not well received as most members did not understand the implications and impact when the perpetrators of violence remained in office. One member opined that “zvinobatsirei kupa masanctions vanhu vacho vachiramba vachitonga” (how useful are the sanctions when perpetrators of violence remain in office). Initially most members embraced the call for sanctions, however, later on they felt the sanctions were of no use as long as they saw violence mongers in their midst.

The MDC utilised prayer as a nonviolent tool. Various meetings were held under the auspices of the church leadership to urge supporters to be tolerant of each other. The call for the prayer meeting was that:

The leadership of the Campaign once again reiterates its commitment to the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis in total defiance of the brutality being perpetrated by the state security agents. We deplore the use of violence by those who are in power not by peoples’ consent but through coercive means. The state has an obligation to protect the citizenry and to respect the human rights, including the civil and political liberties of the people (New African Magazine, May 2007: 87).

The Save Zimbabwe Campaign also demanded peaceful elections during the 2008 general election. They also demanded that the elections be held under a new constitution which respected the fundamental rights of the people. They demanded that the elections be held under the supervision of local, regional, African and international observers. In their campaign, they cited the remarkable words of Eddison Zvobgo who said “We don’t want to create a socio-legal order in the country in which people will go to bed after having barricaded their doors and windows because someone from the special police branch will visit them during the night; no we are tired of it, that’s why we are in this revolution for as long as it is going to take” (Dr Eddison Zvobgo, 1974). In line with the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, the Buhera South MDC leadership attempted to replicate the Harare prayer campaigns with very little uptake of this as most felt they could easily be victimised.

The local leadership simply encouraged their followers to pray in their homes to avoid detection and retribution. The violence of 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections showed them that they had to be discreet in some instances to avoid being victimised.

On 11 March 2007, under the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, the opposition attempted to hold a prayer meeting at Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfields. The Zimbabwe Grounds is an historic place in the Zimbabwe liberation movement as it was the home of African nationalism. The police arrested the MDC leadership which included Morgan Tsvangirai, Arthur Mutambara, Tendai Biti, Organising Secretary Elias Mudzuri, Grace Kwinje, Sekai Holland, Job Sikhala, and NCA leader, Lovemore Madhuku for allegedly inciting violence. Scores of MDC supporters were injured in the ensuing melee with the police. Two MDC supporters Gift Tandari and Itai Manyeruke were killed during the meeting. MDC supporters protested and the protests were met with brute force. Douglas Mwonzora, a senior executive member of the MDC said: "The peace prayers were being run by clergymen who have invited us and the other political parties have apparently not taken them seriously, but we in the MDC take matters of peace and national harmony seriously" (*Herald*, 9/04/2012).

The Save Zimbabwe Campaign and the violence which ensued later showed that the state was prepared to use violence to maintain its hegemony. The beating of Tsvangirai showed that no one was safe especially considering that the MDC leadership were the victims. A Zimbabwean Human Rights Advocate had this to say "the 2008 Presidential campaign has already begun. This violence is the strategy of the ruling party. They want to eliminate opposition now so that the situation will appear calm in the period before the election" (OSISA, 2007: 2). The violence internationalised the Zimbabwean problem and the international community responded by paying spotlighting the crisis.

In this regard the nonviolence helped in isolating the ZANU-PF regime from the international community. During the same period the EU and USA further intensified sanctions on the Mugabe regime. Despite the threats and condemnation from different quotas, Mugabe boisterously stated that “police have the right to bash them... those who incite violence or actually cause and participate in unleashing it are set to pay a very heavy price, regardless of who they are” (*The Chronicle*, 15 March 2007). ZANU-PF attacked the MDC prayer campaigns for becoming a “campaign platform lending holiness to the MDC’s agenda” (*The Herald* 09/04/2012).

The MDC continued with the meetings even after the inception of the Inclusive Government. Even though the party faced criticism from other political players, they still used prayer as a nonviolent tool. Commenting on the events, Arthur Mutambara argued “the brutality has united us. I also observe that there is now total rebellion in the country and that we will defiantly continue with our rallies and demonstrations, in total disregard of the unjust and repressive laws of AIPPA and POSA” (*The Standard*, 2021/03/14). In response, Mugabe defiantly stated “of course he (opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai) was bashed. He deserved it... I told the police beat him a lot. He and his MDC must stop their terrorist activities. We saying to him ‘stop it now, or you will regret it’” (*The Standard*, 2021/03/14). This prompted the UN, EU, UNHRC, US State Department and AU to issue strong statements against Mugabe regime. Levy Mwanawasa was scathing in his condemnation of Mugabe when he says “quiet diplomacy has failed to help solve the political chaos and economic meltdown in Zimbabwe. As I speak right now one SADC country has sunk into such economic difficulties that it may be likened to a sinking Titanic whose passengers are jumping out in a bid to save their live.” (*The Standard*, 2021/03/14). In short what started as a prayer became a trigger for international action and condemnation such that Mbeki became the mediator in the conflict. The international community became more interested in

Zimbabwe with some calling for military action against Mugabe. Calls for fresh elections mounted. The elections earmarked for 2010 were pushed back to 2008 because of mounting legitimacy questions on Mugabe.

The Zimbabwean political scene uses t/shirts and other paraphernalia of marketing political activities. While these t/shirts served as campaign materials, they also became potential sources of violence. The political environment after 2000 became increasingly polarised. As soon as Robert Mugabe declared the MDC the enemies and friends of imperialists and colonial agents, the party youths were given the powers to cleanse territories of MDC supporters. Political party regalia are a source of identity and violence. Comparing violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe, John Githongo pointed out that:

The sources of violence are varied within the structure and organisation of ZANU-PF as a political movement: one of the key players is ZANU Youth militia. As Kenya's former 'anticorruption tsar', John Githongo has pointed out in a different context in Kenya, violence is empowering. Here youth violence has been co-opted, licensed and encouraged by the party-qua-state, in the formation of the Green Bombers. The particular Zimbabwean political culture of T-shirts – which confer identity and affiliation, communicate and intimidate players out here too. Other perpetrators are war veterans, ZANU-PF supporters and 'mixed groups' (Onslow 2011: 9).

As pointed out above t/shirts in Zimbabwe political arena became sources of constestation and violence.

In 2008 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum reported that “the ripping off of MDC t-shirts has also been common on victims that have been attacked whilst putting on MDC party regalia” (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2008: 2). Some victims are reported to have been attacked for their party regalia. It was reported that:

Seven women, who were coming from an MDC rally in Epworth, were attacked by ZANU (PF) supporters who assaulted them and stripped two of them of their MDC regalia leaving the two women half naked. One of the victims reports that shortly after arriving home from the rally, a group of

four ZANU (PF) supporters forced their way into her house and assaulted her with clenched fists and booted feet. The assailants then stripped her of her MDC t-shirt leaving her upper body exposed. She managed to escape from the assailants and was given something to wear by a neighbour. Another victim who had her MDC regalia stripped off her also reports that the assailants went on to strip her of the pair of shorts she was wearing underneath her skirt (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2008: 8).

The various reports depict that the wearing of party regalia became dangerous to MDC supporters as they were easily identifiable. In most rural areas MDC supporters would take party regalia but rarely wore it because of the fears of being targets of violence. Even outside the electioneering period party regalia were rarely used by the supporters. They were also used in the distribution of Aid to communities. Those without political party regalia were denied government aid.

To counter the weaponisation of party regalia, the MDC encouraged its supporters in Buhera South Constituency to participate in ZANU-PF projects through getting ZANU-PF regalia and attending ZANU-PF meetings to protect themselves from violence. In Buhera South Constituency except for known MDC leaders, most members preferred to partake in ZANU-PF programmes and even getting and putting on its regalia religiously although at elections they were determined to vote for their party. This was evident when MDC supporters voted overwhelmingly for Naison Nemadziya against Chinotimba. Theodore is quoted by the *Newsday* saying “I only attend rallies and even take part in the scramble when necessary because it’s important for me to keep at least two different types of influential parties to protect my family...we have learnt our lesson, this time we are prepared” (*Newsday*, 21/06/2019). In the run up to the June 2008 presidential election run-off, MDC members were encouraged to join and vote for ZANU-PF to protect their lives.

The MDC' symbol of the open palm and its red cards were the insignia for change. The red card was symbolically copied from football to signal change. MDC supporters used the open palm to show their support for their party. In most households in Buhera South, individuals had both the regalia for ZANU-PF and MDC. They would put on ZANU-PF regalia during the day and put on MDC regalia during the night.

The MDC attempted a mass action against the government considering alleged electoral theft after the 2002 elections. The mass action was meant to be a peaceful takeover of power. The protester had planned to march straight to State House (the official residents of the Zimbabwean president). The intention was to force the government to arrest the worsening economic situation and also to force Mugabe to step down. This tactic had been used before in other countries with some success. The Orange revolution in Ukraine was one such an example where mass action had been successful. In Africa the Tunisian uprising and the 2019 Sudanese uprising successfully led to the resignation of Al Bashir. Morgan Tsvangirai stated that:

We want to embark on democracy marches in every town and every workplace...must be prepared to be arrested, we must be prepared to make a mark to ensure that we will never again be oppressed....Action must take place everywhere in Zimbabwe. Be peaceful. Be disciplined...Beware of the ZANU-PF merchants of anger (The Zimbabwe Independent, 17/03/2006).

The MDC, then spokesperson Paul Themba Nyathi, stated that "If government out of fear of its own citizens' throngs' security forces into the streets that will be a massive defeat for them and a victory for democracy" (*The Zimbabwe Independent*, 17/03/2006). The MDC mass action became a political mobilisation after each and every election between 2002 and 2019. The party felt that election irregularities could be solved by peaceful political uprising. In 2014 in the call for fresh mass action Tsvangirai said:

Fellow democrats I am making an urgent call today for a shift to action. We cannot allow ourselves to be victims of illusion and phantoms of hope alone. We have to be brave, we have to take action...for my part as I stand before you, I am forever ready to lead from the front these very democratic troops gathered here today and all those across the nation (The Daily News, 01/11/2014).

The attempted takeover was however met with a military show of power which cowed the MDC supporters. Derek Matyszak commented on the failure of the mass action attempt to overthrow Mugabe: "the storming of the Bastille that heralded the end to the despotism of Louis XVI, would not have been possible but for the fact that the French Guard decided to align itself with the people of Paris" (Matyszak, 2011: 135).

In Zimbabwe the army has been an appendage of ZANU-PF, it is often used to entrench ZANU-PF's hold on power. What led to the failure of such an action has been the consistent use of the army to protect the establishment. The army and the police since independence have periodically used live ammunition against protesters. This forced the MDC after 2002 to use other nonviolent methods. However:

Calls for mass demonstrations in Zimbabwe rarely bring more than a few hundred people out onto the streets. Demonstrations have thus been discredited as a means of exerting any effective pressure on the Mugabe government; they result simply in arrests and extended periods of incarceration for the participants (Matyszak, 2011: 135).

On the day of the mass action soldiers were deployed in the high density suburbs and colleges to instil fear in would be protestors.

The MDC attempted diplomatic forays in the region, continent and beyond. The forays resulted in internationalising the Zimbabwean problem. The SADC region appointed South Africa President Thabo Mbeki as the mediator to the Zimbabwean conflict. The mediation

went from 2002-2009 when the Government of National Unit (GNU) came into being. Since the formation of the MDC Tsvangirai visited various African and European countries with the aim of outlining his party's vision and spelling out their economic and political campaigns. In 2015 Luke Tambolinyoka the Presidential spokesperson highlighted that "the president has gone to the USA on a diplomatic offensive. He is going to make more diplomatic offensives in line with the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe... only this morning he was finalising his letter to the SADC Chair that was copied to regional leaders" (*The Daily News* 15/03/2015).

During the GNU Tsvangirai consistently approached the SADC leadership to upraise them on the progress made towards implementing the Global Political Agreement which ushered in the GNU. Moses Matenga a reporter from the *Newsday* quoted the Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai's spokesperson as saying, "The PM is leaving for the region to meet heads of State in SADC and the AU (African Union), he will meet them to discuss the next elections as they are guarantors of the Global Political Agreement and they are trying to create a conducive environment for free and fair elections and make sure agreed reforms are implemented" (*Newsday*, April 29, 2013). The MDC diplomatic offensives were meant to put pressure on Robert Mugabe to implement key reforms agreed during the inclusive government. He also aimed at selling his party's view regarding the implementation of the GPA and the successes of the inclusive government.

The MDC used legal recourse whenever they felt unjustly treated by the government. Since their active participation in the Zimbabwe electoral process, they have approached the courts in each and every electoral contest. The party approached the courts to appeal against certain laws which did not comply with the constitution. In 2001 they approached the courts challenging the constitutionality of the Law and

Order Maintenance Act. The Supreme Court struck down certain provisions of the law as they were unconstitutional. However, the government immediately enacted the Public Order and Security Act which stifled political activity.

The MDC also resorted to challenging the election results in the courts. They challenged parliamentary results in 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2013. They also challenged the presidential results in 2002 and 2018. The judgement for presidential results challenged in 2002 was reserved and up to 2019 the Supreme Court had not delivered a judgement. In 2001 results in Seke, Buhera North, and Hurungwe East were nullified by the High Court, however, ZANU-PF appealed to the Supreme Court and the High court victories to the MDC were nullified. Up to now 2023 the MDC 2002 Presidential Election challenge is not yet finalised.

There was indiscriminate arrest of MDC senior officials at the slightest chance. Tsvangirai was arrested in 2001 for comments made at a rally; he was arrested again after being found in possession of a two-way radio. Others, such as Job Sikhala, Tafadzwa Musekiwa, and Nelson Chamisa became victims of arbitrary arrests. In 2001, MDC supporters in Bulawayo were arrested accused of murdering Cain Nkala, an outspoken leader of the war veterans. However, in all these arrests the MDC approached the courts and the victims were found not guilty. Robert Mugabe used the law as a repressive tool.

Each time the MDC applied to the police for permission to hold rallies, the police gave flimsy reasons to deny them the chance. Reasons usually given were that of inadequate manpower and constrained resources. Three laws became important ZANU-PF instruments of dictatorship. The Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the General Laws Amendment Act (GLAA) institutionalised dictatorship. The POSA provided for the death penalty for those accused of assisting

terrorism, subversion, banditry, sabotage and treason against the government. The law banned public gatherings convened "to conduct riots, disorder or intolerance" and made it an imprisonable offence to undermine the authority of President Mugabe by making or publishing hostile statements". AIPPA was used to close newspapers or deny newspapers sympathetic to the opposition the licence to publish. In Buhera South Constituency, the MDC rallies for Mutiusinazita pencilled for the 10th of March 2002, Chapanduka Business centre rally scheduled for May 2002, Birchenough Bridge May 2002 and Tsvangirai Star rally at Muzokomba in 2002, were all banned (Interview with Participant 28, 13/01/22). The MDC appealed to the Magistrate courts to no avail in all these instances. For the 2008 run off the pattern was the same. The MDC initially applied to have a blanket ban on its rallies lifted but with the intensification of violence they abandoned the legal route before withdrawing from the race.

In cases where the MDC rallies were approved, the ZANU-PF youth militia disrupted them. The MDC rallies in 2002 towards the presidential election and their rally on 20 June 2008 were all disrupted by militia violence. It was reported that:

On 19 January 2002, twenty people were injured and thousands tear-gassed after police and ZANU-PF militants intervened to stop an MDC rally at a stadium in Bulawayo. Militants occupied the stadium and beat MDC supporters while police teargassed people waiting outside. The police claimed that they did not target MDC supporters but intervened to stop violence (CNN, 20/01/2002).

In the 2002 elections around 48 MDC supporters were killed due to political violence. For those killed, there was no prosecution of the perpetrators, in fact after the elections Robert Mugabe issued presidential decrees granting amnesty to perpetrators of violence. MDC polling agents countrywide suffered from retribution and in some cases they were killed. The MDC approached the courts following the kidnapping, assault and murder of Chokuda Mupango at Mavhungire

Business centre. The relatives of the deceased claimed they were cowed into withdrawing the court case (Interview with Participant 27, 13/01/22).

The MDC and its affiliates, which include, the ZCTU and various civil society organisations, had been calling for job actions since 2000. In fact, the strikes and stayaways were a method which had been used during the period 1989-1999 before the formation of the MDC. These job actions received wide spread support from the urban supporters of the MDC in the early 2000s. However, the decimation of the industry and its total collapse rendered strike actions futile and ineffective.

In the formative stages of MDC, strikes received support from the generality of Zimbabweans. However, the government through the secret services used intimidatory tactics to scare supporters of both MDC and ZCTU. Members of the CIO enrolled at universities countrywide to spy on student leaders. The US State Department reported that:

CIO personnel took faculty and other positions and posed as students at the University of Zimbabwe to intimidate and gather intelligence on students who might protest government actions. Approximately five students were suspended or expelled during the year for political activity (US State Department 2006, (Zimbabwe Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005 8 March – Attachment 1).

Student leaders were expelled for petty reasons. The ZINASU leadership particularly bore the brunt of these expulsions. At the Midlands State University Jabusile Shumba and Showers Mawowa were expelled or suspended from their studies for their fight for student rights. In Harare the following ZINASU leadership were also arrested Washington Katema, Zimbabwe National Student's Union (ZINASU) coordinator, Promise Mkwanzani, (ZINASU) president, Tellington Kwashira, Emily Nkhungwa and Roderick Chirowodza (Human Rights Forum March 2007: 8).

As the economic meltdown continued fatigue crept in the nonviolent discourse of strikes and stayaways. By 2007 the ZCTU was taking a backseat as its membership was also affected by job losses. The MDC was affected by its internal problems after their split in 2005. The party was now preoccupied with internal issues. By 2007 calls for general strikes from the main labour body became an academic exercise because the ZCTU membership had considerably dwindled. The IRIN reported that:

The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) that has often been in the vanguard of protest against President Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF government, is taking a back seat, while a whole swathe of society, including doctors, nurses, teachers, university lecturers and tobacco industry workers have embarked on strike action, and miners, government employees and students are on the brink of doing so... Although the ZCTU, an ally of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party, has been a fervent critic of Mugabe, disillusionment with the ZANU-PF government's handling of the economy is spreading among government employees (IRIN News, 7 February 2007).

Due to the problems bedevilling the economy from 2001 to 2008, the government experienced intermittent pressure from its employees who kept on demanding better pay and living conditions. The MDC offered solidarity to the workers.

This chapter has highlighted the nature of MDC's rhetoric and practice of non-violent resistance. The formation of the MDC in 1999 led to one of the most unprecedented state sponsored violence against political opponents. The ZANU-PF government employed its arsenal against perceived opponents. The loss of the referendum vote to the 'VOTE NO' campaigners led to violence against commercial farmers who were accused of supporting and sponsoring a regime change agenda owing to their support of the MDC. Central to this was the revival of a nationalistic discourse portrayed through a new narrative of the liberation struggle code-named 3rd Chimurenga. As in any war situation, violence became the only option for political orientation of

puppets opposed to the regime. The state used the media to carefully create an intellectual nationalist agenda portraying itself as victim to Western machinations and neo-colonial agenda.

Having witnessed the orgy of violence against its supporters, especially those in the rural areas, the MDC evacuated those who felt threatened to safe houses in urban areas. The safe houses provided sanctuary to victims of violence. The MDC headquarters, the Harvest House became a transit centre to safe places. The safe houses were used for the sanctuary of victims of violence (Interview with Participant 27, 26/01/22). The main victims of violence fled from the rural areas to the urban centres where they were kept from further violence by ZANU-PF supporters (Interview with Participant 27, 13/01/22). They were guaranteed safety from abduction, torture and humiliation. Some of the victims were left without shelter after their houses had been burnt in the rural areas.

The local leadership in Buhera South used the same method to protect their own. They used rented houses at Birchenough Bridge Business centre for the safety of their members. These houses were transit houses as they were not very safe. Usually, members would stay for at least two weeks before they were moved to Harare. This applied to the old members as the members of the Youth Movement opted to go to Chiadzwa diamond fields in 2008 for artisanal mining. Others like Chrispen Mupfuki, Rindai Mudzongobaya, Julius Chivandire, Dhindai Nyipo, and Chikondowa Mike fled to South Africa in search for better opportunities (Interview with Participant 27, 13/01/22). When Harvest House was raided on 25 April 2008, the victims were paraded by the government as terrorists. The safe houses mostly in Harare became convergent centres for violence victims from across the country. The MDC spokesperson Nelson Chamisa in 2008 appealed for international humanitarian assistance claiming that “the situation is overwhelming us. There is no way in which we can, on our own provide shelter for

over a hundred homes that have been destroyed, drugs and hospital bills for the maimed or displaced" (*Reliefweb*, 25 April 2008). Others sought for Shelter at the American Embassy as violence swept across the country (*Aljazeera*, 4 July 2008).

The 2008 presidential election runoff was one of the most violent elections since the MDC was formed. The violence transcended geographical location. Since 2000 the violence was largely rural but in 2008 the urban areas became targets of violence. "The worst incident was recorded in 2002 when armed officers who had been sent to disperse MDC supporters who attended an MDC rally at the Harare Show grounds, heavily assaulted the victims. Further to this offensive by members of the armed forces a group of armed ZANU-PF youth reportedly descended on the same MDC supporters intending to disrupt the rally" 9Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 04/11/2008;3). Robert Mugabe had also threatened war by stating that the country was "taken by a gun, not a pen'. Throughout the campaign, ZANU-PF threatened that there would be war if MDC were to win the presidential run off. Mugabe made it clear that power would not be taken by a pen but by a gun. War veterans aligned to him articulated this position throughout the country" (*Mail & Guardian*, 10/08/2008).

The violence forced the MDC to withdraw from the runoff to protect MDC supporters. Tsvangirai said:

We in the MDC have resolved that we will no longer participate in this violent, illegitimate sham of an election process. Conditions as of today do not permit the holding of a credible poll. Given the totality of these circumstances, we believe a credible election is impossible. We can't ask the people to cast their vote on June 27 when that vote will cost their lives. We will no longer participate in this violent sham election. On June 27 Mugabe has declared war, and we will not be part of the war. Our victory is certain, but it can only be delayed (Glendenning & Jones *the Guardian*, 22/06/2008, *Aljazeera*, 23/06/08).

Tsvangirai's argument received widespread support throughout. ZANU-PF forced the runoff despite the withdrawal arguing that it was unconstitutional. While ZANU-PF went ahead through constitutional arguments the MDC withdrawal left a legitimacy crisis hovering over the election and Mugabe's presidency.

The UN condemned the manner in which the elections were held in Zimbabwe as they had failed to meet the required standards for peaceful and democratic elections. The UN concurred with the MDC position as the Deputy Secretary General of the UN said:

(Observations) clearly indicate that the electoral process leading to the declared reelection of President Mugabe was seriously flawed. This profound crisis of illegitimacy is further compounded by the paralysis of State institutions. There is currently no functioning Parliament. Civil society has been silenced and intimidated. The economy is crippled, with annual inflation reaching 10.5 million percent by the end of June and unemployment being over 80 percent, and severe shortages of food and basic services exist. There is an urgent need to restore the rule of law and to start building public institutions (Migiro, 2008: 2).

The MDC managed to internationalise the Zimbabwean crisis. Despite the bravado shown by ZANU-PF during the runoff, the MDC used nonviolent means to find a solution to the crisis prevailing in Zimbabwe.

The AU issued a communiqué condemning the Zimbabwean government and its actions during the runoff period. Mugabe who was inaugurated immediately after the runoff and had attended the AU summit in Egypt to tell the Zimbabwean story was left with egg on his face. The communiqué showed that the international community were:

Deeply concerned with the prevailing situation in Zimbabwe; deeply concerned with the negative reports of SADC, the African Union, and the Pan-African Parliament observers on the Zimbabwean Presidential run-off election held on 27 June 2008; deeply concerned about the violence and the loss of life that has occurred in Zimbabwe; considering the urgent need to prevent further worsening of the situation and with the view to avoid the spread of the conflict with the consequential negative impact on the country

and the subregion ... recognising the complexity of the situation in Zimbabwe, noting the willingness of the political leaders of Zimbabwe to enter into negotiations to establish a government of national unity (AU Summit Communiqué, 2008).

The MDC welcomed the AU position, however they felt that there was no prospect of any negotiated settlement with ZANU-PF. Tendai Biti the MDC Secretary General condemned the runoff arguing that it had “totally and completely exterminated any prospect of a negotiated settlement” (Aljazeera, 01/07/2008). However, as time went by, the party began to warm up to a negotiated settlement probably due to pressure from its supporters who were facing persecution from ZANU-PF and the need to arrest the deteriorating economic conditions in the country. International pressure also contributed to the consummation of the Inclusive Government.

The 2008 elections provided a new framework for nonviolent resistance. ZANU-PF’s violent triumphalism in the runoff failed to gain international traction. The MDC insisted on questioning the legitimacy of the botched runoff citing the way it was conducted and the way the results were announced. The GNU came into effect after:

SADC and the AU initiated the coming together of the political parties. SADC’s formal involvement in the crisis in Zimbabwe that began with the extraordinary summit of the Heads of State and Government that was held in Dar as Salaam, Tanzania, on 29 March, 2007 gathered momentum after the election stalemate of 2008 and became a reality after the AU passed a resolution at Sharm El Sheikh that asked the regional bloc to find a negotiated settlement (Mutambudzi, 2015: 157).

Thabo Mbeki was tasked with mediating between the political parties owing to South Africa’s political and economic leverage over Zimbabwe. In fact, since the beginning of the Zimbabwean crises in 2000 South Africa had been trying to find a solution to the crisis. SADC used a three pronged strategy in coming up with the GPA which

included the pre-2008 election period which ideally covered the period from 2007 to 28 March 2008, the immediate post-2008 election period which gave Mbeki facilitation time, and the period of the GPA.

The MDC insisted on using nonviolent means against electoral theft. Within the party there was a realisation that the securocrats were spoiling for a fight. The MDC felt that violence would play into the hands of the army. While they protested against the delay in announcing election results, they still felt it necessary to be a part to the runoff. However, they did so under protest. The MDC, despite claiming victory was clueless on the way forward. In agreeing to the GPA, MDC agreed to a broader working framework whose aim was to achieve sustainable peace and national healing. The parties agreed that they would:

... work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation and in particular to implement the following agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country (GPA, 2008).

While the signing of the agreement was welcomed by the majority, there was haggling over the implementation of the agreement. The major problems arose over sharing of Cabinet posts and other outstanding issues. MDC attached important attachment to Articles 7, 10, 11, 12, and 19 because they directly addressed the root causes of violence in Zimbabwe. The party wanted professionalism in the security sector having seen the lack of it as the cause of violence. The opposition proposed the repeal of POSA, AIPPA and other laws which they felt were used to the advantage of the incumbent political party.

The MDC joined the government of national unity in 2009 as a transformatory framework to peaceful resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis. The period preceding the June 27 2008 election runoff had shown the extent of ZANU-PF violence. The MDC had realised that

without joining the GNU (though the agreement was far from perfect) they would continue counting body bags of their supporters. From its inception, the old tensions did not disappear but rather they continued as the two protagonists were trapped in fixed positions. Tendai Biti wrote that:

Coalition governments are bound to be more complex. Distinct parties must establish trust, a difficult thing when they are mired into permanent political competition. They must also agree on a common vision and a common plan, and how to execute it. Finding common ground on these four issues alone is often difficult. A coalition government born out of disputed and violent elections—such as Zimbabwe’s GNU was—is even more challenging. ZANU (PF) and the MDC have thoroughly differing ideological backgrounds. By the time the GNU came into existence, the MDC had been the target of sustained attacks from the ZANU (PF)-controlled state since the party’s formation in 1999. Its leaders had been assaulted, tortured, imprisoned, kidnapped and some had lost their lives. The two protagonists thus found themselves trapped in the same government. Regrettably but unsurprisingly, old tensions and mistrust did not disappear. An invisible permanent wall kept on separating both sides (Biti, 2014: 15).

The GNU became an albatross to both political parties as policy shift was seen as a sign of weakness. The MDC used the coalition agreement to better the lives of Zimbabweans and to make fundamental changes to the decades of ZANU-PF hold on the country. The drafting of the new constitution became a priority to the party.

However, the nature of the GNU served the interests of ZANU-PF more than the MDC in that fundamental issues which the MDC had been fighting for were left unattended to in the framework of the agreement. ZANU-PF was left with the crucial ministries of Defence and Home Affairs while the MDC was given social clusters. Mugabe was left primarily in charge of overall responsibilities of cabinet thus, the MDC were junior partners in the agreement. Machakanja wrote that:

The continued impunity undermines the whole concept of inclusive power sharing and a government of national unity assumed to have been founded on the GPA's principles of social cohesion, national healing and unity. The alleged continued contravention of the GPA principles by the ZANU-PF reveals a disregard for both the rule of law and commitment to transformative change that could be premised on the loose and misleading interpretation of the meaning attached to the concept of rule of law and the safeguarding of national and state security (Machakanja, 2010: 05).

The MDC soldiered on despite the challenges from an antagonistic partner. During the subsistence of the GNU abductions and torture of MDC activists continued. However, the MDC approached the courts and SADC as guarantors of the GPA whenever they felt short changed. For instance, during the tenure of the GPA, more than 30 political activists were abducted (*Newsday*, 10/09 2012).

The GPA signing on 15 September signalled the victory of nonviolence over violence. However, the mediation process left gaps such as those on appointment of Provincial Governors that did not transform the conflict. The MDC and ZANU-PF spent more of their time haggling over appointments to position and the role and authority of cabinet. Problems also arose over the secondment of MDC member Roy Bennet to the position of Deputy Minister of Agriculture.

The MDC insisted on the establishment of the Organ on Peace Healing and Reconciliation in the GNU framework for a comprehensive reconciliation and healing process in Zimbabwe. This was after the realisation that since independence there were no concrete steps put in place for truth telling. The assumption was that the Organ would put to closure misdeeds of the past and all the violence which affected Zimbabwe after independence. Article VII of the agreement focused on:

7.1 Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity

7.1.1 The Parties hereby agree that the new Government:

- 7.1.1.a. will ensure equal treatment of all regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin and will work towards equal access to development for all;
- 7.1.1.b. will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and in particular to correct historical imbalances in the development of the regions;
- 7.1.1.c. shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what mechanisms might be necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre and post-independence political conflicts; and
- 7.1.1.d. will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect among Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency irrespective of age, gender, race, and ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation.
- 7.1.1.e. will formulate policies and put measures in place to attract the return and repatriation of all Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and in particular will work towards the return of all skilled personnel (GPA, 15 September 2008)

The MDC used boycotts in advancing its nonviolent rhetoric. The party boycotted the 2005 Senate elections, 2008 run off and disengaged from the GNU. Even the process leading to the GPA witnessed the same methods, they were characterised by “deadlocks, walkouts, harsh exchanges, delays, continuing violence, raised hopes, false expectations and angry words” (Bloomfield *et al.*, 1988:61), The party also disengaged during the GNU as Tsvangirai argued that “It is our right to disengage from a dishonest and unreliable partner. In this regard, whilst being in government we shall forthwith disengage from ZANU-PF and in particular from Cabinet and Council of Ministers until such time as confidence and respect are restored amongst us”

(Dzirutwe, 2009). The disengagement was due to a plethora of problems bedevilling the coalition government. Tsvangirai complained of persecution of his supporters and the refusal by Mugabe to swear in Roy Bennet the MDC treasurer as Deputy Minister of Agriculture.

The MDC boycott of the 2008 presidential runoff and the 2009 disengagement from the GNU prompted SADC to find an amicable solution to the Zimbabwean problem. The MDC disengagement was to create a platform for mediated dialogue as the party felt engagement within the confines of cabinet and government processes was not yielding much due to the disproportionate power that Robert Mugabe continued to exercise over almost all the arms of the state. The disengagement received the backing of the EU as it announced that “in view of the situation in Zimbabwe, in particular the lack of progress in the implementation of the Global Political Agreement signed in September 2008, the restrictive measures ... should be extended for a further period of 12 months” (Felix, 2010). The disengagement removed the legitimacy of ZANU-PF and Mugabe. The opposition used the SADC Troika organ to voice its concerns. Nelson Chamisa the then MDC Spokesperson stated that:

If the (SADC Troika) meeting fails to break the deadlock, we hope there will be a full (SADC) summit. If that fails, then the only option will be a free and fair election under international supervision. In our forensic audit, we have only implemented a quarter of the Global Political Agreement ... and there is a danger that ZANU-PF may want to reverse some of the progress that we have achieved (Chinaka, 2009a).

The MDC was, however, forced back into the inclusive government though without the expected success. Even Thabo Mbeki remained hopeful that the parties to the conflict would guarantee the GNU. Mbeki stated that “I would hope people are faithfully implementing what was contained in the GPA. And really what was contained in it was that they would put in place various measures which would help overcome the causes of conflict that had taken place in Zimbabwe and

create a basis for reconciliation” (Radio VOP, 2010). Commentators condemned the MDC disengagement stance reminding the party that it was no longer an opposition party but rather a governing party.

Having been victims of the Lancaster House Constitution which was heavily doctored to support ZANU-PF hegemony, the MDC insisted on the constitutional reform process during the GNU. The constitutional reform agenda became an imperative agenda of the GNU. In fact, the holding of the next election was going to be preceded by the completion of the drafting of the new constitution. Since the formation of the NCA in 1999, the MDC had always pushed for a people driven Constitution. In early 2000, the MDC and its partners mobilised people to vote against the government-led constitution. In 2007 MDC and ZANU-PF clandestinely agreed on a document later known as the Kariba draft, this document was a draft constitutional agreement between ZANU-PF and MDC. However, the draft was put aside and got overtaken by events. The GPA asserts that “it is the fundamental right and duty of Zimbabwean people to make a constitution by themselves and for themselves” (GPA, 2008; Article 6).

Throughout the talks constitutional reform became a major aim of the MDC. This had been one of their repeated calls since 2000. Munemo (2016: 231) stated that “in the talks, it was also agreed that a new constitution would be drafted, democratic conditions would be created and a roadmap for free and fair undisputed elections would be constructed.”

The MDC documented perpetrators of violence as a nonviolence means to deter would-be perpetrators. Names of security agents responsible for the beatings and torture of members of the MDC were published in leading newspapers as a strategy to shame them and expose their brutality. Prominent politicians were also given prominent coverage in newspapers for their human rights abuses. The

MDC also instituted litigations against officers responsible for torture and unlawful detentions of activists. In some instances, the government was sued for damages resulting from unlawful arrests. The courts pressurised the Attorney General to release the names of the perpetrators of abductions of citizens. The *Zimbabwe Independent* reported that “the Attorney-General's Office has revealed the names of some of the members of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the police who were allegedly involved in the abduction of human rights defenders and MDC activists last November” (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 7/05/2009). This was a nonviolent method which deterred would-be perpetrators of violence.

Following the arrest of prominent activist, Jestina Mukoko in 2008, the government was sued for unlawful arrest and detention. Mukoko received a compensation of US \$150 000 for the abuse she suffered. Upon receiving her compensation, Mukoko revealed that “... there are people who were also abducted before me and people who were abducted after me. So, I think the State has just taken the first step and I think if we are going to say justice has been delivered, they need to be able to take into account all the other instances of enforced disappearances and, in particular, pay attention to those who have never been found after they disappeared” (*Pindula News*, 14/12/2018). Chris Dhlamini, the Director of Security in the MDC approached the courts through his lawyer Alec Muchadehama “demanding damages for unlawful abduction, enforced disappearance, unlawful detention incommunicado, unlawful arrest and unlawful deprivation of liberty; assault, torture, pain, shock, suffering and psychological trauma, contumelia and loss of amenities of life; and for malicious prosecution” (*The Zimbabwean* 22/04/2009). The lawsuit by Dhlamini had the double effect of suing the government and documenting the names of people responsible for his ordeal. All the people implicated were high ranking government officials and security officers. The following were part of the details of the lawsuit:

Dhlamini is demanding the compensation from the co-Ministers of Home Affairs, Kembo Mohadi and Giles Mutsekwa, Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, then Security Minister Didymus Mutasa, Police Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri, Prisons Commissioner Paradzai Zimondi, and Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) Director-General Happyton Bonyongwe. Also sued are police Senior Assistant Commissioner Nyathi, Chief Superintendent Crispin Makendenge, Detective Chief Inspector Mpofu, Chief Superintendent Peter Magwenzi, Senior Assistant Commissioner Chiobvu of the Prison Services, Detective Chief Inspector Elliot Muchada, Superintendent Josh Shasha Tenderere, Assistant Inspector Mudandira, Superintendent Regis Takaitei Chitekwe, Detective Assistant Inspector Maria Phiri, Detective Inspector Chibaya, Detective Muuya and Assistant Director of the External Branch of the CIO, Asher Walter Tapfumaneyi, according to court documents (The Zimbabwean, 22/04/2009).

The lawsuit by Dhlamini reflects the complicity of the government and the security sector in advancing ZANU-PF interests. At the same time, it also showed that top officials in the security sector could be sued for damages in their personal capacity. The lawsuits were intended to lessen police brutality on the MDC.

In the run up to the 2008 elections, the MDC parliamentarian for Buhera West, Eric Matinenga also successfully “presented a case before the High Court alleging that defence force members harassed, assaulted, and humiliated MDC-T supporters... Justice Bhunu issued a court order declaring the deployment of defence forces in Buhera unlawful and ordered their withdrawal” (US State Department, 11 March 2010). In a presentation to the Commission of Inquiry into the 1 August 2018 shootings Tendai Biti cited several cases of litigation against the law enforcement agency. The cases cited were:

Chauke vs Mare is judgement number SC 147 of 2007... Eugenia Teera vs Minister of Defence. The citation is Harare 21 of 2007. And this case involved the plaintiff Mrs Teera suing the Zimbabwe National Army for the sum of \$70 000 for damages for paying shocking suffering and injury as a result of an unlawfully assault and assaults that was inflicted on her by

members of the National Army in Glenview and the judgment was handed down by Justice Hungwe. *Jestina Mukoko vs the Attorney General* the citation is SC 11/12... *Lillian Chinyerere vs Minister of Home Affairs* the citation is HC 11 969/2016... *Vaina Ndlovu and 5 others Vs Officer Mazarura and two others* the citation is GL467/472/15... *Sophia Tagwirei vs Officer in charge Triangle and two others* Chiredzi Magistrate Court the citation is GL184/2015... *Ellen Muteiwa vs Office in charge Masvingo province* and the citation is GHIL 208/15... *Getrude Changweshwa vs Officer in Charge Triangles and two others...* the Citation is GL 201/15... *Cynthia Fungayi Manjoro Vs Minister of affairs, Commissioner General of police and the Prosecutor General* and the case number HC, 2965/14. (Commission of Inquiry, 2018:1156-1158).

The above cases of litigation brings to the fore the fact that the people had moved from acceptance of police brutality to confronting brutality through the lenses of the law. In the case of *Jestina Mukoko* “the Constitutional Court unanimously concluded that the state through its agency had violated the applicant’s right protected in the Constitution, Section 13.1, Section 15 .1 and section 18.1 and therefore ordered a permanent stay of the prosecution” (Commission of Inquiry, 2018:1157). These litigations exposed the complicity of the government in torture and cruel treatment of citizens. The state was forced to pay damages for such criminal acts.

The MDC encouraged their members and supporters to boycott all businesses owned by the ZANU-PF leadership and those aligned to it. Parastatals were not spared from these boycotts. Members were encouraged to boycott products from Gushungo Dairies, a company owned by President Robert Mugabe and his family, ZUPCO, a government owned bus service, National Railways and Air Zimbabwe, the national airline among others. Consumer boycotts can be defined as “as a refusal to buy goods or patronize certain business undertaken by individuals in their role as consumers and citizens to effect political or social change” (Lee, 2012: 3).

Consumer boycotts can be equated to consumerism politics. “Regardless of whether political consumers act individually or collectively, their market choices reflect an understanding of material products as embedded in a complex social and normative context that can be called the politics behind products” (Micheletti, 2003a cited in Stolle *et al*, 2005: 247). Boycotts are used to show political disapproval and claim political rights through targeting businesses of the political elite. Consumer boycotts are a nonviolent political reciprocation to violence. Boycotts shows how citizens can use moral persuasion to voice political grievances. In this regard, MDC targeted influential companies linked to the political elite.

The MDC spokesperson Obert Gutu said “we need to hear ZANU-PF scream and as a democratic party we can only engage in peaceful resistance until it squeals. The MDC has come up with a programme in which we will call on all our supporters and generality of Zimbabweans to stop dealing and buying products from ZANU-PF-linked and owned businesses and their products” (*Newsday*, 18/08/2019). Gutu further commented that “when dealing with an entrenched dictatorship, we need to devise systems or programmes that make it scream. We should hit the regime where it hurts in the pocket. We are aware that most ZANU-PF functionaries have their tentacles in all the facets of the economy” (*Newsday*, 18/08/2019). Douglas Mwonozora, the MDC Secretary General, said “this target is passive. We are not going to buy in their shops. We are not going to do anything. We are not going to loot those shops, we are not going to harass them, we are not going to burn the shops. We are simply staying away from buying from these shops” (*VOA NEWS*, 24/06/2016).

Since 2000 the MDC has created a roll of honour of its members killed, tortured, kidnapped and abducted by ZANU-PF, its militia, soldiers, police and the CIO. This roll of honour represented democratic heroes

who were honoured for their fight for democratic change through nonviolence. Roll of honour exists in many nations affected by violence where nonviolent fighters are honoured and remembered. In Germany, Kurt Huber is honoured for his ability to influence students not to commit any act of violence and to persuade them to adhere to clear moral principles, a constitutional state and mutual trust among people. Huber maintained that doing so was not illegal, but a means to restore legality (Scholl, 2002a). In a memorial address to the nonviolent victims of Nazi rule in 1953 the German president said: 'the courageous death of these young people, who pitted integrity of mind and courage to voice the truth against empty rhetoric and the lie, became a victory at the moment when their life was cut off' (Scholl, 2002a).

Rolls of honours have become important events in commemorating heroes of the nonviolent struggles. The MDC website lists the names of the deceased and commemorations are held to honour the fighters. The key theme was to make sure that they did not die in vain and to show the sanctity of life and the importance of upholding virtue. During the Commission of Enquiry into the 1 August 2018 shooting of the civilians by the army, Tendai Biti presented a list of 3000 of what he termed "democratic resistance warriors" killed by the various government forces. Tendai Biti stated: "Mr Chairperson I have got a roll of honour. This list has got over 3000 people that we have lost over the years at the hands of ZANU-PF. Can I be allowed to submit the same as exhibit A" (Commission of Inquiry, 2018: 1152). The democratic warriors show the power and the force of nonviolent resistance. During the presentation, Tendai Biti attempted to show that despite violence perpetrated by the government, they never resorted to brute force but they soldiered on against the vice of violence.

A roll of honour is an attempt to embarrass the aggressor through showing the excesses of violence. It is a way of creating democratic heroes of the struggle. Roll of honours are nothing new. The ZANU-PF

government has its own at shrines in Chimoio and Nyadzonya and the tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the National Heroes Acre. The MDC, in this instance, was creating a nonviolent heroes list. In 2008 alone, the level of killing of MDC supporters forced ZANU-PF to accept a GNU following sustained pressure from the international community. The MDC-T continued to claim that approximately 200 other members and supporters were missing and presumed dead in the wake of election-related violence in 2008. The MDC youth's assembly on its website notes that:

The MDC roll of honour recognises the role played by all activists who passed away in the line of duty – fighting for democracy and a socially just Zimbabwe. Most on this list were murdered in cold blood, while other members passed away due to injuries sustained from violence. We recognise that we all did something for democracy, but others gave all. They are our heroes and heroines. We remember them. We salute them (<https://mdc-youthassembly.blogspot.com/p/roll-of-honor.html>).

The documentation of such atrocities mobilised the international community to put pressure on ZANU-PF to reform its rule and modus operandi.

The MDC resorted to boycotting national events to show their disapproval of Mugabe and the manner in which he ruled and allegedly killed its supporters. The then MDC spokesman, Nelson Chamisa, commented that “we will not wine and dine with murderers” (*The Zimbabwean*, 22/04/2008). These boycotts by the opposition were a dent on the legitimacy of Mugabe which he so wished to repeatedly assert. Tsvangirai boycotted the inauguration of Mugabe in 2002, and 2008 claiming that he had stolen the vote. MDC members of parliament also boycotted the official opening of parliament by President Mugabe. In 2018 they did not stand up for Mnangagwa in Parliament claiming that the elections were rigged. This was a nonviolent way of showing that they did not recognise the rule by Mnangagwa and Mugabe. Writing in *The Herald* Columnist

Reason Wafawarova opined that “firstly, the strategy of boycott politics itself does not really work in the context of Zimbabwean political culture, where ZANU-PF has never relied on endorsement of its success or victories by political opponents, a predicament largely emanating from the tenacious adherence to protest politics by the opposition” (*The Herald*, 22/05/2015). The MDC also threatened a policy of no reform, no election which was meant to force ZANU-PF to institute electoral reforms. During the GNU, Tsvangirai boycotted cabinet meetings and cut off communication with Mugabe. This was to force ZANU-PF to implement outstanding issues in the GNU.

The MDC used communication strategies as nonviolent tools against the blackout from state media which did not give the party media coverage. The MDC did not receive positive coverage from the state media namely *The Herald*, *The Chronicle*, *The Sunday Mail* and ZBC TV. Gilbert Nyambavhu asserted that “research has shown that, quite apart from being ‘passive receivers’ of media messages, listeners/viewers and readers actively mediate the communication process by interrogating encoded content and, very often, reject outright the influences of media propaganda” (*Nehanda Radio*, 20/12/2009). Attempts by various people to set up radio stations in Zimbabwe failed. In 2000, Mike Auret jnr and Gerry Jackson attempted to set up Capital Radio but failed to do so as the radio station was shut down before it went on air.

Pirate radio stations became the last resort as legal action against the government yielded nothing. Many people resorted to the pirate radio stations for news on the political goings on in the country and on MDC political programmes. Various MDC linked organisations distributed short wave radios to the people in the rural areas for them to receive pro-MDC messages. While these radios became an MDC identity in the rural areas, ZANU-PF members threatened those who were receiving information from pirate radio stations. Government Spokesperson

George Charamba equated the pirate radio stations to “media terrorism” (*Nehanda Radio*, 20/12/2009). In an interview with *SW Radio* Nelson Chamisa argued that “it was an ‘empty ban’: It’s laughable, ridiculous and misconceived. There is no way you can put effective ban on the hearing of people. You cannot put an effective ban on the ability of people to talk” (*SW Radio*, 20/02/3). The Co-Home Affairs Minister in the GNU, Theresa Makone, went on to say “I was very clear that airwaves are still restricted to other parties, that is why my party is distributing radios to our poor rural members...in the meantime the government will have its engineers verify that the radios are simple receivers” (*SW Radio*, 20/02/3). During the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe the ZANU resorted to broadcast from Maputo; the MDC did the same. *The Voice of Zimbabwe* radio became the communication and mobilisation tool during the liberation struggle. The MDC attempted to set a radio station in early 2000, however it was quickly shut down by the government.

Just like the Civil Rights movement in the USA whose songs such as “Keep Your Eyes on the Prize,” “This Little Light of Mine,” “Oh Freedom,” and “Ain’t Gonna Let Nobody Turn Us Around” which helped the civil rights movement, the MDC supporters recorded several songs which were used to convey the MDC messages. They were distributed for free at rallies and its offices countrywide. Songs like Famba Tsvangirai Famba (Go ahead Tsvangirai), Saddam Waenda Sare BOB (Saddam is Gone Next is Mugabe), Tsvangirai chikara Che ZANU (Tsvangirai, The Lion to ZANU-PF). These songs provided entertainment but with deep political undertones. They helped to prop the image of MDC and Tsvangirai. One of the popular MDC songs is handicheuke (I will never look back) by Paul Madzore. It is about consistency and pledging never to return to ZANU-PF.

Scholars have defined this form of resistance as creative cultural resistance. Nardine Bloch defines it as “the broad use of arts, literature,

and traditional practices to challenge or fight unjust or oppressive systems and/or power holders within the context of nonviolent actions, campaigns and movements” (Bloch, 2012a). The purpose of the MDC songs, dance and drama was to inspire others to face the dictatorship. Artists have been powerful conveyors of protest music which has helped mobilise support. The work of the MDC songs was akin to what music was during the liberation struggle. To the older generations of MDC supporters, music brought the spirit of Chimurenga back though this time without the gun. During the liberation struggle various musicians composed songs to mobilise people to join and support the struggle. Notable musicians of that time were Cde Chinx, Thomas Mapfumo, the LMG Choir and many others. Songs which were inspirational then were “Hokoyo’, ‘Pfumvu paruzevha, Tumira Vana Kuhondo by Thomas Mapfumo... ‘Nzira Dzemasoja’ guided the conduct of the guerrillas in the bush while Mtukudzi’s compositions were about people’s power, freedom and hope. He also did ‘Mutavara’, a song about a man bidding farewell as he leaves home to join the war.” (*The Patriot*, 1/10/2015). At various pungwes (Night vigils) around the country “the songs, war cries of the struggle, clearly defined the objectives of the liberation war. ‘Mukoma nhongo bereka sabhu tiende’, ‘Nyika yedu yeZimbabwe’, ‘Ruzhinji rwatsidza’, ‘Sendekera mukoma chakanyuka’ and ‘Emoyeni Kuyatshisa’ are some of the songs that were continuously sung and danced to by freedom fighters and the armed struggle” (*The Patriot* 1/10/2015). Under the prevailing circumstances of TV and radio black-out from the Zimbabwean government, the MDC music acted as the gun against black-out from radio stations. In fact, MDC musicians used music as a mobilising tool and for bonding during the years of violence under the ZANU-PF government.

This chapter delved into the furnishing of empirical evidence of the MDC nonviolent struggle against dictatorship. The major findings of the chapter are that, since 2000, MDC has been a victim of endemic and

systematic violence perpetrated by ZANU-PF. This violence was in different forms namely structural, direct and psychological. However, the MDC responded to the violence through gratuitous acts of peace. The MDC used various methods of nonviolent resistance such as songs, dance, strikes, mass mobilisation, rallies and radios to counter that. The MDC reflected the supremacy of peace in confronting and dealing with those who relied on might rather than brains. The next chapter critically explores the intractable linkages between nonviolent resistance and human security in Buhera South Constituency.

CHAPTER 7: HOW LACK OF HUMAN SECURITY AFFECTED DEVELOPMENT

This chapter critically explores the intractable nexus between human security and development in Buhera South Constituency. It analyses the various aspects of human security. The chapter unpacks how lack of human security affected development through the exploration of its various facets. Non-violent resistance has been a popular political instrument among the weaker subjects of the colonized and subjugated world for quite a considerable period. There is, however, limited understanding of what the politics of non-violent resistance entails by the ordinary person and what it is capable to achieve in the development of conflict-ridden states, a research lacunae which this research seeks to fill.

Political violence in Zimbabwe in general, and in Buhera South Constituency in particular, has highlighted a critical component of human security. While the old conception of human security centred on the centrality of the state in preserving the territorial integrity and sovereignty, this research will, however, conceptualise human security to mean the security of the individual. The UNDP narrowed down human security to include freedom “from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards” (UNDP, 1994: 22). The individual becomes the centrality of the developmental discourse. Most African states have a narrow-minded conception of human security which has, somewhat, led to the discourse of nationalist dictatorship. “Rather than providing security for their citizens, states are frequently the instruments that destroy the security of their populations” (Wilkin, 1999: 28). This nationalist dictatorship is predominantly the monopoly of liberation movements which view opposition political parties as threats to national security. Mugabe utilised this approach since 1980 to maintain a carefully oiled dictatorship which used disguised Pan Africanism to

maintain power. The “exclusion and deprivation of whole communities of people from the benefits of development naturally contribute to the tensions, violence and conflict within countries” (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 5).

Using the UNDP yardstick, human security encompasses the following elements: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security community security and political security (UNDP, 1994: 23). The study shows that human security was critically missing in Buhera South. The political violence led to widespread displacement and wholesale deprivations to the community. For the purposes of this study, “human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights” (UN General Assembly Resolution, 2012).

This study posits that the traditional concept of security has become an entrenched system of the Zimbabwe government. Mugabe had been a proponent of the traditional security discourse. The concept of human security has since evolved to encompass more than the liberation war meaning. While other states moved to post-Cold War security meaning, Mugabe held on to this definition and accused whoever challenged his authority with treason. Buhera became engulfed in this traditionalist sense of security. The violence in Buhera affected the development of the area. The International Peace Security Report (2004: 2) defined development as “... the processes and strategies through which societies and states seek to achieve more prosperous and equitable standards of living”. Traditional proponents of development skirted around the link between Human Security and development. However, this research argues that there is increasing convergence between human insecurity and development. The IPA Report (2004: 3) asserted that “there has been an increasing convergence in the strategies and activities of security and

development actors working in conflict-ridden countries, on the assumption that the challenges facing an unstable country need to be addressed in a holistic and integrated manner to achieve sustainable peace and long-term prosperity.”

Political violence in Buhera critically affected the livelihoods of the district, especially the material aspect of human security owing to deprivation, destruction and displacement of people. Since 2000, the Zimbabwean government ran different economic support initiatives throughout the country. The land reform programme, various farmer support schemes in the country such as farm implements scheme through the Farm Mechanisation scheme were some of the government initiatives. These government aided schemes were often hijacked for political ends. While these were government funded schemes, the new unwritten policy was that the implementation of government initiatives was to be done through the traditional chiefs, supervised by councillors who were ZANU-PF members and the local MP. From 2000- 2008 Buhera District had two constituencies whose MPs were ZANU-PF members, notably Kumbirai Kangai in Buhera South and Kenneth Manyonda in Buhera North. In 2008 the constituency was further divided into 4 constituencies. The MDC won two of the constituencies in 2008 and a few council seats. Thus, the majority of decision makers have largely been ZANU-PF.

Considering the above, there has been serious deprivations on sources of livelihood for most MDC members. The majority were denied access to farm inputs provided by the government because the traditional leaders were given strict instructions to ‘screen’ members of the opposition. In Ward 27, Buhera South, MDC members reported that the local leaders such as Mukanwa, Madziturira (late) and Silas Andudzai systematically deleted names of opposition members from the list of beneficiaries because of their links to the MDC. One respondent stated that “tainyimwa mbeu nekuti tiri veopposition

inopikisa hurumende yeZanu iri kutonga, chikafu ndeche ZANU-PF” (We were denied farming inputs because we are members of the opposition which opposes the ZANU-PF government. These inputs are for ZANU-PF members) (interview with a Participant 1 10/02/22). The conflation of the party and the state compromised the security and development of the people in Buhera. Buhera is one of the poorest districts in the country without resources. Farming is the only source of income for most. Income from farming helps in buying grain, paying school fees for kids and general upkeep of families.

During the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Farm mechanisation Scheme in 2008, implements such as ploughs, generators, planters and scotch carts, were given to the people. However, the distribution followed a familiar script. This time it was worsened by the fact that Chinotimba and Manyonda lost in Buhera South and North respectively. Despite their losses, they continued acting in their capacity as losing candidates to undermine elected MP’s. Naison Nemasziya the MP for Buhera South claimed that he was an MP in name and not in deed. The ZANU-PF structures in collusion with government workers undermined the MP. In an interview with a government employed Youth Officer, he claimed that “the country is governed by ZANU-PF, we will work through ZANU-PF system” (Interview with a Participant 2 22/02/22). The pronouncements from civil servants was expected considering that ZANU-PF, through the Ministry of Youth, clandestinely employed ZANU-PF youth members into the civil service after its electoral defeat in the 2008 elections.

Suspected MDC sympathisers in the Civil Service were often haunted out of office. Chokuda, the Headmaster of Murove Primary in Buhera South was killed during the 2002 elections. At the height of economic decline most teachers left their jobs for Chiadzwa diamond fields. The MDC youth who went to Chiadzwa set their bases there and hounded the ZANU-PF youths out of the fields. Where NGOs wanted to give

farming aid, ZANU-PF attempted to use its structures to deny members of the opposition. Georgina Godwin of SW Radio Africa commented that:

It is an open secret in Harare that on the Save the Children trucks you see people in ZANU-PF youth militia uniform. That goes on every day. Who is talking about it? You ring up all these aid agencies; they do not want to speak about it. It is a terrible thing and I believe they must surely take on board this responsibility. They are watching people starve whilst feeding other people. They need to do something about the people they cannot feed (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 20 May 2003: 8).

This seemed to be a common trend in Buhera South Constituency as the ruling party wanted to get political mileage from donated food stuffs. The major donor agencies in Buhera South were Christian Care, World Vision, and Catholic Relief Services (CRS). The ZANU leadership made sure that they were involved in at least one of the stages of either offloading or compiling names or maintaining order. There were reports of the leadership demanding kickbacks from beneficiaries and forwarding non-existent names and issuing out threats to aid workers (Interview with Participant 5 13/02/22). In Wards 27, 28 and 29 World Vision withdrew after realising the unfair practices mentioned above. The unwritten rule was that those who benefit from donors could also not benefit from the Ministry of Social Welfare, however, due to their proximity to power this provision was violated in some cases.

Health centres in Buhera became hotbeds of political activity. There was systematic concealment of victims through an attempt to abduct those who would have sought medical help in local health centres. At Muchuwa, Chapanduka, Muzokomba, and Mutusinzaza clinics many were denied access to health care due to their political connections. Health workers who attended to MDC violence victims were also at risk of victimisation. The family of Nyoka Mupango a veteran of the

MDC democratisation struggle alleges that upon his harassment and violent beatings during the 2008 run-off, the losing legislator Joseph Chinotimba whisked their badly injured father to Rusape without their knowledge where he eventually died. After the death of Mupango's father, Joseph Chinotimba forced ZANU-PF youth to bury the deceased without a post-mortem report (interview with Participant 5 13/02/22). In 2000 four teachers namely Mataruse, Muchena, Musoni and Chitura from different schools in Buhera South were beaten up and followed to host clinics where they were abducted for fear that they might get a police report which they could use to sue the culprits. After such an ordeal they were whisked away by their relatives to urban areas for treatment (interview with a Participant 7 /12/21).

Health became a security and development issue. The constituency was deprived of health security and other essential health-related amenities. Health is a critical component in the development discourse which enhances the security of citizen. This critique goes hand in glove with the UNDP (1994) and UN General Assembly (2012) which all but confirms that central to human security is treatment of citizens with dignity free from existential threats. Their right to dignity and freedom from violation has been systematically violated by the powers that be. In 2000, 2002 and 2008 Chapanduka clinic had a ZANU-PF base stationed right in its premises. One official said that "*mukuru we base Cde Wevhu akatitaurira kuti nyika ino inoti ZANU, tinoita musangano patinodira veMDC vakaita nharo tinoenda kuhondo kana kuuraya chaiko*", which is loosely translated into English as, "the ZANU-PF leader Comrade Wevhu told us that this country belongs to ZANU-PF and we do as we please, we are prepared to go to war against MDC and its supporters" (interview with Participant 12 10/11/21). In short, the health of those affected was not important but what mattered most was the political objective of attaining victory.

One critical aspect of the period under review was the lack of personal and community security. Many people in Buhera South were not secure as they were subjected to constant threats. The worst aspect was that all avenues for recourse were closed to the public. The judiciary and police became appendages of ZANU-PF. The MDC suffered the fate a pattern that once they got arrested for flimsy reasons then get denied bail at the courts. Instead of providing personal and community security, the police brutalised people for attending MDC rallies while the magistrate courts denied anyone accused of being MDC bail. In one instance the Human Rights NGO Forum reported that:

Buhera South 20 March 2008 Anti-riot Police reportedly assaulted MDC supporters who were attending a rally in Birchenough Bridge. The rally was being held close to where a ZANU (PF) rally was also being held. The police were apparently called in by the ZANU (PF) supporters on allegations that they were being provoked by the MDC supporters. There was a stampede of MDC supporters fleeing from the police, resulting in injuries. A male victim reports that he was beaten three times on the right hand and also lost his glasses during the chaos (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO, March 2008: 12).

This report is one of the many cases of personal and community insecurity in Buhera South. There was a systematic profiling of citizens and communities in political terms. Those classified as MDC bore the brunt of violence and deprivation. The communities were often deprived of government handouts such as farming inputs and food aid. Notable areas to be red-zoned as MDC strongholds such as Nyadi, Chapanduka, Kufakwatenzi, and Birchenough Bridge became hotbeds of violence (interview with Participant 15 10/12/21). In 2008, Sibamba was murdered in broad daylight to serve as a lesson for others not to be MDC members. Individuals who were seen as strong MDC supporters were forced to confess and repent at every rally held in the constituency. They would travel wherever ZANU-PF rallies were held. One of the victims who chose anonymity stated that “taidiwa kwese

kwaitwa rally to reurura pamberi pevanhu kuti ini ... ndakanga ndakarasika nekusapota MDC asi ikozvino ndadzoka kumusha kuZANU vehukama ndiregerereiwo" (I would go to each and every rally to confess that I was lost by supporting MDC but now I am back home in ZANU-PF, please forgive me for my sins). Usually this was followed by the burning of MDC regalia in front of the people (Interview with Participant 17 29/01/22).

In some instances, those who lived and worked in urban areas were also profiled as MDC supporters who were a bad influence to the villagers. Because of their perceived bad influence, they were not welcome in the villages. Communities with large numbers of MDC supporters were forced through their village heads to confess to their 'sins.' In most cases, village leaders were assigned powers to surrender their subjects who supported the MDC. In some instances, village political commissars were given powers to fire and expel teachers from their stations for being a bad influence to children and communities. Teachers were fired even during examination times. Most children went for long periods without teachers in some subject areas as the teachers were not easily replaced. In some instance, Ministry of Education officials prioritised the safety of their teachers more than the learners. The ZESN in its 2000 parliamentary report claimed that "it is reported that about 250 schools were closed and more than 6 000 teachers displaced by alleged war veterans on the grounds that some teachers supported opposition political parties" (ZESN, 2000: 28). While this report gives a countrywide view, the MDC estimates that at least 200 teachers were displaced in Buhera South constituency in between 2000 and 2008 as it was a hotbed of political violence (Interview with Participant 18 12/02/22).

Since the formation of the MDC various legal instruments came into place to forestall democratic participation. Legislation became a means

to stop and subvert democratic participation. Klingibel (2006: 1) avers that:

Security has fundamentally evolved in the international debate from a concept which focused on the stability of the state to a protective approach related to the individual... For the conceptual debates "human security" has become a key term. A constituent element of the concept of human security is the protection of people or individuals.

ZANU-PF, through the control of the legislature, hid behind the need to protect human security to enact such laws. Chief laws used post-2000, were the Public Order and security Act and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002) (AIPPA), respectively. Through AIPPA, newspapers and pirate radio stations were shut. It became a criminal offence in Buhera South to be seen moving around with independent newspapers or listening to the Voice of America's Studio 7 radio station. One notable feature of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) passed in 2002 was that it authorised police brutality. Section 29, subsection 2 of POSA gave the police or those assisting them the right to kill. It stated that "the police may use all necessary force to disperse an unlawful meeting in terms of other sections, and if a person is killed by the police - or any other person assisting them during dispersal - this killing shall be considered lawful" (The Solidarity Peace Trust, 2004: 11).

MDC members and supporters were victims of this legislation which subtly outlawed political activities. The then MP for Buhera South Constituency, Naison Nemadziya, claimed that in the run up to the 2008 runoff all MDC meetings were unofficially banned while activists went into hiding. His rallies at Nemadziya, Zangama, Mabhoko were called off due to non-clearance by the police. In some cases, MDC supporters arrived at rally venues only to see ZANU-PF youths and war veterans waiting for them and spoiling for a fight. This pattern degenerated to levels where MDC victims of violence would be arrested for allegedly attacking ZANU-PF members. Normally such

arrests would be executed after ZANU-PF officials rush report to file pre-emptive reports to the police against MDC members (interview with Participant 18 13/02/22). POSA required that meetings be booked four days in advance. This was a political ruse as it allowed enough time for the state repressive apparatus and ZANU-PF members to adequately to prepare counter measures against MDC planned rallies. The post 2000 period in Buhera South reinforced the argument by Brian Raftopoulos that "...it is quite clear that President Robert Mugabe's real strength is the coercion which comes out of the army and the liberation war veterans. He is using it to the full and the militarisation will be to his benefit even if the opposition does well in any election which might take place" (quoted in *The Independent* (UK), 12 April 2008).

In Buhera South Constituency, the military was a dominant factor in denying the people political security. The government led initiatives such as Operation Maguta and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe sponsored food schemes were all led by serving soldiers. These soldiers were permanently stationed in the rural areas with unspecified duties. The 8 wards in Buhera South had two serving soldiers each. The main aim was the intimidation of MDC supporters. After the 2008 harmonised elections which ZANU dismally lost, Colonel Mzilikazi and Major D Muchena, serving army officers, commanded the operation in Buhera South. The MDC Buhera South official claimed in 2008 at least 6 people were directly killed by the military during the 27 June 2008 run off period (interview with Participant 22 13/02/22).

Political security, an essential element of human security, was compromised during the period. The use of the army to subvert the people's rights was a re-enactment of the war time philosophy of the gun guaranteeing the vote. In 1976, it was declared that "...our votes must go together with our guns; after all any vote ... shall have been

the product of the gun. The gun that provides the votes, should remain its security officer, its guarantor” (Mugabe, 1981: 100). The military generals specifically gave directives to the soldiers. Addressing soldiers Martin Chedondo said:

The Constitution says the country should be protected by voting and in the 27 June presidential election run-off pitting our defence chief, Cde Robert Mugabe, and Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T, we should, therefore, stand behind our Commander-in-Chief. Soldiers are not apolitical. Only mercenaries are apolitical. We have signed and agreed to fight and protect the ruling party’s principles of defending the revolution. If you have other thoughts, then you should remove that uniform (The Herald, 31 May 2008).

In 2002 General Vitalis Zvinavashe issued the following statement which in earnest subverted the right to political security. He urged that:

Pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interest. To this end, let it be known that the highest office on the land is a ‘straightjacket’ whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people (SW Radio Africa Zimbabwe news, 2007).

In successive elections since 2000, ZANU-PF revived its war time ideology of night vigil as instruments of coercion. One respondent claimed that they had no choice but to go to the rallies or face public lashing. Most MDC supporters relied on the age old wisdom “chinonzi siya ndechiri mumaoko chiri mumoyo ndechekufa nacho” (innate characters can never be wished off). To make sure that die hard supporters voted for ZANU-PF it assisted suspected MDC supporters to vote (interview with Participant 32 16/02/22). Since 2000 the number of assisted voters increased. These were literate people who out of fear for their safety were assisted to vote by ZANU-PF officials

to ensure that ZANU-PF retained the vote. Intimidation, coercion, violence spiced up with nationalist rhetoric were the chief means used at election time to subvert the political will of the people.

As articulated by Mhanda (2005), “political power became the dominant social good, and those in control of it have a control of a whole range of other goods in society”. At local level the District, Ward and cell leadership clearly understood this philosophy. The benefits to them ranged to corrupt allocation of stands at Murambinda growth point, Mutiusinazita shopping centre and Muzokomba shopping centre. They also shared government provided aid such as maize and maize seeds. During the Farm mechanisation programme, they took farming implements such as ploughs, scotch carts, hoes and even generators. Political power became a tool for corruption that ZANU-PF and its supporters did with impunity. They felt any loss of power would result in loss of privileges to them. They worked hand in glove to suppress political rights with the national and provincial leadership.

The executive arm of government curtailed the political security of Zimbabwe. This cascaded down to the constituencies as the warship of leaders became an albatross on the country’s march towards democracy. The primary objective of the state created by Mugabe was a complex web of independent institutions serving and advancing the interests of ZANU-PF. Thus the government became a de facto one-party state. The judiciary, executive, legislature, electoral commission, security services, media and other independent commissions were under the armpit of Mugabe for the sole purpose of advancing his political interests. Sachikonye, (2003: 99) observed that “ZANU-PF...uses coercive instruments of the state to expedite its own purposes of monopolising power while denying political rights and opportunities to other groups to compete for that power”.

One notable feature of the period under study is that Buhera South's MDC members became victims of coordinated extortion orchestrated by members of the ZANU-PF youth league and war veterans. Often times MDC supporters were forced to pay 'fines' at rallies in form of livestock to the base commanders. Many have claimed that they lost goats, sheep and to some extent cattle as payment to the leaders for their alleged support of the MDC. Some of the livestock taken were slaughtered at rallies or bases to feed the leadership. One elderly MDC supporter claimed that he lost 4 goats as punishment for his sons' support for the MDC. He claimed that he paid out of fear of further harm from the 'commanders' (Interview with Participant 23 13/02/22). This was not an isolated case but rather one of the many cases which went unreported to the police. In fact, most claim that it was of no use to report matters to the police as the police were fearful of retribution from political leaders. Most youth were promised land in return for supporting ZANU-PF. In ward 28 and 26 many reported that the youth members invaded their lands with the help of ZANU-PF cell leaders. However, this did not fully materialise as the village heads resisted these moves since communal lands were under their jurisdiction.

A key feature of violence and human security during the period under study is the violation of fundamental human rights. Women and girls were victims of sexual violation at the pungwes (night vigils). Rape was used as an instrument of exerting authority on women. Some reported that they were sexually abused during night vigils led by ZANU-PF youths and were often vulnerable because there was no recourse to justice (Interview with Participant 22 15/02/22). The normalisation of such cases of sexual abuse is reminiscent of the struggle years where women were referred to as "warm blankets" by commanders as reported by Fay Chung (Chung, 2006: 126).

This chapter has comprehensively canvassed the concept of human security and development. This concept is the central aspect of development. It critically exposes how peace is a prerequisite to development. In the case of Buhera South Constituency, the failure to develop in the period under review can be attributed to the prevalence of violence during the period under review. Violence led to displacements, death, forced migrations and the general decline in economic output. Violence disrupted livelihood activities thereby affecting development. In areas such as Buhera with less economic resources, the disruption of the agriculture which is the backbone of their economy also affected income levels and food security. The next chapter will focus on the impact of nonviolent resistance on human security and development.

CHAPTER 8: THE IMPACT OF THE ADOPTION OF NON-VIOLENCE RESISTANCE

This chapter critically analyses the impact of violence and nonviolent resistance on human security and development. The attempt by the MDC to use nonviolent resistance as a political strategy received mixed results on human security and development. Nonviolence served the MDC, its allies and supporters. The MDC failed to harness their doctrine in internal democratic practices. The MDC used nonviolence as a political strategy against ZANU-PF but failed the same in their internal disputes, the deep-seated factionalism in MDC showed their belief in violence to settle political scores.

The success of nonviolent resistance as a political strategy hinges on proper training of members for the use of the same. At various fora and campaign platforms the MDC preached self-restraint and non-violence. However, evidence has shown that nonviolent resistance as a political strategy was used as political rhetoric rather than a pragmatic political action. Gene Sharp (2005: 08) in his seminal writings has emphasised the importance of training to would-be nonviolent practitioners. Evidence has shown that MDC did not and does not have a practical working manual for its supporters. As Sharp (2005: 8) argues, “Non-violent struggle is identified by what people do, not by what they believe”. The MDC leadership preaching on nonviolence were discordant with what their members believed in; some felt that violence should be dealt with in equal force. In Buhera South Ward 27, the general belief of the members was that they should meet violence with violence. MDC members arrested in the run up to the June 27 2008 presidential run off grouped themselves against the ZANU-PF members. MDC supporters were arrested due to the ensuing violence. The MDC splits in 2005 and 2013, respectively, were fuelled by ideological differences among the top leadership. In 2005 the party split due to a contested vote on whether the party should participate in

the reintroduced Senate. Tsvangirai lost the Executive Council vote and declared a split of the party. In 2014 after the party lost the 2013 elections the party split with one faction going along with Tenadi Biti the then Secretary General while Morgan Tsvangirai retained the larger faction of the MDC. After each split there were accusations of violence which showed that the MDC leadership and supporters were inclined towards violence. The MDC splits in 2005, 2014 and 2018 have shown the worst of the MDC violence. Various MDC leaders were brutalised during the factional disputes. Welshman Ncube, Trudy Stevenson and Job Sikhala were brutalised in 2005, while Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma suffered the same in 2014 and in 2018 Thokozani Khupe became a victim at the hands of MDC supporters. Thus, there were contradictions in the official MDC position and internal political practices. The MDC failed to match rhetoric with practice. There was internal rupture in the MDC party. In 2005, 2008 and 2018 primary elections violence erupted between supporters of different MDC factions. Rampant factionalism in 2018 resulted in violence in Birchenough Bridge, Nyadi and Chapanduka business centre pitting the supporters of Mabika and Mudisi who were vying for the same Parliamentary seat against each other.

The MDC lacked a comprehensive working manual to achieve its nonviolent resistance. This created ambiguity in that no decisive practical actions were taught to the multitude of its supporters. In fact, the approach reflected an elite nonviolent plan where the elite preached nonviolence while the masses were left to their own devices. The success of nonviolent resistance hinges on several steps:

The first step to success in any nonviolent campaign is clearly articulated goals/objectives. These goals must be unanimous, achievable and must consider the strengths and weaknesses of the opponents. The goals help streamline, guide and secure the activities and interest of the supporters. Once the goal(s) have been set, we must proceed to select the appropriate strategies however, it is important to consider the context in which it would be applied. Strategies are very important to nonviolent struggles because it

involves a detailed articulation of the actions that would be executed in order to achieve the goals and objectives of the struggle. Nonviolent methods must be evaluated in terms of goals, effectiveness, legitimacy and appropriateness to achieve success. (Musarurwa, 2016: 140).

Due to lack of a working manual, there was no clear communication to successfully execute the nonviolent resistance. Research brought to the fore the fact that there was no working manual for practising nonviolent resistance in Buhera South Constituency. Party supporters highlighted that Tsvangirai had preached peace, therefore there was no need to be violent towards ZANU-PF supporters. In short, there was no clear and consistent pattern of disseminating information to the supporters and also between the supporters and the oppressors. Supporters of the revolution must have a clear understanding of the goals and objectives of their struggles and must be able to articulate it to other people especially external parties.

Since 2000, the MDC made repeated calls for dialogue with ZANU-PF. The local systems were initiated to create lasting relations in the constituency. Human security is also about creating synergies in communities to advance shared developmental goals. The communities were used to working together in local ventures such as *nhimbe* where communities pool resources together for draught power or weeding. However, the violence within the communities strained relations thereby creating a politically polarised society. It should be noted that violence was pervasive during election time and soon after loud calls for unity, forgiveness and dialogue were initiated.

However, the calls for dialogue were often spurned as ZANU-PF accused the MDC and its leadership of being puppets of the West. The local war veterans who were champions of violence spurned all efforts for inter-party collaboration alleging that working with puppets was a non-starter. There were also different ideological underpinnings of the

political parties. ZANU-PF's revolutionary zeal and its hard stance on land created an untenable position in the relationship of the parties. The talks in 2002 failed because of the intransigent positions of the two parties. In 2004 Tsvangirai wrote:

To the new ZANU-PF leadership, I welcome you with the same old message. I am still holding out the olive branch. An opportunity for a rapid turnaround of our fortunes is still possible. Zimbabwe requires a soft landing. May I call, once again, for a search for a political solution before it is too late. We must check our national transition to realise a win-win situation. There is no way out of the crisis ... we remain deeply concerned that the grass is now so dry that any form of carelessness, in particular within the next two to three months, could lead to an inferno (*Daily Mirror*, 8 December 2004).

The dialogue offers were completely spurned by Mugabe and his party. The ZANU-PF strategy during the dialogue offers was to show bravado and pseudo machoism in the face of worsening economic and political crises. Kriger opines that:

Organised violence and intimidation of the opposition, albeit of varying intensity, has been a recurrent strategy of the ruling party before, during and after elections to punish constituencies that dared oppose it. ... Besides coercion, ZANU (PF) has also engaged in a political discourse that demonises its key opponents as reactionary, subversive, and often stooges of whites and/or foreigners (Kriger, 2005: 2).

ZANU-PF's *modus operandi* in Buhera South Constituency and, arguably, in other constituencies as well, was to portray the MDC as a sell-out outfit. It was a strategy which had been effective before. This created a difficult position for even the ruling party to embrace dialogue despite the overtures. Between 2000 and 2005 dialogue did not materialise. The ZANU-PF party preferred to talk directly to Tony Blair "puppet master". In 2005 Mugabe claimed that:

Today we tell all those calling for such ill-conceived talks to please stop misdirecting their efforts. The rest of the world knows who must be spoken to. In case they do not, we tell them here at Heroes' Acre that the man to be spoken to to make him see reason resides in Number 10 Downing Street.

This is the man to speak to and those at Harvest House [the MDC headquarters] are no more than his stooges and puppets. What does it pay us to speak to them? We would rather speak to the principal (*The Herald*, 9 August 2005).

Mugabe thereby entrenched the regime's apparatus against opponents. The political culture was reinvented to suit the liberation narrative. Despite this little acknowledgement of the MDC Tsvangirai pushed for dialogue in the national interest. The only platform from which the parties met and discussed issues of national importance was parliament. In 2007, dialogue processes began centred on the constitution making process. The Kariba draft became a defacto constitutional arrangement for the two parties. There was also an agreement on the road map to the 2008 elections. While the 2008 March elections were generally peaceful, ZANU-PF resorted to violence in the run up to the 27 June run off after sensing imminent defeat.

Despite the seemingly antagonistic position of the two parties, they later on agreed to the GNU and the constitution-making process. The major problem which affected the dialogue process from 2000 was the dominant hegemonic nature of ZANU-PF (Barnes, 2004). The 2008 dialogue, dubbed, 'talks', resulted in the Global Political Agreement and power sharing between ZANU-PF and MDC. The dialogue and agreement led to the thawing of relations as parties started to acknowledge each other. The GNU and the constitution making process had teething problems from the onset. Apparently, the mediators from SADC notably Thabo Mbeki, the then President of South Africa had been wearied by the Zimbabwean problems such that he was in a rush to find a solution to the decade long problem. The imperfections of the GNU agreement left it to manipulation by the 'gun holding' ZANU-PF. The economic meltdown which reached an unprecedented rock bottom in 2008 pushed the antagonistic parties to set aside their differences and work together. The message by Mugabe

in 2008 was consistent with his messages from the liberation era. The wartime declarations dating back to the Sikombela Declaration in 1965 (Madenga, 2016: 124) glorified war and guaranteed the supremacy of the gun.

Violence and accusations of being sellouts had become the norm in the life of the MDC. Due to the prevalence of violence, the MDC gave dialogue a chance to end the carnage from ZANU-PF. In fact, the GNU and the Unity Accord were products of the ZANU-PF political carnage. The message from Tsvangirai in 2008 became a message of peace, bringing hope to the economic downtrodden. His argument was that the road to the Zimbabwean state house should and must not be littered with dead bodies of innocent Zimbabweans.

The GNU successfully ended political violence against the MDC members. In Buhera South, the GNU created apprehension amongst MDC and ZANU-PF supporters as the former took it as an opportunity to retaliate against the atrocities perpetrated against them by the later by agreeing to work with the MDC. Mugabe managed to end the political hostility between the parties. The puppetry tag used on MDC by ZANU-PF disappeared from ZANU-PF politicians. Article X of the GNU provided for:

[T]he right to canvass and freely mobilise for political support is the cornerstone of any multi-party democratic system, the Parties have agreed that there should be free political activity throughout Zimbabwe within the ambit of the law in which all political parties are able to propagate their views and canvass for support, free of harassment and intimidation (The GPA, 2008: 13).

While cases of violence were reported from 2009, they were relatively rare. The level of intimidation considerably subsided. The MDC however faced violence from the security services. The army became an active player in both ZANU-PF and national politics. ZANU-PF used food aid as a weapon against perceived MDC supporters in the rural

areas. The Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) reported that “food and other forms of aid continue to be used as a weapon to cow members of the public to submit or confirm allegiance to ZANU (PF) and that many non-ZANU (PF) members were denied farming inputs.” (*The Zimbabwean*, 12/2/2010).

The GNU in Buhera South gave a reprieve amongst MDC supporters as they managed to coexist with the ZANU-PF supporters without the threat of violence. In fact, when Tsvangirai and Mugabe began working together the residents of Buhera South constituency notably ZANU-PF supporters came to realise that they had been used against their relatives while the person they were fighting for (Mugabe) was now dining with the supposed puppet. Many MDC supporters who had deserted their villages and work stations trooped back to their villages. Those who came back were reunited with families and began working for the development of their families. In schools, teachers who had also deserted workstations returned and the education sector was resuscitated.

The belief among the MDC leadership was that the national constitution-making process was a panacea to creating a just society primed on liberty equality and fraternity. The MDC argued that the first stage in human security is creating institutions which respect human values. Most thought the constitution-making process would create strong independent institutions to stop violence. Their key demands in the new constitution were aimed at restoring the fundamental values of the liberation struggle and initiating a process of democratic transformation in Zimbabwe. Since its formation the MDC has been key in demanding a people driven constitution through the NCA. Since 1999 the NCA was a de facto constitutional making body of the MDC. In 1999 it held consultations throughout the country in preparation for its draft constitution. This civic constitutional making process was however overshadowed by the government sponsored

Constitutional Commission which came up with the 2000 draft Constitution. Through spirited campaigns the MDC and the NCA sponsored the No vote against the draft Constitutional Commission Constitution in February 2000.

From 2000, the MDC vigorously campaigned for a people-driven constitution. It opposed the Lancaster House Constitution and condemned the various amendments by ZANU-PF. These amendments were seen as self-serving and undemocratic. In 2007 the MDC clandestinely agreed on the Kariba draft with ZANU-PF. This agreement put the party on collision course with its civil society partners notably the NCA led by Lovemore Madhuku. The agreement showed that the MDC was negating on principles of its foundation. Even though it failed to see the day it also reflected on the undemocratic nature of the movement. During the GNU the MDC and ZANU-PF agreed and worked together crafting the 2013 Zimbabwe constitution. Civil Society leaders particularly the NCA, argued that the MDC actions were an “act of treachery” (*The Zimbabwe Times*, 26/09/07). The ZCTU protested that “We opposed Amendment Number 17 last year (2006) that established the senate. Now number 18 has increased the seats of the Senate to 93. Why should we support it now?” (*Financial Gazette*, 28/09/07). This showed that the MDC was deviating from the core of its constitution writing principles.

While at national level the MDC was advocating for a new constitution, the party failed to uphold its own constitutional values. The MDC leader disregarded internal democratic elections which led to splits in 2005 and 2014. The splits led to violence amongst party youths and those seen as renegades. In 2005, Trudy Stevenson was violently attacked by party youths aligned to Tsvangirai. There was a sense in the MDC that violence was acceptable within its structures to solve political problems. Disagreements attracted labelling which often led to violence. This became a political survival tactic by Morgan Tsvangirai

despite enjoying popular support from the grassroots. Other members of the MDC attacked for disagreeing with Tsvangirai were Tendai Biti, Elton Mangoma and Job Sikhala.

The trend of violence and unconstitutional usurping of political power also continued with the coming in of Nelson Chamisa as the MDC president upon the death of Morgan Tsvangirai. Firstly, Tsvangirai unconstitutionally and unilaterally appointed two vice presidents Nelson Chamisa and Elias Mudzuri outside congress. Secondly upon Tsvangirai's death, Chamisa unconstitutionally took over power sidelining the elected Thokozani Khupe from the presidency. Those opposed to Chamisa were either violently silenced or expelled from the party. The above shows the pretentious constitutionalism of the MDC.

The MDC utilised legal challenges to resist the oppressive rule in Zimbabwe. From its formation, the MDC relied on the interpretation of the law whenever aggrieved. In 2000 the MDC challenged the parliamentary results and won in the High Court, however, appeals by the ZANU-PF member quickly dented the MDC celebrations. In a clear travesty of justice, no judgement has been delivered up to date for the 2002 election appeal against Mugabe victory. Whenever unfavourable judgements were passed against ZANU-PF, Mugabe threatened the judiciary with unspecified action. In 2005 Mugabe urged ZANU-PF members to act as if nothing had happened despite a court ruling. He said, "I don't understand the court's decision. We can't be held to ransom by a man who is in prison. That is absolute nonsense. We will study the decision and appeal against it. He (Bennett) has a case to answer. Rambai muchienderera mberi (Proceed as if nothing has happened). Rwendo runo tinoda kutsvaira (This time around we are determined to sweep every seat.)" (*The Herald*, 17/04/2005). As a result of such threats, the judge was forced to suspend his own judgement because of political interference (Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, 11/2005: 11).

The MDC utilised the justice system to fight the oppressive government machinery which apparently was in collusion with ZANU-PF to stifle democratic processes. The party approached the High court contesting the outcome of the 2000 Parliamentary election results. The victory it scored was short-lived following appeals by ZANU-PF to the Supreme Court. Mugabe and the war veterans resorted to hounding Judges deemed unfavourable to them out office, notable among them, Justice Gubbay. In fact, violence was imported from the political field to the judiciary. The MDC also spent considerable time in courts with disgruntled party members. This created multiple focus areas in its political fights. The MDC often argued that the courts are captured by the ZANU-PF regime however it became a paradox when the party went to the same courts for adjudication.

Political insecurity created a demand for security sector reforms. The vagaries of political violence led by the security service threatened development and human security. Since 2000 the MDC had been calling for security sector reforms. Their rallying call was that members of the security sector particularly the army and the CIO should either stay in barracks or join politics fulltime. These calls failed to depoliticise the army because most of the senior members of the military were war veterans whose allegiance was to ZANU-PF first and the nation second. There is the need to “train and educate both the security personnel and the ordinary citizens on issues of governance, security sector reforms and the dangers of authoritarian rule. Furthermore, there is a “strong call for partnership with the media in promoting the concept of security sector reforms” (Sharp, 2003).

The MDC failed to influence the security sector reforms both in and outside government. Mugabe flatly refused tampering with the security sector which left the army and the CIO fully controlled by ZANU-PF. There was also fear of the military by the ordinary people. The army

actively campaigned for ZANU-PF in the elections since 2000 and it carried out various operations in the rural areas whose main motive was to canvass for support for the ruling party. There was need for training and education of both the ordinary people and the army to achieve the desired reforms. Musarurwa (2016) opines that:

The training must clarify on the continuous significance between the liberation struggle and the security sector reform. It must come out clean that it will not eradicate that part of the history... In order for security forces to change the way they view themselves and the nexus between them and the ruling party, demonstrates the need to transform their mind-sets through intensive training or education on sector reform. This kind of training will eradicate the wrong misconceptions that they have about this noble cause of security sector reforms.

The MDC failed to come up with a proper security reform manual to help them achieve transformative peace building. On his part, Mugabe rewarded the security sector with trinkets and appointments in crucial government portfolios. The army was key and instrumental in ZANU-PF politics as Constantino Chiwenga regarded it as the stockholders of the revolution.

Since 2000 the MDC has managed to internationalise and create a legitimacy crisis for ZANU-PF. The internationalisation of the Zimbabwean politics has become a nonviolent tool for political change. In the initial years of MDC formation ZANU-PF resorted to uncouth violent politics claiming to preserve liberation war gains. The MDC international campaigns yielded results as the violence was drastically reduced. Machaya (2016) opined that “continued systematic use of violence, intimidation and rigging has run its full course and there is no way a government that continues to rely on unorthodox means to retain power can continue to enjoy ‘widespread acceptance’ both internally and externally”. While the violence of the 1980s and the 1990s worked in its favour, the years after 2000 witnessed a drastic change in the world view of international politics. The violence during

the land reform and the election period in 2000 and 2002 clearly alienated ZANU-PF from international sympathisers. This resulted in the imposition of sanctions against ZANU-PF officials and some state enterprises.

ZANU-PF even attempted to seek "legitimacy through the back door by approaching the General Court of the European Union seeking the invalidation of the sanctions imposed by the EU" (SW *Radio* 17/06/2014). As pointed out by Weber "the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige" (Weber, 1964: 382). While people had faith in ZANU-PF prior to 2000 because of tradition, the charisma of Mugabe and some level of liberation trust in the past, the post 2000 period clearly marked the dwindling support base for ZANU-PF. The ZANU-PF leadership had not anticipated this development, hence they resorted to violence to maintain their stranglehold on power. Even though it constantly won elections from 2000, the fact that the victories were questioned was a major cause for concern. The various reports from election observers also dented ZANU-PF credibility requirements. In the long run the lack of legitimacy forced ZANU-PF into a negotiated settlement with the MDC which it had long loathed as puppets of the West.

In politics, power and governance legitimacy is crucial for acceptance by both internal and external groups. Between 2000 and 2017 Mugabe ruled with authority but lacked legitimate power. In the same vein Mnangagwa has used authority at the expense of legitimacy in his rule. Legitimacy shows that the basis and foundation of any government power come from the electorate. In the intervening period the lack of legitimacy became the basis of violence as ZANU-PF coerced people to support its rule. However, this failed to hold in the long run as ZANU-PF was forced to tone down its hard line stance to accommodate MDC.

It was also forced to make concessions which it could not have done. In Leslie Green's view "Coercion threats provide secondary, reinforcing motivation when the political order fails in its primary normative technique of authoritative guidance" (Green, 1988: 75). Through electoral violence, intimidation and coercion ZANU-PF failed the legitimacy test, thus it was not internationally accepted. Accounts that emphasize political participation or political influence regard a political decision as legitimate if it has been made in a process that allows for equal participation of all relevant persons. MDC managed to play the legitimacy card as opposed to responding through violence, the international community through election observers failed to acknowledge the electoral victories of ZANU-PF. In the 2002, 2008 and 2018 elections, the majority of the observers were not satisfied with the way elections were conducted in Zimbabwe.

In the 2018 elections, the MDC raised irregularities during the voting process which dented the ZANU-PF victory. President Mnangagwa's reign has also been hampered by a legitimacy crisis. In a Workers Day, address the MDC Vice President Welshman Ncube said that:

The nation must just unite to fight a single battle which is the illegitimacy crisis of the current government led by Mnangagwa. To that end, I want to reiterate that Mnangagwa's all other efforts to restore economic prosperity will not succeed as long as the legitimacy crisis of this country that was given birth by stolen elections last year is not resolved. Mnangagwa must set aside all the other efforts and sit down with Chamisa to resolve this illegitimacy crisis. That is the only way things can start moving and that is the only way the other hardships, especially the economic problems can be put to rest (*Pindula News*, /2019/05/03).

The MDC utilised the courts through a Constitutional Court application to challenge the 2000, 2002 and 2018 elections. While the courts action failed politically the exposed the irregularities in the manner in which the whole electoral process was carried out. They managed to delegitimise Mugabe and Mnangagwa's victory. In the end

the EU also noted with grave concern the eruption of violence and occurrence of serious human rights violations following the peaceful election of 30 July 2018. "These tragic events stand in sharp contrast to the high hopes and expectations for a peaceful, inclusive, transparent and credible election in Zimbabwe" (*The Zimbabwe Independent*, 10/08/2018).

The MDC managed to work with various Civil Society groups to document and amplify ZANU violence and atrocities in the country. The civil society groups became the voice of the people in the face of political polarisation. The NGO's were grouped under the banner of the Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe (CCZ) which collectively lobbied the international community to aid Zimbabweans suffering from state sponsored violence. The CCZ draws:

Its membership draws from churches, women's groups, social movements, residents' associations, labour unions, human rights lawyers, teachers' groups and health professionals...The organization's vision is to see a democratic Zimbabwe, and believes civil society has a critical role to play in nurturing and sustaining a culture of respect for principles and values of good governance, openness and accountability within Zimbabwean society. To this end, it enjoyed international attention as one of Zimbabwe's biggest and most vocal pro-democracy advocacy groups in the country (*Crisis in Zimbabwe*, 2005).

The civil society became the backbone of societal transformation in terms of rights, amplifying the voice of the common man as well providing the much needed developmental relief. Most people in the rural areas used organisations such as the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human rights to fight unjust police brutality, getting restitution from violence perpetrators. This served as a message to would be violence sponsors. In ward 27 in Buhera South, Julius Chivandire successfully reclaimed his goats taken as punishment for supporting the MDC during the 2008 June 27 runoff. This opened the floodgates for further action by MDC supporters. While some could not get the desired

results however it also lessened the scourge of violence in the 2003 and 2018 elections.

From its formation the MDC enjoyed widespread support across the country. Results of the 2000 parliamentary elections showed that the party enjoyed popular support across the country. In 2000 the following rural seats went to the MDC Seke, Mhondoro, Chimanimani, Chipinge North, Mutare North, Mutare South, Mutasa, Nyanga, Gweru Rural, Silobela, Bikita West and 13 seats in rural Matabeleland. This was despite the fact that there was political violence which claimed 30 lives, over 100 people were injured, and at least 6500 were displaced and substantial damage was caused to property. However, in the following elections the trend drastically changed as most people began voting for ZANU-PF largely because of the prevalence of violence instigated by ZANU-PF. The MDC however continued to preach peace in the face of atrocities committed by ZANU-PF.

Nonviolent resistance has failed as a political tool for change to bring the rural vote to the MDC. The MDC has repeatedly failed to canvass support due to the prevalence of the Militia in most rural areas. The failure of the MDC to gain political power has been attributed mostly to success of ZANU-PF intimidation in rural areas. Buhera South was used by ZANU-PF as an outpost of violence. The rural population was easy to control because of the nature of their old and traditional system in which village heads are prominent political players. ZANU-PF deliberately elevated village leaders such as Chiefs to de facto political players and mobilisers. The chiefs were used in registration of people for drought relief along political party lines. As a result, there were many cases where MDC members were victimised and failed to get drought relief unless they denounced their membership. During voting, the village heads were required to monitor the voting patterns off their subjects in the 2008 elections. The rural voters were required to submit their voters slip serial numbers to the Chiefs, village Heads

or ZANU-PF party agents. The *Newzimbabwe.com* website reported that:

The pattern of suspicious numbers of assisted voters was first observed in the 2013 elections which were won overwhelmingly by ZANU-PF. Those who were assisting the voters were a group of known ZANU-PF activists who walked in and out of the polling station... To make a circus of the process, voters, including those who were claiming to be illiterate, would later be required to append signatures onto a separate polling station book, something which they did free of any hassles. Further investigations revealed that ZANU-PF had a well-choreographed voting system in which traditional leaders dragged dozens of their people to station some 500 metres outside polling centres. The chief would release his people in batches to go and vote in a particular order. In some cases, ZANU-PF used headmen as polling agents. Their job was to ensure the people who were told to ask for assistance comply with the instructions and follow the order. "At Chireya primary school in Mashonaland East, headmen Michael Tupe, Simon Ruvura and Givemore Nehurambe were ZANU-PF polling agents," said ZPP. According to the poll based NGO, Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), this was more marked in ZANU-PF stronghold rural Mashonaland areas. In 2013, some 97 voters out of 370 were assisted to vote at one polling station in Muzarabani, 77 out of 374 at a second station and 85 out of 374 at a third station. In Muzarabani North, more than half of the 17 400 voters were assisted. (*NewZimbabwe.com*, 15/03/2019).

ZANU-PF shifted its ideological position from open violence to smart intimidation which was difficult to prove. MDC members were victims of this structural violence carried out in the rural areas. MDC doctrine of nonviolence failed to help the party gain votes and traction in the rural areas. Attempts by the MDC to protest to ZEC against these anomalies failed because the electoral body distanced itself from that by arguing "If at all these things happened then they happened outside our polling stations and in that case we had no jurisdiction over them. All those who were not able to vote on their own due to illiteracy or physical impairment were allowed to bring trusted persons of their choice to assist them for as long as those helpers were above 18 years of age" (*NewZimbabwe.com*, 19/03/2019).

One critical finding of the study is that human security is compromised in areas affected by violence. This therefore retards human development. Findings showed deep deprivation of basic life necessities. A notable finding is that most were deeply affected in agricultural production and therefore food security. While Buhera South is in agriculture region five, the MDC supporters were even further exposed to hunger as they could not access inputs. The adoption of nonviolent resistance reduced the spread and virulence of political violence against MDC supporters. Since 2009 the MDC members were not victims of direct violence, but of structural violence. They were left out in in most government funded economic activities such as agricultural support schemes and cooperatives funded by the government departments. Those who got support did so mostly through relatives in government. Most members have accepted that the government will not come to their rescue because of their political affiliation.

In the thesis, the level of insecurity was felt because “human security connects different types of freedoms – freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf. To do this, it offers two general strategies: protection and empowerment. Protection shields people from dangers” (Annan, 2003a). This lack became a common occurrence to the MDC supporters and leadership as “it requires concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities. Empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision making. Protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing, and both are required in most situations” (Annan, 2003a). MDC members were grossly disenfranchised economically and politically.

In some instances, due to insecurity there was a problem of refugees migrating to South Africa for protection. The violence of 2000, 2002 and 2008 drove many young people to neighbouring countries for

security reasons. The most common destination was South Africa, only a few preferred to go to Mozambique and Botswana. One elderly parent lamented the breakdown of his family as the children who left have vowed never to come back unless there is a change of government. He lamented that “vana vangu varamwa nyika zvese neni baba vavo, vakasiya vati hatidzoki kusvika nyika yanaka yave nehutongi huzere” that can be translated to mean (my children have deserted both the country and the family, they have vowed never to come back unless the government changes) (interview with MDC AY official 13/02/22). Security is a political issue which requires the political will of a political society and an entity. The issue of displacement as opined by Baysoy (2018: 21) shows that “in this sense, security is not safety. It refers to a situation and an act in which a political society is secure physically and mentally”.

Nonviolent resistance is a panacea for development and human security. It shields supporters against violent opponents. It saves society from open and total destruction. The MDC scored notable successes in the struggle for democracy and democratisation in Zimbabwe. It has been noted that the success of nonviolent resistance is not measured by ballot success but the influence which it has on the people and the impact on the lives of the people. The approach helped to amplify the struggle in Zimbabwe. The MDC approach helped in transforming conflict in Buhera South. It reduced the levels of direct violence, however the MDC members remained victims of structural violence and inequalities. Thus, while violence subsided, oppression and disempowerment continued. The next chapter provides the summary, recommendations and conclusions of the thesis.

CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter summarises key arguments and conceptual threads advanced in this thesis regarding the adoption and implementation of non-violent resistance as a political strategy and normative ideology by the MDC in Buhera South Constituency.

It is clear from the findings of the study that the predicament of systematic violence Zimbabwe faces is partly as a result of the residual effects a long history of colonialism coupled with the unfinished problems of decolonization. The chapter also argues that the 1980 reconciliation programme advanced by Mugabe left a myriad of unresolved issues and was rushed without due regard to the problematic nature of state building. The independent government which came into being in 1980 failed to undo the legacy of colonialism through legal reforms and social reforms. This created a complex problem for opposition political parties. Finally, the chapter stresses the need for the adoption of nonviolent resistance to achieve lasting peace and development. In other words, nonviolent resistance is the panacea for human security and development.

The research has sought to advance new frontiers of knowledge in the field of nonviolent resistance and to interrogate its applicability in the present political system in Zimbabwe. The research has striven to understand the Zimbabwean problem of violence and how it could be solved without resorting to political violence which hinders development. The research demonstrates that the culture of violence and impunity can be overcome with nonviolent resistance. While there were flashes of violence in its own politics, the MDC approach to national politics reflects that nonviolence can advance goals without compromising human security. It takes a cue from African countries which have resorted to violence as a response to state-sponsored

violence and concludes that no matter how aggressive an incumbent government can be, using violence to solve political problems has far reaching effects in economic, political and social development.

This study has brought to the fore the fact that violence is a pervasive feature in Zimbabwean politics therefore the adoption of nonviolent resistance is a panacea to this predicament. To those in power, violence is used as a guarantor and systematic weapon aimed at sustaining and maintaining the grip on power. Since 1980, Mugabe has devised various orthodox and unorthodox means to maintain power. While preaching reconciliation, he somehow managed to harness each opportunity to centralise power. Nonviolent resistance is useful in providing conditions necessary for political transformation and ensuring that human security and development can be achieved. The theory of nonviolence shows a shift from this violent politics to politics of reason.

The analysis in this study concludes that violence in Zimbabwean politics was a result of the intensification of colonial practices, lack of political tolerance and the need for power retention at all costs. The study found that since 1980 violence has been a dominant feature of Zimbabwean politics. The victors in 1980 wanted to create a single party society. This partly explains the violence that has been witnessed such as the infamous Gukurahundi killings of 1983-1987 and the 1990 electoral violence. The thesis noted that Mugabe used a two-pronged approach to subdue enemies notably violence followed by unity agreements such as the Unity Accord 1987 and the GNU 2008. Thus, peace agreements which followed after the violence were on Mugabe's terms.

The study traced the origins of the MDC. The MDC was formed within the context of political violence and repression. The MDC was formed as a result of the failures of ZANU-PF to provide basic life necessities

and foster conditions necessary for human flourishing. The MDC presented itself as a peace-loving political party. It cites nonviolent resistance as one of its core values. However, within its ranks the MDC also exercised violence. Tsvangirai was intolerant of those opposed to him. This violence led to splits in 2005, 2014 and 2018 when Nelson Chamisa took over. Rather than solving their issues peacefully, the MDC degenerated into violent factional politics. The study critically looked at the MDC values since its formation and whether the values have been adhered to. To a greater extent, it adhered to its values but however failed in its internal democratic processes.

This thesis provides the empirical evidence of the attempts by the MDC in pursuing nonviolent struggle against dictatorship. The major findings are that since 2000, the MDC has been a victim of endemic and systematic violence orchestrated by ZANU-PF. This violence was perpetrated in different forms namely structural, direct-physical, and psychological. However, the MDC responded to the violence through gratuitous acts of peace. The MDC used various methods of nonviolent resistance such as songs, dance, strikes, mass mobilisation, rallies and radios to counter that. The MDC showed the supremacy of peace in confronting and dealing with those who relied on might rather than brains.

The study is central in explaining the concept of human security and development. This concept is the central aspect of development. It shows how peace is a prerequisite for inclusive and sustainable development. In the case of Buhera South Constituency, the failure to develop in the period under review can be attributed to recurrent violence. Violence led to displacements, death, forced migrations and the general decline in economic output. While violence disrupted life activities, thereby affecting development. In Buhera South Constituency, with less economic resources the disruption of the agriculture which is the backbone of their economy also affected fees payment and food security among the disparate and poor members of

the community. The chapter has shown the impact of the adoption of nonviolent resistance in Zimbabwe. This helped in gauging whether nonviolent resistance is an option in violent prone areas. It showed that violence is not an option as it leads to more violence. Nonviolent resistance in the end helps in maintaining human security.

This thesis has amply demonstrated that violence is a threat to human security and development. The thesis argued that while violence has been predominantly used to solve problems in Zimbabwe dating back to the advent of colonialism in 1890, the liberation war and the postcolonial state, it has affected human security and led to insecurity in affected communities. The research argued that this long history of political violence left a legacy of violence in Zimbabwe. It was shown that the violence during the liberation struggle and within the liberation movement was extended beyond independence. However, nonviolent resistance by the MDC sought to ensure the respect for human security through the advancement of rights based politics.

It has been noted that once liberation movements feel that their power is threatened, they resort to violence and create binary politics of allies and enemies. In the case of Buhera South, the MDC became the enemy that needed to be crushed. The MDC, except for isolated cases, has resorted to peaceful means to confront the dictatorship of ZANU-PF which saw the party undertake a series of nonviolent means to conflict transformation. What was also highlighted as problematic was the overlap of colonial patterns of power into the post-independence period through the inheritance of colonial legislations and norms and values. The research demonstrated that Zimbabwe has remained ensnared in colonial matrices of power. This has partly explained the ensnarement of Zimbabwe in political violence since 1980.

Violence threatens human security. Human security in this case is the freedom of choice and living a sustainable life free from life

deprivations. In Buhera South constituency, people were deprived of their basic livelihood amenities which created and worsened poverty conditions. Anyone seen as an 'enemy' by ZANU-PF was deprived of basic livelihood amenities. Discussions with MDC party members in Buhera South showed that their lives worsened due to deaths of breadwinners, deprivations of farming implements and forced migration of breadwinners. Those who migrated to South Africa for instance, did not return, leading to the breakdown of their families that remained behind.

This study has analysed the conditions that enable the development of the idea of nonviolent resistance as a means of resolving conflict and how this practice of conflict resolution manifests itself in practice. The research found out that nonviolent resistance was advanced as a practical realisation that the use of violence to advance political goals was not what the MDC stood for. The MDC advanced nonviolent resistance realising the futility of violence against ZANU-PF. To them the Gukurahundi disturbances of 1982-1987 were an episode in the history of Zimbabwe which could not be repeated. The study also found out that the MDC believed in nonviolent resistance as a shift from the pervasive politics of violence and antagonism. As a constitutional advocate, the MDC wanted to remove constitutional bottlenecks to political participation in Zimbabwe. The study concludes that constitutionalism was part of MDC politics though within the movement traits of violence against its members were apparent.

The research found out that the methods used by MDC in countering ZANU-PF violence and propaganda succeeded to a greater extent in solving the culture of violence and impunity in Zimbabwe. The internationalisation of the conflict through international lobbying at SADC, AU and UN summits by MDC members was a master stroke in exposing ZANU-PF violence to the entire world. Targeted sanctions

imposed against ZANU-PF officials and companies which supported them forced ZANU-PF to negotiate with the MDC.

This thesis has also brought to the fore the fact that the GPA lessened the level of violence in Zimbabwe's elections. Since 2013, ZANU-PF has come up with new methods of electoral malpractices to win elections. The study notes that while the GPA crafted an Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation, this organ failed to fulfil its mandate due to political interference and the lack of political will by the elites. The study noted that all the agreements were not people centric but elite agreements which cultivated a culture of impunity and violence. These agreements did not address the fundamentals of conflict but protected the perpetrators of violence. They were generally followed by general amnesty and presidential pardon for those who committed crimes.

The study established that the GPA created a platform for dialogue in Buhera South. After Mugabe and Tsvangirai began working together in the inclusive government, most people divided by binary politics did the same in the constituency. The GPA was a triumph of nonviolence over polarisation and violence in Zimbabwe.

The study contends that the adoption of nonviolent resistance saved the country from far worse situations as the examples of African countries which resorted to violence has shown. In the case of Buhera South, the resort to violence by both sides could have flared into a full blown civil war which could have engulfed the nation and probably the region. Drawing from examples such as Libya, Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria where Boko Haram is wreaking havoc, the use of violence by both sides has destroyed years of attempts at peace. Post conflict reconstruction is a difficult process. In instances where violence was adopted as a resistance strategy, there was destruction of property, homes and livestock. The resort to

nonviolence led to SADC and AU putting pressure on political leaders to opt for a negotiated settlement. In fact, after 2013 the level of political violence subsided.

This study makes a strong case for the respect of human security to achieve peace and development. The approach adopted by the MDC to stick nonviolent means, as a political normative ideology, shows that there is need to pursue peace in the face of adversity. Nonviolent resistance is the panacea to achieve lasting peace and to enhance the human security of the individuals, communities and nation at large. The MDC through its adoption of nonviolent resistance sees peace as a prerequisite to development.

This study is in tandem with Abutudu's observations (2005:107) who claims that "there is a strong developmental component to the concept of human security... human security relies on enhancing people's capability to qualitatively improve their lives. It seeks to protect against the 'menaces' that may diminish living a fulfilling life." Human security gives essence to human life. It stresses the need for state and state actors to value peace to achieve wholesale development. Using the case of Buhera South constituency, human insecurity has had catastrophic effects such as death, injury, lost property, forced migrations and family disintegration. Political violence deprived people of their security, health, livelihood and education. Nonviolent approaches by the MDC, in a way, saved the constituency from descending into the abyss of violence. The research has shown that coercive force is not the answer to the challenges of electoral politics, but rather the power of the people.

While violence seemed to have worked in the past, the fear and aura of invincibility of ZANU-PF seems to have waned as people in the constituency are now openly discussing politics and showing where their political allegiance lie. The hallmark of nonviolent resistance is

persistence and not a resort to violence as pointed out by Tendai Biti during the Mothlante Commission:

and remained steadfast in the quest for peaceful democratic change in our country (Mothlante Commission, 2018: 1152).

The research concludes that nonviolent resistance must be seen as an imperative revolutionary exercise in the quest to achieve inclusive and substantive human security, peace and development. It is relevant for conflict transformation and management. Nonviolent resistance saved Buhera South constituency from further degenerating into destruction, despair and retarded development.

The research has contended that nonviolent resistance is the sole viable panacea in achieving sustainable peace and development. The practice of nonviolent resistance should form the basis for human security-centred democratic movement as war is destructive. However, nonviolent resistance should be properly propagated. Nonviolent resistance needs to be mainstreamed and incorporated into training manuals for practitioners to avoid ambiguities in its implementation. Considering the recurring violence in Zimbabwean politics, nonviolent resistance and the various methods which can be used should be the political philosophy of all movements across the political divide. In the case of Zimbabwe, nonviolent resistance has exposed the ruling party's propensity for violence. As argued by Sharp (2005: 12), "the extremely widespread practice of nonviolent struggle is possible because the operation of this technique is compatible with the nature of political power and the vulnerabilities of all hierarchical systems".

The research advocates for a human-centred approach to development. One notable finding from the research is that poverty and underdevelopment create a disempowered population which can easily be taken advantage of by power hungry politicians. In Buhera

South Constituency there is rampant poverty which exacerbates conflict as people fight for scarce resources. Generally, there are no meaningful economic activities other than subsistence farming which does not yield much since the area is in the drought prone ecological region five. Those from poor households are the most active in politics. They are most likely to be taken advantage of by politicians who can easily buy their loyalty and use them to advance their political interests. They forego family relations for the sake of a cup of rice. The best empowerment tool under the circumstances is education. However, without any vocational training centre in the Constituency it is increasingly difficult for Ordinary Level graduates to find meaningful employment and empowerment projects. Empowerment can be defined as “strategies that enable people to develop their resilience to difficult situations” (CHS, 2003: 10). These have also fallen prey to political vultures who have nothing to sell but violence. It is recommended that education and empowerment can be deployed as tools to help the youth to engage in developmental activities for sustainable livelihoods. This will enable people to find approaches within their context to enhance human security and development.

It is recommended that mapping and analysis of problems affecting poor communities be thoroughly carried out. Development agencies are recommended to establish participatory processes for the protection and promotion of sustainable and inclusive human security and values. Vulnerability assessments need to be conducted to find lasting solutions to poverty reduction in the area. There is need for a people centred approach to development which must take away people from violent and unproductive politics. The donor community needs to implement the bottom-up approach in Buhera to effectively deal with the crisis of poverty in the area. Those in the legal fraternity such as the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and the Legal Resources Foundation, need

to help victims of violence and forced displacements in suing for damages. This will mitigate the recurrence of violence and deprivation. The study recommends that a post conflict strategy be put in place to ensure reconciliation and rehabilitation. The Unity Accord of 1987 and the GNU of 2008 failed to provide a comprehensive, broad-based platform for national healing and reconciliation. Politicians need to devise effective strategies on reconciliation and rehabilitation so that people within communities can coexist. It is paramount to have transitional justice where there is reconciliation coupled with justice and compensation. Madenga (2016) observes that, “there is need to go beyond mere documentation and analysis of the forms and extent of political violence, and engage the alleged perpetrators and victims in the search for preventive mechanisms”. Without preventive measures and justice there is likelihood of human insecurity. Looking at Mugabe’s rule, it is important to note that the various Clemency Orders he granted on perpetrators of violence since 1980 have led to a culture of impunity which has been inherited by later generations. Data from the study showed that victims want revenge while perpetrators grudgingly apologised, this is a recipe for future conflict bearing in mind that 2023 elections are around the corner.

In the pursuit of change, nonviolent practitioners should have an ideological underpinning in which training of all should be a priority. Training helps in creating a universal system where the leadership and the supporters are on the same page. Massive training of supporters can also help influence the antagonistic parties in the communities to change tactic. In the case of Zimbabwe, the population is largely rural and tied together by history, ethnic and other relations which can be useful in recruiting enemies to the other side. What should be taken note of is that violence in Zimbabwe has been perpetrated by close relatives. Training members on nonviolence helps in recruiting opponents into the philosophy of nonviolence. This training is important in countering provocations by the other side. Findings from

this research show that ZANU-PF is the master of provocations and denialism. In other words, it does not own up to its transgressions. Munemo argues that training “decolonizes the mind, for it is in the mind that decolonial struggles are first won. Freeing the mind allows for the development of strategies of circumventing coloniality by creating a new political order uncontaminated by coloniality” (Munemo, 2016: 253). Coloniality in this case refers to the embedded colonial traits adopted by ZANU-PF after independence which have promoted violence and violent politics.

The study recommends that leaders should exercise strategic thinking. Clear strategy thinking sends clear signals in the struggle. The lack of clear signals led to violence within the struggle in 2005, 2009 and 2013 following the splits. The lack of strategy created a two-tier policy where violence was meted out on the opponents of the MDC leadership while nonviolence was the practice against ZANU-PF. Strategic errors made by MDC include the failure to create a well-crafted ideological message crosscutting the political divide; failing to provide a clearly defined land policy which resonated with all, and the failure in their ideological propaganda. The splits in the MDC also exposed the party to internal frictions. From 2005 when the party split the MDC was fighting on two fronts against ZANU-PF and its former members which rendered it structurally and ideologically weak. The 2008 election results proved that the party could have won the elections if it did not split. While they tried to unite towards the 2008 presidential run off, the playing field was no longer even. The MDC failed to mobilise on a large scale during its attempt for the 2003 mass action because of a lack of a clearly defined strategy.

The culture of violence in Zimbabwe needs to be looked at holistically. There is need for proper healing and reconciliation if Zimbabwe has to end violent politics. Lessons should be drawn from the Lancaster House Conference and Constitution of 1979, the reconciliation policy

of 1980, the Unity Accord of 1987, the GNU of 2008 and even the 2017 New Dispensation in Zimbabwe. There is also need for transitional justice mechanisms to attain lasting peace. As pointed out by Mashingaidze, 'Zimbabweans have failed to heal and reconcile after major crises, because their national leadership has accorded premium to the state-sanctioned ideal of forgiveness without truth, and reconciliation without justice' (Mashingaidze, 2010:21). Critiquing the GNU Mashingaidze contended:

For truth and justice to take place, there should be strong moral rejection of the former regime, and a clear consensus that its system was bad and its agents guilty of moral wrongs. There should also be a clear definition of what was wrong with the past. The Inclusive Government is in reality, however, a case of transition without transformation. ZANU (PF)-aligned functionaries still control the police and army, the Attorney General's office, the reserve Bank and provincial governance. There is also no clear definition or understanding of what went wrong in the past (Mashingaidze, 2010: 24).

There is need to reform government structures to reflect the desires, aspirations and demands of modern politics. As pointed out by Madenga (2017: 345) "the State has the sovereign mandate to ensure positive peace and security as preconditions for wholesale development". There is need to end various prerogatives for mercy issued by the presidency to perpetrators of violence. These clemency orders have been abused by repeat offenders who, upon their release, meet out violence against their former victims. This has created a culture of impunity in politics.

The research recommends inclusive, broad-based and comprehensive National Dialogue which is not only limited to political parties but to the generality of Zimbabweans through various interest groups. The previous dialogues have failed to proffer a lasting solution to the scourge of violence in Zimbabwean politics. For example, the Unity Accord of 1987 created 'false' peace in Zimbabwe. Mugabe used it to

further entrench his hold on power considering that soon after he created the executive presidency and vigorously campaigned for the one-party state. The Accord created politics of intolerance. As for Mugabe anyone who opposed him, as Tekere did in 1990, became an enemy of unity. All the might of the state descended upon him. On the other hand, Nkomo reflected signs of capitulation against the might of the state as he signed the Unity Accord to ward off violence against his supporters. This also applies to the 2008 dialogue between Tsvangirai and Mugabe. With these lessons, new frameworks for dialogue should be used. The post 2018 period has seen calls for dialogue in Zimbabwe grow louder. The Political Actors Dialogue (POLAD) instituted by Emmerson Mnangagwa is an attempt to initiate dialogue among the contesting presidential candidates in 2018. This platform has been looked down upon notably because those participating got miniscule votes in the plebiscite. Thus, they clearly did not have the mandate to represent anyone. It seems the whole ruse was a search for legitimacy by Mnangagwa. Future dialogue should first deal with the past before rushing to elite pacts. Elite pacts protect elite interests which leads to cover ups of past misdeeds or position led agreements.

There is however, need to guard against proxy interest groups which are politically aligned to major political parties. The year 2000 has witnessed binary NGO's representing either the MDC or ZANU-PF interests. This has created problems for civil society groups in Zimbabwe. The dialogue should also include the security sector in Zimbabwe mainly the army which has been deeply loyal to ZANU-PF. The dialogue should remove the stockholder syndrome of the army in politics; this will also remove the Mgagao culture of the military in ZANU-PF. The Mgagao culture stems from the ZANLA active involvement in the ZANU-PF coup which elevated Mugabe to the leadership of ZANU-PF in 1977. From 1977 the army has become the main component in ZANU-PF and mainstream national politics.

Dialogue leads to truth telling, reconciliation and justice and, ultimately, leads to sustainable and enduring peace. Issues to be looked at should include, but not limited to, the residual effects of colonialism and colonisation, liberation struggle, struggles and violence within the nationalist movement, the policy of reconciliation, Gukurahundi, violence against the MDC and the removal of Robert Mugabe in the 2017 military led uprising. These issues have not been properly canvassed and addressed and have become a source of discontent in the Zimbabwean political discourse such that the peace dream has become elusive. The envisaged inclusive dialogue should be presided over by eminent personalities in the world who are neutral to the Zimbabwean problem. This will be a departure from the Thabo Mbeki led initiative where he was accused of siding with ZANU-PF. This dialogue will be a panacea to the development challenges Zimbabwe face as peace is the key to the attainment of development.

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
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Synopsis

This study critically explores the dimensions of human security and developmental challenges in Zimbabwe using the concept of nonviolent resistance as an analytical framework and entry point for understanding post-colonial violence in this country. It examines the use of nonviolent resistance as a political strategy by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the democratisation process in Zimbabwe, after its formation in 1999. Factors that promote violence in Zimbabwe's polity are identified and recommendations for moving Zimbabwe towards violence-free politics are proffered. It is argued that the practice and discourse of non-violent resistance is neither new nor unique to Zimbabwe. The thesis briefly traces the culture of violence and nonviolent resistance in Zimbabwe since 1980, and the non-violent strategies employed up to 1999. It examines post-independent political and peace-building processes as missed opportunities in ending the culture of violence in Zimbabwe. This is a qualitative research study that draws data from document analysis, interviews and focus group discussions. The central thesis advanced by this study is that violence has been a major affront to human security which adversely affect development. Nonviolence, as a political strategy, has achieved considerable success in the democratisation process. It has helped to amplify the Zimbabwean struggle for democracy on the international scene. The study deploys the nonviolence theoretical framework to unmask political violence and democratisation processes. It leans towards the pursuit of nonviolent resistance as the panacea to human security and development, and as an approach to conflict resolution and peace building. This can help Zimbabwe to achieve its human development goals. The thesis recommends that governments and political parties must strive to achieve peace, human security and development.

About the Author



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